PHILOSOPHY 

6 


SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON,  BART,, 


PEOFESSOE    OF    LOGIC    AND    METAPHYSICS    IN    EDINBUEGH 
VNIVEESITY  ; 


0.    W.    WIGHT, 

TBANSLATOR  OF  COUSIN'S  "  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY.' 


FOE  THE  USE  OF  SCHOOLS  AND  COLLEGES. 


NoSs  ip?)  KOI  NoCf  aKovei,  raAXa  %(i)$(l  KO.I  TV<f>\d. 

Mind  it  seeth,  Mind  it  heareth ;  all  beside  is  deaf  and  blind. 

EPICHAEMOT  (?). 


NEW  YORK: 
D.  APPLETON  &  COMPANY,  200  BROADWAY. 

M  DCCC  Lin. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1853, 
BY  D.  APPLETON  &  COMPANY, 

In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  Southern 
District  of  New  York. 


3 


TO 


REV.  LAURENS   P.  HICKOK,  D.  D., 

VICE-PRESIDENT  OP  UNION   COLLEGE,   LATE  PROFESSOR   OF  CHRISTIAN  THEOLOGY   IN 

AUBURN  THEOLOGICAL  SEMINARY,   AUTHOR  OF   "  RATIONAL 

PSYCHOLOGY,"  ETC.,   ETC., 


THIS  COLLECTION  OF  SIR  WM.  HAMILTON'S 

PHILOSOPHICAL  DISCUSSIONS  AND  DISSERTATIONS, 

%s  BeUfcateH; 


2 

O  AS  A  TOKEN  OF  TUE  EDITOR  S  ADMIRATION  OF 


ONE   OF   THE   VERY   ABLEST    METAPHYSICIANS   AMERICA  HAS    PRODUCED; 

AS 
A  TRIBUTE  JUSTLY  DUE  TO  THE  FAITHFUL  TEACHER, 

WHO  HAS  DEVOTED 

MANY    YEARS    OF    HIS   LIFE   TO   PREPARING    YOUNG    MEN   FOR 
HIGH  PUBLIC   DUTIES, 


O 

t 

O 

THUS   FULFILLING  TIIE   RESPONSIBLE  OFFICE  OF 


A  "KEEPER  OF  THE  KEEPERS." 


43200 S 


PREFACE. 


IN  this  publication  we  give  to  the  readers  and  students 
of  philosophy  in  America  all,  except  part  of  an  unfin- 
ished Dissertation,  that  Sir  "Wm.  Hamilton  has  pub- 
lished directly  on  the  subject  of  metaphysics.  The  com- 
pleted supplementary  Dissertations  on  Reid,1  the  foot- 
notes to  Reid  that  have  an  enduring  interest,  and  the 
philosophical  portion  of  the  'Discussions,2  etc.,'  have 
been  used  to  make  up  this  work.  The  article  on  Logic 
and  the  Appendix  Logical,  in  the  Discussions,  might 
have  been  added,  but  these  do  not  properly  belong  to 
the  metaphysical  system  of  Hamilton,  and,  moreover, 
have  been  •reserved  for  another  purpose.  The  place 
where  each  part  of  this  volume  may  be  found  in  the 
work  from  which  it  is  taken,  has  been  designated  by  a 
foot-note. 

In  our  collection  and  arrangement  of  Hamilton's  Phi- 
losophy, we  have  followed  a  systematic  plan.  Any  ex- 
planation or  vindication  of  this  plan  would  be,  to  those 
who  are  unacquainted  with  Sir  Wm.'s  system,  unintel- 

1  The  works  of  Thomas  Reid,  D.  D.,  now  fully  collected,  with  selec- 
tions from  his  unpublished  letters.     Preface,  Notes,  and  Supplementary 
Dissertations,  by  Sir  Wm.  Hamilton,  Bart.     London  and  Edinburgh  : 
Third  Edition,  1852  :  pp.  914  (not  completed). 

2  Discussions  on  Philosophy  and  Literature,  Education  and  University 
Reform.     By  Sir  Win.  Hamilton,  Bart.     London  and  Edinburgh,  1852: 
pp.  758. 


b  PREFACE. 

ligible ;  to  those  who  have  mastered  its  principles,  su- 
perfluous. Our  foot-notes  are  not  very  numerous,  and 
consist  mostly  in  references  to  other  parts  of  the  work, 
where  some  point  indicated  is  more  fully  treated ;  and  in 
explanations  of  a  few,  more  than  usually  difficult,  pas- 
sages. In  a  single  instance  we  have  expressed  our  dis- 
sent from  a  position  taken  by  Hamilton,  the  grounds 
of  which  we  have  briefly  designated,  without  entering 
upon  a  systematic  discussion.  A  severer  study  may 
convince  us  that  Sir  Win.  is  right  and  that  we  are 
wrong. 

Hamilton  has  promised  a  General  Preface  to  his  Reid, 
and  a  Sequel  of  the  Dissertations.  When  these  appear, 
they  will  be  added  to  this  work  in  a  separate  volume,  in 
which  the  Indices  will  be  given  to  the  whole. 

New  York,  June,  1853. 


INTRODUCTION. 


WE  do  not  propose  to  give  here  a  resume  of  Sir  Win.  Hamilton's 
philosophy.  A  correct  list,  in  technical  language,  of  the  principles 
of  his  system,  would  not  be  a  clear  exposition  of  his  metaphysical 
doctrines.  To  attempt  to  put  in  a  brief  introduction  the  substance 
of  several  hundred  pages  of  Hamilton's  Philosophical  Discussions  and 
Dissertations  would  be  presumptuous  and  preposterous.  A  philoso- 
pher, who  thinks  like  Aristotle ;  whose  logic  is  as  stern  as  that  of 
St.  Thomas,  'the  lawgiver  of  the  Church;'  who  rivals  Muretns  as 
a  critic ;  whose  erudition  finds  a  parallel  only  in  that  of  the  younger 
Scaliger ;  whose  subtlety  of  thought  and  polemical  power  remind  us 
of  the  dauntless  prince1  of  Verona ;  Avhose  penetrating  analysis  reaches 
deeper  than  that  of  Kant, — such  a  one,  it  it  our  pleasure  to  introduce 
to  the  students  of  philosophy  in  America ;  who,  in  a  style  severely 
elegant,  with  accuracy  of  statement,  with  precision  of  definition,  in 
sequence  and  admirable  order,  will  explain  a  system  in  many  respects 
new, — a  system  that  will  provoke  thought,  that,  consequently,  carries 
in  itself  the  germs  of  beneficial  revolutions  in  literature  and  educa- 
tion, in  all  those  things  that  are  produced  and  regulated  by  miud 
in  action.  True  to  our  plan  of  making  the  work  as  completely 
Hamilton's  as  possible,  we  shall  offer,  mostly  in  the  language  of 
our  author,  a  few  considerations  on  the  utility  of  the  study  of  phi- 
losophy. 

Philosophy  is  a  necessity.  Every  man  philosophizes  as  he  thinks. 
The  worth  of  his  philosophy  will  depend  upon  the  value  of  his  think- 
ing. '  If  to  philosophize  be  right,'  says  Aristotle,  in  his  Exhortative, 
we  must  philosophize  to  realize  the  right;  if  to  philosophize  be 


1  The  elder  Scaliger. 


8  INTRODUCTION. 

wrong,  we  must  philosophize  to  manifest  the  wrong :  on  any  alterna- 
tive, therefore,  philosophize  we  must." 

No  philosopher  can  explore  the  whole  realm  of  truth.  No  single 
mind  can  compass  the  aggregate  of  what  is  possessed  by  all.  Every 
system  must,  then,  he  incomplete ;  it  cannot  be  taken  as  an  equiva- 
lent for  all  that  can  be  thought.  The  most  that  any  system  can  do 
for  us  is  to  aid  us,  to  stimulate  our  minds,  to  infuse  higher  intellectual 
energy.  '  If  the  accomplishment  of  philosophy,'  says  Hamilton  (Db. 
p.  39,  et  seq.),  'imply  a  cessation  of  discussion — if  the  result  of  specu- 
lation be  a  paralysis  of  itself,  the  consummation  of  knowledge  is  the 
condition  of  intellectual  barbarism.  Plato  has  profoundly  defined 
man  "  the  hunter  of  truth ;"  for  in  this  chase  as  in  others,  the  pursuit 
is  all  in  all,  the  success  comparatively  nothing.  "  Did  the  Almighty,1' 
says  Lessing,  "  holding  in  his  right  hand  Truth,  and  in  his  left,  Search 
after  Truth,  deign  to  proffer  me  the  one  I  might  prefer,  in  all  hu- 
mility, but  without  hesitation,  I  should  request — Search  after  Truth."1 
We  exist  only  as  we  energize;  pleasure*  is  the  reflex  of  unimpeded 
energy ;  energy  is  the  mean  by  which  our  faculties  are  developed ; 
and  a  higher  energy  the  end  which  their  development  proposes.  In 
action  is  thus  contained  the  existence,  happiness,  improvement,  and 
perfection  of  our  being ;  and  knowledge  is  only  previous,  as  it  may 
afford  a  stimulus  to  the  exercise  of  our  powers,  and  the  condition  of 
their  more  complete  activity.  Speculative  truth  is,  therefore,  sub- 
ordinate to  speculation  itself;  and  its  value  is  directly  measured  by 
the  quantity  of  energy  which  it  occasions — immediately  in  its  dis- 
covery— mediately  through  its  consequences.  Life  to  Endymiou 
was  not  preferable  to  death ;  aloof  from  practice,  a  waking  error  is 
better  than  a  sleeping  truth. — Neither,  in  point  of  fact,  is  there  found 
any  proportion  between  the  possession  of  truths,  and  the  development 
of  the  mind  in  which  they  are  deposited.  Every  learner  in  science 
is  now  familiar  with  more  truths  than  Aristotle  or  Plato  ever  dreamt 
of  knowing;  yet,  compared  with  the  Stagirite  or  the  Athenian,  how 
few  among  our  masters  of  modern  science  rank  higher  than  intel- 
lectual barbarians !  Ancient  Greece  and  modern  Europe  prove,  in- 
deed, that  the  "  march  of  intellect"  is  no  inseparable  concomitant  of 


'   E/  ftiv    <f>t\ooo<priTtov,    <pi\t>ao(pt)Ttov'    xal    si    ft!)    <f>i\i,aoif>i}rio 
vdvriaf  Spa  <j>i\ooo$ririov. 

*  Aristotle  defined  happiness,  Energizing  according  to  virtue.    It  results  from  th» 
healthy,  unimpeded  activity  of  every  element  of  eur  nature.—  W. 


INTfiODUCTION.  9 

"  the  march  of  science ;"  that  the  cultivation  of  the  individual  is  not 
to  be  rashly  confounded  with  the  progress  of  the  species. 

'  But  if  the  possession  of  theoretical  facts  be  not  convertible  with 
mental  improvement,  and  if  the  former  be  important  only  as  subser- 
vient to  the  latter,  it  follows  that  the  comparative  utility  of  a  study 
is  not  to  be  principally  estimated  by  the  complement  of  truths  which 
it  may  communicate,  but  by  the  degree  in  which  it  determines  our 
higher  capacities  to  action.  But  though  this  be  the  standard  by 
which  the  different  methods,  the  different  branches,  and  the  different 
masters  of  philosophy  ought  to  be  principally  (and  it  is  the  only 
criterion  by  which  they  can  all  be  satisfactorily)  tried,  it  is  never- 
theless a  standard  by  which  neither  methods,  nor  sciences,  nor  phi- 
losophers, have  ever  yet  been  even  inadequately  appreciated.  The 
critical  history  of  philosophy,  in  this  spirit,  has  still  to  be  written ; 
and  when  written,  how  opposite  will  be  the  rank  which,  on  the 
higher  and  more  certain  standard,  it  will  frequently  adjudge  to  the 
various  branches  of  knowledge,  and  the  various  modes  of  their  culti- 
vation— to  the  different  ages,  and  countries,  and  individuals,  from 
that  which  has  been  hitherto  partially  awarded,  on  the  vacillating 
authority  of  the  lower ! 

'  On  this  ground  (which  we  have  not  been  able  fully  to  state,  far 
less  adequately  to  illustrate),  we  rest  the  pre-eminent  utility  of  meta- 
physical speculations.  That  they  comprehend  all  the  sublimest  ob- 
jects of  our  theoretical  and  moral  interest ;  that  every  (natural)  con- 
clusion concerning  God,  the  soul,  the  present  worth  and  future  des- 
tiny of  man,  is  exclusively  metaphysical,  will  be  at  once  admitted. 
But  we  do  not  found  the  importance  on  the  paramount  dignity  ot 
the  pursuit.  It  is  as  the  best  gymnastic  of  the  mind — as  a  mean 
principally  and  almost  exclusively  conducive  to  the  highest  education 
of  our  noblest  powers,  that  we  would  vindicate  to  these  speculation 
the  necessity,  which  has  too  frequently  been  denied  them.  By  no 
other  intellectual  application  (and  least  of  all  by  physical  pursuits) 
is  the  soul  thus  reflected  on  itself,  and  its  faculties  concentrated  in 
such  independent,  vigorous,  unwonted,  and  continued  energy ;  by 
none,  therefore,  are  its  best  capacities  so  variously  and  intensely 
evolved.  "  Where  there  is  most  life,  there  is  the  victory." 

'  Let  it  not  be  believed  that  the  mighty  minds  who  have  cultivated 
these  studies,,  have  toiled  in  vain.  If  they  have  not  always  realized 
truth,  they  have  always  determined  exertion ;  and  in  the  genial  elo- 

1* 


10  INTRODUCTION. 

queuce  of  the  elder  Scaliger : — u  Eio  subtilitates,  quanquam  sint  auimi.s 
otiosis  atqiie  inutiles,  vegetis  tniueii  ingcniis  summain  cognoscendi 
afferunt  voloptateui,*— sitffl,  scilicet  in  fastigio  ejus  sapiential,  qiuo 
forum  oinniuin  principia  contemplatur.  Et  quainvis  liannn  iudagatio 
non  sit  utilis  ad  machinas  farinarias  conliciendas ;  exuit  tamen  ani- 
muin  iu.scit'ue  rubigine,  acuitque  ad  alia.  Eo  denique  splendoro  ailicit, 
ut  pncluceat  sibi  ad  uanciscendum  primi  opiticis  similitudinem.  Qui, 
ut  oiunia  pleue  ac  perfects  cst,  at  prroter  et  supra  oinuia ;  ita  eos, 
qui  scientiarum  studios!  sunt,  suos  esse  voluit,  ipsorumque  intellectinn 
reruiu  dominum  constituit.'" 

'The  practical  danger  which  has  sometimes  been  apprehended  from 
metaphysical  pursuits,  has  in  reality  only  been  found  to  follow  from 
their  stunted  and  partial  cultivation.  The  poison  has  grown  up ;  the 
antidote  has  been  repressed.  In  Britain  and  in  Germany,  where 
speculation  lias  remained  comparatively  free,  the  dominant  result  has 
been  highly  favorable  to  religion2  and  morals;  whilst  the  evils  which 
arose  in  France,  arose  from  the  benumbing  influence  of  a  one  effete 
philosophy  ;a  and  have,  in  point  of  fact,  mainly  been  corrected  by 
the  awakened  spirit  of  metaphysical  inquiry  itself.' 

Hamilton  again  says  ('  Discussions-,'  p.  696,  et  seq.) :  '  Yet  is  Philoso- 
phy (the  science  of  science — the  theory  of  what  we  can  know  and 
think  and  do,  in  a  word,  the  knowledge  of  ourselves),  the  object  of 
liberal  education,  at  once  of  paramount  importance  in  itself,  and  the 
requisite  condition  of  every  other  liberal  science.  If  men  are  really 


1  Bacon,  himself,  the  great  champion  of  physical  pursuits,  says:— 'Those  sciences  are 
not  to  be  regarded  as  useless,  -which,  considered  in  themselves,  are  valueless,  if  they 
sharpen  the  mind  and  reduce  it  to  order.    Hume,  Burke,  Knnt,  Stewart,  &c.,  might  be 
quoted  to  the  same  effect — Compare  Aristotle,  Metapli.  I.  2,  Eth.  Nic.  v.  7. 

2  The  philosophers  of  Germany,  not  as  it  is  generally  supposed  in  this  country,  and 
even  by  those  who  ought  to  know,  have  been  more  orthodox  than  the  divines.    Fichte, 
who  was,  for  his  country  and  his  times,  a  singularly  pious  Christian,  was  persecuted  by 
the  theologians,  on  account  of  his  orthodoxy. —  IK 

3  'Since  the  mctaphysic  of  Locke,'  says  M.  Cousin,  in  1S10,  'crossed  the  channel  on 
the  light  and  brilliant  wings  of  Voltaire's  imagination,  sensualism  has  reigned  in  France 
without  contradiction,  and  with  an  authority  of  which  there  is  no  parallel  in  the  whole 
history  of  philosophy.    It  is  a  fact,  marvellous  but  incontestable,  that  from  the  time  of 
Condillac,  there  has  not  appeared  among  us  any  philosophical  work,  at  variance  with 
his  doctrine,  which  has  produced  the  smallest  impression  on  the  public  mind.   Condillao 
thus  reigned  in  peace  ;  and  his  domination,  prolonged  even  to  our  own  days,  through 
changes  of  every  kind,  pursued  its  tranquil  course,  apparently  above  the  reach  of  dan- 
ger.  Discussion  had  closed :  his  disciples  had  only  to  develop  the  words  of  their  master : 
philosophy  seemed  accomplished.' — (Journal  des  Savan-s.)    During  the  reign  of  sen- 
sualism in  France,  religion  languished,  for  she  was  deprived  of  the  aid  of  her  most  ef- 
ficient servant— philosophy. —  W. 


INTKODUCTION.  11 

to  know  aught  else,  the  human  faculties,  by  which  alone  this  knowl- 
edge may  be  realized,  must  be  studied  for  themselves,  in  their  extent 
and  in  their  limitations.  To  know, — we  must  understand  our  in- 
strument of  knowing.  "  Know  thyself"  is,  in  fact,  a  heavenly  precept, 
in  Christianity  as  in  heathenism.  And  this  knowledge  can  be  com- 
passed only  by  reflection, — only  from  within :  "  Ne  te  qusesieris 
extra."  It  tells  us  at  once  of  our  weakness  and  our  worth ;  it  is  the 
discipline  both  of  humility  and  hope.  On  the  other  hand,  a  knowl- 
edge, drawn  too  exclusively  from  without,  is  not  only  imperfect  in 
itself,  but  makes  its  votaries  fatalists,  materialists,  pantheists — if  they 
dare  to  think ;  it  is  the  dogmatism  of  despair.  "  Laudabilior,"  says 
Augustin,  "laudabilior  est  animus,  cui  nota  est  infirmitas  propria, 
quam  qui,  ea  non  respecta,  mcenia  mundi,  vias  siderum,  ftmdamenta 
terrarum  et  fastigia  coelorum,  etiam  cogniturus,  scrutatur."  We  can 
know  God  only  as  we  know  ourselves.  "  Xoverim  me,  noverim  Te," 
is  St.  Austin's  prayer ;  St.  Bernard  : — "  Principale,  ad  videndum 
Deum,  est  animus  rationalis  intuens  seipsum ;"  and  even  Averroes : — 
"  Nosce  teipsum,  et  cognosces  creatorem  tuum." 

'  ]STor  is  the  omission  of  philosophy  from  an  academical  curriculum 
equivalent  to  an  arrest  on  the  philosophizing  activity  of  the  student. 
This  stupor,  however  deplorable  in  itself,  might  still  be  a  minor  evil ; 
for  it  is  better,  assuredly,  to  be  without  opinions,  than  to  have  them, 
not  only  superlatively  untrue,  but  practically  corruptive.  Yet,  even 
this  paralysis,  I  say,  is  not  accomplished.  Eight  or  wrong,  a  man 
must  philosophize,  for  he  philosophizes  as  he  thinks ;  and  the  only 
eifect,  in  the  present  day  especially,  of  a  University  denying  to  its 
alumni  the  invigorating  exercise  of  a  right  philosophy,  is  their  aban- 
donment, not  only  without  precaution,  but  even  prepared  by  debili- 
tation, to  the  pernicious  influence  of  a  wrong : — "  Sine  vindice  prseda." 
And  in  what  country  has  a  philosophy  ever  gravitating,  as  theoretical 
towards  materialism,  as  practical  towards  fatalism,  been  most  pecu- 
liar and  pervasive  ? 

4  Again : — Philosophy,  the  thinking  of  thought,  the  recoil  of  mind 
upon  itself,  is  the  most  improving  of  mental  exercises,  conducing, 
above  all  others,  to  evolve  the  highest  and  rarest  of  the  intellectual 
powers.  By  this,  the  mind  is  not  only  trained  to  philosophy  proper, 
but  prepared,  in  general,  for  powerful,  easy,  and  successful  energy, 
in  whatever  department  of  knowledge  it  may  more  peculiarly  apply 
itself.  But  the  want  of  this  superior  discipline  is  but  too  apparent  in 


12  INTRODUCTION. 

English  [American]  literature,  and  especially  in  those  very  fields  of 
erudition  by  preference  cultivated  in  England  [America]. 

*  Of  English  [American]  scholars  as  a  class,  both  now  and  for  gen- 
erations past,  the  observation  of  Godfrey  Hermann  holds  good : — 
u  They  read  but  do  not  think ;  they  would  be  philologers,  and  have 
not  learned  to  philosophize."  The  philosophy  of  a  philology  is  shown 
primarily  in  its  grammars,  and  its  grammars  for  the  use  of  schools. 
But  in  this  respect,  England  [America]  remained,  till  lately,  nearly 
two  centuries  behind  the  rest  of  Christendom.  If  there  were  any 
principle  in  her  pedagogical  practice,  "Gaudent  sudoribus  artes," 
must  have  been  the  rule ;  and  applied  it  was  with  a  vengeance.  The 
English  [American]  schoolboy  was  treated  like  the  Russian  pack- 
horse  ;  the  load  in  one  pannier  was  balanced  by  a  counter-weight 
of  stones  in  the  other.  .  .  .  The  unhappy  tyro  was  initiated  in 
Latin,  through  a  Latin  book ;  while  the  ten  declensions,  the  thirteen 
conjugations,  which  had  been  reduced  to  three  and  two  by  Weller 
and  Lancelot,  still  continued,  among  a  mass  of  other  abomina- 
tions, to  complicate,  in  this  country,  the  elementary  instruction  of 
Greek.  .  .  .  But  all  has  now  been  changed — except  the  cause :  for 
the  same  iuertion  of  original  and  independent  thought  is  equally  ap- 
parent. As  formerly,  from  want  of  thinking,  the  old  sufficed;  so 
now,  from  want  of  thinking,  the  new  is  borrowed.  In  fact,  openly  or 
occultly,  honorably  or  dishonorably,  the  far  greater  part  of  the  higher 
and  lower  philology  published  in  this  country  is  an  importation, 
especially  from  Germany :  but  so  passive  is  the  ignorance  of  our 
compilers,  that  they  are  often  (though  affecting,  of  course,  opin- 
ions), unaware  even  of  what  is  best  worthy  of  plagiarism  or  trans- 
plantation. 

'  Theology — Christian  theology  is,  as  a  human  science,  a  philology 
and  history  applied  by  philosophy ;  and  the  comparatively  ineffectual 
character  of  our  British  [American]  theology  has,  for  generations, 
mainly  resulted  from  the  deficiency  of  its  philosophical  element.  The 
want  of  a  philosophical  training  in  the  Anglican  [American]  clergy. 
to  be  regretted  at  all  times,  may  soon,  indeed,  become  lamentably 
apparent,  were  they  called  on  to  resist  an  invasion,  now  so  likely,  of 
certain  foreign  philosophico- theological  opinions.1  In  fact,  this  is  the 


1  This  invasion  has  already  come  with  us.  Dr.  Hickok  and  a  few  others,  who  alone 
see  the  real  danger,  have  faced  it  manfully  and  well  armed.  .The  spirit  of  the  Absolute, 
•which  has  found  its  way  hither  through  various  channels,  from  the  country  of  Scholling 


INTRODUCTION.  13 

invasion,  and  this  the  want  of  national  preparation,  for  which  even  at 
the  present  juncture,  I  should  be  most  alarmed.  On  the  Universities,1 
which  have  illegally  dropped  philosophy  and  its  training  from  their 
course  of  discipline,  will  lie  the  responsibility  of  this  singular  and 
dangerous  disarmature.' 

We  commend  Hamilton's  philosophy  to  educators,  not  only  for  its 
great  excellence  as  a  metaphysical  system,  for  its  profound  thought 
and  affluent  erudition,  for  its  spirit  of  free  inquiry,  and,  consequently, 
its  power' to  quicken  the  mind;  but,  above  all,  we  commend  it  for  its 
accordance  with  the  principles  of  revealed  religion.  Sir  Wm.,  though 
metaphysically  the  '  most  formidable  man  in  Europe,'  is  an  humble 
Christian ;  though  the  most  learned  of  men,  he  is  ready  to  bow  be- 
fore the  spirit  that  '  informed'  the  mind  of  Paul.  Hamilton  says  that 
he  is  confident  that  his  philosophy  is  founded  upon  truth.  '  To  this 
confidence  I  have  come,  not  merely  through  the  convictions  of  my 
own  consciousness,  but  by  finding  in  this  system  a  centre  and  con- 
ciliation for  the  most  opposite  of  philosophical  opinions.  Above  all, 
however,  I  am  confirmed  in  my  belief,  by  the  harmony  between  the 
doctrines  of  this  philosophy,  and  those  of  revealed  truth.  "  Credo 
equidem,  nee  von  fides."  The  philosophy  of  the  Conditioned  is  indeed 
pre-eminently  a  discipline  of  humility ;  a  "  learned  ignorance,"  directly 
opposed  to  the  false  "  knowledge  which  puffeth  up."  I  may  say  with 
St.  Chrysostom : — "  The  foundation  of  our  philosophy  is  humility."- 
(Homil.  de  Perf.  Evang.)  For  it  is  professedly  a  scientific  demon- 
stration of  the  impossibility  of  that  "  wisdom  in  high  matters"  which 
the  apostle  prohibits  us  even  to  attempt ;  and  it  proposes,  from  the 
limitations  of  the  human  powers,  from  our  impotence  to  comprehend 
what,  however,  we  must  admit,  to  show  articulately  why  the  "  secret 
things  of  God"  cannot  but  be  to  man  "  past  finding  out."  Humility 
thus  becomes  the  cardinal  virtue,  not  only  of  revelation,  but  of  reason. 
This  scheme  proves,  moreover,  that  no  difficulty  emerges  in  theology, 
which  had  not  previously  emerged  in  philosophy ;  that  in  fact,  if  the 
divine  do  not  transcend  what  it  has  pleased  the  Deity  to  reveal,  and 
wilfully  indentify  the  doctrine  of  God's  word  with  some  arrogant  ex- 


and  Hegel,  will  not  be  exorcised  by  a  solemn  reading  of  creeds,  and  by  repeating  some 
stereotyped  theological  phrases ;  it  must  be  brought  into  the  clear  white  light  of  thought ; 
like  every  other  spectre  of  the  night,  it  will  vanish  at  the  real  dawn.—  W. 

1  Our  American  colleges,  instead  of  having  'dropped  philosophy  and  its  training  from 
their  course  of  discipline,'  have  never  seriously  taken  it  tip.—  W. 


14:  INTRODUCTION. 

treme  of  human  speculation,  philosophy  will  bo  found  the  most  use- 
ful auxiliary  of  theology.  For  a  world  of  false,  and  pestilent,  and 
presumptuous  reasoning,  by  which  philosophy  and  theology  are  now 
equally  discredited,  would  be  at  once  abolished,  in  the  recognition  of 
this  rule  of  prudent  nescience;  nor  could  it  longer  be  too  justly  said 
of  the  code  of  consciousness,  as  by  reformed  divines  it  has  been  ac- 
knowledged of  the  Bible : — 

"This  is  the  book,  where  each  his  dogma  seeks; 
And  this  the  book,  where  each  his  dogma  finds." ' 


CONTENTS. 


PART  FIRST. 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OP  COMMON  SENSE ;   OR,  OUR  PRIMARY  BE- 
LIEFS CONSIDERED  AS  THE  ULTIMATE  CRITERION  OF  TRUTH. 

SECTION     I.  The  Meaning  of  the  Doctrine,  and  Purport  of  the  Argu- 
ment, of  Common  Sense 19 

II.  The  Conditions  of  the  Legitimacy,  and  legitimate  applica- 
tion, of  the  argument 86 

III.  That  it  is  one  strictly  Philosophical  and  scientific 41 

IV.  The  Essential  Characters  by  which  our  primary  beliefs,  or 

the  principles  of  Common  Sense,  are  discriminated 47 

V.  The  Nomenclature,  that  is,  the  various   appellations   by 

which  these  have  been  designated 50 

VI.  The  Universality  of  the  philosophy  of  Common  Sense;  or 
its  general  recognition,  in  reality  and  in  name,  shown  by 
a  chronological  series  of  Testimonies  from  the  dawn  of 
speculation  to  the  present  day , 85 


PART  SECOND. 

PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 

CHAPTER  I. — ELUCIDATION  or  REID'S  DOCTRINE  or  PERCEPTION,  AND  ITS 
DEFENCE  AGAINST  SIR  THOMAS  BROWN 165 

CHAPTER  II.— PRESEXTATIVE  AND  REPRESENTATIVE  KNOWLEDGE. 

SECTION  I.  The  distinction  of  Presentative,  Intuitive,  or  Immediate, 
and  of  Representative  or  Mediate  cognition  ;  with  the  va- 
rious significations  of  the  term  Object,  its  conjugates  and 

correlatives 233 

II.  Errors  of  Reid  and  other  Philosophers,  in  reference  to  the 

preceding  distinctions 256 


16  CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  IIL — VARIOUS  THEORIES  OF  EXTERNAL  PERCEPTION. 

SECTION  I.  Systematic  Schemes,  from  different  points  of  view,  of  the 
various  theories  of  the  relation  of  External  Perception  to 
its  Object;  and  of  the  various  systems  of  Philosophy 

founded  thereon 265 

II.  What  is  the  character,  in  this  respect,  of  Reid's  doctrine  of 

Perception  ? 272 

CHAPTER  IV. — DOCTRINE  OF  PERCEPTION  MAINTAINED  BY  THE  ABSO- 
LUTE IDEALISTS. — DISCUSSION  ON  THE  SCHEME  OF  ARTHUR  COLLIER..  285 

CHAPTER  V. — DISTINCTION  OF  THE  PRIMARY  AND  SECONDARY  QUALITIES  OF 

BODY. 

SECTION     I.  Historically  considered 806 

II.  Critically  considered.     Three  classes  (Primary,  Secundo- 

Primary,  and  Secondary  Qualities)  established 852 

CHAPTER  VI. — PERCEPTION  PROPER  AND  SENSATION  PROPER. 

SECTION  I.  Principal  momenta  of  the  Editor's  doctrine  of  Perception, 
(A)  in  itself,  and  (B)  in  contrast  to  that  of  Reid,  Stewart, 
Royer-Collard,  and  other  philosophers  of  the  Scottish 

School 412 

II.  Historical  notices  in  regard  to  the  distinction  of  Perceptio* 

proper  and  Sensation  proper 482 


PART  THIRD. 

PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  CONDITIONED. 

CHAPTER  I. — REFUTATION  OF  THE  VARIOUS  DOCTRINES  OF  THB  UNCON- 
DITIONED, ESPECIALLY  OF  COUSIN'S  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  INFINITO- ABSO- 
LUTE    441 

CHAPTER  II. — LIMITATION  OF  THOUGHT  AND  KNOWLEDGE. 

SECTION     I.  A  Doctrine  of  the  Relative  ;  tho  Categories  of  Thought 484 

II.  Philosophical  Testimonies  to  the  Limitation  of  our  Knowl- 
edge, from  the  Limitation  of  our  Faculties 517 


PAET    FIRST. 


PHILOSOPHY 


COMMON     SENSE. 


\\ 

"THERE  is  nothing  that  can  pretend  to  judge  of  Reason  but  itself:  and, 
therefore,  they  who  suppose  that  they  ran  say  aught  against  it,  are  forced 
(like  jewellers,  who  beat  true  diamonds  to  powder  to  cut  and  polish  false 
ones),  to  make  use  of  it  against  itself.  But  in  this  they  cheat  themselves  as 
well  as  others.  For  if  what  they  say  against  Reason,  be  without  Reason, 
they  deserve  to  be  neglected ;  and  if  with  Reason,  they  disprove  them- 
selves. For  they  use  it  while  they  disclaim  it;  and  with  as  much  contra- 
diction, as  if  a  man  should  tell  me  that  he  cannot  speak." 

AUTHOR  OF  HCDIBRAS  (Reflections  upon  Reason). 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMMON  SENSE,1 

OR, 

OUR   PRIMARY    BELIEFS  CONSIDERED   AS    THE   ULTIMATE 
CRITERION  OF  TRUTH. 


§    I. THE    MEANING    OF   THE    DOCTRINE,    AND    PURPORT    OF     THE 

ARGUMENT,  OF    COMMON    SENSE. 

IN  the  conception  and  application  of  the  doctrine  of  Common 
Sense,  the  most  signal  mistakes  have  been  committed  ;  and  much 
unfounded  prejudice  has  been  excited  against  the  argument  which 
it  affords,  in  consequence  of  the  erroneous  views  which  have  been 
held  in  regard  to  its  purport  and  conditions.  What  is  the  veritable 
character  of  this  doctrine,  it  is,  therefore,  necessary  to  consider. 

Our  cognitions,  it  is  evident,  are  not  all  at  second  hand.  Con- 
sequents cannot,  by  an  infinite  regress,  be  evolved  out  of  ante- 
cedents, which  are  themselves  only  consequents.  Demonstration, 
if  proof  be  possible,  behooves  us  to  repose  at  last  on  propositions, 
which,  carrying  their  own  evidence,  necessitate  their  own  admis- 
sion ;  and  which  being,  as  primary,  inexplicable,  as  inexplicable, 
incomprehensible,  must  consequently  manifest  themselves  less  in 
the  character  of  cognitions  than  of  facts,  of  which  consciousness 
assures  us  under  the  simple  form  of  feeling  or  belief. 

Without  at  present  attempting  to  determine  the  character, 
number,  and  relations — waiving,  in  short,  all  attempt  at  an  artic- 


1  The  Philosophy  of  Common  Sense  properly  comes  first  in  Hamilton's 
System,  for  he  sets  out  from  the  ultimate  facts  of  consciousness,  or  the  pri- 
mary beliefs  of  mankind.  The  leading  Supplementary  Dissertation  in  his 
edition  of  Reid,  constitutes  the  first  general  division  in  our  arrangement  of 
his  philosophy.—  W, 


20  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

ulate  analysis  and  classification  of  the  primary  elements  of  cogni- 
tion, as  carrying  us  into  a  discussion  beyond  our  limits,  and  not 
of  indispensable  importance  for  the  end  we  have  in  view  ;*  it  is 
sufficient  to  have  it  conceded,  in  general,  that  such  elements  there 
are  ;  and  this  concession  of  their  existence  being  supposed,  I  shall 
proceed  to  hazard  some  observations,  principally  in  regard  to  their 
authority  as  warrants  and  criteria  of  truth.  Nor  can  this  as- 
sumption of  the  existence  of  some  original  bases  of  knowledge  in 
the  mind  itself,  be  refused  by  any.  For  even  those  philosophers 
who  profess  to  derive  all  our  knowledge  from  experience,  and  who 
admit  no  universal  truths  of  intelligence  but  such  as  are  generalized 
from  individual  truths  of  fact — even  these  philosophers  are  forced 
virtually  to  acknowledge,  at  the  root  of  the  several  acts  of  observa- 
tion from  which  their  generalization  starts,  some  law  or  principle 

*  Such  an  analysis  and  classification  is  however  in  itself  certainly  one  of 
the  most  interesting  and  important  problems  of  philosophy ;  and  it  is  one 
in  which  much  remains  to  be  accomplished.  Principles  of  cognition,  which 
now  stand  as  ultimate,  may,  I  think,  be  reduced  to  simpler  clemente ;  and 
some  which  are  now  viewed  as  direct  and  positive,  may  bo  shown  to  be 
merely  indirect  and  negative ;  their  cogency  depending,  not  on  the  immedi- 
ate necessity  of  thinking  them — for  if  carried  unconditionally  out,  {hey  are 
themselves  incogitable — but  in  the  impossibility  of  thinking  something  to 
which  they  are  directly  opposed,  and  from  which  they  are  the  immediate  re- 
coils. An  exposition  of  the  axiom — That  positive  thought  lies  in  the  limita- 
tion or  conditioning  of  one  or  other  of  two  opposite  extremes,  neither  of  which 
as  unconditioned,  can  be  realized  to  the  mind  as  possible,  and  yet  of  which, 
as  contradictories,  one  or  other  must,  by  the  fundamental  laws  of  thought, 
be  recognized  as  necessary : — The  exposition  of  this  great  but  unenounced 
axiom  would  show  that  some  of  the  most  illustrious  principles  are  only  its 
subordinate  modifications  as  applied  to  certain  primary  notions,  intuitions, 
data,  forms,  or  categories  of  intelligence,  as  Existence,  Quantity  (protensive, 
Time — extensive,  Space — intensive,  Degree)  Quality,  etc.  Such  modifications, 
for  example,  are  the  principles  of,  Cause  and  Effect,1  Substance  and  Phenom- 
enon, etc. 

I  may  here  also  observe,  that  though  the  primary  truths  of  facts  and  the 
primary  truths  of  intelligence  (the  contingent  and  necessary  truths  of  Eeid) 
form  two  very  distinct  classes  of  the  original  beliefs  or  intuitions  of  conscious- 
ness ;  there  appears  no  sufficient  ground  to  regard  their  sources  as  different, 
and  therefore  to  be  distinguished  by  different  names.  In  this  I  regret  that 
I  am  unable  to  agree  with  Mr.  Stewart.  See  his  Elements,  vol.  ii.  ch.  1,  and 
his  account  of  Reid. 

See  Part  Third  of  thia  vol.  pawira.—  W. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  21 

to  which  they  can  appeal  as  guaranteeing  the  procedure,  should  the 
validity  of  these  primordial  acts  themselves  be  called  in  question- 
This  acknowledgment  is,  among  others,  made  even  by  Locke ;  and 
on  such  fundamental  guarantee  of  induction  he  even  bestows  the 
name  of  Common  Sense.  (See  below,  in  Testimonies,  No.  51.) 

Limiting,  therefore,  our  consideration  to  the  question  of  au- 
thority ;  how,  it  is  asked,  do  these  primary  propositions — these 
cognitions  at  first  hand — these  fundamental  facts,  feelings,  beliefs, 
certify  us  of  their  own  veracity  ?  To  this  the  only  possible  an- 
swer is — that  as  elements  of  our  mental  constitution — as  the  es- 
sential conditions  of  our  knowledge — they  must  by  us  be  accept- 
ed as  true.  To  suppose  their  falsehood,  is  to  suppose  that  we  are 
created  capable  of  intelligence,  in  order  to  be  made  the  victims 
of  delusion ;  that  God  is  a  deceiver,  and  the  root  of  our  nature  a 
lie.-  But  such  a  supposition,  if  gratuitous,  is  manifestly  illegiti- 
mate. For,  on  the  contrary,  the  data  of  our  original  conscious- 
ness must,  it  is  evident,  in  the  first  instance,  be  presumed  true.  It 
is  only  if  proved  false,  that  their  authority  can,  in  consequence  of 
that  proof,  be,  in  the  second  instance,  disallowed.  Speaking,  there- 
fore, generally,  to  argue  from  common  sense,  is  simply  to  show, 
that  the  denial  of  a  given  proposition  would  involve  the  denial  of 
some  original  datum  of  consciousness.;  but  as  every  original  da- 
tum of  consciousness  is  to  be  presumed  true,  that  the  proposition 
in  question,  as  dependent  on  such  a  principle,  must  be  admitted. 

But  that  such  an  argument  is  competent  and  conclusive,  must 
be  more  articulately  shown. 

Here,  however,  at  the  outset,  it  is  proper  to  take  a  distinction, 
the  neglect  of  which  has  been  productive  of  considerable  error 
and  confusion.  It  is  the  distinction  between  the  data  or  deliver- 
ances of  consciousness  considered  simply,  in  themselves,  as  appre- 
hended facts  or  actual  manifestations,  and  those  deliverances 
considered  as  testimonies  to  the  truth  of  facts  beyond  their  own 
phenomenal  reality. 

Viewed  under  the  former  limitation,  they  are  above  all  skepti- 
cism. For  as  doubt  is  itself  only  a  manifestation  of  consciousness, 


22  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

it  is  impossible  to  doubt  that,  what  consciousness  manifests,  it 
does  manifest,  without,  in  thus  doubting,  doubting  that  we  actu- 
ally doubt ;  that  is,  without  the  doubt  contradicting  and  there- 
fore annihilating  itself.  Hence  it  is  that  the  facts  of  conscious- 
ness, as  mere  phenomena,  are  by  the  unanimous  confession  of 
all  Skeptics  and  Idealists,  ancient  and  modern,  placed  high  above 
the  reach  of  question.  Thus,  Laertius,  in  Pyrrh.,  L.  ix.  seg.  103 ; 
— Seztus  Empiricus,  Pyrrh.  Hypot,  L.  i.  cc.  4,  10,  et  passim ; — 
Descartes,  Mecl.,  ii.  pp.  13,  and  iii.  p.  16,  ed.  1058; — Hume, 
Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  vol.  i.  pp.  123,  370,  et  alibi,  orig. 
ed. ; — Schulze,  Aenesidemus,  p.  24,  Kritik,  vol.  i.  p.  51 ; — Plai- 
ner, Aphor.,  vol.  i.  §  708  ; — Reinhold,  Theorie,  p.  190  ; — ScJtad, 
in  Fichte's  Philos.  Jour.,  vol.  x.  p.  270.  See  also  St.  Austin, 
Contra.  Academ.,  L.  iii.  c.  11 ;  De  Trin.,  L.  xv.  c.  112 ;  Scotm, 
in  Sent.,  L.  i.  disk  3,  qu.  4,  10  ; — Buffier,  Prem.  Verit.,  §  9 — 11 
40; — Maynds  Essay  on  Consciousness,  p.  177,  sq. ; — Reid,^. 
442,  b.  et  alibi ; — Cousin,  Cours  d'Hist.  de  la  Philosophie  Mo- 
rale, vol.  ii.  pp.  220,  236. 

On  this  ground,  St.  Austin  was  warranted  in  affirming — Ni- 
hil  intelligenti  tarn  notum  esse  quam  se  sentire,  se  cogitare,  se 
velle,  se  vivere  ;  and  the  cogito  ergo  sum  of  Descartes  is  a  valid 
assertion,  that  in  so  far  as  we  are  conscious  of  certain  modes  of 
existence,  in  so  far  we  possess  an  absolute  certainty  that  we  really 
exist.  (Aug.  De  Lib.  Arb.,  ii.  3  ;  De  Trin.,  x.  3 ;  De  Civ.  Dei., 
xi.  26  ;  Desc.,  11.  cc.,  et  passim.) 

Viewed  under  the  latter  limitation,  the  deliverances  of  con- 
sciousness do  not  thus  peremptorily  repel  even  the  possibility  of 
doubt.  I  am  conscious  for  example,  in  an  act  of  sensible  percep- 
tion, 1°,  of  myself,  the  subject  knowing ;  and  2°,  of  something 
given  as  different  from  myself,  the  object  known.  To  take  the 
second  term  of  this  relation : — that  I  am  conscious  in  this  act 
of  an  object  given,  as  a  non-ego' — that  is,  as  not  a  modifica- 
tion of  my  mind — of  this,  as  a  phenomenon,  doubt  is  impossi- 

1  Hamilton  always  uses  ego,  and  non^eyo,  instead  of  me  and  not-me,  which, 
though  convenient  and  common,  involve  a  grammatical  error. —  W. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  23 

We.  For,  as  has  been  seen,  we  cannot  doubt  the  actuality 
of  a  fact  of  consciousness  without  doubting,  that  is  subvert- 
ing, our  doubt  itself.  To  this  extent,  therefore,  all  skepticism  is 
precluded.  But  though  it  cannot  but  be  admitted  that  the  object  of 
which  we  are  conscious  in  this  cognition  is  given,  not  as  a  mode 
of  self,  but  as  a  mode  of  something  different  from  self,  it  is  how- 
ever possible  for  us  to  suppose,  without  our  supposition  at  least 
being  felo  de  se,  that,  though  given  as  a  non-ego,  this  object  may, 
in  reality,  be  only  a  representation  of  a  non-ego,  in  and  by  the 
ego.  Let  this  therefore  be  maintained  :  let  the  fact  of  the  testi- 
mony be  admitted,  but  the  truth  of  the  testimony,  to  aught  be- 
yond its  own  ideal  existence,  be  doubted  or  denied.  How  in  this 
case  are  we  to  proceed  ?  It  is  evident  that  the  doubt  does  not 
in  this,  as  in  the  former  case  refute  itself.  It  is  not  suicidal  by 
self-contradiction.  The  Idealist,  therefore,  in  denying  the  exist- 
ence of  an  external  world,  as  more  than  a  subjective  phenome- 
non of  the  internal,  does  not  advance  a  doctrine  ab  initio  null,  as 
a  skepticism  would  be  which  denied  the  phenomena  of  the  inter- 
nal world  itself.  Yet  many  distinguished  philosophers  have  fall- 
en into  this  mistake  ;  and,  among  others,  both  Dr.  Reid,  proba- 
bly, and  Mr.  Stewart,  certainly.  The  latter  in  his  Philosophical 
Essays  (pp.  6,  7),  explicitly  states,  "  that  the  belief  which  accom- 
panies consciousness,  as  to  the  present  existence  of  its  appropriate 
phenomena,  rests  on  no  foundation  more  solid  than  our  belief 
of  the  existence  of  external  objects."  Reid  does  not  make  any 
declaration  so  explicit,  but  the  same  doctrine  seems  involved  in 
various  of  his  criticisms  of  Hume  and  of  Descartes  (Inq.1  pp.  100 
a.,  129,  130  ;  Int.  Pow.,  pp.  269  a.,  442  b).  Thus  (p.  100  a.) 
he  reprehends  the  latter  for  maintaining  that  consciousness  affords 
a  higher  assurance  of  the  reality  of  the  internal  phenomena, 
than  sense  affords'  of  the  reality  of  the  external.  He  asks — Why 
did  Descartes  not  attempt  a  proof  of  the  existence  of  his  thought  ? 
and  if  consciousness  be  alleged  as  avouching  this,  he  asks  again, 

'The  reference  is  to  Hamilton's  edition  of  Reid. —  W. 


24  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMMON   SENSE. 

— Who  is  to  be  our  voucher  that  consciousness  may  not  deceive 
us  ?  My  observations  on  this  point,  which  were  printed  above 
three  years  ago,  in  the  foot-notes  at  pp.  129  and  442  b.,'  I  am 

1  The  following  arc  the  foot-notes  referred  to : 

"There  is  no  skepticism  possible  touching  the  facts  of  consciousness  in 
themselves.  We  cannot  doubt  that  the  phenomena  of  consciousness  are  real, 
in  so  far  as  wo  are  conscious  of  them.  I  cannot  doubt,  for  example,  that  I 
am  actually  conscious  of  a  certain  feeling  of  fragrance,  and  of  certain  percep- 
tions of  color,  figure,  etc.,  when  I  see  and  smell  a  rose.  Of  the  reality  of 
these,  as  experienced,  I  cannot  doubt,  because  they  are  facts  of  conscious- 
ness ;  and  of  consciousness  I  cannot  doubt,  because  such  doubt  being 
itself  an  act  of  consciousness,  would  contradict,  and,  consequently,  annihi- 
late itself.  But  of  all  beyond  the  mere  phenomena  of  which  we  are  con- 
scious, we  may — without  fear  of  self-contradiction  at  least — doubt.  I  may. 
for  instance,  doubt  whether  the  rose  I  see  and  smell  has  any  existence  be- 
yond a  phenomenal  existence  in  my  consciousness.  I  cannot  doubt  that  I 
am  conscious  of  it  as  something  different  from  self,  but  whether  it  have,  in- 
deed, any  reality  beyond  my  mind — whether  the  not-self  \>e  not  in  truth  only 
self— that  I  may  philosophically  question.  In  like  manner,  I  am  conscious 
of  the  memory  of  a  certain  past  event.  Of  the  contents  of  this  memory,  ae 
a  phenomenon  given  in  consciousness,  skepticism  is  impossible.  But  I  may 
by  possibility  demur  to  the  reality  of  all  beyond  these  contents  and  the 
sphere  of  present  consciousness. 

"  In  Eeid's  strictures  upon  Hume,  he  confounds  two  opposite  things.  He 
reproaches  that  philosopher  with  inconsequence,  in  holding  to  '  the  belief 
of  the  existence  of  his  own  impressions  and  ideas.'  Now,  if,  by  the  existence 
of  impressions  and  ideas,  Eeid  meant  their  existence  as  mere  phenomena  of 
consciousness,  his  criticism  is  inept ;  for  a  disbelief  of  their  existence,  as  such 
phenomena,  would  have  been  a  suicidal  act  in  the  skeptic.  If,  again,  he 
meant  by  impressions  and  ideas  the  hypothesis  of  representative  entities  dif- 
ferent from  the  mind  and  its  modifications ;  in  that  case  the  objection  is 
equally  invalid.  Hume  was  a  skeptic ;  that  is,  he  accepted  the  premises  af- 
forded him  by  the  dogmatist,  and  carried  these  premises  to  their  legitimate 
consequences.  To  blame  Hume,  therefore,  for  not  having  doubted  of  his 
borrowed  principles,  is  to  blame  the  skeptic  for  not  performing  a  part  alto- 
gether inconsistent  with  his  vocation.  But,  in  point  of  fact,  the  hypothesis 
of  such  entities  is  of  no  value  to  the  idealist  or  skeptic.  Impressions  and  ideas. 
viewed  as  mental  modes,  would  have  answered  Hume's  purpose  not  a  whit 
worse  than  impressions  and  ideas  viewed  as  objects,  but  not  as  affections  of 
mind.  The  most  consistent  scheme  of  idealism  known  in  the  history  of  phi- 
losophy is  that  of  Fichte ;  and  Fichte's  idealism  is  founded  on  a  basis  which 
excludes  that  crude  hypothesis  of  ideas  on  which  alone  Eeid  imagined  any 
doctrine  of  Idealism  could  possibly  be  established.  And  is  the  acknowl- 
edged result  of  the  Fichtean  dogmatism  less  a  nihilism  than  the  skepticism 
of  Hume?  'The  sum  total,'  says  Fichte,  'is  this: — There  is  absolutely 
nothing  permanent  either  without  me  or  within  me,  but  only  an  unceasing 
change.  I  know  absolutely  nothing  of  any  existence,  not  even  of  my  own. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  25 

happy'to  find  confirmed  by  the  authority  of  M.  Cousin.  The  fol- 
lowing passage  is  from  his  Lectures  on  the  Scottish  School,  con- 
stituting the  second  volume  of  his  "  Course  on  the  History  of  the 
Moral  Philosophy  of  the  Eighteenth  Century,"  delivered  in  the 
years  1819,  1820,  but  only  recently  published  by  M.  Vacherot.1 
"  It  is  not  (he  observes  in  reference  to  the  preceding  strictures  of 
Reid  upon  Descartes)  as  a  fact  attested  by  consciousness,  that 
Descartes  declares  his  personal  existence  beyond  a  doubt ;  it  is 
because  the  negation  of  this  fact  would  involve  a  contradiction." 
And  after  quoting  the  relative  passage  from  Descartes  : — "  It  is 
thus  by  a  reasoning  that  Descartes  establishes  the  existence  of 
the  thinking  subject ;  if  he  admit  this  existence,  it  is  not  because 
it  is  guaranteed  by  consciousness ;  it  is  for  this  reason,  that  when 
he  thinks — let  him  deceive  himself  or  not — he  exists  in  so  far  as 
he  thinks." 

It  is  therefore  manifest  that  we  may  throw  wholly  out  of  ac- 
count the  phenomena  of  consciousness,  considered  merely  in  them- 
selves ;  seeing  that  skepticism  in  regard  to  them,  .under  this  lim- 
itation, is  confessedly  impossible ;  and  that  it  is  only  requisite  to 
consider  the  argument  from  common  sense,  as  it  enables  us  to 


I  myself  know  nothing,  and  am  nothing.  Images  (Bilder)  there  are:  they 
constitute  all  that  apparently  exists,  and  what  they  know  of  themselves  is 
after  the  manner  of  images  ;  images  that  pass  and  vanish  without  there  be- 
ing aught  to  witness  their  transition  ;  that  consist  in  fact  of  the  images  of 
images,  without  significance  and  without  an  aim.  I  myself  am  one  of  these 
images ;  nay,  I  am  not  even  thus  much,  but  only  a  confused  image  of  images. 
All  reality  is  converted  into  a  marvellous  dream,  without  a  life  to  dream  of 
and  without  a  mind  to  dream ;  into  a  dream  made  up  only  of  a  dream  of 
itself.  Perception  is  a  dream  ;  thought — the  source  of  all  the  existence  and 
all  the  reality  which  I  imagine  to  myself  of  my  existence,  of  my  power,  of 
my  destination — is  the  dream  of  that  dream.' 

"  In  doubting  the  fact  of  his  consciousness,  the  skeptic  must  at  least  af- 
firm his  doubt ;  but  to  affirm  a  doubt  is  to  affirm  the  consciousness  of  it ;  the 
doubt  Vould  therefore  be  self-contradictory — i.  e.  annihilate  itself." — W. 

'Since  the  above  was  written,  M.  Cousin  has  himself  published  the  Course 
of  1819-20,  and  the  Lectures  on  the  Scottish  School  may  now  bo  found,  am- 
plified, in  the  fourth  volume  of  his  first  series.  The  same  thing  is  stated 
with  precision,  clearness,  and  force,  here  and  there  in  Cousin's  second  se- 
ries, the  whole  of  which  we  have  recently  translated  and  published. —  W. 

2 


26  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON    SENSE. 

vindicate  the  truth  of  these  phenomena,  viewed  as  attestations  of 
more  than  their  own  existence,  seeing  that  they  are  not,  in  this 
respect,  placed  beyond  the  possibility  of  doubt 

When,  for  example,  consciousness  assures  us  that,  in  percep- 
tion, we  are  immediately  cognizant  of  an  external  and  extended 
non-ego;  or  that,  in  remembrance,  through  the  imagination,  of 
which  we  are  immediately  cognizant,  we  obtain  a  mediate  knowl- 
edge of  a  real  past ;  how  shall  we  repel  the  doubt — in  the  for- 
mer case,  that  what  is  given  as  the  extended  reality  itself  is  not 
merely  a  representation  of  matter  by  mind — in  the  latter,  that 
what  is  given  as  a  mediate  knowledge  of  the  past,  is  not  a  mere 
present  phantasm,  containing  an  illusive  reference  to  an  unreal 
past  ?  We  can  do  this  only  in  one  way.  The  legitimacy  of  such 
gratuitous  doubt  necessarily  supposes  that  the  deliverance  of  con- 
sciousness is  not  to  be  presumed  true.  If,  therefore,  it  can  be  shown, 
on  the  one  hand,  that  the  deliverances  of  consciousness  must 
philosophically  be  accepted,  until  their  certain  or  probable  false- 
hood has  been  positively  evinced ;  and  if,  on  the  other  hand,  it 
cannot  be  shown  that  any  attempt  to  discredit  the  veracity  of 
consciousness  has  ever  yet  succeeded ;  it  follows  that,  as  philoso- 
phy now  stands,  the  testimony  of  consciousness  must  be  viewed 
as  high  above  suspicion,  and  its  declarations  entitled  to  demand 
prompt  and  unconditional  assent. 

In  the  first  place,  as  has  been  said,  it  cannot  but  be  acknowl- 
edged that  the  veracity  of  consciousness  must,  at  least  in  the  first 
instance,  be  conceded.  "  Neganti  incumbit  probatio."  Nature  is 
not  gratuitously  to  be  assumed  to  work,  not  only  in  vain,  but  in 
counteraction  of  herself;  our  faculty  of  knowledge  is  not,  with- 
out a  ground,  to  be  supposed  an  instrument  of  illusion ;  man,  un- 
less the  melancholy  fact  be  proved,  is  not  to  be  held  organized  for 
the  attainment,  and  actuated  by  the  love  of  truth,  only  to  become 
the  dupe  and  victim  of  a  perfidious  creator. 

But,  in  the  second  place,  though  the  veracity  of  the  primary 
convictions  of  consciousness  must,  in  the  outset,  be  admitted,  it 
still  remains  competent  to  lead  a  proof  that  they  are  undeserving 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  27 

of  credit.  But  how  is  this  to  be  done  ?  As  the  ultimate  grounds 
of  knowledge,  these  convictions  cannot  be  redargued  from  any 
higher  knowledge ;  and  as  original  beliefs,  they  are  paramount  in 
certainty  to  every  derivative  assurance.  But  they  are  many; 
they  are,  in  authority,  co-ordinate ;  and  their  testimony  is  clear 
and  precise.  It  is  therefore  competent  for  us  to  view  them  in  cor- 
relation ;  to  compare  their  declarations ;  and  to  consider  whether 
they  contradict,  and,  by  contradicting,  invalidate  each  other. 
This  mutual  contradiction  is  possible,  in  two  ways.  1°,  It  may 
be  that  the  primary  data  themselves  are  directly  or  immediately 
contradictory  of  each  other ;  2°,  it  may  be  that  they  are  medi- 
ately or  indirectly  contradictory,  inasmuch  as  the  consequences  to 
which  they  necessarily  lead,  and  for  the  truth  or  falsehood  of 
which  they  are  therefore  responsible,  are  mutually  repugnant.  By 
evincing  either  of  these,  the  veracity  of  consciousness  will  be  dis- 
proved ;  for,  in  either  case,  consciousness  is  shown  to  be  inconsist- 
ent with  itself,  and  consequently  inconsistent  with  the  unity  of 
truth.  But  by  no  other  process  of  demonstration  is  this  possible. 
For  it  will  argue  nothing  against  the  trustworthiness  of  conscious- 
ness, that  all  or  any  of  its  deliverances  are  inexplicable — are  in- 
comprehensible ;  that  is,  that  we  are  unable  to  conceive  through 
a  higher  notion,  how  that  is  possible,  which  the  deliverance 
avouches  actually  to  be.  To  make  the  comprehensibility  of  a 
datum  of  consciousness  the  criterion  of  its  truth,  would  be  indeed 
the  climax  of  absurdity.  For  the  primary  data  of  consciousness, 
as  themselves  the  conditions  under  which  all  else  is  comprehended, 
are  necessarily  themselves  incomprehensible.  We  know,  and  can 
know,  only — That  they  are,  not — How  they  can  be.  To  ask  how 
an  immediate  fact  of  consciousness  is  possible,  is  to  ask  how  con- 
sciousness is  possible ;  and  to  ask  how  consciousness  is  possible, 
is  to  suppose  that  we  have  another  consciousness,  before  and  above 
that  human  consciousness,  concerning  whose  mode  of  operation  we 
inquire.  Could  we  answer  this,  "  verily  we  should  be  as  gods." ' 

1  From  what  has  now  been  stated,  it  will  be  seen  how  far  and  on  what 
grounds  I  hold,  at  once  with  Dr.  Reid  and  Mr.  Stewart,  that  our  original 


SJO  PHILOSOPHY    OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

To  take  an  example : — It  would  be  unreasonable  in  the  Cosmo- 
thetic  or  the  Absolute  Idealist,  to  require  of  the  Natural  Realist1  a 
reason,  througli  which  to  understand  how  a  self  can  be  conscious 
of  a  not-self — how  an  unextended  subject  can  be  cognizant  of  an 
extended  object ;  both  of  which  are  given  us  as  facts  by  conscious- 
ness, and,  as  such,  founded  on  by  the  Natural  Realist.  This  is  un- 
reasonable, because  it  is  incompetent  to  demand  the  explanation 
of  a  datum  of  consciousness,  which,  as  original  and  simple,  is 
necessarily  beyond  analysis  and  explication.  It  is  still  further 
unreasonable,  inasmuch  as  all  philosophy  being  only  a  develop- 
ment of  the  primary  data  of  consciousness,  any  philosophy,  in 
not  accepting  the  truth  of  these,  pro  tanto  surrenders  its  own  pos- 
sibility—is felo  de  se.  But  at  the  hands  of  the  Cosmothetic  Ideal- 
ists— and  they  constitute  the  great  majority  of  philosophers — the 
question  is  peculiarly  absurd ;  for  before  proposing  it,  they  are 
themselves  bound  to  afford  a  solution  of  the  far  more  insuperable 
difficulties  which  their  own  hypothesis  involves — difficulties  which, 
so  far  from  attempting  to  solve,  no  Hypothetical  Realist  has  ever 
yet  even  articulately  stated.8 

This  being  understood,  the  following  propositions  are  either 
self-evident,  or  admit  of  easy  proof: 

1.  The  end  of  philosophy  is  truth;  and  consciousness  is  the 
instrument  and  criterion  of  its  acquisition.     In  other  words,  phi- 
losophy is  the  development  and  application  of  the  constitutive 
and  normal  truths  which  consciousness  immediately  reveals. 

2.  Philosophy  is  thus  wholly  dependent  upon  consciousness ;  the 
possibility  of  the  former  supposing  the  trustworthiness  of  the  latter. 

3.  Consciousness  is  presumed  to  be  trustworthy,  until  proved 
mendacious. 

4.  The  mendacity  of  consciousness  is  proved,  if  its  data,  imme- 

beliefs  are  to  be  established,  but  their  authority  not  to  be  canvassed ;  and 
with  M.  Jouffroy,  that  the  question  of  their  authority  is  not  to  be  absolutely 
withdrawn,  as  a  forbidden  problem,  from  philosophy. 

1  On  these  terms  see  the  third  and  fourth  chapters  of  the  second  part  of 
this  vol.—  W. 

3  For  the  illustration  of  this,  see  chapter  first  of  the  second  part. —  W. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  29 

diately  in  themselves,  or  mediately  in   their  necessary  conse- 
quences, be  shown  to  stand  in  mutual  contradiction. 

5.*The  immediate  or  mediate  repugnance  of  any  two  of  its 
data  being  established,  the  presumption  in  favor  of  the  general 
veracity  of  consciousness  is  abolished,  or  rather  reversed.  For 
while,  on  the  one  hand,  all  that  is  not  contradictory  is  not  there- 
fore true ;  on  the  other,  a  positive  proof  of  falsehood,  in  one  in- 
stance, establishes  a  presumption  of  probable  falsehood  in  all ; 
for  the  maxim,  "falsus  in  uno,falsus  in  omnibus"  must  deter- 
mine the  credibility  of  consciousness,  as  the  credibility  of  every 
other  witness. 

6.  No  attempt  to  show  that  the  data  of  consciousness  are 
(either  in  themselves,  or  in  their  necessary  consequences)  mutually 
contradictory,  has  yet  succeeded ;  and  the  presumption  in  favor 
of  the  truth  of  consciousness  and  the  possibility  of  philosophy 
has,  therefore,  never  been  redargued.     In  other  words,  an  ori- 
ginal, universal,  dogmatic  subversion  of  knowledge  has  hitherto 
been  found  impossible. 

7.  No  philosopher  has  ever  formally  denied  the  truth  or  dis- 
claimed the  authority  of  consciousness ;  but  few  or  none  have 
been  content  implicitly  to  accept  and  consistently  to  follow  out  its 
dictates.     Instead  of  humbly  resorting  to  consciousness,  to  draw 
from  thence  his  doctrines  and  their  proof,  each  dogmatic  specula- 
tor looked  only  into  consciousness,  there  to  discover  his  pre- 
adopted  opinions.     In  philosophy,  men  have  abused  the  code  of 
natural,  as  in  theology,  the  code  of  positive,  revelation;  and  the 
epigraph  of  a  great  protestant  divine,  on  the  book  of  scripture,  is 
certainly  not  less  applicable  to  the  book  of  consciousness : 

"  Hie  liber  est  in  quo  qucerit  sua  dogmata  quisque  ; 
Invenit,  etpariter  dogmata  quisque  *«a."  J 

8.  The  first  and  most  obtrusive  consequence  of  this  proceedure 
has  been,  the  multiplication  of  philosophical  systems  in  every 
conceivable  aberration  from  the  unity  of  truth. 

1  "  This  is  the  book  where  each  his  dogma  seeks ; 
And  this  the  book  where  each  his  dogma  finds." 


30  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

9.  The  second,  but  less  obvious,  consequence  has  been,  the  vir- 
tual surrender,  by  each  several  system,  of  the  possibility  of  phi- 
losophy in  general.     For,  as  the  possibility  of  philosophy  sup- 
poses the  absolute  truth  of  consciousness,  every  system  which 
proceeded  on  the  hypothesis,  that  even  a  single  deliverance  of 
consciousness  is  untrue,  did,  however  it  might  eschew  the  overt 
declaration,  thereby  invalidate  the  general  credibility  of  conscious- 
ness, and  supply  to  the  skeptic  the  premises  he  required  to  sub- 
vert philosophy,  in  so  far  as  that  system  represented  it. 

10.  And  yet,  although  the  past  history  of  philosophy  has,  in 
a  great  measure,  been  only  a  history  of  variation  and  error  (vari- 
asse  erroris  est) ;  yet  the  cause  of  this  variation  being  known,  we 
obtain  a  valid  ground  of  hope  for  the  destiny  of  philosophy  in 
future.     Because,  since  philosophy  has  hitherto  been  inconsistent 
with  itself,  only  in  being  inconsistent  with  the  dictates  of  our 
natural  beliefs — 

"  For  Truth  is  catholic,  and  Nature  one ;" 

it  follows,  that  philosophy  has  simply  to  return  to  natural  con- 
sciousness, to  return  to  unity  and  truth. 

In  doing  this  we  have  only  to  attend  to  the  three  following 
maxims  or  precautions : 

1°,  That  we  admit  nothing,  not  either  an  original  datum  of 
consciousness,  or  the  legitimate  consequence  of  such  a  datum ; 

2°,  That  we  embrace  all  the  original  data  of  consciousness, 
and  all  their  legitimate  consequences ;  and 

3°,  That  we  exhibit  each  of  these  in  its  individual  integrity 
neither  distorted  nor  mutilated,  and  in  its  relative  place,  whether 
of  pre-eminence  or  subordination. 

Nor  can  it  be  contended  that  consciousness  has  spoken  in  so 
feeble  or  ambiguous  a  voice,  that  philosophers  have  misappre- 
hended or  misunderstood  her  enouncements.  On  the  contrary, 
they  have  been  usually  agreed  about  the  fact  and  purport  of  the 
deliverance,  differing  only  as  to  the  mode  in  which  they  might 
evade  or  qualify  its  acceptance. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  31 

This  I  shall  illustrate  by  a  memorable  example — by  one  in  ref- 
erence to  the  very  cardinal  point  of  philosophy.  In  the  act  of 
sensible  perception,  I  am  conscious  of  two  things ; — of  myself  as 
the  perceiving  subject,  and  of  an  external  reality,  in  relation  with 
my  sense,  as  the  object  perceived.  Of  the  existence  of  both  these 
things  I  am  convinced :  because  I  am  conscious  of  knowing  each 
of  them,  not  mediately,  in  something  else,  as  represented,  but  im- 
mediately in  itself,  as  existing.  Of  their  mutual  independence  I 
am  no  less  convinced ;  because  each  is  apprehended  equally,  and 
at  once,  in  the  same  indivisible  energy,  the  one  not  preceding  or 
determining,  the  other  not  following  or  determined ;  and  because 
each  is  apprehended  out  of,  and  in  direct  contrast  to  the  other. 

Such  is  the  fact  of  perception  as  given  in  consciousness,  and  as 
it  affords  to  mankind  in  general  the  conjunct  assurance  they  pos- 
sess, of  their  own  existence,  and  of  the  existence  of  an  external 
world.  Nor  are  the  contents  of  the  deliverance,  considered  as  a 
phenomenon,  denied  by  those  who  still  hesitate  to  admit  the  truth 
of  its  testimony.  As  this  point,  however,  is  one  of  principal  im- 
portance, I  shall  not  content  myself  with  assuming  the  preceding 
statement  of  the  fact  of  perception  as  a  truth  attested  by  the  in- 
ternal experience  of  all ;  but,  in  order  to  place  it  beyond  the  pos- 
sibility of  doubt,  quote  in  evidence,  more  than  a  competent  num- 
ber of  authoritative,  and  yet  reluctant  testimonies,  and  give 
articulate  references  to  others. 

Descartes,  the  father  of  modern  idealism,  acknowledges,  that 
in  perception  we  suppose  the  qualities  of  the  external  realities  to 
be  themselves  apprehended,  and  not  merely  represented,  by  the 
mind,  in  virtue  or  on  occasion  of  certain  movements  of  the  sen- 
suous organism  which  they  determine.  "  Putamus  nos  videre 
ipsam  tcedam,  et  audire  ipsam  campanam :  non  vero  solum  sen- 
tire  motus  qui  ab  ipsis  proveniunt."  De  Passionibus  art.  xxiii. 
This,  be  it  observed,  is  meant  for  a  statement  applicable  to  our 
perception  of  external  objects  in  general,  and  not  merely  to  our 
perception  of  their  secondary  qualities. 

De  Raei,  a  distinguished  follower  of  Descartes,  frequently  ad- 


32  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

mits,  that  what  is  commonly  rejected  by  philosophers  is  univer- 
sally believed  by  mankind  at  large — "  Res  ipsas  secundum  se  in 
sensum  incurrere"  De  Mentis  Humanae  Facultatibus,  Sectio  II. 
§  41,  70,  89.  De  Cognitione  Humana,  §  15,  39,  et  alibi. 

In  like  manner,  Berkeley,  contrasting  the  belief  of  the  vulgar, 
and  the  belief  of  philosophers  on  this  point,  says : — "  The  former 
are  of  opinion  that  those  things  they  immediately  perceive  are  the 
real  things  ;  and  the  latter,  that  the  things  immediately  perceived 
are  ideas  which  exist  only  in  the  mind."  Three  Dialogues,  &c., 
Dial.  III.  prope  finem.  His  brother  idealist,  Arthur  Collier,  might 
be  quoted  to  the  same  purport ;  though  he  does  not,  like  Berke- 
ley, pretend  that  mankind  at  large  are  therefore  idealists. 

Hume  frequently  states  that,  in  the  teeth  of  all  philosophy, 
•'  men  are  carried  by  a  blind  and  powerful  instinct  of  nature  to 
suppose  the  very  images  presented  by  the  senses  to  be  the  external 
objects,  and  never  entertain  any  suspicion  that  the  one  are  nothing 
but  representations  of  the  other."  Inquiry  concerning  Human 
Understanding,  Sect.  XII.,  Essays,  ed.  1788,  vol.  ii.  p.  154. 
Compare  also  ibid.  p.  157  ;  and  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  vol. 
i.  B.  i.  P.  iv.  Sect.  2,  pp.  330,  338,  353,  358,  361,  369. 

Schilling,  in  many  passages  of  his  works,  repeats,  amplifies, 
and  illustrates  the  statement,  that  "  the  man  of  common  sense  be- 
lieves, and  will  not  but  believe,  that  the  object  he  is  conscious  of 
perceiving  is  the  real  one."  This  is  from  hi.«  Philosophische  Schrif- 
ten,  I.  p.  274 ;  and  it  may  be  found  with  the  context,  translated 
by  Coleridge — but  given  as  his  own — in  the  "  Biographia  Litera- 
ria,"  I.  p.  262.  See  also  among  other  passages,  Philos.  Schr.,  I. 
pp.  217,  238 ;  Ideen  zu  einer  Philosophie  der  Natur,  Einleit.  pp. 
xix.  xxvi.  first  edition  (translated  in  Edinb.  Rev.,  vol.  lii.  p.  202) ; 
Philosophisches  Journal  von  Fichte  und  Niethhammer,  vol.  vii. 
p.  244.  In  these  passages  Schelling  allows  that  it  is  only  on  the 
believed  identity  of  the  object  known  and  of  the  object  existing,  and 
in  our  inability  to  discriminate  in  perceptive  consciousness  the 
representation  from  the  thing,  that  mankind  at  large  believe  in  the 
reality  of  an  external  world. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  33 

But  to  adduce  a  more  recent  writer,  and  of  a  different  school. — 
"  From  the  natural  point  of  view,"  says  Stiedenroth,  "  the  repre- 
sentation (Vorstellung)  is  not  in  sensible  perception  distinguished 
from  the  object  represented  ;  for  it  appears  as  if  the  sense  actu- 
ally apprehended  the  things  out  of  itself,  and  in  their  proper 
space."  (Psychologic,  vol.  i.  p.  244.)  "  The  things — the  actual 
realities  are  not  in  our  soul.  Nevertheless,  from  the  psychologi- 
cal point  of  view  on  which  we  are  originally  placed  by  nature,  we 
do  not  suspect  that  our  representation  of  external  things  and  their 
relations  is  naught  but  representation.  Before  this  can  become  a 
matter  of  consideration,  the  spatial  relations  are  so  far  developed, 
that  it  seems  as  if  the  soul  apprehended  out  of  itself — as  if  it  did 
not  carry  the  image  of  things  within  itself,  but  perceived  the 
things  themselves  in  their  proper  space"  (p.  26*7).  "  This  belief 
(that  our  sensible  percepts  are  the  things  themselves)  is  so  strong 
and  entire,  that  a  light  seems  to  break  upon  us  when  we  first 
learn,  or  bethink  ourselves,  that  we  are  absolutely  shut  in  within 
the  circle  of  our  own  representations.  Nay,  it  costs  so  painful  an 
effort,  consistently  to  maintain  this  acquired  view,  in  opposition 
to  that  permanent  and  unremitted  illusion,  that  we  need  not  mar- 
vel, if,  even  to  many  philosophers,  it  should  have  been  again  lost" 
(p.  270). 

But  it  is  needless  to  accumulate  confessions  as  to  a  fact  which 
has  never,  I  believe,  been  openly  denied ;  I  shall  only  therefore 
refer  in  general  to  the  following  authorities,  who,  all  in  like  man- 
ner, even  while  denying  the  truth  of  the  natural  belief,  acknowl- 
edge the  fact  of  its  existence.  Malebranche,  Recherche,  L.  iiL 
c.  1 ;  Tetens,  Versuche,  vol.  i.  p.  375  ;  Fichte,  Bestimmung  des 
Menschen,  p.  56,  ed.  1825;  and  in  Philos.  Journal,  VII.  p.  35;. 
Tennemann,  Geschichte  der  Philosophic,  vol.  ii.  p.  294  .{trans- 
lated in  Edinb.  Rev.,  vol.  Hi.  p.  202) ;  Fries,  Neue  Kritik,  Vorr., 
p.  xxviii.  sec.  ed. ;  Herbart,  Allgemeine  Metaphysik,  II.  Th., 
§  327 ;  Gerlach,  Fundamental  Philosophic,  §  33  ;  Bencke,  Das  Ver- 
haeltniss  von  Seele  und  Leib,  p.  23 ;  and  Kant  und  die  Philosc- 
phische  Aufgabe  unserer  Zeit,  p.  70 ;  Stoeger,  Pruefung,  &c.,  p. 

2* 


34:  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

504.  To  these  may  be  added,  Jacobi,  Werke,  vol.  i.  p.  119 ;  and 
in  vol.  ii.,  his  "  David  Hume"  passim,  of  which  see  a  passage 
quoted  infra  in  Testimonies,  No.  87  c. 

The  contents  of  the  fact  of  perception,  as  given  in  conscious- 
ness, being  thus  established,  what  are  the  consequences  to  philos- 
ophy, according  as  the  truth  of  its  testimony  (I.)  is,  or  (II.)  is  not, 
admitted  ? 

I.  On  the  former  alternative,  the  veracity  of  consciousness,  in 
the  fact  of  perception,  being  unconditionally  acknowledged,  we 
have  established  at  once,  without  hypothesis  or  demonstration,  the 
reality  of  mind,  and  the  reality  of  matter ;  while  no  concession 
is  yielded  to  the  skeptic,  through  which  he  may  subvert  philoso- 
phy in  manifesting  its  self-contradiction.     The  one  legitimate  doc- 
trine, thus  possible,  may  be  called  Natural  Realism  or  Natural 
Dualism. 

II.  On  the  latter  alternative,  five  great  variations  from  truth 
and  nature  may  be  conceived — and  all  of  these  have  actually 
found  their  advocates — according  as  the  testimony  of  conscious- 
ness, in  the  fact  of  perception,  (A)  is  wholly,  or  (B)  partially, 
rejected. 

A.  If  wholly  rejected,  that  is,  if  nothing  but  the  phenomenal 
reality  of  the  fact  itself  be  allowed,  the  result  is  Nihilism.     This 
may  be  conceived  either  as  a  dogmatical  or  as  a  skeptical  opinion ; 
and  Hume  and  Fichte  have  competently  shown,  that  if  the  truth 
of  consciousness  be  not  unconditionally  recognized,  Nihilism  is 
the  conclusion  in  which  our  speculation,  if  consistent  with  itself, 
must  end. 

B.  On  the   other   hand,  if  partially  rejected,  four  schemes 
emerge,  according  to  the  way  in  which  the  fact  is  tampered  with. 

i.  If  the  veracity  of  consciousness  be  allowed  to  the  equipoise 
of  the  subject  and  object  in  the  act,  but  disallowed  to  the  reality 
of  their  antithesis,  the  system  of  Absolute  Identity  (whereof  Pan- 
theism is  the  corollary)  arises,  which  reduces  mind  and  matter  to 
phenomenal  modifications  of  the  same  common  substance. 

ii.,  iii.  Again,  if  the  testimony  of  consciousness  be  refused  to 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   COMMON   SENSE.  35 

the  equal  originality  and  reciprocal  independence  of  the  subject 
and  object  in  perception,  two  Unitarian  schemes  are  determined, 
according  as  the  one  or  as  the  other  of  these  correlatives  is  sup- 
posed the  prior  and  genetic.  Is  the  object  educed  from  the  sub- 
ject 1  Idealism  ;  is  the  subject  educed  from  the  object  ?  Materi- 
alism, is  the  result. 

iv.  Finally,  if  the  testimony  of  consciousness  to  our  knowl- 
edge of  an  external  world  existing  be  rejected  with  the  Idealist, 
but  with  the  Eealist  the  existence  of  that  world  be  affirmed,  we 
have  a  scheme  which,  as  it  by  many  various  hypotheses,  endeav- 
ors, on  the  one  hand,  not  to  give  up  the  reality  of  an  unknown 
material  universe,  and  on  the  other,  to  explain  the  ideal  illusion 
of  its  cognition,  may  be  called  the  doctrine  of  Cosmothetic  Ideal- 
ism, Hypothetical  Realism,  or  Hypothetical  Dualism.  This  last, 
though  the  most  vacillating,  inconsequent,  and  self-contradictory 
of  all  systems,  is  the  one  which,  as  less  obnoxious  in  its  acknowl- 
edged consequences  (being  a  kind  of  compromise  between  specu- 
lation and  common  sense),  has  found  favor  with  the  immense 
majority  of  philosophers.1 

From  the  rejection  of  the  fact  of  consciousness  in  this  example 
of  perception,  we  have  thus,  in  the  first  place,  multiplicity,  spec- 
ulative variation,  error ;  in  the  second,  systems  practically  danger- 
ous ;  and  in  the  third,  what  concerns  us  exclusively  at  present, 
the  incompetence  of  an  appeal  to  the  common  sense  of  mankind 
by  any  of  these  systems  against  the  conclusions  of  others.  This 
last  will,  however,  be  more  appropriately  shown  in  our  special 
consideration  of  the  conditions  of  the  argument  of  Common  Sense, 
to  which  we  now  go  on. 


1  See,  in  connection  with  this  more  general  distribution  of  philosophical 
systems  from  the  whole  fact  of  consciousness  in  perception,  other  more  spe- 
cial divisions,  from  the  relation  of  the  object  to  the  subject  of  perception,  in 
the  second  part,  chapter  iii. —  W. 


36  PHILOSOPHY    OF   COMMON   SENSE. 


§  II. — CONDITIONS  OF  THE  LEGITIMACY,  AND  LEGITIMATE  APPLI- 
CATION,   OF   THE    ARGUMENT   FROM   COMMON   SENSE. 

From  what  has  been  stated,  it  is  manifest  that  the  argument 
drawn  from  Common  Sense,  for  the  truth  or  falsehood  of  any 
given  thesis,  proceeds  on  two  suppositions : 

1°.  That  the  proposition  to  be  proved  is  either  identical  with,  or 
necessarily  evolved  out  of,  a  primary  datum  of  consciousness  ; 
and, 

2°.  That  the  primary  data  of  consciousness  are,  one  and  all  of 
them,  admitted,  by  the  proponent  of  this  argument,  to  be  true. 

From  this  it  follows,  that  each  of  these  suppositions  will  con- 
stitute a  condition,  under  which  the  legitimate  application  of  this 
reasoning  is  exclusively  competent.  Whether  these  conditions 
have  been  ever  previously  enounced,  I  know  not.  But  this  I 
know,  that  while  their  necessity  is  so  palpable,  that  they  could 
never,  if  explicitly  stated,  be  explicitly  denied ;  that  in  the  hands 
of  philosophers  they  have  been  always,  more  or  less  violated, 
implicitly  and  in  fact,  and  this  often  not  the  least  obtrusively 
by  those  who  have  been  themselves  the  loudest  in  their  appeal 
from  the  conclusions  of  an  obnoxious  speculation  to  the  common 
convictions  of  mankind.  It  is  not  therefore  to  be  marvelled  at, 
if  the  argument  itself  should  have  sometimes  shared  in  the  con- 
tempt which  its  abusive  application  so  frequently  and  so  justly 
merited. 

1.  That  the  first  condition — that  of  originality — is  indispens- 
able, is  involved  in  the  very  conception  of  the  argument.  I 
should  indeed  hardly  have  deemed  that  it  required,  an  articulate 
statement,  were  it  not  that,  in  point  of  fact,  many  philosophers 
have  attempted  to  establish,  on  the  principles  of  common  sense, 
propositions  which  are  not  original  data  of  consciousness ;  while 
the  original  data  of  consciousness,  from  which  their  propositions 
were  derived,  and  to  which,  they  owed  their  whole  necessity  and 
truth — these  data  the  same  philosophers  were  (strange  to  say !) 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  37 

not  disposed  to  admit.  Thus,  when  it  is  argued  by  the  Cosmo- 
tlietic  Idealists — "  The  external  world  exists,  because  we  naturally 
believe  it  to  exist ;"  the  illation  is  incompetent,  inasmuch  as  it 
erroneously  assumes  that  our  belief  of  an  external  world  is  a  pri- 
mary datum  of  consciousness.  This  is  not  the  case.  That  an 
outer  world  exists  is  given  us,  not  as  a  "  miraculous  revelation," 
not  as  a  "  cast  of  magic,"  not  as  an  "  instinctive  feeling,"  not  as 
a  "  blind  belief."  These  expressions,  in  which  the  Cosmothetic 
Idealists  shadow  forth  the  difficulty  they  create,  and  attempt  to 
solve,  are  wholly  inapplicable  to  the  real  fact.  Our  belief  of  a 
material  universe  is  not  ultimate ;  and  that  universe  is  not  un- 
known. This  belief  is  not  a  supernatural  inspiration  ;  it  is  not  an 
infused  faith.  We  are  not  compelled  by  a  blind  impulse  to  be- 
lieve in  the  external  world,  as  in  an  unknown  something  ;  on  the 
contrary,  we  believe  it  to  exist  only  because  we  are  immediately 
cognizant  of  it  as  existing.  If  asked,  indeed — How  we  know 
that  we  know  it — how  we  know  that  what  we  apprehend  in  sen- 
sible perception  is,  as  consciousness  assures  us,  an  object,  external, 
extended,  and  numerically  different  from  the  conscious  subject  ? — 
how  we  know  that  this  object  is 'not  a  mere  mode  of  mind,  illu- 
sively presented  to  us  as  a  mode  of  matter  ? — then  indeed  we 
must  reply,  that  we  do  not  in  propriety  know  that  what  we  are 
compelled  to  perceive  as  not-self,  is  not  a  perception  of  self, 
and  that  we  can  only  on  reflection  believe  such  to  be  the  case,  in 
reliance  on  the  original  necessity  of  so  believing,  imposed  on  us 
by  our  nature, 

Quas  nisi  sit  veri,  ratio  quoque  falsa  fit  omnia. 

That  this  is  a  correct  statement  of  the  fact  has  been  already 
shown ;  and  if  such  be  the  undenied  and  undeniable  ground  of 
the  natural  belief  of  mankind,  in  the  reality  of  external  things, 
the  incompetence  of  the  argument  from  common  sense  in  the 
hands  of  the  Cosmothetic  Idealist  is  manifest,  in  so  far  as  it  does 
not  fulfil  the  fundamental  condition  of  that  argument. 

This  defect  of  the  argument  may  in  the  present  example  in- 


4S2COS 


38  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

deed,  be  easily  supplied,  by  interpolating  the  medium  which  has 
been  left  out.  But  this  cannot  consistently  be  done  by  the  Cos- 
mothetic  Idealist,  who  is  reduced  to  this  dilemma — that  if  he  ad- 
here to  his  hypothesis,  he  must  renounce  the  argument ;  and  if 
he  apply  the  argument,  he  must  renounce  his  hypothesis. 

2.  The  second  condition,  that  of  absolute  truth,  requires  that 
he  who  applies  the  argument  of  common  sense,  by  appealing  to 
the  veracity  of  consciousness,  should  not  himself,  directly  or  indi- 
rectly, admit  that  consciousness  is  ever  false ;  in  other  words,  he 
is  bound,  in  applying  this  argument,  to  apply  it  thoroughly,  im- 
partially, against  himself  no  less  than  against  others,  and  not  ac- 
cording to  the  conveniences  of  his  polemic,  to  approbate  and  rep- 
robate the  testimony  of  our  original  beliefs.  That  our  immediate 
consciousness,  if  competent  to  prove  any  thing,  must  be  compe- 
tent to  prove  every  thing  it  avouches,  is  a  principle  which  none 
have  been  found,  at  least  openly,  to  deny.  It  is  proclaimed  by 
Leibnitz  : — "  Si  1'experience  interne  immediate  pouvait  nous  trom- 
per,  il  ne  saurait  y  avoir  pour  moi  aucune  verite  de  fait,  j'ajoute, 
ni  de  raison.  And  by  Lucretius : 

Denique  nt  in  fabrica  si  p*rava  'st  Regula  prim  a, 
•  Omnia  mendosa  fieri  atque  obstipa  necessum  'st ; 
Sic  igitur  Ratio  tibi  rerum  prava  necesse  'st, 
Falsaque  sit,  falsis  quaccunquo  ab  Sensibus  orta  'st. 

Compare  Plotinus,  En.  V.  Lib.  v.  c.  1 ;  Buffier,  Pr.  Ver.,  §  71  ; 
Reid,  Inq.,  p.  183,  b.  I.  P.  p.  260,  b. 

Yet,  however  notorious  the  condition,  that  consciousness  unless 
held  trustworthy  in  all  its  revelations  cannot  be  held  trustworthy 
in  any ;  marvellous  to  say,  philosophers  have  rarely  scrupled,  on 
the  one  hand,  quietly  to  supersede  the  data  of  consciousness,  so 
often  as  these  did  not  fall  in  with  their  preadopted  opinions ;  and 
on  the  other,  clamorously  to  appeal  to  them,  as  irrecusable  truths, 
so  often  as  they  could  allege  them  in  corroboration  of  their  own, 
or  in  refutation  of  a  hostile  doctrine. 

I  shall  again  take  for  an  example  the  fact  of  perception,  and 
the  violation  of  the  present  condition  by  the  Cosmothetic  Ideal- 


r-r  V-, 

w-*-   <^    TvU     r-m^ 

^  -^ 


- 
PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  39 

t-»7  '•     ~  —    "'  k  ~  i/l~'    V*~~'       &     ^--.<r4-^>V'V^-         ~    f-  V  i         ft_i      -     7     •«— 

ists  —  1°,  in  the  constitution  of  their  own  doctrine  ;  2°,  in  their 
polemic  against  more  extreme  opinions. 

In  the  first  place,  in  the  constitution  of  their  doctrine,  nothing 
can  be  imagined  more  monstrous  than  the  procedure  of  these 
philosophers,  in  attempting  to  vindicate  the  reality  of  a  material 
world,  on  the  ground  of  a  universal  belief  in  its  existence;  and 
yet  rejecting  the  universal  belief  in  the  knowledge  on  which  the 
universal  belief  in  the  existence  is  exclusively  based.  Here  the 
absurdity  is  twofold.  Firstly,  in  postulating  a  conclusion  though 
rejecting  its  premises  ;  secondly,  in  founding  their  doctrine  partly 
on  the  veracity,  and  partly  on  the  mendacity,  of  consciousness. 

In  the  second  place,  with  what  consistency  and  effect  do  the 
Hypothetical  Realists  point  the  argument  of  common  sense 
against  the  obnoxious  conclusions  of  the  thorough-going  Idealist, 
the  Materialist,  the  Absolutist,  the  Nihilist  ? 

Take  first  their  vindication  of  an  external  world  against  the 
Idealist. 

To  prove  this,  do  they,  like  Dr.  Thomas  Brown,  simply  found 
on  the  natural  belief  of  mankind  in  its  existence  ?  But  they 
themselves,  as  we  have  seen,  admitting  the  untruth  of  one  natu- 
ral belief  —  the  belief  in  our  immediate  knowledge  of  external 
things  —  have  no  right  to  presume  upon  the  truth  of  any  other  ; 
and  the  absurdity  is  carried  to  its  climax,  when  the  natural  belief, 
which  they  regard  as  false,  is  the  sole  ground  of  the  natural  be- 
lief which  they  would  assume  and  found  upon  as  true.  Again, 
do  they  like  Descartes,  allege  that  God  would  be  a  deceiver,  were 
we  constrained  by  nature  to  believe  in  the  reality  of  an  unreal 
world  ?  But  the  Deity,  on  their  hypothesis,  is  a  deceiver  ;  for 
that  hypothesis  assumes  that  our  natural  consciousness  deludes  us 
in  the  belief,  that  external  objects  are  immediately,  and  in  them- 
selves perceived.  Either  therefore  maintaining  the  veracity  of 
God,  they  must  surrender  their  hypothesis  ;  or,  maintaining  their 
hypothesis,  they  must  surrender  the  veracity  of  God. 

Against  the  Materialist,  in  proof  of  our  Personal  Identity,  can 
they  maintain  that  consciousness  is  able  to  identify  self,  at  one 


40  PHILOSOPHY    OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

period,  with  self,  at  another ;  when,  in  their  theory  of  percep- 
tion, consciousness,  mistaking  self  for  not-self,  is  unable,  they 
virtually  assert,  to  identify  self  with  self,  even  at  the  same  mo- 
ment of  existence  ? 

How,  again,  can  they  maintain  the  substantial  Individuality 
and  consequent  Immateriality  of  the  thinking  principle,  on  the 
unity  of  consciousness,  when  the  duality  given  in  consciousness 
is  not  allowed  substantially  to  discriminate  the  object  from  the 
subject  in  perception  ? 

But  to  take  a  broader  view.  It  is  a  maxim  in  philosophy, — 
Tliat  substances  are  not  to  be  multiplied  without  necessity ;  in 
other  words, — That  a  plurality  of  principles  are  not  to  be 
assumed,  when  the  phenomena  can  possibly  be  explained  by  one. 
This  regulative  principle,  which  may  be  called  the  law  or  maxim 
of  Parcimony,1  throws  it  therefore  on  the  advocates  of  a  scheme 
of  psychological  Dualism,  to  prove  the  necessity  of  supposing 
more  than  a  single  substance  for  the  phenomena  of  mind  and 
matter. — Further,  we  know  nothing  whatever  of  mind  and  mat- 
ter, considered  as  substances ;  they  are  only  known  to  us  as  a 
twofold  series  of  phenomena :  and  we  can  only  justify,  against 
the  law  of  parcimony,  the  postulation  of  two  substances,  on  the 
ground,  that  the  two  series  of  phenomena  are,  reciprocally,  so 
contrary  and  incompatible,  that  the  one  cannot  be  reduced  to  the 
other,  nor  both  be  supposed  to  coinhere  in  the  same  common  sub- 
stance. Is  this  ground  shown  to  be  invalid  ? — the  presumption 
against  a  dualistic  theory  at  once  recurs,  and  a  Unitarian  scheme 
becomes,  in  the  circumstances,  philosophically  necessary. 

Now  the  doctrine  of  Cosmothetic  Idealism,  in  abolishing  the 
incompatibility  of  the  two  series  of  phenomena,  subverts  the 
only  ground  on  which  a  psychological  Dualism  can  be  maintained. 
This  doctrine  denies  to  mind  a  knowledge  of  aught  beyond  its 
own  modifications.  The  qualities,  which  we  call  material — Exten- 

'The  rule  of  philosophizing,  which  Hamilton  felicitously  calls  the  law  of 
parcimony,  was  often  keenly  applied  hy  the  logical  Occam ;  hence  it  is 
sometimes  designated  as  "  Occam's  razor." — W. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   COMMON    SENSE  41 

sion,  Figure,  &c., — exist  for  us,  only  as  they  are  known  by  us  ;  and, 
on  this  hypothesis,  they  are  known  by  us  only  as  modes  of  mind. 
The  two  series  of  phenomena,  therefore,  so  far  from  being  really, 
as  they  are  apparently,  opposed,  are,  on  this  doctrine,  in  fact, 
admitted  to  be  all  only  manifestations  of  the  same  substance. 

So  far,  therefore,  from  the  Hypothetical  Dualist  being  able  to 
resist  the  conclusion  of  the  Unitarian — whether  Idealist,  Materi- 
alist, or  Absolutist ;  the  fundamental  position  of  his  philosophy — 
that  the  object  immediately  known  is  in  every  act  of  cognition 
identical  with  the  subject  knowing — in  reality,  establishes  any 
and  every  doctrine  but  his  own.  On  this  principle,  the  Idealist 
may  educe  the  object  from  the  subject ;  the  Materialist  educe  the 
subject  from  the  object ;  the  Absolutist  carry  both  up  into  indif- 
ference ;  nay  the  Nihilist  subvert  the  substantial  reality  of  either : 
and  the  Hypothetical  Dualist  is  doomed  to  prove,  that,  while  the 
only  salvation  against  these  melancholy  results  is  an  appeal  to 
the  natural  convictions  of  mankind,  that  the  argument  from 
common  sense  is  in  his  hands  a  weapon,  either  impotent  against 
his  opponents,  or  fatal  equally  to  himself  and  them. 

§  III. THE  ARGUMENT     FROM    COMMON    SENSE   IS    ONE    STRICTLY 

PHILOSOPHICAL   AND    SCIENTIFIC. 

We  have  thus  seen,  though  the  argument  from  common  sense 
be  an  appeal  to  the  natural  convictions  of  mankind,  that  it  is  not 
an  appeal  from  philosophy  to  blind  feeling.  It  is  only  an  appeal, 
from  the  heretical  conclusions  of  particular  philosophies,  to  the 
catholic  principles  of  all  philosophy.  The  prejudice,  which,  on 
this  supposition,  has  sometimes  been  excited  against  the  argu- 
ment, is  groundless. 

Nor  is  it  true,  that  the  argument  from  common  sense  denies 
the  decision  to  the  judgment  of  philosophers,  and  accords  it  to 
the  verdict  of  the  vulgar.  Nothing  can  be  more  erroneous.  We 
admit — nay  we  maintain,  as  D'Alembert  well  expresses  it,  "  that 
the  truth  in  metaphysic,  like  the  truth  in  matters  of  taste,  is  a 


42  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

truth  of  which  all  minds  have  the  germ  within  themselves ;  to 
which  indeed  the  greater  number  pay  no  attention,  but  which 
they  recognize  the  moment  it  is  pointed  out  to  them.  .  .  But  if, 
in  this  sort,  all  are  able  to  understand,  all  are  not  able  to  instruct. 
The  merit  of  conveying  easily  to  others  true  and  simple  notions 
is  much  greater  than  is  commonly  supposed;  for  experience 
proves  how  rarely  this  is  to  be  met  with.  Sound  metaphysical 
ideas  are  common  truths,  which  every  one  apprehends,  but  which 
few  have  the  talent  to  develop.  So  difficult  is  it  on  any  subject 
to  make  our  own  what  belongs  to  every  one."  (Melanges,  t.  iv. 
§  6.)  Or,  to  employ  the  words  of  the  ingenious  Lichtenberg — 
"Philosophy,  twist  the  matter  as  we  may,  is  always  a  sort  of 
chemistry  (Scheidekunst).  The  peasant  employs  all  the  princi- 
ples of  abstract  philosophy,  only  inveloped,  latent,  engaged,  as  the 
men  of  physical  science  express  it ;  the  Philosopher  exhibits  the 
pure  principle."  (Hinterlassene  Schriften,  vol.  ii.  p.  67.) 

The  first  problem  of  Philosophy — and  it  is  one  of  no  easy 
accomplishment — being  thus  to  seek  out,  purify,  and  establish, 
by  intellectual  analysis  and  criticism,  the  elementary  feelings 
or  beliefs,  in  which  are  given  the  elementary  truths  of  which 
all  are  in  possession ;  and  the  argument  from  common  sense 
being  the  allegation  of  these  feelings  or  beliefs  as  explicated 
and  ascertained,  in  proof  of  the  relative  truths  and  their  neces- 
sary consequences ; — this  argument  is  manifestly  dependent  on 
philosophy,  as  an  art,  as  an  acquired  dexterity,  and  cannot, 
notwithstanding  the  errors  which  they  have  so  frequently  com- 
mitted, be  taken  out  of  the  hands  of  the  philosophers.  Common 
Sense  is  like  Common  Law.  Each  may  be  laid  down  as  the 
general  rule  of  decision  ;  but  in  the  one  case  it  must  be  left  to 
the  jurist,  in  the  other  to  the  philosopher,  to  ascertain  what  are 
the  contents  of  the  rule  ;  and  though  in  both  instances  the  com- 
mon man  may  be  cited  as  a  witness,  for  the  custom  or  the  fact, 
in  neither  can  he  be  allowed  to  officiate  as  advocate  or  as  judge. 

f  Kplvttv  a&afipovat  avipat  Idoarn' 
ao<piijv  o-o^if  idiivci,  rlxvas  V  &i>6Te\vos. 

PHOCYLIDES. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  43 

It  must  be  recollected,  also,  that  in  appealing  to  the  conscious- 
ness of  mankind  in  general,  we  only  appeal  to  the  consciousness 
of  those  not  disqualified  to  pronounce  a  decision.  "  In  saying" 
(to  use  the  words  of  Aristotle),  "  simply  and  without  qualifica- 
tion, that  this  or  that  is  a  known  truth,  we  do  not  mean  that  it 
is  in  fact  recognized  by  all,  but  only  by  such  as  are  of  sound 
understanding;  just  as  in  saying  absolutely  that  a  thing  is 
wholesome,  we  must  be  held  to  mean,  to  such  as  are  of  a  hale 
constitution."  (Top.  L.  vi.  c.  4.  §  7.) — We  may,  in  short,  say 
of  the  true  philosopher  what  Erasmus,  in  an  epistle  to  Hutten, 
said  of  Sir  Thomas  Moore  : — "  Nemo  minus  ducitur  vulgi  judi- 
cio  ;  sed  rursus  nemo  minus  abest  a  sensu  communi" 

When  rightly  understood,  therefore,  no  valid  objection  can  be 
taken  to  the  argument  of  common  sense,  considered  in  itself. 
But  it  must  be  allowed  that  the  way  it  has  been  sometimes 
applied  was  calculated  to  bring  it  into  not  unreasonable  disfavor 
with  the  learned.  (See  C.  L.  Reinhold's  Beytrsege  zur  leichtern 
Uebersicht  des  Zustandes  der  Philosophic,  i.  p.  61  ;  and  Nieth- 
hammer  in  his  Journal,  i.  p.  43  sq.)  In  this  country  in  particu- 
lar, some  of  those  who  opposed  it  to  the  skeptical  conclusions  of 
Hume  did  not  sufficiently  counteract  the  notion  which  the  name 
might  naturally  suggest ;  they  did  not  emphatically  proclaim 
that  it  was  no  appeal  to  the  undeveloped  beliefs  of  the  unreflect- 
ive  many ;  and  they  did  not  inculcate  that  it  presupposed  a 
critical  analysis  of  these  beliefs  by  the  philosophers  themselves. 
On  the  contrary,  their  language  and  procedure  might  even,  some- 
times, warrant  an  opposite  conclusion.  This  must  be  admitted 
without  reserve  of  the  writings  of  Beattie,  and  more  especially 
of  Oswald.  But  even  Reid,  in  his  earlier  work,  was  not  so 
explicit  as  to  prevent  his  being  occasionally  classed  in  the  same 
category.  That  the  strictures  on  the  "  Scottish  Philosophy  of 
Common  Sense"  by  Feder,  Lambert,  Tetens,  Eberhard,  Kant, 
Ulrich,  Jacob,  &c.,  were  inapplicable  to  Reid,  is  sufficiently  proved 
by  the  more  articulate  exposition  of  his  doctrine,  afterwards  given 
in  his  Essays  on  the  Intellectual  and  Active  Powers.  But  these 


44  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

criticisms  having  been  once  recorded,  we  need  not  wonder  at 
their  subsequent  repetition,  without  qualification  or  exception,  by 
philosophers,  and  historians  of  philosophy. 

To  take,  as  an  example,  the  judgment  of  the  most  celebrated 
of  these  critics.  "  It  is  not"  (says  Kant,  in  the  preface  to  his 
Prolegomena)  "  without  a  certain  painful  feeling,  that  we  behold 
how  completely  Hume's  opponents,  Reid,  Oswald,  Beattie,  and, 
at  last,  Priestley,  missed  the  point  of  his  problem ;  and  whilst 
they,  on  the  one  hand,  constantly  assumed  the  very  positions 
which  he  did  not  allow,  and  on  the  other,  demonstrated  warmly, 
and  often  with  great  intemperance,  what  he  had  never  dreamt 
of  calling  into  question,  they  so  little  profited  by  the  hint  which 
he  had  given  towards  better  things,  that  all  remained  in  the 
same  position  as  if  the  matter  had  never  been  agitated  at  all. 
The  question  mooted,  was  not —  Whether  the  notion  of  Cause 
were  right,  applicable,  and,  in  relation  to  all  natural  knowledge, 
indispensable  ;  for  of  this  Hume  had  never  insinuated  a  doubt ; 
but —  Whether  this  notion  were  to  the  mind  excogitated  a  priori, 
whether  it  thus  possessed  an  intrinsic  truth,  independent  of  all 
experience,  and  consequently  a  more  extensive  applicability,  one 
not  limited  merely  to  objects  of  experience  ;  on  this  Hume  awaited 
a  disclosure.  In  fact,  the  whole  dispute  regarded  the  origin  of 
this  notion,  and  not  its  indispensability  in  use.  If  the  former 
be  made  out,  all  that  respects  the  conditions  of  its  use,  and  the 
sphere  within  which  it  can  be  validly  applied,  follow  as  corolla- 
ries, of  themselves.  In  order  satisfactorily  to  solve  the  problem, 
it  behooved  the  opponents  of  this  illustrious  man  to  have  pene- 
trated deeply  into  the  nature  of  the  mind,  considered  as  exclu- 
sively occupied  in  pure  thinking :  but  this  did  not  suit  them. 
They,  therefore,  discovered  a  more  convenient  method,  in  an 
appeal  to  the  common  understanding  of  mankind  (gemeiner 
Menschenverstand) " — and  so  forth  ;  showing  that  Kant  un- 
derstood by  the  common  sense  of  the  Scottish  philosophers, 
only  good  sense,  sound  understanding,  <fcc.  (Prolegomena, 
p.  10.) 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  45 

I  will  not  object  to  the  general  truth  of  the  statements  in  this 
passage ;  nor  to  their  bearing  in  so  far  as  they  are  applied  to  the 
British  philosophers  in  general.  For  Reid,  however,  I  must 
claim  an  exemption ;  and  this  I  shall  establish  with  regard  to 
the  very  notion  of  Cause  to  which  Kant  refers. 

That  from  the  limited  scope  of  his  earlier  work,  the  "Inquiry" 
Reid  had  not  occasion  to  institute  a  critical  analysis  of  the  notion 
of  Causality,  affords  no  ground  for  holding  that  he  did  not  con- 
sider such  analysis  to  be  necessary  in  the  establishment  of  that 
and  the  other  principles  of  common  sense.  This,  indeed,  he  in 
that  very  work,  once  and  again,  explicitly  declares.  "  We  have 
taken  notice  of  several  original  principles  of  belief  in  the  course 
of  this  inquiry ;  and  when  other  faculties  of  the  mind  are  exam- 
ined we  shall  find  more.  *  *  *  *  A  clear  explication  and 
enumeration  of  the  principles  of  a  common  sense,  is  one  of  the 
chief  desiderata  in  Logic.  We  have  only  considered  such  of 
them  as  occurred  in  the  examination  of  the  Jive  senses.r  And 
accordingly  in  his  subsequent  and  more  extensive  work,  the 
"Essays  on  the  Intellectual  powers,"  published  within  two  years 
after  Kant's  "Prolegomena,"  we  find  the  notion  of  Causality, 
among  others,  investigated  by  the  very  same  critical  process 
which  the  philosopher  of  Koenigsberg  so  successfully  employed ; 
though  there  be  no  reason  whatever  for  surmising  that  Reid  had 
ever  heard  the  name,  far  less  seen  the  works,  of  his  illustrious 
censor.  The  criterion — the  index  by  which  Kant  discriminates 
the  notions  of  pure  or  a  priori  origin  from  those  elaborated  from 
experience,  is  their  quality  of  necessity  ;  and  its  quality  of  neces- 
sity is  precisely  the  characteristic  by  which  Reid  proves  that, 
among  others,  the  notion  of  causality  cannot  be  an  educt  of 
experience,  but  must  form  a  part  of  the  negative  cognitions  of 
the  mind  itself.  It  is  doubtful,  indeed,  whether  Reid,  like  Kant, 
was  even  indebted  to  Leibnitz  for  his  knowledge  of  this  touch- 
stone ;  but  the  fact  of  its  familiar  employment  by  him  in  the  dis- 
crimination and  establishment  of  the  fundamental  principles  of 
thought,  more  especially  in  his  later  works,  sufficiently  shows, 


46  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

that  the  reproach  of  an  uncritical  application  of  the  argument 
from  common  sense,  made  against  the  Scottish  philosophers  in 
general,  was,  at  least  in  reference  to  him,  unfounded.  Reid, 
however — and  to  his  honor  be  it  spoken — stands  alone  among 
the  philosophers  of  this  country  in  his  appreciation  and  employ- 
ment of  the  criterion  of  necessity. 

[Since  writing  the  above,  I  have  met  with  the  following  pas- 
sage in  the  "  Lettere  Philosophiche"  of  Baron  Galuppi,  one  of 
the  two  most  distinguished  of  the  present  metaphysicians  of  Italy. 

"  Tbe  philosopher  of  Koenigsberg  makes  Hume  thus  reason : 
— '  Metaphysical  Causality  is  not  in  the  objects  observed ;  it  is, 
therefore,  a  product  of  imagination  engendered  upon  custom.' — 
This  reasoning,  says  Kant,  is  inexact.  It  ought  to  have  pro- 
ceeded thus : — '  Causality  is  not  in  the  things  observed ;  it  is 
therefore  in  the  observer.'  But  here  Kant  does  not  apprehend 
Hume's  meaning,  whose  reasoning,  as  I  have  stated  in  the  eighth 
letter,  is  altogether  different.  Metaphysical  causality,  he  argues, 
is  not  in  the  things  observed ;  it  cannot,  therefore,  be  in  the 
observer,  in  whom  all  is  derived  from  the  things  observed.  Reid 
fully  understands  the  purport  of  Hume's  argument,  and  meets  it 
precisely  and  conclusively  with  this  counter-reasoning : — '  Meta- 
physical Causality  is  a  fact  in  our  intellect;  it  is  not  derived 
from  the  things  observed,  and  is  therefore  a  subjective  law  of  the 
observer.'  Kant  objects,  that  Reid  has  not  attended  to  the  state 
of  the  question.  There  is  no  dispute,  he  says,  about  the  exist- 
ence of  the  notion  of  metaphysical  causality;  the  only  doubt 
regards  its  origin.  This  is  altogether  erroneous.  Hume  being 
unable  to  find  the  origin  of  the  notion  in  experience,  denied  its 
existence.  Kant's  criticism  of  Reid  is  therefore  unjust."  P.  225. 

Kant,  I  think,  is  here  but  hardly  dealt  with.  Hume  did  not, 
certainly,  deny  the  existence  of  the  notion  of  causality,  meaning 
thereby  its  existence  as  a  mental  phenomenon ;  he  only  (on  the 
hypothesis  of  the  then  dominant  doctrine  of  sensualism)  showed 
that  it  had  no  objective  validity — no  legitimate  genesis.  In  dif- 
ferent points  of  view,  therefore,  Hume  may  be  said  to  deny,  and 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  47 

not  to  deny,  its  reality.  The  dispute  is  a  mere  logomachy. 
Kant  also  stands  clear  of  injustice  towards  Reid,  when  it  is  con- 
sidered that  his  strictures  on  the  Scottish  philosophers  were  prior 
to  the  appearance  of  the  "  Essays  on  the  Intellectual  Powers," 
the  work  in  which  Reid  first  expounded  his  doctrine  of  causality.] 

§    IV. ON   THE   ESSENTIAL  CHARACTERS  BY  WHICH   THE    PRINCI- 
PLES OF  COMMON  SENSE  ARE  DISCRIMINATED. 

It  now  remains  to  consider  what  are  the  essential  notes  or 
characters  by  which  we  are  enabled  to  distinguish  our  original 
from  our  derivative  convictions.  These  characters,  I  think,  may 
be  reduced  to  four; — 1°,  their  Incomprehensibility — 2°,  their 
Simplicity — 3°,  their  Necessity  and  absolute  Universality — 4°, 
their  comparative  Evidence  and  Certainty. 

1.  In  reference  to  the  first; — A  conviction  is  incomprehensible 
when  there  is  merely  given  us  in  consciousness—  That  its  object 
is  (on  s'oVi) ;  and  when  we  are  unable  to  comprehend  through  a 
higher  notion  or  belief,  Why  or  How  it  is  (Jion  stfri).     When 
we  are  able  to  comprehend  why  or  how  a  thing  is,  the  belief  of 
the  existence  of  that  thing  is  not  a  primary  datum  of  conscious- 
ness, but  a  subsumption  under  the  cognition   or  belief  which 
affords  its  reason. 

2.  As  to  the  second ; — It  is  manifest  that  if  a  cognition  or 
belief  be  made  up  of,  and  can  be  explicated  into,  a  plurality  of 
cognitions  or  beliefs,  that,  as  compound,  it  cannot  be  original. 

3.  Touching  the  third ; — Necessity  and  Universality  may  be 
regarded  as  coincident.     For  when  a  belief  is  necessary  it  is,  eo 
ipso,  universal ;  and  that  a  belief  is  universal,  is  a  certain  index 
that  it  must  be  necessary.     (See  Leibnitz,  Nouveaux  Essais,  L.  i. 
§  4,  p.  32.)     To  prove  the  necessity,  the  universality  must,  how- 
ever, be  absolute ;  for  a  relative  universality  indicates  no  more 
than  custom  and  education,  howbeit  the  subjects  themselves  may 
deem  that  they  follow  only  the  dictates  of  nature.    As  St.  Jerome 
has  it — "  Unaquaeque  gens  hoc  legem  naturae  putat,  quyd  didicit." 


48  PHILOSOPHY   OF  COMMON   SENSE. 

It  is  to  be  observed,  that  the  necessity  here  spoken  of,  is  of  two 
kinds.  There  is  one  necessity  when  we  cannot  construe  it  to  our 
minds  as  possible,  that  the  deliverance  of  consciousness  should 
not  be  true.  This  logical  impossibility  occurs  in  the  case  of 
what  are  called  necessary  truths — truths  of  reason  or  intelligence ; 
as  in  the  law  of  causality,  the  law  of  substance,  and  still  more  in 
the  laws  of  identity,  contradiction,  and  excluded  middle.  There 
is  another  necessity,  when  it  is  not  unthinkable,  that  the  deliver- 
ance of  consciousness  may  possibly  be  false,  but  at  the  same 
time,  when  we  cannot  but  admit,  that  this  deliverance  is  of  such 
or  such  a  purport.  This  is  seen  in  the  case  of  what  are  called  con- 
tingent truths,  or  truths  of  fact.  Thus,  for  example,  I  can  theoreti- 
cally suppose  that  the  external  object  I  am  conscious  of  in  percep- 
tion, may  be,  in  reality,  nothing  but  a  mode  of  mind  or  self.  I  am 
unable,  however,  to  think  that  it  does  not  appear  to  me — that 
consciousness  does  not  compel  me  to  regard  it — as  external — as 
a  mode  of  matter  or  not-self.  And  such  being  the  case,  I  cannot 
practically  believe  the  supposition  I  am  able  speculatively  to 
maintain.  For  I  cannot  believe  this  supposition,  without  believ- 
ing that  the  last  ground  of  all  belief  is  not  to  be  believed ;  which 
is  self-contradictory.  "  Nature,"  says  Pascal,  "  confounds  the 
Pyrrhonist;"  and,  among  many  similar  confessions,  those  of 
Hume,  of  Fichte,  of  Hommel  may  suffice  for  an  acknowledg- 
ment of  the  impossibility  which  the  Skeptic,  the  Idealist,  the 
Fatalist  finds  in  practically  believing  the  scheme  which  he  views 
as  theoretically  demonstrated.  The  argument  from  common 
sense,  it  jpay  be  observed,  is  of  principal  importance  in  reference 
to  the  class  of  contingent  truths.  The  others,  from  their  converse 
being  absolutely  incogitable,  sufficiently  guard  themselves. 

As  this  criterion  of  Necessity  and  Universality  is  signalized  by 
nearly  the  whole  series  of  authorities  adduced  in  the  sequel,  it 
would  be  idle  to  refer  to  any  in  particular. 

4.  The  fourth  and  last  character  of  our  original  beliefs  is  their 
comparative  Evidence  and  Certainty.  This,  along  with  the  third, 
is  well  stated  by  Aristotle. — "  What  appears  to  all,  that  we  affirm 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  49 

to  be;  and  he  who  rejects  this  belief  will  assuredly  advance 
nothing  better  deserving  of  credence"  And  again : — "  If  we  know 
and  believe  through  certain  original  principles,  we  must  know  and 
believe  these  with  paramount  certainty,  for  the  very  reason  that 
we  know  and  believe  all  else  through  them."  And  such  are  the 
truths  in  regard  to  which  the  Aphrodisian  says, — "  though  some 
men  may  verbally  dissent,  all  men  are  in  their  hearts  agreed." 
This  constitutes  the  first  of  Buffer's  essential  qualities  of  primary 
truths,  which  is,  as  he  expresses  it, — "  to  be  so  clear,  that  if  we  at- 
tempt to  prove  or  to  disprove  them,  this  can  be  done  only  by 
propositions  which  are  manifestly  neither  more  evident  n.or  more 
certain"  Testimonies,  nn.  3, 10,  63.  Compare  the  others,  passim. 
A  good  illustration  of  this  character  is  afforded  by  the  assur- 
ance— to  which  we  have  already  so  frequently  referred — that  in 
perception,  mind  is  immediately  cognizant  of  matter.  How  self, 
can  be  conscious  of  not-self,  hoiv  mind  can  be  cognizant  of  matter, 
we  do  not  know;  but  we  know  as  little  how  mind  can  be  per- 
cipient of  itself.  In  both  cases  we  only  know  the  fact,  on  the 
authority  of  consciousness;  and  when  the  conditions  of  the  prob- 
lem are  rightly  understood — when  it  is  established  that  it  is  only 
the  primary  qualities  of  body  which  are  apprehended  in  them- 
selves, and  this  only  in  so  far  as  they  are  in  immediate  relation  to 
the  organ  of  sense,  the  difficulty  in  the  one  case  is  not  more  than 
in  the  other.  This  in  opposition  to  the  simple  Idealists.  But  the 
Cosmothetic  Idealists — the  Hypothetical  Realists  are  far  less  rea- 
sonable; who,  in  the  teeth  of  consciousness,  on  the  ground  of 
inconceivability,  deny  to  mind  all  cognizance  of  matter,  yet  bestow 
on  it  the  more  inconceivable  power  of  representing,  and  truly 
representing  to  itself  the  external  world,  which,  ex  hypothesi,  it 
does  not  know.  These  theorists  do  not  substitute,  in  place  of  the 
simple  fact  which'  they  repudiate,  another  more  easy  and  intelli- 
gible. On  the  contrary,  they  gratuitously  involve  themselves  in  a 
maze  of  unwarrantable  postulates,  difficulties,  improbabilities,  and 
self-contradictions,  of  such  a  character,  that  we  well  may  wonder, 
how  the  doctrine  of  Cosmothetic  Idealism  has  been  able  to  enlist 

3 


50  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

under  its  banners,  not  a  few  merely,  but  the  immense  majority  of 
modern  philosophers.  The  Cosmothetic  Idealists,  in  truth,  violate 
in  their  hypothesis  every  condition  of  a  legitimate  hypothesis.1 


§  V. — THE  NOMENCLATURE,  THAT  is,  THE  VARIOUS  APPELLATIONS 

BY  WHICH   THE  PRINCIPLES    OF    COMMON    SENSE    HAVE  BEEN 
DESIGNATED. 

It  is  evident  that  the  foundations  of  our  knowledge  cannot  prop- 
erly be  themselves  the  objects  of  our  knowledge ;  for  as  by  them 
we  know  all  else,  by  naught  else  can  they  themselves  be  known. 
We  know  them  indeed,  but  only  in  the  fact,  that  with  and  through 
them  we  know.  This  it  is,  which  has  so  generally  induced  philos- 
ophers to  bestow  on  them  appellations  marking  out  the  circum- 
stance, that  in  different  points  of  view,  they  may,  and  they  may 
not,  be  regarded  as  cognitions.  They  appear  as  .cognitions,  in  so 
far  as  we  are  conscious  that  (6Vi)  they  actually  are ;  they  do  not 
appear  as  cognitions,  in  so  far  as  in  them  we  are  not  conscious 
how  (<SioVi)  they  possibly  can  be.  Philosophers  accordingly,  even 
when  they  view  and  designate  them  as  cognitions,  are  wont  to 
qualify  their  appellation  under  this  character,  by  some  restrictive 
epithet.  For  example,  Cicero  styling  them  intelligentice  does  not 
do  so  simply  ;  but  i.  inchoatce,  i.  adumbrates,  i.  obscurw,  <fec.  A 
similar  limitation  is  seen  in  the  terms  ultimate  facts,  primary 
data,  <fec.,  of  consciousness ;  for  these  and  the  analogous  expres- 
sions are  intended  to  show,  that  while  their  existence  is  within  our 
apprehension,  the  reason  or  ground  of  their  existence  is  beyond 
our  comprehension. 

On  the  other  hand  we  see  the  prevalence  of  the  opposite  point 
of  view  in  the  nomenclatures  which  seem  to  regard  them  not  as 
cognitions  wholly  within  consciousness,  but  as  the  bases  of  cogni- 
tion, and  therefore  partly  without,  and  partly  within  conscious- 
ness. Such  is  the  scope  of  the  analogical  designations  applied  to 

1  For  illustration  of  this  see  chapter  first  of  the  second  part  of  this  vol. —  W. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMMON   SENSE.  51 

them,  of  Senses,  Feelings,  Instincts,  Revelations,  Inspirations, 
Suggestions,  Beliefs,  Assents,  Holdings,  <fec.  It  is  the  inexplica- 
ble and  equivocal  character  which  the  roots  of  our  knowledge 
thus  exhibit,  to  which  we  ought  to  attribute  the  inadequacy,  the 
vacillation  and  the  ambiguity  of  the  terms  by  which  it  has  been 
attempted  to  denote  them ;  and  it  is  with  an  indulgent  recollec- 
tion of  this,  that  we  ought  to  criticise  all  and  each  of  these  de- 
nominations,— which,  after  this  general  observation,  I  proceed  to 
consider  in  detail.  In  doing  this,  I  shall  group  them  according 
to  the  principal  points  of  view  from  which  it  would  seem  they 
were  imposed. 

I.  The  first  condition,  the  consideration  of  which  seems  to  have 
determined  a  certain  class  of  names,  is  that  of  Immediacy.  In  our 
primitive  cognitions  we  apprehend  existence  at  once,  and  without 
the  intervention  of  aught  between  the  apprehending  mind  and  the 
existence  apprehended. 

Under  this  head  the  first  appellations  are  those  which,  with 
some  qualifying  attribute,  apply  to  these  cognitions  the  name  of 
— Sense. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  observe,  that  the  words  corresponding 
to  the  term  Sense  and  its  conjugates,  have  in  no  language  been 
limited  to  our  perceptions  of  the  external  world,  or  to  the  feeling 
of  our  bodily  affections.  In  every  language  they  have  been  ex- 
tended to  the  operations  of  the  higher  faculties.  Indeed,  it  can 
be  shown,  in  almost  every  instance,  that  the  names  which  ulti- 
mately came  to  be  appropriated  to  the  purest  acts  of  intelligence, 
were,  in  their  origin,  significant  of  one  or  other  of  the  functions  of 
our  organic  sensibility.  Such  among  others  is  the  rationale  of 
the  terms  moral  sense  {sensus  boni),  logical  sense  (sensus  vcri), 
cesthetical  sense  (sensus  pulchri],  which,  even  in  modern  philos- 
ophy, have  been  very  commonly  employed,  though  not  employ- 
ed to  denote  any  thing  lower  than  the  apprehensive  faculty  of 
intelligence  in  these  different  relations.  On  this  transference  of 
the  term  Sense,  see  Aristotle  (De  Anima,  L.  iii.  c.  3) — Quintil- 
ian  (Instit  L.  viii.  c.  5) — Budaeus  (in  Pandectas,  Tit.  i.) — Sal- 


'•  * 

52  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMMON   SENSE. 

masius  (ad  Solinum,  p.  141) — Grotius  (ad  Acta  Apostolorum, 
vii.  32,  and  I.  Petri,  i.  12) — Claubergius  (Exercitationes,  83-88) 
— Burmannus  (ad  Phaedrura,  L.  ii.  Ep.  13) — Gronovius  (Dia- 
tribe ad  Statium,  c.  43) — J.  A.  Fabricius  (Programma  De  Gus- 
tatu  Pulcri,  p.  5),  <fec.,  &c. 

This  being,  in  general,  premised,  we  have  now  to  consider  in 
particular:  1°,  the  ancient  term  Common  Sense;  and  2°,  the 
modern  term  Internal  Sense,  as  applied  to  our  elementary  con- 
sciousness. 

1.  SENSE  Common  (sensus  communis,  sensus  communes,  sensus 
publicus,  sens  commun,  senso  comune,  Gemeinsinn),  principles, 
axioms,  maxims,  truths,  judgments,  &c.,  of. 

The  Greek  tongue  was  for  a  long  period  destitute  of  any 
word  to  denote  Consciousness;  and  it  was  only  after  both  the 
philosophy  and  language  of  Greece  had  passed  their  prime,  that 
the  terms  rfuvai<rt)avojj,a»  and  rfuvaiVdrio'is  were  applied,  not  merely 
to  denote  the  apperception  of  sense,  but  the  primary  condition  of 
knowledge  in  general.  The  same  analogy  explains  how  in  the 
Latin  tongue  the  term  Sensus  Communis  came,  from  a  very  an- 
cient period,  to  be  employed  with  a  similar  Latitude ;  and  as  Lat- 
in, even  after  its  extinction  as  a  living  language,  was  long  the 
exclusive  vehicle  of  religion  and  philosophy  throughout  western 
Europe,  we  need  not  wonder  that  the  analysis  and  its  expression, 
the  thing  and  the  word,  passed  not  only  into  the  dialects  in  which 
the  Romanic,  but  into  those  also  in  which  the  Teutonic  element 
was  predominant.  But  as  the  expression  is  not  unambiguous,  it 
is  requisite  to  distinguish  its  significations. 

The  various  meanings  in  which  the  term  Common  Sense  is  met 
with,  in  ancient  and  modern  times,  may  I  think  be  reduced  to 
four  ;  and  these  fall  into  two  categories,  according  as  it  is,  or  is 
not,  limited  to  the  sphere  of  sense  proper. 

As  restricted  to  sense  proper. 

a. — Under  this  head  Common  Sense  has  only  a  single  mean- 
ing ;  that,  to  wit,  which  it  obtained  in  the  Peripatetic  philosophy 
and  its  derivative  systems.  Common  Sense  (XOIVT)  aiffSytfis)  was 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  COMMON   SENSE.  53 

employed  by  Aristotle  to  denote  the  faculty  in  which  the  various 
reports  of  the  several  senses  are  reduced  to  the  unity  of  a  common 
apperception.  This  signification  is  determinate.  The  others  are 
less  precisely  discriminated  from  each  other. 

(I  may  observe,  however,  that  a  second  meaning  under  this 
category  might  be  found  in  the  Cwncesthesis,  common  feeling  or 
sensation,  by  which  certain  German  physiologists  have  denomi- 
nated the  sensus  vagus  or  vital  sense,  and  which  some  of  them 
translate  by  common  sense  (Gemeinsinn).  But  as  the  term  in 
this  signification  has  been  employed  recently,  rarely,  abusively, 
and  without  imposing  authority,  I  shall  discount  it.) 

As  not  limited  to  the  sphere  of  sense  proper,  it  comprises  three 
meanings. 

b. — The  second  signification  of  Common  Sense  is  when  it  de- 
notes the  complement  of  those  cognitions  or  convictions  which  we 
receive  from  nature  ;  which  all  men  therefore  possess  in  common ; 
and  by  which  they  test  the  truth  of  knowledge,  and  the  morality 
of  actions.  This  is  the  meaning  in  which  the  expression  is  now 
emphatically  employed  in  philosophy,  and  which  may  be,  there- 
fore, called  its  philosophical  signification.  As  authorities  for  its 
use  in  this  relation,  Reid  (I.  P.  p.  423-425')  has  adduced  legiti- 
mate examples  from  Bentley,  Shaftesbury,  Fenelon,  Buffier,  and 
Hume.  The  ethers  which  he  quotes  from  Cicero  and  Priestley, 
can  hardly  be  considered  as  more  than  instances  of  the  employ- 
ment of  the  words;  for  the  former,  in  the  particular  passage 
quoted,  does  not  seem  to  mean  by  "sensus  communes"  more  than 
the  faculty  of  apprehending  sensible  relations  which  all  possess  ; 
and  the  latter  explicitly  states,  that  he  uses  the  words  in  a  mean- 
Ing  (the  third)  which  we  are  hereafter  to  consider.  Mr.  Stewart 
(Elements,  vol.  ii.  c.  7,  sect.  3,  p.  76),  to  the  examples  of  Reid, 
adds  only  a  single,  and  that  not  an  unambiguous  instance,  from 
Bayle.  It  therefore  still  remains  to  show  that  in  this  signification 
its  employment  is  not  only  of  authorized  usage,  but,  in  fact,  one 

1  The  reference  is  to  Hamilton's  edition  of  Reid. —  W. 


54  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMO^N   SENSE. 

long  and  universally  established.  This  is  done  in  the  series  of 
testimonies  I  shall  adduce — principally  indeed  to  prove  that  the 
doctrine  of  Common  Sense,  notwithstanding  many  schismatic- 
aberrations,  is  the  one  catholic  and  perennial  philosophy,  but 
which  also  concur  in  showing  that  this  too  is  the  name  under 
which  that  doctrine  has  for  two  thousand  years  been  most  famil- 
iarly known,  at  least,  in  the  western  world.  Of  these  Lucretius, 
Cicero,  Horace,  Seneca,  Tertullian,  Arnobius,  and  St.  Augustin  ex- 
hibit the  expression  as  recognized  in  the  language  and  philosophy 
of  ancient  Rome ;  while  some  fifty  others  prove  its  scientific  and 
colloquial  usage  in  every  country  of  modern  Europe.  (See  Nos. 
5-8,  12,  13,  15,  23,  25,  27-29,  31,  32,  34,  36,  38-44,  47,  48, 
51-53,  55,  56,  58-69,  71-75,  78-85,  90.) 

The  objections  to  the  term  Common  Sense  in  this  its  philoso- 
phical application  are  obvious  enough.  It  is  not  unambiguous. 
To  ground  an  objection  it  has  sometimes  unintentionally,  more 
frequently  willingly,  been  taken  in  the  third  signification  (v.  p.  56 
c.)  ;  and  its  employment  has  even  afforded  a  ground  for  suppo- 
sing that  Reid  and  other  Scottish  philosophers  proposed  under  it 
a  certain  peculiar  sense,  distinct  from  intelligence,  by  which  truth 
is  apprehended  or  revealed.  See  Fries,  in  Testimonies  No.  70, 
and  Franke,  Leben  des  Gefuehls,  §  42. 

On  the  other  hand,  besides  that  no  other  expression,  to  which 
valid  objection  may  not  be  taken,  has  yet  been  proposed  ;  and  be- 
sides, that  it  has  itself  been  ratified  by  ancient  and  general  usage ; 
the  term  Common  Sense  is  not  inappropriately  applied  to  denote 
an  original  source  of  knowledge  common  to  all  mankind — a 
fountain  of  truths  intelligible  indeed,  but  like  those  of  the  senses 
revealed  immediately  as  facts  to  be  believed,  but  not  as  possibili- 
ties to  be  explained  and  understood.  On  this  ground  the  term 
Sense  has  found  favor,  in  this  application,  with  the  most  ancient 
and  the  most  recent  philosophers.  For  example — Aristotle  (Eth. 
Nic.  L.  vi.  c.  11,  and  Eth.  Eud.  L.  v.  c.  11)  says  that  voug,  Intelli- 
gence proper,  the  faculty  of  first  principle  is,  in  certain  respects,  a 
Sense  ;  and  the  ancient  Scholiast,  Eustratius,  in  his  commentary 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  55 

on  the  former  work  (f.  110,  b)  explains  it  by  observing,  "that 
Intelligence  and  Sense  have  this  exclusively  in  common — they 
are  both  immediate  cognitions"  Hence  it  is  that  Aristotle  (Me- 
taph.  xii.  Y),  Theophrastus  (see  Test.  No.  4),  and  Plotinus  (En.  vi. 
L.  vii.  cc.  36,  39,  L.  ix.  c.  7)  assimilate  intellection,  the  noetic  en- 
ergy, to  touching  in  particular.*  In  reference  to  the  apprehension 


*  Among  the  Greeks  the  expression  "  Common  Intellect"  was,  however, 
rarely,  if  ever,  used  for  Common  Sense  in  this  its  second,  or  philosophical 
meaning.  The  learned  Mr.  Harris  (in  a  note  on  his  Dialogue  concerning 
Happiness)  in  stating  the  doctrine  of  the  Greek  philosophers,  says — "  The 
recognition  of  self-evident  truths,  or  at  least  the  ability  to  recognize  them,  is 
called  icoivds  »ouj,  '  common  sense,'1  as  being  a  sense  common  to  all,  except 
lunatics  and  idiots."  This  is  inaccurate  ;  for  his  statement  of  what  was 
usual  among  the  Greeks  is  founded  (I  presume,  for  he  does  not  allege  any 
authority)  on  a  single,  and  singular,  example  of  such  usage.  It  is  that  of 
Epictetus  (Diss.  Arriani,  L.  iii.  c.  6).  This  philosopher  seems  in  that  pas- 
sage to  give  the  name  of  common  intellect  (xotvtis  voDf,  which  H.  Wolflus  and 
Upton  translate  by  sensus  communis)  to  the  faculty  of  those  common  notions 
possessed  by  all  who  are  of  sound  mind.  Now  were  the  epithet  common 
here  applied  to  intellect  because  intellect  is  the  repository  of  such  common  , 
notions  or  inasmuch  as  it  is  common  to  all  men — this,  however  likely  a 
usage,  is,  I  am  confident,  the  only,  or  almost  the  only,  example  to  be  fo'ird 
in  antiquity  of  such  a  nomenclature;  for  though  the  expression  in  question 
is  frequent  among  the  Greek  writers,  I  do  not  recollect  to  have  elsewhere 
met  with  it  in  a  similar  import.  It  is  employed  in  two  significations. — 1°, 
with  vovs  in  its  stricter  meaning,  for  the  highest  faculty  of  mind,  KOIV&S  is 
used  to  mark  its  impersonality,  its  unity,  its  general  identity  in  men,  or  in 
man  and  God.  2°,  With  vovs,  in  its  looser  meaning  Ibr  mind  in  general,  it 
denotes  a  community  of  opinion  or  a  community  of  social  sentiment,  corres- 
ponding to  Sensus  Communis  among  the  Eomans,  to  be  spoken  of  as  the 
fourth  signification.  The  only  second  instance,  I  believe,  that  can  be  brought 
is  from  the  Aphrodisian.  (On  the  Soul,  f.  138,  ed.  Aid.)  But  there  the  epi- 
thet common  is  given  to  the  natural  in  opposition  to  the  acquired  intellect, 
exclusively  from  the  circumstance  that  the  former  is  possessed  by  all  of  sound 
mind,  the  latter  only  by  some  ;  nay,  from  a  comparison  of  the  two  passages 
it  is  evident,  that  Alexander  in  his  employment  of  the  expression  had  Epic- 
tetus and  this  very  instance  immediately  in  his  eye.  But  it  is  in  fact  by  no 
means  improbable  that  Epictetus  here  uses  the  expression  only  in  the  first 
of  its  two  ordinary  significations — as  a  Stoic,  to  denote  the  individual 
intellect,  considered  as  a  particle  of  the  universal ;  and  this  even  the  com- 
mentators are  inclined  to  believe.  See  Upton,  ad  locum.  In  illustration  of 
this  : — Plutarch  in  his  treatise  '  On  Common  Notions  against  the  Stoica,' 
uses  (after  irapa  or  Kara)  rfiv  icoivqv  swoiav  or  rat  KOIVUJ  iwoi'if  at  least  twenty- 
three  times,  and  without  the  adjective  rfiv  Ivvoiav  or  rag  Ivmlas,  at  least 


56  PHILOSOPHY   OF  COMMON   SENSE. 

of  primary  truths,  '  the  soul,'  says  Dr.  John  Smith,  '  has  its 
senses,  in  like  manner  as  the  l>ody '  (Select  Discourses) ;  and  his 
friend  Dr.  Henry  More  designates  the  same  by  the  name  of  intel- 
lectual sense.  (Test.  n.  45.)  Jacobi  defines  Vernunft,  his  facul- 
ty of '  intellectual  intuitions '  as  '  the  sense  of  the  supersensible.' 
(Test.  n.  87.)  De  la  Mennais  could  not  find  a  more  suitable  ex- 
pression whereby  to  designate  his  theological  system  of  univer- 
sal consent,  or  general  reason,  than  that  of  Common  Sense  ; 
and  Borger  in  his  classical  work  '  De  Mysticismo '  prefers  sensus 
as  the  least  exceptionable  word  by  which  to  discriminate  those 
notions,  of  which,  while  we  are  conscious  of  the  existence,  we  are 
ignorant  of  the  reason  and  origin.  '  Cum  igitur,  qui  has  notiones 
sequitur,  ilium  sensum  sequi  dicimus,  hoc  dicimus,  illas  notiones 
non  esse  ratione  [ratiocinatione]  quaesitas,sedomni  argumentatione 
antiquiores.  Eo  autem  majori  jure  eos  sensus  vocabulo  complecti- 
mur,  quod,  adeo  obscurae  sunt,  ut  eorum  ne  distincte  quidem  no- 
bis  conscii  simus,  sed  eas  esse,  ex  efficacia  earuin  intelligamus,  i. 
e.  ex  vi  qua  animum  afficiunt.'  (P.  259,  ed.  2.)  See  also  of  Testi- 
monies the  numbers  already  specified. 

c. — In  the  third  signification,  Common  Sense  may  be  used 
with  emphasis  on  the  adjective  or  on  the  substantive. 

In  the  former  case,  it  denotes  such  an  ordinary  complement  of 
intelligence,  that,  if  a  person  be  deficient  therein,  he  is  accounted 
mad  or  foolish. 

Sensus  communis  is  thus  used  in  Phaedrus,  L.  i.  7  ; — but  Hor- 


'tcenty-one  times ;  which  last,  by  the  by,  Xylauder  always  renders  by  '  Sen- 
sus communis.'  Now  how  many  timea  does  Plutarch  use  as  a  synonym, 
icoiviv  vovvl  Not  once.  He  does,  indeed,  once  employ  it  and  Kenya;  Qpi- 
vaf  (p.  1077  of  the  folio  editions);  but  in  the  sense  of  an  agreement  in 
thought  with  others — the  sense  which  it  obtains  also  in  the  only  other  ex- 
ample of  the  expression  to  be  found  in  his  writings.  (P.  529  D). 

I  see  Forcellini  (voce  Sensus)  has  fallen  into  the  same  inaccuracy  as 
Harris. 

I  may  here  notice  that  Aristotle  does  not  apply  the  epithet  common  to  in- 
tellect at  all;  for  roB  KOIVOU  (De  An.  i.  S.  §  5)  does  not,  as  Thcrnistius  sup- 
poses, mean  '  of  the  common  [intellect]'  but  '  of  the  composite,'  made  up 
of  soul  and  body. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  57 

ace,  Serai  i.  iii.  66,  and  Juvenal,  Sat.  viii.  73,  are  erroneously, 
though  usually,  interpreted  in  this  signification.  In  modern  La- 
tinity  (as  in  Milton  contra  Salmasium,  c.  8)  and  in  most  of  the 
vulgar  languages,  the  expression  in  this  meaning  is  so  familiar 
that  it  would  be  idle  to  adduce  examples.  Sir  James  Mackintosh 
(Dissertations,  &c.,  p.  387  of  collected  edition)  indeed,  imagines 
that  this  is  the  only  meaning  of  common  sense  ;  and  on  this 
ground  censures  Reid  for  the  adoption  of  the  term  ;  and  even  Mr. 
Stewart's  objections  to  it  seem  to  proceed  on  the  supposition, 
that  this  is  its  proper  or  more  accredited  signification.  See  Ele- 
ments ii.  ch.  1,  sec.  2.  This  is  wrong ;  but  Reid  himself,  it  must 
be  acknowledged,  does  not  sufficiently  distinguish  between  the 
second  and  third  acceptations  ;  as  may  be  seen  from  the  tenor  of 
the  second  chapter  of  the  sixth  Essay  on  the  Intellectual  Powers, 
but  especially  from  the  concluding  chapter  of  the  Inquiry. 

In  the  latter  case,  it  expresses  native,  practical  intelligence, 
natural  prudence,  mother  wit,  tact  in  behavior,  acuteness  in  the 
observation  of  character,  &c.,  in  contrast  to  habits  of  acquired 
learning,  or  of  speculation  away  from  the  affairs  of  life.  I  recol- 
lect no  unambiguous  example  of  the  phrase,  in  this  precise  ac- 
ceptation, in  any  ancient  author.  In  the  modern  languages,  and 
rc,ore  particularly  in  French  and  English,  it  is  of  ordinary  occur- 
rence. Thus,  Voltaire's  saying,  '  Le  sens  commun  n'est  pas  si 
commun  ;' — which,  I  may  notice,  was  stolen  from  Buffier  (Meta- 
physique,  §  69). 

With  either  emphasis  it  corresponds  to  the  xoivo'f  XoyirffAoj  of 
the  Greeks,  and  among  them  to  the  o£t)o£  X6yo£  of  the  Stoics,  to 
the  gesunde  Menschenverstand  of  the  Germans,  to  the  Bons  Sens 
of  the  French,  and  to  the  Good  Sense  of  the  English.  The  two 
emphases  enable  us  to  reconcile  the  following  contradictions:  — 
'  Le  bon  sens  (says  Descartes)  est  la  chose  du  monde  la  mieux 
partagee ;'  '  Good  sense  (says  Gibbon)  is  a  quality  of  mind  hardly 
less  rare  than  genius.' 

d. — In  the  fourth  and  last  signification,  Common  Sense  is  no 
longer  a  natural  quality ;  it  denotes  an  acquired  perception  or 

3* 


58  PHILOSOPHY   OF  COMMON   SENSE. 

feeling  of  the  common  duties  and  proprieties  expected  from  each 
member  of  society, — a  gravitation  of  opinion — a  sense  of  conven- 
tional decorum — coramunional  sympathy — general  bienstance — 
public  spirit,  <kc.  In  this  signification — at  least  as  absolutely 
used — it  is  limited  to  the  language  of  ancient  Rome.  This  is  the 
meaning  in  which  it  occurs  in  Cicero,  pe  Orat.  i.  3,  ii.  16 — Or. 
pro  Domo  37  ;  in  Horace,  Serm.  i.  iii.  66 ;  in  Juvenal,  Sat  viii. 
73;  in  Quintilian,  Instit.  i.  2;  and  in  Seneca,  Epp.  5,  105, 
whose  words  in  another  place  (which  I  cannot  at  the  moment 
recover)  are — '  Sic  in  beneficio  sensus  communis,  locum,  tempus, 
personam  observet.'  Shaftesbury  and  others,  misled  probably  by 
Casaubon,  do  not  seize  the  central  notion  in  their  interpretation 
of  several  of  these  texts.  In  this  meaning  the  Greeks  sometimes 
employed  xoivoj  vovg — an  ambiguous  expression,  for  which  Anto- 
ninus seems  to  have  coined  as  a  substitute,  xoivovoTjfAorfJvT].  To  this 
head  may  be  referred  Hutcheson's  employment  of  Sensus  Com- 
munis for  Sympathy.  Synopsis  Metaphysicae,  P.  ii.  c.  1. 

2. — SENSE  inmost,  interior,  internal  (sensus  intimus,  interior, 
internus,  sens  intime,  interne).  This  was  introduced  as  a  con- 
vertible term  with  Consciousness  in  general  by  the  philosophers 
of  the  Cartesian  school ;  and  thus  came  to  be  frequently  applied 
to  denote  the  source,  complement,  or  revelation  of  immediate 
truths.  It  is  however  not  only  in  itself  vague,  but  liable  to  be 
confounded  with  internal  sense,  in  other  very  different  significa- 
tions. We  need  not  therefore  regret  that  in  this  relation  it  has 
not  (though  Hutcheson  set  an  example)  been  naturalized  in 
British  Philosophy. 

The  third  appellation  determined  by  the  condition  of  Imme- 
diacy is  that  of 

3. — INTUITIONS — INTUITIVE  cognitions,  notions,  judgments  (In- 
tuitiones — Intuitus — cognitio  Intuitiva — Intuitions — -faculty  In- 
tuitive— Anschauungen.  We  may  add,  $ifi/3o\a.i — yvutfis  xa.ro. 
s-pwrrjv  sVi/3oX>;v.  In  this  sense  au«-oir"nxo£,  iifoirrixog  are  rare. 

The  term  Intuition  is  not  unambiguous.  Besides  its  original 
and  proper  meaning  (as  a  visual  perception),  it  has  been  em- 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  59 

ployed  to  denote  a  kiud  of  apprehension,  and  a  kind  of  judg- 
ment. 

Under  the  former  head,  Intuition,  or  intuitive  knowledge,  has 
been  used  in  the  six  following  significations : 

a. — To  denote  a  perception  of  the  actual  and  present,  in  oppo- 
sition to  the  '  abstractive'  knowledge  which  we  have  of  the  possi- 
ble in  imagination,  and  of  the  past  in  memory. 

b. — To  denote  an  immediate  apprehension  of  a  thing  in  itself, 
in  contrast  to  a  representative,  vicarious,  or  mediate,  apprehension 
of  it,  in  or  through  something  else.  (Hence  by  Fichte,  Schelling, 
and  others,  Intuition  is  employed  to  designate  the  cognition,  as 
opposed  to  the  conception,  of  the  Absolute.) 

c. — To  denote  the  knowledge  which  we  can  adequately  repre- 
sent in  imagination,  in  contradistinction  to  the  'symbolical' 
knowledge  which  we  cannot  image,  but  only  think  or  conceive, 
through  and  under  a  sign  or  word.  (Hence  probably  Kant's 
application  of  the  term  to  the  forms  of  the  Sensibility — the 
imaginations  of  Space  and  Time — in  contrast  to  the  forms  or 
categories  of  the  Understanding.) 

d. — To  denote  perception  proper  (the  objective),  in  contrast 
to  sensation  proper  (the  subjective),  in  our  sensitive  conscious- 
ness. 

e. — To  denote  the  simple  apprehension  of  a  notion,  in  contra- 
distinction to  the  complex  apprehension  of  the  terms  of  a  propo- 
sition. 

Under  the  latter  head,  it  has  only  a  single  signification  ;  viz. : 

f. — To  denote  the  immediate  affirmation  by  the  intellect,  that 
the  predicate  does  or  does  not  pertain  to  the  subject,  in  what  are 
called  self-evident  propositions. 

All  these  meanings,  however,  with  the  exception  of  the  fourth, 
have  this  in  common,  that  they  express  the  condition  of  an 
immediate,  in  opposition  to  a  mediate,  knowledge.  It  is  there- 
fore easy  to  see  how  the  term  was  suggested  in  its  application  to 
our  original  cognitions ;  and  how  far  it  marks  out  their  distinc- 
tive character.  It  has  been  employed  in  this  relation  by  Des- 


60  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

cartes,  Leibnitz,  Locke,  Hemsterhuis,  Beattie,  Jacobi,  Ancillon, 
Degerando,  Thurot,  and  many  others. 

II.  The  second  condition,  which,  along  with  their  Immediacy, 
seems  to  have  determined  a  class  of  names,  is  the  Incomprehensi- 
bility or  Inexplicability  of  our  original  cognitions. 

Under  this  head  there  are  two  appellations  which  first  present 
themselves — Feeling  and  Belief ;  and  these  must  be  considered 
in  correlation. 

A  thing  mediately  known  is  conceived  under  a  representation 
or  notion,  and  therefore  only  known  as  possibly  existing ;  a  thing 
immediately  known  is  apprehended  in  itself,  and  therefore  known 
as  actually  existing. 

This  being  understood,  let  us  suppose  an  act  of  immediate 
knowledge.  By  external  or  internal  perception,  I  apprehend  a 
phenomenon,  of  mind  or  matter,  as  existing ;  I  therefore  affirm 
it  to  be.  Now  if  asked  how  I  know,  or  am  assured,  that  what  I 
apprehend  as  a  mode  of  mind  may  not  be,  in  reality,  a  mode  of 
matter,  or  that  what  I  apprehend  as  a  mode  of  matter  may  not, 
in  reality,  be  a  mode  of  mind,  I  can  only  say,  using  the  simplest 
language,  '  I  know  it  to  be  true,  because  I  feel  and  cannot  but 
feel,'  or  '  because  I  believe  and  cannot  but  believe  it  so  to  be.' 
And  if  farther  interrogated  how  I  know  or  am  assured  that  I 
thus  feel  or  thus  believe,  I  can  make  no  better  answer  than,  in 
the  one  case,  'because  I  believe  that  I/ee£,'  in  the  other,  'because 
I  feel  that  I  believe?  It  thus  appears,  that  when  pushed  to  our 
last  refuge,  we  must  retire  either  upon  Feeling  or  upon  Belief,  or 
upon  both  indifferently.  And  accordingly,  among  philosophers, 
we  find  that  a  great  many  employ  one  or  other  of  these  terms 
by  which  to  indicate  the  nature  of  the  ultimate  ground  to  which 
our  cognitions  are  reducible;  while  some  employ  both,  even 
though  they  may  accord  a  preference  to  one. 

1. — FEELING,  in  English  (as  Sentiment  in  French,  Gefuehl  in 
German,  &c.),  is  ambiguous : — And  in  its  present  application 
(to  say  nothing  of  its  original  meaning  in  relation  to  Touch)  we 
must  discharge  that  signification  of  the  word  by  which  we  denote 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  61 

the  phenomena  of  pain  and  pleasure.  Feeling  is  a  term  prefera- 
ble to  Consciousness,  in  so  far  as  the  latter  does  not  mark  so  well 
the  simplicity,  ultimacy,  and  incomprehensibility  of  our  original 
apprehensions,  suggesting,  as  it  does,  always  something  of  thought 
and  reflection.  In  other  respects,  Consciousness — at  least  with  a 
determining  epithet — may  be  the  preferable  expression.  In  the 
sense  now  in  question,  Feeling  is  employed  by  Aristotle,  Theo- 
phrastus,  Pascal,  Malebranche,  Bossuet,  Leibnitz,  Burner, 
D'Aguesseau,  Berkeley,  Hume,  Kames,  Hemsterhuis,  Jacobi, 
Schulze,  Bouterweck,  Fries,  Koppen,  Ancillon,  Gerlach,  Franke, 
and  a  hundred  others.  In  this  meaning  it  has  been  said,  and 
truly,  that '  Reason  is  only  a  developed  Feeling.' 

2. — BELIEF  or  FAITH  (IIioVis,  Fides,  Croyance,  Foi,  Crlaube, 
&c.).  Simply,  or  with  one  or  other  of  the  epithets  natural,  pri- 
mary, instinctive,  &c.,  and  some  other  expressions  of  a  similar 
import  as  Conviction,  Assent,  Trust,  Adhesion,  Holding  for  true 
or  real,  <fec.  (Suyxaradsrfis,  Assensus,  Fuerwahr-und-wirHich- 
halten,  <fec.),  have,  though  not  unobjectionable,  found  favor  with 
a  great  number  of  philosophers,  as  terms  whereby  to  designate 
the  original  warrants  of  cognition.  Among  these  may  be  men- 
tioned Aristotle,  Lucretius,  Alexander,  Clement  of  Alexandria, 
Proclus,  Algazel,  Luther,  Hume,  Reid,  Beattie,  Hemsterhuis, 
Kant,  Heidenreich,  Fichte,  Jacobi,  Bouterweck,  Koppen,  Ancil- 
lon, Hermes,  Biunde,  Esser,  Elvanich,  &c.,  &c. 

Nor  can  any  valid  objection  be  taken  to  the  expression.  St. 
Austin  accurately  says — "  We  know  what  rests  upon  reason  ;  we 
believe  what  rests  upon  authority."  But  reason  itself  must  rest 
at  last  upon  authority ;  for  the  original  data  of  reason  do  not 
rest  on  reason,  but  are  necessarily  accepted  by  reason  on  the 
authority  of  what  is  beyond  itself.  These  data  are,  therefore,  in 
rigid  propriety,  Beliefs  or  Trusts.  Thus  it  is,  that  in  the  last 
resort,  we  must,  per  force,  philosophically  admit,  that  belief  is  the 
primary  condition  of  reason,  and  not  reason  the  ultimate  ground 
of  belief.  We  are  compelled  to  surrender  the  proud  Intellige  ut 


62  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

credas1  of  Abelard,  to  content  ourselves  with  the  humble  Crede 
ut  intelligas*  of  Anselra. 

3. — A  third  denomination,  under  this  head,  is  that  of 

INSTINCTS,  rational  or  intellectual  (Instinctus,  Impetus  sponta 
nei,  instinctus  intelligentice,  rationales). 

INSTINCTIVE  beliefs,  cognitions,  judgments,  &c. 

These  terms  are  intended  to  express  not  so  much  the  light  as 
the  dark  side  which  the  elementary  facts  of  consciousness  exhibit. 
They  therefore  stand  opposed  to  the  conceivable,  the  understood, 
the  known. 

Notre  faible  Raison  se  trouble  et  se  confond ; 
Oui,  la  Raison  se  tait,  mais  1'Instinct  vous  repond. 

Priestley  (Examination,  <fec.,  passim)  has  attempted  to  ridicule 
Reid's  use  of  the  terms  Instinct  and  Instinctive,  in  this  relation, 
as  an  innovation,  not  only  in  philosophy,  but  in  language ;  and 
Sir  James  Mackintosh  (Dissert  p.  388)  considers  the  term 
Instinct  not  less  improper  than  the  term  Common  Sense. 

As  to  the  impropriety,  though  like  most  other  psychological 
terms  these  are  not  unexceptionable,  they  are  however  less  so 
than  many,  nay  than  most,  others.  An  Instinct  is  an  agent 
which  performs  blindly  and  ignorantly  a  work  of  intelligence  and 
knowledge.  The  terms,  Instinctive  belief, — -judgment — cognition 
are  therefore  expressions  not  ill  adapted  to  characterize  a  belief, 
judgment,  cognition,  which  as  the  result  of  no  anterior  con- 
sciousness, is,  like  the  products  of  animal  instinct,  the  intelligent 
effect  of  (as  far  as  we  are  concerned)  an  unknowing  cause.  In 
like  manner,  we  can  hardly  find  more  suitable  expressions  to  indi- 
cate those  incomprehensible  spontaneities  themselves,  of  which 
the  primary  facts  of  consciousness  are  the  manifestations,  than 
rational  or  intellectual  Instincts.  In  fact  if  Reason  can  justly 
be  called  a  developed  Feeling,  it  may  with  no  less  propriety  be 
called  an  illuminated  Instinct : — In  the  words  of  Ovid, 
Et  quod  nunc  Ratio,  Impetus  ante  fuit. 

1  "  Know  that  you  may  believe." —  W. 
1  ".Believe  that  you  may  know." —  W. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   COMMON    SENSE.  63 

As  to  an  innovation  either  in  language  or  philosophy,  this 
objection  only  betrays  the  ignorance  of  the  objector.  Mr.  Stew- 
art (Essays,  p.  87,  4to  ed.)  adduces  Boscovich  and  D'Alembert 
as  authorities  for  the  employment  of  the  terms  Instinct  and  In- 
stinctive in  Reid's  signification.  But  before  Reid  he  might  have 
found  them  thus  applied  by  Cicero,  Scaliger,  Bacon,  Herbert. 
Descartes,  Rapin,  Pascal,  Poiret,  Barrow,  Leibnitz,  Musaeus, 
Feuerlin,  Hume,  Bayer,  Kames,  Reimarus,  and  a  host  of  others  ; 
while  subsequent  to  the  '  Inquiry  into  the  Human  Mind,'  besides 
Beattie,  Oswald,  Campbell,  Fergusson,  among  our  Scottish  philos- 
ophers, we  have,  with  Hemsterhuis  in  Holland,  in  Germany  Te- 
tens,  Jacobi,  Bouterweck,  Neeb,  Koppen,  Ancillon,  and  many  other 
metaphysicians  who  have  adopted  and  defended  the  expressions. 
In  fact,  Instinct  has  been  for  ages  familiarized  as  a  philosophical 
term  in  the  sense  in  question,  that  is,  in  application  to  the  higher 
faculties  of  mind,  intellectual  and  moral.  In  proof  of  this,  take 
the  article  from  the  '  Lexicon  Philosophicum '  of  Micraelius, 
which  appeared  in  1653  : — '  Instinctus  est  rei  ad  aliquid  tenden- 
tis  inclinatio ;  estque  alius  materialis  in  corporibus ;  alius  ratio- 
nalis  in  mente ;'  and  Chauvin  is  to  the  same  purport,  whose 
'Lexicon  Philosophicum'  was  first  published  in  1691.  In  a 
moral  relation,  as  a  name  for  the  natural  tendencies  to  virtue, 
it  was  familiarly  employed  even  by  the  philosophers  of  the  six- 
teenth century  (v.  F.  Picolominei  '  Decem  Gradus,'  <fec.  Gr.  iii. 
c.  i.  sq.) ;  and  in  the  seventeenth,  it  had  become,  in  fact,  their 
usual  appellation  (v.  Velthuysen  De  Principiis  Justi,  &c.,  p. 
73  sq.) 

4. — REVELATIONS — INSPIRATIONS. — These  expressions  are  in- 
tended metaphorically  to  characterize  the  incomprehensible  man- 
ner in  which  we  are  made  suddenly  aware  of  existence ;  and, 
perhaps,  to  indicate  that  our  knowledge  rests  ultimately  on  a 
testimony  which  ought  to  be  implicitly  believed,  however  unable 
we  may  be  explicitly  to  demonstrate,  on  rational  grounds,  its 
credibility.  They  have  been  thus  employed,  one  or  both,  by 


64r  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

Reid,  Stewart,  Degerando,  Cousin,  and  others,  but  most  emphat- 
ically by  Jacobi. 

5. — SUGGESTIONS  (Suggestiones,  Suggestus). — This  term  with 
some  determining  epithet  is  a  favorite  word  of  Reid,  and  in  a 
similar  signification.  So  also  was  it  of  St.  Augustin  and  Tertul- 
lian. — By  the  vou$  of  Aristotle,  the  latter  says — "  non  aliud  quid 
intelligimus  quam  suggestum  animte  ingenitum  et  insitum  et 
nativitus  proprium."  De  Anima,  c.  12.  See  also  Testimonies, 
infra,  No.  12  d  ;  and,  supra,  p.  Ill  a,  note.1 

6. — FACTS — DATA  (ultimate — primary — original,  <fcc.)  of 
Consciousness  or  Intelligence.  These  expressions  have  found 

1  The  following  is  the  note  referred  to: 

" '  The  word  tuggesf  (says  Mr.  Stewart,  in  reference  to  the  preceding 
passage)  'is  much  used  by  Berkeley,  in  this  appropriate  and  technical 
sense,  not  only  in  his  'Theory  of  Vision,'  but  in  his  '  Principles  of  Human 
Knowledge,'  and  in  his  '  Minute  Philosopher.'  It  expresses,  indeed,  the 
cardinal  principle  on  which  his  '  Theory  of  Vision '  hinges,  and  is  now  so 
incorporated  with  some  of  our  best  metaphysical  speculations,  that  one  can- 
not easily  conceive  how  the  use  of  it  was  so  long  dispensed  with.  Locke 
uses  the  word  excite  for  the  same  purpose ;  but  it  seems  to  imply  an  hypoth- 
esis concerning  the  mechanism  of  the  mind,  and  by  no  means  expresses  the 
fact  in  question  with  the  same  force  and  precision. 

'  It  is  remarkable,  that  Dr.  Reid  should  have  thought  it  incumbent  on 
him  to  apologize  for  introducing  into  philosophy  a  word  so  familiar  to  every 
person  conversant  with  Berkeley's  works.  '  I  beg  leave  to  make  use  of  the 
word  suggestion,  because,'  &c.  ..... 

'  So  far  Dr.  Reid's  use  of  the  word  coincides  exactly  with  that  of  Berke- 
ley ;  but  the  former  will  be  found  to  annex  to  it  a  meaning  more  extensive 
than  the  latter,  by  employing  it  to  comprehend,  not  only  those  intimation* 
which  are  the  result  of  experience  and  habit ;  but  another  class  of  intima- 
tions (quite  overlooked  by  Berkeley),  those  which  result  from  the  original 
frame  of  the  human  mind.' — Dissertation  on  the  History  of  Metaphysical 
and  Ethical  Science.  P.  167.  Second  edition. 

"  Mr.  Stewart  might  have  adduced,  perhaps,  a  higher  and,  certainly  a 
more  proximate  authority,  in  favor,  not  merely  of  the  term  in  general,  but 
of  Reid's  restricted  employment  of  it,  as  an  intimation  of  what  he  and  others 
have  designated  the  Common  Sense  of  mankind.  The  following  sentence 
of  Tertulliau  contains  a  singular  anticipation,  both  of  the  philosophy  and 
of  the  philosophical  phraseology  of  our  author.  Speaking  of  the  universal 
belief  of  the  soul's  immortality: — 'Natura  pleraque  suggeruntur,  quasi  de 
jniblico  sensu  quo  animam  Deus  ditare  dignatus  est.' — DE  ANIMA,  c.  2. 

"  Some  strictures  on  Reid's  employment  of  the  term  suggestion  may  be 
seen  in  the  '  Vereuche'  of  Tetens,  I.  p.  508,  sqq."—  W. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON    SENSE.  65 

favor  with  many  philosophers,  among  whom  Fergusson,  Fichte, 
Creuzer,  Krug,  Ancillon,  Gerlach,  Cousin,  Bautain,  may  be  men- 
tioned. They  are  well  adapted  to  denote,  that  our  knowledge 
reposes  upon  what  ought  to  be  accepted  as  actually  true,  though 
why,  or  in  what  manner  it  is  true,  be  inexplicable. 

III. — The  third  quality,  in  reference  to  which  our  primary 
cognitions  have  obtained  certain  appellations,  is  their  Originali- 
ty. Under  this  head : 

1 . — FIRST — PRIMARY —  PRIMITIVE — PRIMORDIAL —  ULTIMATE, 
as  epithets  applied  to  truths,  principles  of  thought,  laws  of  intel- 
ligence, facts  or  data  of  consciousness,  elements  of  reason,  &c.,  are 
expressions  which  require  no  comment. 

2. — PRINCIPLES  ('Ap^aj,  Principia,  literally  commencements 
— points  of  departure)  Principles  of  Common  Sense — first,  proper, 
authentic  (xupiwraTai)  Principles  of  thought,  reason,  judgment, 
intelligence — Initia  naturae,  &c. 

Without  entering  on  the  various  meanings  of  the  term  Princi- 
ple, which  Aristotle  defines,  in  general,  that  from  whence  any 
thing  exists,  is  produced,  or  is  Tcnown,  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that 
it  is  always  used  for  that  on  which  something  else  depends  ;  and 
thus  both  for  an  original  law,  and  for  an  original  element.  In 
the  former  case  it  is  regulative,  in  the  latter  a  constitutive,  prin- 
ciple ;  and  in  either  signification  it  may  be  very  properly  applied 
to  our  original  cognitions.  In  this  relation,  Mr.  Stewart  would 
impose  certain  restrictions  on  the  employment  of  the  word.  But 
admitting  the  propriety  of  his  distinctions,  in  themselves, — and 
these  are  not  new — it  may  be  questioned  whether  the  limitation 
he  proposes  of  the  generic  term  be  expedient,  or  permissible. 
See  his  Elements,  ii.  c.  1,  particularly  pp.  59,  93  of  8vo  editions. 

3. — ANTICIPATIONS — PRESUMPTIONS — PRENOTIONS  (tfpoX^si?, 
*pou*ap^ou(j'a  yvwrfis,  anticipationes,  prcesumptiones,  prcenotiones, 
informationes  anteceptce,  cognitiones  anticipate,  &c.),  with  such 
attributes  as  common,  natural,  native,  connate,  innate,  &c.,  have 
been  employed  to  indicate  that  they  are  the  antecedents,  causes, 
or  conditions  of  all  knowledge.  These  are  more  especially  the 


66  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

terms  of  ancient  philosophy. — To  this  group  may  be  added  the 
expression  Legitimate  Prejudices,  borrowed  from  the  nomencla- 
ture of  theology,  but  which  have  sometimes  been  applied  by 
philosophers  in  a  parallel  signification.* 

4. — A  PRIORI — truths,  principles,  cognitions,  notions,  judg- 
ments, <fec. 

The  term  a  priori,  by  the  influence  of  Kant  and  his  school,  is 
now  very  generally  employed  to  characterize  those  elements  of 
knowledge  which  are  not  obtained  a  posteriori, — are  not  evolved 
out  of  experience  as  factitious  generalizations ;  but  which,  as 
native  to,  are  potentially  in,  the  mind  antecedent  to  the  act  of 
experience,  on  occasion  of  which  (as  constituting  its  subjective 
conditions)  they  are  first  actually  elicited  into  consciousness. 
These  like  many — indeed  most — others  of  his  technical  expres- 
sions, are  old  words  applied  in  a  new  signification.  Previously 
to  Kant  the  terms  a  priori  and  a  posteriori  were,  in  a  sense 
which  descended  from  Aristotle,  properly  and  usually  employed, 
— the  former  to  denote  a  reasoning  from  cause  to  effect — the 
latter,  a  reasoning  from  effect  to  cause.  The  term  a  priori  came, 
however,  in  modern  times  to  be  extended  to  any  abstract  reason- 
ing from  a  given  notion  to  the  conditions  which  such  notion 
involved ;  hence,  for  example,  the  title  a  priori  bestowed  on  the 
ontological  and  cosmological  arguments  for  the  existence  of  the 
deity.  The  latter  of  these,  in  fact,  starts  from  experience — from 
the  observed  contingency  of  the  world,  in  order  to  construct  the 
supposed  notion  on  which  it  founds.  Clarke's  cosmological 
demonstration,  called  a  priori,  is  therefore,  so  far,  properly  an 
argument  a  posteriori. 

5. — CATEGORIES  of  thought,  understanding,  reason,  &c. 

The  Categories  of  Aristotle  and  other  philosophers  were  the 


*  As  by  Trcmbley  of  Geneva.  It  is  manifest,  though  I  have  not  his  trea- 
tise at  hand,  that  he  borrowed  this,  not  over-fortunate,  expression  from  the 
Prfjug'es  Legltimes  contre  Les  Calmnistes  of  Nicole,  the  work  in  which  origina- 
ted the  celebrated  controversy  in  which  Pajon,  Basnage,  &c.,  were  engaged. 
Of  this  Mr.  Stewart  does  not  seem  to  be  aware. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   COMMON   SENSE.  6Y 

highest  classes  (under  Being)  to  which  the  objects  of  our  knowl- 
edge could  be  generalized.  Kant  contorted  the  term  Category 
from  its  proper  meaning  of  attribution ;  and  from  an  objective 
to  a  subjective  application  ;  bestowing  this  name  on  the  ultimate 
and  necessary  laws  by  which  thought  is  governed  in  its  mani- 
festations. The  term,  in  this  relation,  has  however  found  accep- 
tation; and  been  extended  to  designate,  in  general,  all  the  a 
priori  phenomena  of  mind,  though  Kant  himself  limited  the 
word  to  a  certain  order  of  these. 

6. — TRANSCENDENTAL  trtiths,  principles,  cognitions,  judg- 
ments, &c. 

In  the  Schools  transcendentalis  and  transcendens,  were  con- 
vertible expressions,  employed  to  mark  a  term  or  notion  which 
transcended,  that  is,  which  rose  above,  and  thus  contained  under 
it  the  categories,  or  summa  genera,  of  Aristotle.  Such,  for  ex- 
ample, is  Being,  of  which  the  ten  categories  are  only  subdivi- 
sions. Kant,  according  to  his  wont,  twisted  these  old  terms  into 
a  new  signification.  First  of  all,  he  distinguished  them  from 
each  other.  Transcendent  (transcendens)  he  employed  to  denote 
what  is  wholly  beyond  experience,  being  given  neither  as  an  a 
posteriori  nor  a  priori  element  of  cognition — what  therefore  tran- 
scends every  category  of  thought.  Transcendental  (transcenden- 
talis) he  applied  to  signify  the  a  priori  or  necessaiy  cognitions 
which,  though  manifested  in,  as  affording  the  conditions  of,  expe- 
rience, transcend  the  sphere  of  that  contingent  or  adventitious 
knowledge  which  we  acquire  by  experience.  Transcendental  is 
not  therefore  what  transcends,  but  what  in  fact  constitutes,  a 
category  of  thought.  This  term,  though  probably  from  another 
quarter,  has  found  favor  with  Mr.  Stewart ;  who  proposes  to  ex- 
change the  expression  principles  of  common  sense  for,  among 
other  names,  that  of  transcendental  truths, 

7.-  PURE  (rein)  is  another  Kantian  expression  (borrowed  with 
a  modification  of  meaning  from  previous  philosophers*)  for  cogni- 

*  Pure  knowledge  (cognitio  pura)  was  a  term  employed  by  the  Cartesians 
nnd  Leibnitians  to  denote  that  knowledge  in  which  there  was  no  mixture  of 


68  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

tious,  in  which  there  is  mingled  nothing  foreign  or  adventitious, 
that  is,  nothing  from  experience,  and  which  consequently  are 
wholly  native  to  the  mind,  wholly  a  priori.  Such  elements, 
however,  are  obtained  only  by  a  process  of  sundering  and 
abstraction.  In  actual,  or  concrete,  thinking,  there  is  given 
nothing  pure ;  the  native  and  foreign,  the  a  priori  and  a  posteri- 
ori are  there  presented  in  mutual  fusion. 

IV.  The  fourth  determining  circumstance,  is  that  the  cogni- 
tions  in   question   are  natural,   not  conventional,   native,   not 
acquired.     Hence  their  most  universal  denominations : 

1. — NATURE  ((putfi?  natura)  ;  as,  common  Nature  of  man — light 
of  Nature* — primary  hypotheses  of  Nature — initia  Natures, 
&c. 

NATURAL  (^utf/xo^,  naturalis)  as  conjoined  with  cognitions, 
notions,  judgments  anticipations,  presumptions,  prenotions,  beliefs, 
truths,  criteria,  &c. 

2. — NATIVE,  INNATE,  CONNATE,  IMPLANTED,  &c.  (svwv,  e'fjt,cpuTO£, 
tfupcpwros,  innatus,  ingenitus,  congenitus,  insitus,  &c.),  as  applied  to 
cognitions,  notions,  conceptions,  judgments,  intellections,  beliefs,  &c. 
These  terms  may  be  used  either  to  express  a  correct  or  an  erro- 
neous doctrine. 

V.  The  fifth  ground  of  nomenclature,  is  the  Necessity  of  these 
cognitions,  constituting  as  they  do  the  indispensable  foundations 
and  elementary  ingredients  of  every  act  of  knowledge  and  thought. 
Hence  they  have  been  called  in  the  one  point  of  view, 


sensible  images,  being  purely  intellectual.  Using  the  term  Intellect  less  pre- 
cisely than  the  Aristotelians,  the  Cartesians  found  it  necessary  to  employ,  in 
ordinary,  for  the  sake  of  discrimination,  the  expression  pv/re  Intellect  (intel- 
lectus  purus)  in  contrast  to  Sense  and  Imagination.  This  term  was,  how- 
ever, borrowed  from  the  Schools ;  who  again  borrowed  it,  through  the 
medium  of  St.  Augustine,  from  the  Platonists. — See  Scoti  Comm.  Oxon.  in 
Sen.  L.  i.  dist.  iii.  qu.  4,  §  22,  Op.  V.  p.  491. 

*  Ligltt  of  Nature,  or  Lumen  naturale  (intellectus  sc.  agentis)  a  household 
expression  with  the  Schoolmen,  was,  however,  used  to  denote  the  natural 
revelation  of  intelligence,  in  opposition  to  the  supernatural  light  afforded 
through  divine  inspiration.  The  analogy  of  the  active  Intellect  and  light 
was  suggested  by  Aristotle. — (De  An.  iii.  §  1.) 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  COMMON   SENSE.  69 

FUNDAMENTAL — truths,  laws  of  belief,  principles  of  knowledge, 
intelligence,  reason,  &c. ;  in  the  other, 

ESSENTIAL  or  CONSTITUENT  ELEMENTS  of  reason — Original 
STAMINA,  of  reason — ELEMENTAL  laivs  of  thought,  &c.  These 
are  Mr.  Stewart's  favorite  denominations. 

VI.  The  sixth  circumstance  is,  that  they  afford  the  conditions 
and  regulative  principles  of  all  knowledge.     Hence  they  obtain 
the  name  of 

LAWS,  or  CANONS — -fundamental,  ultimate,  elemental,  neces- 
sary, &c.,  of  human  belief,  knowledge,  thought,  &c. 

VII.  The  seventh   circumstance  is  their   Universality ;    this 
being  at  once  the  consequence  of  their  necessity,  and  its  index. 
Hence  to  designate  them  the  attributes  of 

COMMON — UNIVERSAL — CATHOLIC — PUBLIC,  &c.  (xoivo^,  com- 
munis,  xo$oAixo£,  universalis,  publicus],  applied  to  sense,  reason, 
intelligence — to  cognitions,  notions,  conceptions,  judgments,  intel- 
lections, prenotions,  anticipations,  presumptions,  principles,  ax- 
ioms, beliefs,  nature  of  man,  &c.,  &c.  I  may  observe,  however, 
that  a  principle,  &c.,  may  be  called  common  for  one  or  other,  or 
for  all  of  three  reasons : — 1°,  because  common  to  all  men  (philos- 
ophers in  general) ;  2°,  because  common  to  all  sciences  (Aristo- 
tle, Anal.  Post.  L.  i.  c.  ii.  §  5) ;  3°,  by  relation  to  the  multitude 
of  conclusions  dependent  from  it  (Calovius,  Nool.  c.  2). 

VIII.  The  eighth  is  their  presumed  Trustworthiness,  either  as 
veracious  enouncements,  or  as  accurate  tests  of  truth.     Hence,  in 
the  one  relation,  they  have  been  styled 

1. — TRUTHS  (veritates)  first,  primary,  a  priori,  fundamental, 
&c. ;  and  in  the  other 

2. — CRITERIA  (xpiryjpia,  normci)  natural,  authentic,  &c. 

IX.  The  ninth  is  that  the  principles  of  our  knowledge  must 
be  themselves  Knowledges.* 


*  Knmvledyes,  in  common  use  with  Bacon  and  our  English  philosophers  till 
after  the  time  of  Locke,  ought  not  to  be  discarded.  It  is,  however,  unno- 
ticed by  any  English  Lexicographer. 


70  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

If  viewed  as  cognitions,  in  general,  they  have  been  called 

1.  a. — COGNITIONS  or  KNOWLEDGES  (yvwrfsfg,  cognitiones,  noti- 
tice,  informationes,  <fec.),  with  the  discriminative  attributes,  first, 
primary,  ultimate,  original,  fundamental,   elemental,  natural, 
common,  pure,  transcendental,  a  priori,  native,  innate,  connate, 
implanted,  <fcc. 

2.  b. — CONSCIOUSNESS   (conscientia,   conscience,  Bewusstseyii) 
facts,  data,  revelations,  <fcc.,  of,  have  been  very  commonly  em- 
ployed ;  while 

CONSCIOUSNESSES  (conscientioe,  consciences),  with  or  without 
an  epithet,  as  connate,  innate,  has  the  authority  of  Tertullian, 
Keckermann,  D'Aguesseau,  Huber,~and  many  others. 

If  viewed  as  incomplex  cognitions,  they  have  more  properly 
obtained  the  names  of 

3. — NOTIONS,  CONCEPTIONS,  PKENOTIONS  ("vvoiai,  swovj/xara, 
vo>jf/-a<ra,  *poX>jvj,ei£,  notiones,  conceptiones,  conceptus,  &c.),  some- 
times simply,  but  more  usually  limited  by  the  same  attributes ; 
though  these  terms  were  frequently  extended  to  complex  cogni- 
tions likewise. 

If  viewed  as  complex  cognitions  they  have  been  designated, 
either  by  the  general  name  of 

4. — JUDGMENTS,  PROPOSITIONS  (judicia,  cwrocpavo'eif,  ^piTao'iif, 
effata,  pronunciata,  enunciata,  <fcc.),  qualified  by  such  adjectives  as 
self-evident,  intuitive,  natural,  common,  a  priori,  &c. ; — or  by 
some  peculiar  name.  Of  these  last  there  are  two  which  deserve 
special  notice — Axiom  and  Maxim. 

5. — AXIOMS  (dgiw|u,a<ra,  dignitates,  pronunciata  honoraria, 
effata  fide  digna,  propositiones  illustres,  xupiai  £ogai,  rata>,  firmcp. 
sententice,  <fec.). 

The  term  Axiom  is  ambiguous ;  the  history  of  its  employment 
obscure,  and  uninvestigated ;  and  the  received  accounts  of  its 
signification,  and  the  reasons  of  its  signification,  very  erroneous. 
— I  am  aware  of  three  very  different  meanings  in  which  it  has 
been  used.  Of  these  the  first  and  second  are  of  ancient,  and  the 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  71 

third  of  modern  usurpation.  The  verb  d|;i6w,  originally  and 
properly,  means  to  rate  a  thing  at  a  certain  worth  or  value,  to 
appreciate,  to  estimate.  Now  it  is  evident,  that  from  this  central 
signification  it  might  very  easily  be  deflected  into  two  collateral 
meanings. 

a. — To  rate  a  thing  at  its  value,  seems  to  presuppose  that  it 
has  some  value  to  be  rated ;  hence  the  verb  came  very  naturally 
to  signify — /  deem  worthy,  &c.  From  it  in  this  signification  we 
have  dS-i'wfjux,  worth,  dignity,  authority ;  and,  applied  in  a  logi- 
cal relation,  a  toorthy,  an  authoritative  proposition.  But  why 
worthy  ? — why  authoritative  ?  Either  because  a  proposition 
worthy  of  acceptance  (-^poTac^  af  jo<jn'<3V»]) ;  or  because  a  proposi- 
tion commanding  and  obtaining  acceptance  (xup/a  <%fa,  pronuncia- 
tum  honorarium,  illustre).  But  of  what  nature  are  the  proposi- 
tions worthy  of,  or  which  command,  universal  credence  ?  Mani- 
festly not,  at  least  primarily,  those  which,  though  true,  and  even 
admitted  to  be  true,  shine  in  a  reflected  light  of  truth,  as  depen- 
dent on  other  propositions  for  their  evidence ;  but  those  out  of 
which  the  truth  beams  directly  and  immediately,  which  borrow 
not  the  proof  from  any  which  they  afford  to  all,  which  are 
deserving  of  credit  on  their  own  authority — in  a  word,  self-evident 
propositions  (rpoTatfij^  auro'Tfio'Tat).  Hence  the  application  of 
the  term  to  judgments  true,  primary,  immediate,. common.  To 
this  result  converge  the  authorities  of  Aristotle.  Theophrastus,  Alex- 
ander, Themistius,  Proclus,  Ammonius  Hermite,  and  Philoponus 

In  this  signification,  as  I  can  recollect,  the  oldest  example  of 
the  word  is  to  be  found  in  Aristotle.  That  this  philosopher 
limited  the  expression  Axiom  to  those  judgments  which,  on  occa- 
sion of  experience,  arise  naturally  and  necessarily  in  the  conscious 
mind,  and  which  are  therefore  virtually  prior  to  experience,  can- 
not, I  think,  be  reasonably  doubted.  '  Of  the  immediate  princi- 
ples,' he  says,  '  of  syllogism,  that  which  cannot  be  demonstrated, 
but  which  it  is  not  necessary  to  possess  as  the  prerequisite  of  all 
learning,  I  call  Thesis  ;  and  that  Axiom,  which  he  who  would 


72  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

learn  aught  must  himself  bring,  [and  not  receive  from  his  instruc- 
tor]. For  some  such  principles  there  are ;  and  it  is  to  these  that 
we  are  accustomed  to  apply  this  name.'  (Anal.  Post.,  L.  i.  c.  1, 
§  14.)  And  again,  distinguishing  the  Axiom  from  the  Hypothe- 
sis and  Postulate,  of  the  two  latter  he  says — '  Neither  of  these  of 
itself  necessarily  exists,  and  necessarily  manifests  its  existence  in 
thought.'  (Ibid.  c.  10,  §  7.)  He  consequently  supposes  that  an 
Axiom  is  not  only  something  true,  but  something  that  we  cannot 
but  think  to  be  true.  All  this  is  confirmed  by  sundry  other  pas- 
sages. (Of  these,  some  will  be  seen  in  Testimonies,  n.  3  ;  where 
also,  in  a  note,  is  given  a  solution  of  what  may  be  said  in  oppo- 
sition to  the  attribution  of  this  doctrine  to  the  Stagirite.)  The 
same  is  confirmed,  also,  by  the  ancient  interpreters  of  the  Poste- 
rior Analytics — Themistius  (f.  2,  a,  ed.  Aid.),  and  Philoponus,  or 
rather  Ammonius  Hermiae  (f.  9,  b,  ed.  Aid.)  These  harbor  no 
doubt  in  regard  to  the  purport  of  the  texts  now  quoted ; — and 
the  same  construction  is  given  to  Aristotle's  doctrine  on  this 
point,  by  Alexander,  elsewhere,  but  especially  in  his  Commentary 
on  the  Topics  (p.  12,  ed.  Aid.),  and  by  Proclus  in  his  Commen- 
taries on  Euclid.  (Libb.  ii.  iii.) 

The  following  definition  by  Theophrastus  is  preserved  by  The- 
mistius (1.  c.).  I  translate  the  context,  cautioning  the  reader  that 
it  is  impossible  to  determine  whether  the  latter  part  of  the  pas- 
sage belongs  to  Theophrastus,  or,  what  is  more  probable,  to  The- 
mistius himself.  '  Theophrastus  thus  defines  an  Axiom  : — An 
axiom  is  a  certain  kind  of  opinion  [or  judgment],  one  species  of 
which  is  [valid]  of  all  things  of  the  same  class,  as  [under  the  cat- 
egory, Quantity] — If  equals  be  taken  from  equals,  the  remainders 
are  equal ;  while  another  is  [valid]  of  all  things  indifferently,  as — 
Between  affirmation  and  negation  there  is  no  medium.  For  these 
are,  as  it  were,  connate  and  common  to  all.  Whence  also  the 
reason  of  the  denomination  Axiom  [worth,  dignity,  authority]. 
For  what  is  set  over,  either  all  things  absolutely,  or  certain  classes 
of  things  universally,  that  we  judge  to  have  precedence,  authori- 
ty, by  reference  to  them.' 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  COMMON   SENSE.  73 

In  this  sense  the  word  is  universally  supposed  to  have  been  tech- 
nically employed  by  the  mathematicians,  from  a  very  ancient 
period.  But  whether  it  was  so  prior  to  Aristotle,  I  should  be  vehe- 
mently disposed  to  doubt ;  both  from  the  tenor  of  the  former  pas- 
sage of  the  Posterior  Analytics,  just  quoted,  in  which  the  philos- 
opher seems  to  attribute  to  himself  this  application  of  the  term, 
and  from  the  absence  of  all  evidence  to  prove  its  earlier  intro- 
duction. I  am  aware  indeed  of  a  passage  in  the  Metaphysics 
(L.  iii.  [iv.]  c.  3),  which,  at  first  sight,  and  as  it  has  always  been 
understood,  might  appear  unfavorable  to  this  surmise ;  for  men- 
tion is  there  made  of  '  what  in  mathematics  (Iv  <roi£  (xa^fjiarff) 
are  called  Axioms.'  But  this  text  is,  I  suspect,  misunderstood, 
and  that  it  ought  to  be  translated — '  what  in  our  "  Mathematics" 
are  called  Axioms.'  But  did  Aristotle  write  on  this  subject  ? 
He  did,  one,  if  not  two  treatises ;  as  appears  from  the  lists  of 
Laertius  (L.  v.  §  24)  and  the  Anonymus  Menagii.  In  the  former 
we  have  Mo&ffMWixev,  a,  '  On  Mathematics,  one  book;''  in  the 
latter — Hegi  <z%  iv  <ro?s  f/.a^fjwx.o'iv  ourfi'a?,  "  On  the  existence  treated 
of  in  Mathematics.'1  Nay,  the  term  is  not  to  be  found  in  the 
writings  we  possess  of  those  geometricians  who  ascend  the  near- 
est to  the  age  of  Aristotle.  Euclid,  what  may  surprise  the  reader, 
does  not  employ  it.  There  it  stands,  certainly,  in  all  the  editions 
and  translations  of  the  Elements  in  ordinary  use.  But  this  is 
only  one  of  the  many  tamperings  with  his  text,  for  which  the 
perfidious  editors  and  translators  of  Euclid  are  responsible ;  and 
in  the  present  instance  the  Aristotelizing  commentary  of  Proclus 
seems  to  have  originally  determined  the  conversion  of  '  Common 
Notions'  into  '  Axioms.'  Archimedes  (De  Sphaera  et  Cylindro, 
sub  initio)  is,  after  Aristotle,  the  oldest  authority  extant  for  the 
term,  in  a  mathematical  relation  ;  though  Archimedes,  who  only 
once  .employs  it,  does  not  apply  it  in  the  Aristotelic  limitation,  as 
equivalent  to  the  Common  Notions  of  Euclid,  and  exclusive  of 
Postulates  and  Definitions.  On  the  contrary,  with  him  axiom  is, 
if  not  convertible  with  definition,  used  only  in  the  second  or  Sto- 
ical sense,  for  an  enunciation  in  general.  Turning  indeed  to  the 

4 


74  PHILOSOPHY   OF  COMMON   SENSE. 

works  of  the  other  Greek  Mathematicians  which  I  have  at  hand, 
I  cannot  find  the  term  in  Apollonius  of  Perga,  in  Serenus,  Dio- 
phantus,  Pappus,  Eutocius,  Hero,  or  the  Samian  Aristarchus. 
Sextus  Empiricus,  in  all  his  controversy  with  the  Mathematicians, 
knows  it  not ;  nor,  except  in  the  second  technical  meaning,  is  it 
to  be  found  in  Plutarch.  Its  application  in  mathematics  was 
therefore,  I  surmise,  comparatively  late,  and  determined  by  the 
influence  of  Aristotle.  This  is  not  the  only  instance  by  which  it 
might  be  shown  that  the  Mathematicians  are  indebted  to  the  Sta- 
girite  for  their  language ;  who,  if  he  borrowed  a  part  of  his  Log- 
ical nomenclature  from  Geometry,  amply  repaid  the  obligation. 

This  first  meaning  is  that  which  Axiom  almost  exclusively  ob- 
tains in  the  writings  of  the  Aristotelian,  and  (though  Plato  does 
not  philosophically  employ  the  term)  of  the  Platonic  school. 

b. — To  rate  a  thing  at  its  value,  that  is,  to  attribute  or  not  to 
attribute  to  it  a  certain  worth,  is  a  meaning  which  would  easily 
slide  into  denoting  the  affirmation  or  negation  of  qualities  in  re- 
gard to  a  subject ;  for  its  qualities  determine,  positively  or  nega- 
tively, the  value  of  any  thing.  Hence,  in  general,  to  be  of  opin- 
ion, to  think  so  and  so,  to  judge.  (In  like  manner,  among  othei 
analogical  examples,  the  Latin  verb  existimo  (that  is  ex-cestimo), 
its  primary  meaning  falling  into  desuetude,  was  at  last  almost  ex- 
clusively employed  in  the  secondary,  as — /  think  that,  or  I  opine.) 
From  this  signification  of  the  verb  flowed  a  second  logical  mean- 
ing of  the  substantive ;  Axiom  being  applied  to  denote,  in  gen- 
eral, an  enunciation  or  proposition  (properly  a  categorical),  whether 
true  or  false.  In  this  sense  it  was  used,  sometimes  by  Aristotle 
(v.  Top.,  L.  viii.  cc.  1,  3 — if  this  work  be  his — et  ibi,  Alexandrum), 
and,  as  far  as  I  am  aware,  to  say  nothing  of  the  Epicureans  and 
Skeptics,  always  by  the  Stoics — though  Simplicius  (ad.  Epict. 
Ench.,  c.  58)  asserts,  that  they  occasionally  employed  it,  like  the 
Aristotelians,  in  the  first.  Laelius,  Varro,  Cicero,  Sergius,  Agelli- 
us,  Apuleius,  Donatus,  Martianus  Capella,  &c.,  render  it  by  vari- 
ous Latin  terms,  in  all  of  which,  however,  the  present  meaning 
exclusively,  is  embodied ;  and  in  the  same  signification  the  Greek 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  COMMON   SENSE.  75 

term  axloma  itself  was,  in  modern  times,  adopted  by  Ramus  and 
his  school,  as  their  common  logical  expression  for  "  proposition." 

Thus  in  neither  of  its  logical  significations,  I  make  bold  to  say, 
is  the  word  Axiom  to  be  found  in  any  writing  extant,  prior  to 
Aristotle ;  and  in  its  second,  only  in  a  work,  the  Topics,  which  is 
not  with  absolute  certainty  the  production  of  the  Stagirite.  I 
may  observe,  that  there  is  another  account  given  of  the  logical 
applications  of  the  word,  but  to  this  I  think  it  wholly  needless  to 
advert. 

c. — The  third  and  last  meaning  is  that  imposed  upon  the  word 
by  Bacon.  He  contorted  Axiom  to  designate  any  higher  propo- 
sition, obtained  by  generalization  and  induction  from  the  obser- 
vation of  individual  instances — the  enunciation  of  a  general  fact 
— an  empirical  law. 

So  much  for  the  meanings  of  the  term  Axiom  itself — now  for 
its  translation. 

Dignitas  was  employed  by  Boethius  to  render  Axioma  in  its 
first  or  Aristotelic  meaning ;  and  from  him  came,  in  this  appli- 
cation, into  general  use  among  the  Latin  schoolmen.  But  before 
Boethius,  and  as  a  translation  of  the  term  in  its  second  or  Stoical 
meaning,  I  find  Dignitas  employed  by  Priscian  (Instit.  Grammat., 
L.  xvii.  c.  1).  No  lexicographer,  however,  no  philologist  has 
noticed  these  authorities  for  the  word,  while  Latin  was  still  a 
living  language.  It  has,  indeed,  till  this  hour,  been  universally 
taken  for  granted  by  philologers  that  dignitas  in  this  relation  is 
a  mere  modern  barbarism.  'Inepte  faciunt  (says  Muretus)  qui 
df iojfjia<ra  dignitates  vocant ;  cujus  pravae  constietudinis  Hermo- 
laus  Barbarus  auctor  fuit.'  (Variae  Lectiones,  L.  vi.  c.  2.)  This 
is  wrong,  more  especially  as  regards  the  author  and  era  of  the 
custom :  nay,  II.  Barbaras  is  only  reprehensible  for  not  always, 
instead  of  rarely,  translating  the  term,  as  it  occurs  in  Themistius, 
by  Dignitas,  if  translated  into  Latin  it  must  be  ;  for  his  usual  ver- 
sion by  Proloquium  or  Pronuntiatum — expressions  which  only 
render  the  word  in  its  Stoical  meaning — has  been  the  cause  of 
considerable  error  and  confusion  among  subsequent  logicians,  who, 


76  PHILOSOPHY    OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

unable  to  resort  to  the  one  rare  edition  of  the  original,  were  thus 
led  to  suppose  that  the  nomenclature  of  Theophrastus  and  The- 
mistius  were  different  from  that  of  Aristotle.  The  authority  of 
Muretus  has  obtained,  however,  for  his  mistake  a  universal  accep- 
tation ;  and  what  is  curious,  Nicolaus  Loensis  (Misc.  Epiph.,  L.  i. 
c.  1),  in  his  criticism  of  the  very  chapter  in  which  it  occurs, 
omitting  this  solitary  error,  stupidly  or  perfidiously  inculpates 
Muretus  for  assertions,  which  that  illustrious  scholar  assuredly 
never  dreamt  of  hazarding. 

6.  MAXIMS — (inaximce,  propositiones  maxima,  supremce,  prin- 
cipales,  &c.) 

In  Maxim  we  have  the  example  of  a  word  which  all  employ, 
but  of  whose  meaning  none  seem  to  know  the  origin  or  reason.* 
Extant  in  all  the  languages  of  Christendom,  this  term  is  a  bequest 
of  that  philosophy,  once  more  extensive  than  Christianity  itself, 
through  which  Aristotle,  for  a  thousand  years,  swayed  at  once 
and  with  almost  equal  authority,  the  theology  of  the  Bible  and 
the  Koran.  But  it  was  not  original  to  the  scholastic  philosophy. 
The  schoolmen  received  it  from  Boethius,  who  is  the  earliest  au- 
thor to  whom  I  trace  the  expression.  He  propounds  it  in  his 
two  works — '  In  Topica  Ciceronis,'  and  '  De  Differentiis  Topi- 
cis.'  The  following  is  one  of  his  definitions : — '  Maximas  propo- 
sitiones [which  he  also  styles  propositiones  supremae,  principales, 
indemonstrabiles,  per  se  notae,  <fec.]  vocamus  quse  et  universales 

*  I  have  had  the  curiosity  to  see  how  far  this  ignorance  extended.  Our 
English  Lexicographers,  Johnson,  Todd,  Webster,  are  in  outer  darkness. 
They  only  venture  to  hint  at  some  unknown  relation  between  maxim  and 
"  maximum,  the  greatest  /"  Richardson  is  not  positively  wrong.  He  is  aware 
(probably  from  Furetiere  or  his  copyist  the  Dictionaire  de  Trevoux,  for  there 
is  a  verbal  coincidence  in  all  three)  that  maxima,  was  in  low  Latin  used  in  a 
similar  signification;  but  his  explanation  of  the  reason  is  not  only  defective, 
but  erroneous.  In  other  dictionaries,  real  and  verbal,  if  we  find  the  word 
noticed  at  all,  we  find  nothing  beyond  a  bare  statement  of  its  actual  meaning ; 
as  may  be  seen  in  those  of  Goclenius,  Micraelins,  Martinius,  Ducange,  the 
Zedlcrian  Lexicon,  to  say  nothing  of  our  more  modern  Encyclopedias.  Even 
the  great  Selden  (On  Fortescue,  c.  8)  in  attempting  to  explain  the  term  in 
its  legal  application,  betrays  his  uuacquaintance  with  its  history  and  proper 
import. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  77 

Bunt,  et  ita  notse  atque  manifest®,  ut  probatione  non  egeant, 
eaque  potius  quse  in  dubitatione  sunt  probent.  Nam  quse  in 
dubitatse  sunt,  ambiguorum  demonstration!  solent  esse  principia ; 
qualis  est — Omnem  numerum  vel  parem  vel  imparem,  et — ^Equa- 
lia  relinqui  si  cequalibus,  cequalia  detrahuntur,  caeteraeque  de 
quarum  nota  veritate  non  quaeritur.' 

With  Boethius  maxima  propositio  (maxima  he  never  uses  abso- 
lutely) is  thus  only  a  synonym  for  axiom  or  self-evident  judg- 
ment. He  however  applies  the  term  specially  to  denote  those 
dialectical  principles,  axioms,  or  canons,  those  catholic  judgments 
which  constitute  what  in  logic  and  rhetoric  have  since  Aristotle 
been  called  common-places,  that  is,  the* sources  or  receptacles  of 
arguments  applicable  to  every  matter,  and  proper  to  none.  Such 
propositions,  he  says,  are  styled  maximce  or  greatest,  because  as 
universal  and  primary,  they  implicitly  contain  the  other  proposi 
tions  (minores  posterioresque),  and  determine  the  whole  inference 
of  a  reasoning  (reliquas  in  se  propositiones  complectuntur,  et  per 
eas  fit  consequens  et  rata  conclusio).*  But  he  also  sometimes  in- 
dicates that  they  are  entitled  to  this  epithet,  because,  as  evident 

*  Thus  in  arguing,  that  a  wise,  is  not  an  intemperate,  man,  by  the  syllo- 
gism— 

He  is  wise  who  controls  his  passions ; 

He  is  intemperate  who  does  not  control  his  passions ; 

Therefore  a  wise,  is  not  an  intemperate,  man ;  the  whole  reasoning  is  con- 
tained under,  and  therefore  presupposes,  the  proposition — To  what  the  defi- 
nition is  inapplicable,  to  that  is  inapplicable  the  thing  defined  (cui  non  convenit 
definitio,  non  convenit  definitum).  This  proposition  (one  of  six  co-ordinates 
which  make  up  the  common-place  called  of  Definition)  as  containing  under 
it  a  multitude  of  others  (e.  g.,  Cui  non  convenit  definitio  sapientis,  nee  con- 
venit nomen ;  cui  non  convenit  definitio  justi,  pulchri,  timidi,  &c.,  &c.,  nee 
nomen)  is  not  inappropriately  styled  p.  maxima.  I  may  observe,  however, 
that,  as  thus  employed,  maxima  can  only,  in  strict  propriety,  qualify  a  propo- 
sition relatively,  not  absolutely,  greatest.  For  every  maxim  of  every  dialecti- 
cal Place  is  itself  contained  within  the  sphere  of  one  or  other  of  the  four 
logical  laws  of  Identity,  Contradiction,  Excluded  Middle,  and  Eeason  and 
Consequent,  of  which  it  is  only  a  subordinate  modification.  Thus  the  maxim 
adduced,  is  only  a  special  application  of  the  law  of  Contradiction.  To  the 
four  laws,  therefore,  the  name  of  propositiones  maximce  should  be  exclusively 
applicable,  if  this  expression  were  intended  to  denote  an  unconditioned  uni- 
versality. 


78  PHILOSOPHY   OF  COMMON   SENSE. 

in  themselves  and  independent  of  all  others,  they  afford  to  the 
unintuitive  judgments  they  support,  their  primary  proof  (anti- 
quissimam  probationem),  and  their  greatest  certainty  (maximarn 
fidem).  Compare  In  Top.  Cic.  L.  i.  Op.  p.  765 — De  Diff.  Top.  L. 
i.  p.  859,  L.  ii.  p.  865  sq.  Boethius  had  likewise  perhaps  Aris- 
totle's saying  in  his  thought — '  that  principles,  though  what  are 
least  in  magnitude,  are  what  are  greatest  in  power.' 

Maxima  propositio,  as  a  dialectical  expression,  was  adopted 
from  Boethius  by  his  friend  and  brother-consul,  the  patrician 
Cassiodorus ;  and  from  these  '  ultimi  Romanorum'  it  passed  to  the 
schoolmen,  with  whom  so  soon  as  it  became  established  as  a  com- 
mon term  of  art,  propositio  was  very  naturally  dropt,  and  maxima 
thus  came  to  be  employed  as  a  substantive — by  many  at  last,  who 
were  not  aware  of  the  origin  and  rationale  of  its  meaning.  Finally, 
from  the  Latinity  and  philosophical  nomenclature  of  the  schools, 
it  subsided,  as  a  household  word,  into  all  the  vernacular  languages 
of  Europe ;  with  this  restriction  however — that  in  them  it  is  not 
usually  applied  except  in  a  practical  relation ;  denoting  a  moral 
apophthegm,  a  rule  of  conduct,  an  ethical,  a  political,  a  legal  ca- 
non, &c.,  and  this  too,  enouncing,  not  so  much  what  is  always  and 
necessarily,  but  what  is  for  the  most  part  and  probably,  true.  It 
sounds  strange  in  our  ears  to  hear  of  a  mathematical  or  logical 
maxim,  in  the  sense  of  axiom,  self-evident  principle,  or  law — 
though  this  is  the  sense  in  which  it  was  commonly  employed, 
among  others,  by  Locke  and  Leibnitz.  To  this  restriction,  its 
special  employment  in  Dialectic  (the  logic  of  contingent  matter) 
probably  prepared  the  way ;  though  by  the  schoolmen,  as  by  Boe- 
thius, it  continued  to  be  used  as  convertible  with  axiom.  '  Dig- 
nitas  di'citur  (says  Albertus  Magnus)  quia  omnibus  dignior  est,  eo 
quod  omnibus  influit  cognitionem  et  veritatem ;  et  dicitur  Max- 
ima, eo  quod  virtute  influentise  lucis  et  veritatis  omnia  excedit 
immediata  principia.'  (In  i.  Post.  Anal.,  c.  1.)  St.  Thomas  and 
Scotus  might  be  adduced  to  the  same  effect;  see  also  P.  Hispa- 
nus  (Summulae,  tr.  v.  c.  3,  et  ibi  Versor).  At  an  early  period,  it 
was  borrowed  as  a  term  of  art,  into  the  Common  Law  of  Eng- 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  79 

land ;  Maxims  there  denoting  what  by  the  civilians  were  tech- 
nically denominated  Regulce  Juris.  (Fortescue,  De  Laudibus 
legum  Anglise,  c.  8. — Doctor  and  Student,  c.  8.)  By  Kant 
Maxim  was  employed  to  designate  a  subjective  principle,  theo- 
retical or  practical,  i.  e.  one  not  of  objective  validity,  being  exclu- 
sively relative  to  some  interest  of  the  subject.  Maxim  and  Reg- 
ulative principle  are,  in  the  Critical  philosophy,  opposed  to  Law 
and  Constitutive  principle. 

Besides  the  preceding  designations  under  this  head,  names  have 
been  given  to  the  original  deliverances  of  Consciousness,  consid- 
ered as  the  manifestations  of  some  special  faculty  ;  that  is,  Con- 
sciousness as  performing  this  peculiar  function  has  obtained  a  par- 
ticular name.  In  this  respect  it  has  been  called  Reason,  and, 
with  greater  propriety,  Intellect  or  Intelligence. 

7.  REASON  (Xoyoff,  ratio,  raison,  Vernunff),  truths,  principles, 
belief s,  feelings,  intuitions,  &c.,  of. 

Reason  is  a  very  vague,  vacillating,  and  equivocal  word.  Throw- 
ing aside  various  accidental  significations  which  it  has  obtained 
in  particular  languages,  as  in  Greek  denoting  not  only  the  ratio 
but  the  oratio  of  the  Latins  ;  throwing  aside  its  employment,  in 
most  languages,  for  cause,  motive,  argument,  principle  of  proba- 
tion, or  middle  term  of  a  syllogism,  and  considering  it  only  as  a 
philosophical  word  denoting  a  faculty  or  complement  of  faculties ; 
in  this  relation  it  is  found  employed  in  the  following  meanings, 
not  only  by  different  individuals,  but  frequently,  to  a  greater  or 
less  extent,  by  the  same  philosopher. 

a. — It  has  both  in  ancient  and  modern  times  been  very  com- 
monly employed,  like  understanding  and  intellect,  to  denote  our 
intelligent  nature  in  general  (Xoyixov  ^i^s) ;  and  this  usually  as 
distinguished  from  the  lower  cognitive  faculties,  as  sense,  imagi- 
nation, memory— but  always,  and  emphatically,  as  in  contrast  to 
the  feelings  and  desires.  In  this  signification,  to  follow  the  Aris- 
totelic  division,  it  comprehends — 1°,  Conception,  or  Simple  Ap- 
prehension (g'vvoia,  VO'TJO'IJ  TCJV  cc&ai^sVwv,  conceptus,  conceptio,  ap- 
prehensio  simplex,  das  Begreifen) ;  2°,-  the  Compositive  and  Divi- 


80  PHILOSOPHY   OF  COMMON  SENSE. 

fdve  process,  Affirmation  and  Negation,  Judgment  (<Jvv6e<fis  xa< 
Stct'igettis,  d*6<pav<ri£,  judicium)  ; — 3°,  Reasoning  or  the  Discursive 
faculty  (<Jiavoia,  X6yo£,  Xoyi<f|*o£,  TO  tfuXXoyi'^stfdai,  discursus,  ratio- 
cinatio) ; — 4°,  Intellect  or  Intelligence  proper,  either  as  the  intui- 
tion, or  as  the  place,  of  principles  or  self-evident  truths  (vou£,  intel- 
lectus,  intelligentia,  mens). 

b. — In  close  connection  with  the  preceding  signification,  from 
which  perhaps  it  ought  not  to  be  separated,  is  that  meaning  in 
which  reason,  the  rational,  the  reasonable,  is  used  to  characterize 
the  legitimate  employment  of  our  faculties  in  general,  in  contra- 
distinction to  the  irregular  or  insubordinate  action  of  one  or  more 
even  of  our  rational  faculties,  which,  if  exercised  out  of  their 
proper  sphere,  may  be  viewed  as  opposed  to  reason.  Thus  the 
plain  sense  of  one  of  Moliere's  characters  complains — 

Raisonner  est  1'emploi  do  toute  ma  maison, 
Et  le  raisonnement  en  hannit  la  raison. 

c. — It  has  not  unfrequently  been  employed  to  comprehend  the 
third  and  fourth  of  the  special  functions  above  enumerated — to 
wit,  the  dianoetic  and  noetic.  In  this  meaning  it  is  taken  by  Reid 
in  his  later  works.  Thus  in  the  Intellectual  Powers  (p.  425  ab.) 
he  states,  that  Reason,  in  its  first  office  or  degree  [the  noetic],  i? 
identical  with  Common  Sense,  in  its  second  [the  dianoetic],  with 
Reasoning. 

d. — It  has  very  generally,  both  in  ancient  and  modern  philos 
ophy,  been  employed  for  the  third  of  the  above  special  func- 
tions ; — Xoyos  and  Xoyitfju.off,  Ratio  and  Ratiocinatio,  Reason  and 
Reasoning  being  thus  confounded.  Reid  thus  applied  it  in  his 
earlier  work  the  Inquiry.  See  pp.  100,  b.,  108,  a.,  127,  a.  b. 

e. — In  the  ancient  systems  it  was  very  rarely  used  exclusively 
for  the  fourth  special  function,  the  noetic  in  contrast  to  the  dia- 
noetic. Aristotle,  indeed  (Eth.  Nic.,  L.  vi.  c.  11  (12),  Eth.  Eud., 
L.  v.  c.  8),  expressly  says  that  reason  is  not  the  faculty  of  prin- 
ciples, that  faculty  being  Intelligence  proper.  Boethius  (De  Cons. 
Phil.,  L.  v.  Pr.  5)  states  that  Reason  or  Discursive  Intellect  be- 
longs to  man,  while  Intelligence  or  Intuitive  Intellect  is  the  exclu- 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  COMMON   SENSE.  81 

sive  attribute  of  Divinity.  '  Ratio  humani  tantum  generis  est, 
sicuti  Intelligently  sola  clivini ;'  while  Porphyry  somewhere  says 
'  that  we  have  Intelligence  in  common  with  the  Gods,  and  rea- 
son in  common  with  the  brutes.'  Sometimes,  however,  it  was 
apparently  so  employed.  Thus  St.  Augustine  seems  to  view 
Eeason  as  the  faculty  of  intuitive  truths,  and  as  opposed  to  Rea- 
soning : — '  Ratio  est  quidam  mentis  adspectus,  quo,  per  seipsam 
non  per  corpus,  verum  intuetur ;  Ratiocinatio  autem  est  rationis 
inquisitio,  a  certis  ad  incertorum  indagationem  nitens  cogitatio.' 
(De  Quant.  An.,  §  53— De  Immort.  An.,  §§  1,  10.)  This,  how- 
ever, is  almost  a  singular  exception. 

In  modern  times,  though  we  frequently  meet  with  Reason,  as 
a  general  faculty,  distinguished  from  Reasoning,  as  a  particular ; 
yet  until  Kant,  I  am  not  aware  that  Reason  (Vemunft)  was  ever 
exclusively,  or  even  emphatically,  used  in  a  signification  corres- 
ponding to  the  noetic  faculty,  in  its  strict  and  special  meaning, 
and  opposed  to  understanding  (Verstand)  viewed  as  comprehend- 
ing the  other  functions  of  thought — unless  Crusins  (Weg.  &c.  §  62 
sq.)  may  be  regarded  as  Kant's  forerunner  in  this  innovation.  In- 
deed the  Vernunft  of  Kant,  in  its  special  signification  (for  he  also 
uses  it  for  Reason  in  the  first  or  more  general  meaning,  as  indeed 
nothing  can  be  more  vague  and  various  than  his  employment  of 
the  word),  cannot  without  considerable  qualification  be  considered 
analogous  to  Nouj,  far  less  to  Common  Sense ;  though  his  usur- 
pation of  the  term  for  the  faculty  of  principles,  probably  deter- 
mined Jacobi  (who  had  originally,  like  philosophers  in  general, 
confounded  Vernunft  with  Verstand,  Reason  with  Reasoning)  to 
appropriate  the  term  Reason  to  what  he  had  at  first  opposed  to 
it,  under  the  name  of  Belief  (Glaube).  Accordingly  in  his  ma- 
turer  writings,  '  Vernunft,  Reason — '  Vernunft-GlaubeJ  Belief  of 
Reason — '  Vernunft- Gefmhl]  Feeling  of  Reason — 'Rationale 
AnschauunyJ  Rational  Intuition — '  Sinn,  Organ  fuer  das  (Tcber- 
sinnlichej  Sense  or  Organ  of  the  Supersensible,  &c.,  are  the  terms 
by  which  we  may  roundly  say  that  Jacobi  denominates  the  noetic 
faculty  or  common  sense. 

4* 


82  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

Kant's  abusive  employment  of  the  term'  Reason,  for  the  faculty 
of  the  Unconditioned,  determined  also  its  adoption,  under  the 
same  signification,  in  the  philosophy  of  Fichte,  Schelling,  and 
Hegel;  though  NoU^,  Intellectus,  Intelligentia,  which  had  been 
applied  by  the  Platonists  in  a  similar  sense,  were  (through  Ver- 
stand,  by  which  they  had  been  always  rendered  into  German) 
the  only  words  suitable  to  express  that  cognition  of  the  Absolute, 
in  which  subject  and  object,  knowledge  and  existence,  God  and 
man,  are  supposed  to  be  identified.  But  even  in  this,  to  add  to 
the  confusion,  no  consistency  was  maintained.  For  though  that 
absolute  cognition  was  emphatically  the  act  of  Reason,  it  was 
yet  by  Fichte  and  Schelling  denominated  the  Intuition  of  Intel- 
lect (intellectuale  Anschauung).  F.  Schlegel  was  therefore  jus- 
tified in  his  attempt  to  reverse  the  relative  superiority  of  Ver- 
nunft  and  Verstand.  What  were  his  reasons  I  know  not ;  but 
as  they  have  excited  no  attention,  they  were  probably  of  little 
weight 

Though  Common  Sense  be  not  therefore  opposed  to  Reason,  ex- 
cept perhaps  in  its  fourth  signification,  still  the  term  Reason  is  of 
so  general  and  ambiguous  an  import,  that  its  employment  in  so  de- 
terminate a  meaning  as  a  synonym  of  Common  Sense  ought  to 
be  avoided.  It  is  only,  we  have  seen,  as  an  expression  for  the 
noetic  faculty,  or  Intellect  proper,  that  Reason  can  be  substituted 
for  Common  Sense ;  and  as  the  former  is  hardly  allowable,  still 
less  is  the  latter. 

Besides  the  more  precise  employment  of  Reason  as  a  synonym 
for  Common  Sense  by  the  recent  German  philosophers,  it  will  be 
found  more  vaguely  applied  in  the  same  meaning — usually,  how- 
ever, with  some  restrictive  epithet,  like  common,  universal,  funda- 
mental, &c. — by  many  older  authorities,  of  whom  Heraclitus,  the 
Stoics,  Turretin,  Lyons,  Bentley,  Shaftesbury,  De  la  Mennais, 
are  among  the  Testimonies  adduced  in  the  sequel. 

8. — INTELLECT,  INTELLIGENCE  (vous?  intcllcctus,  intelligentia, 

1  See  below,  p.  454.—  W.  *  See  above,  p.  54,  b.  note.—  W. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  83 

mens,  entendement,  intelligence,  intellect,  Verstand).  truths,  prin- 
ciples, axioms,  dicta,  intuitions,  <fcc.,  of. 

INTELLECTIONS  (yoyitsis,  intellectiones,  intelligentice,  intellections, 
intelligences),  primary,  natural,  common,  <fec. 

By  Aristotle,  from  whom  it  finally  obtained  the  import,  which 
it  subsequently  retained,  the  term  Nous  is  used  in  two  principal 
significations.  In  the  one  (like  Reason  in  its  first  meaning)  it  de- 
notes, in  general,  our  higher  faculties  of  thought  and  knowledge ; 
in  the  other  it  denotes,  in  special,  the  faculty,  habit,  place,  of 
principles,  that  is,  of  self-evident  and  self-evidencing  notions  and 
judgments.  The  schoolmen,  following  Boerhius,  translated  it  by 
intellectus  and  intelligentia  ;*  and  some  of  them  appropriated 
the  former  of  these  terms  to  its  first,  or  general  signification,  the 
latter  to  its  second  or  special.  Cicero  does  not  employ  the  term 
intellectus;  and  the  Ciceronian  epidemic  prevalent  after  the  revival 
of  letters,  probably  induced  the  Latin  translators  of  the  Greek  phi- 
losophers to  render  it  more  usually  by  the  term  mens.  In  one  and 
all  of  our  modern  languages  the  words  derived  from,  or  corres- 
ponding to,  Intellectus,  Intellectio,  Intelligentia,  have  been  so 
loosely  and  variously  employed,  that  they  offer  no  temptation  to 
substitute  them  for  that  of  Common  Sense.  The  case  is  different 
with  the  adjective  noetic.  The  correlatives  noetic  and  dianoetic 
would  afford  the  best  philosophical  designations — the  former  for 
an  intuitive  principle,  or  truth  at  first  hand ;  the  latter  for  a  dem- 
onstrative proposition,  or  truth  a't  second  hand.  Noology  and 
Noological,  Dianoialogy  and  Dianoialogical  would  be  also  tech- 
nical terms  of  much  convenience  in  various  departments  of  philos- 
ophy. On  the  doctrine  of  first  principles  as  a  department  of 


*  Intettigentia  (like  Intelledw)  properly  denotes  the  act  or  energy  of  Intellec- 
tus.  How  it  came  that  the  term  Intelliij 'entire  was  latterly  applied  to  denote 
the  higher  order  of  created  existences,  as  angels,  &c.,  is  explained  by  Aqui- 
nas (S.  Th.,  P.  i.  qu.  79,  art.  10),  as  an  innovation  introduced  by  certain 
translations  from  the  Arabic.  I  shall  not  commemorate  the  distinction  of 
Intettectus  and  Inttlligentia  given  in  the  contradictory  farrago  attributed  to 
St.  Augustine,  under  the  title  De  Spiritu  et  Anima.  See  cc.  37,  88. 


84  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

'  Gnostology,'  the  philosophy  of  knowledge,  we  have  indeed  du- 
ring the  seventeenth  century,  by  German  authors  alone,  a  series 
of  special  treatises,  under  the  titles — of  '  NoologiaJ  by  Calovius, 
1651,  Mejerus,  1662,  Wagnerus,  1670,  and  Zeidlerus,  1680,— 
and  of  '  Intelligentia?  by  Gutkius,  1625,  and  Geilfussius,  1662. 
'Archelogia,'  again,  was  the  title  preferred  for  their  works  upon 
the  same  subject  by  Alstedius,  1620,  and  Micraelius,  1658.  Of 
these  treatises,  in  so  far  as  I  have  seen  them,  the  execution  disap- 
points the  curiosity  awakened  by  the  title  and  attempt. 

In  this  sense,  besides  the  ordinary  employment  of  Intellectus, 
and  Intelligentia  by  the  ancient  and  modern  Aristotelians  ;  Cice- 
ro, St.  Austin,  and  others,  in  like  manner,  use  Intelligentiw,  either 
simply,  or  with  some  differential  epithet,  as  inchoates,  adumbrates, 
complicates,  involutes,  primes,  communes,  &c. ;  as  is  done  like- 
wise by  Pascal  and  other  French  philosophers  with  the  terms  In- 
telligence and  Intelligences. 

X.  The  tenth  and  last  circumstance  is,  that  the  native  contri- 
butions by  the  mind  itself  to  our  concrete  cognitions  have,  prior 
to  their  elicitation  into  consciousness  through  experience,  only  a 
potential,  and  in  actual  experience  only  an  applied,  engaged,  or 
implicate,  existence.  Hence  their  designation  of — 

HABITS  (possessions),  DISPOSITIONS,  VIRTUALITIES,  <fec.,  with 
some  discriminating  epithet.  Thus,  by  Aristotle,  noetic  Intelli- 
gence is  called  the  (natural)  Habit  of  principles  (if  i£  rwv  d^wv)  ; 
and  principles  themselves  are  characterized  by  Leibnitz,  as  natu- 
ral Habits,  Dispositions,  Virtualities.  As  prior  to  experience, 
Galen  styles  them  things  occult  or  delitescent  (xsx^ujxjas'va),  in  con- 
trast to  the  manifestations  made  in  experience  itself  (<pa»vof/,sva). 
Cicero  and  others  call  them  Intelligentia;,  obscures,  inchoatcc, 
complicates,  involutes,  &c.  To  the  same  head  are  to  be  referred 
the  metaphorical  denominations  they  have  obtained  of — Seeds 
(Xoyoi  <r<T££|xa<nx(H,  semina  scientiee,  semina  cetemitatis,  &c.)  — or 
Sparks  (scintilla:,  igniculi,  ^wfft^a  sva^tf/xara,  0Viv0»j£££,  »fee.) 


PHILOSOPHY  OF   COMMON   SENSE.  85 


§  VI.  THE  UNIVERSALITY  OF  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMMON 
SENSE  ;  OR  ITS  GENERAL  RECOGNITION,  IN  REALITY  AND 
IN  NAME,  SHOWN  BY  A  CHRONOLOGICAL  SERIES  OF  TESTI- 
MONIES FROM  THE  DAWN  OF  SPECULATION  TO  THE  PRESENT 


1.  —  HESIOD  thus  terminates  his  Works  and  Days: 

<I>j7//>j  &'  oviroTt  Tfaftirav  dmftXurat  rjv  nva  iroXXol 
Aaoi  tfuinl^ovaC  Olds  vv  rif  tirri  Kal  air^. 


'  The  Word  proclaimed  by  the  concordant  voice 
Of  mankind  fails  not  ;  for  in  man  speaks  God.' 

Hence  the  adage  ?  —  Vox  Populi,  vox  Dei. 

2.  —  HERACLITUS.  —  The  doctrine  held  by  this  philosopher  of  a 
Common  Reason  (£uvo£  Xoyoj),  the  source  and  the  criterion  of 
truth,  in  opposition  to  individual  wisdom  (Wia  <p£o'vrj£if),  the 
principle  of  opinion  and  error,  may  be  regarded  as  one  of  Com- 
mon Sense.  Its  symbol  —  rot  xoivvj  (paivo'fisva  rtftra.  —  Sextus  Em- 
piricus  thus  briefly  expounds  :  —  '  What  appears  to  all,  that  is  to 
be  believed  ;  for  it  is  apprehended  by  the  Reason  which  is  Com- 
mon and  Divine  ;  whereas,  what  is  presented  to  individual  minds, 
is  unworthy  of  belief,  and  for  the  counter  cause.'  —  I.  Adv.  Log. 
§131. 

In  so  far,  however,  as  our  scanty  sources  of  information  enable 
us  to  judge,  Heraclitus  mistook  the  import,  and  transgressed  the 
boundaries  of  the  genuine  doctrine,  in  the  same  way  as  is  done 


*  In  throwing  together  these  testimonies,  I  had  originally  in  view,  merely 
to  adduce  such  as  bore  explicitly  and  directly  on  the  doctrine  of  Common 
Sense,  word  and  thing ;  subsequently,  I  found  it  proper  to  take  in  certain 
others,  in  which  thatdoctrin*  is  clearly,  though  only  implicitly  or  indirectly, 
asserted.  These  last,  I  have  admitted,  in  preference,  from  those  schools 
which  ascribe  the  least  to  the  mind  itself,  as  a  fountain  of  knowledge,  and  a 
criterion  of  truth ;  and  have,  in  consequence,  taken  little  cr  nothing  from 
the  Platonic.  I  have  also  been  obliged  to  limit  the  testimonies,  almost  ex- 
clusively, to  Common  Sense,  considered  on  its  speculative  side.  On  its  prac- 
tical, there  could  have  been  no  end. 


86  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

in  the  system  of '  Common  Sense,' '  Universal  Consent,'  or  (  Com- 
mon Reason,'  so  ingeniously  maintained  by  the  eloquent  Abb6 
DeLaMennais  (No.  101).  Both  vilipend  all  private  judgment 
as  opinion ;  and  opinion  both  denounce  as  a  disease.  Both  sac- 
rifice the  intelligence  of  individual  men  at  the  shrine  of  the 
common  reason  of  mankind  ;  and  both  celebrate  the  apotheosis 
of  this  Common  Reason  or  Sense,  as  an  immediate  ray  of  the 
divinity.  Both,  finally,  in  proclaiming — '  that  we  ought  to  follow 
the  Common'  (SsTv  &i(e<f&a.i  <rw  £uvw),  mean,  that  we  should  resort 
to  this,  not  merely  as  a  catholic  criterion,  or  a  source  of  element- 
ary truths,  but  as  a  magazine  of  ready  fabricated  dogmas.  Herac- 
litus  and  La  Mennais  are  the  first  and  last  philosophers  in  our 
series  :  philosophy  would  thus  seem  to  end  as  it  began. — In  re- 
lation to  the  former,  see  Schleiermacher,  in  Wolf  and  Butt- 
mann's  Museum,  i.  pp.  313,  seq. ;  and  Brandis  Geschichte  der 
Philosophic,  i.  §  44.  In  relation  to  the  latter,  see  his  Catechisme 
du  Sens  Commun — Essais  sur  L'IndirFerence,  «fec.,  passim  ;  with 
Bautaiu,  Psychologie,  i.  Disc.  Prelim.,  pp.  xliv.  seq. ;  and  Biunde, 
Fund.  Phil,  pp.  129,  seq.  166.  (To  these  is  now  to  be  added  the 
Esquisse  d'une  Philosophic  par  F.  Lamennais,  1840,  L.  i.  ch.  1. 
Here  the  doctrine  in  question  is  presented  in  a  far  less  objection- 
able form ;  but  as  its  previous  statements  are  not  withdrawn,  I 
have  not  thought  it  necessary  to  cancel  the  preceding  observa- 
tions, which  were  written  before  I  had  received  this  remarkable 
work.) 

3. — ARISTOTLE. — He  lays  it  down  in  general  as  the  condition 
of  the  possibility  of  knowledge  that  it  does  not  regress  to  infinity, 
but  depart  from  certain  primary  facts,  beliefs,  or  principles — true, 
and  whose  truth  commands  assent,  through  themselves,  and 
themselves  alone.  These,  as  the  foundations,  are  not  objects,  of 
Science ;  as  the  elements  of  Demonstration  they  are  themselves 
indemonstrable.  The  fountains  of  certainty  to  all  else,  they  are 
themselves  pre-eminently  certain,  and  if  denied  in  words,  they  are 
still  always  mentally  admitted.  The  faculty  of  such  principles 
is  not  Reason,  the  discursive  or  dianoetic  faculty  (Xoyo?,  &avoia), 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  87 

but  Intellect  or  Intelligence  proper,  the  noetic  faculty  (vouj). 
Intellect  as  an  immediate  apprehension  of  what  is,  may  be  viewed 
as  a  Sense  (a'/tf^o'ij).  Compare  Analyt.  Post.  L.  i.  cc.  2,  3,  10, 
32— L.  ii.  c.  ult. — Top.  L.  i.  c.  1 — Metaph.  L.  i.  c.  7 — L.  ii.  (A 
minor)  c.  2 — L.  ii.  (iii.  Duvallio)  cc.  3,  4,  6 — L.  iii.  (iv.)  c.  6 — 
Eth.  Nic.  L.  vi.  cc.  6,  11,  (12)— Eth.  Eud.  L.  v.  cc.  6,  8— L.  vii. 
c.  14 — Mag.  Mor.  L.  i.  c.  35. 

In  particular,  that  Aristotle  founds  knowledge  on  belief,  and 
the  objective  certainty  of  science  on  the  subjective  necessity  of 
believing,  is,  while  not  formally  enounced,  manifest  from  many 
passages — though  he  might  certainly  have  been  more  explicit. 
Compare  Post.  Anal.  L.  i.  c.  2,  §§  1,  2,  16,  17,  18  ;  c.  10,  §  7  ; 
c.  31,  §  3  ;  Top.  L.  i.  c.  1,  §  6,  &c. ;  Eth.  Nic.  vii.  c.  3  ;  Magn. 
Mor.  L.  ii.  c.  6. 

'  Since  Aristotle,'  says  the  profound  Jacobi  (Werke  ii.  p.  11), 
'  there  has  been  manifested  a  continual  and  increasing  tendency 
in  the  philosophical  schools  to  subordinate,  in  general,  immedi- 
ate to  mediate  knowledge — the  powers  of  primary  apprehension, 
on  which  all  is  founded,  to  the  powers  of  reflection  as  determined 
by  abstraction — the  prototype  to  the  ectype — the  thing  to  the 
Avord — the  Reason  [Vernunft — Aristotle's  noetic  faculty  or  Intel- 
lect] to  the  Intellect  [Verstand — Aristotle's  dianoetic  faculty  or 
Reason]  ;  nay,  to  allow  the  former  to  be  wholly  subjugated  and 
even  lost.'  In  this  Jacobi  (and  to  Jacobi  may  be  added  Fries) 
docs  Aristotle  the  most  signal  injustice  ;  for  there  is  no  philoso- 
pher who  more  emphatically  denounces  the  folly  of  those  '  who 
require  a  reason  of  those  things  of  which  there  is  no  reason  to 
be  given,  not  considering  that  the  principle  of  demonstration  is 
not  itself  demonstrable.'  Metaph.  iii.  6.  See  No.  4  a.  In  fact 
Jacobi's  own  doctrine  in  its  most  perfect  form,  will  be  found  to 
bear  a  wonderful  analogy  to  that  of  Aristotle.  See  No.  87  d. 
'In  determining  indeed  the  question  whether  Aristotle  does  or 
does  not  derive  all  our  knowledge  from  experience  and  induction, 
there  is  some  difficulty,  from  the  vagueness  with  which  the 
problem  has  usually  been  stated.  In  so  far,  however,  as  it  con- 


88  PHILOSOPHY:  OF  COMMON  SENSE. 

cerns  the  doctrine  of  Common  Sense,  the  opinion  of  Aristotle 
admits  of  no  reasonable  doubt.* 

*  The  doctrine  of  those  passages  (as  Post.  An.  L.  ii.  c.  ult.,  Eth.  Nic.  L.  vi. 
o.  8.  Eth.  Eud.  L.  v.  c.  8,  &c.)  in  which  Aristotle  asserts  that  our  knowledge 
of  principles  is  derived  from  sense,  experience,  induction,  may  bo  reconciled 
with  the  doctrine  of  those  others  in  which  he  makes  the  intellect  itself  their 
source  (see  above,  p.  70  b,  and  quotations  a.  b.  c.  that  follow) — in  two  ways. 

The  first  is  that  adopted  by  a  majority  of  his  Greek  and  Latin  expositors. 
They  suppose  that  our  knowledge  of  principles  is  dependent  on  both,  but  in 
different  manners,  and  in  different  degrees.  On  the  intellect  this  knowledge 
is  principally  dependent,  as  on  its  proximate,  efficient,  essential  cause  (atria 
ytwnriK'ii  xotrirticri,  causa,  causa  per  se,  origo,  &c.)  On  sense,  experience,  in- 
duction, it  is  dependent,  as  on  its  exciting,  disponent,  permissive,  manifesta- 
tive,  subsidiary,  instrumental,  occasional  cause  (atpopph,  tyopp}),  Trp6<paeis,  alrta 
tiTovpyij,  An'rpif,  {nnjp/nt,  &c.)  Of  the  Greek  interpreter,  sec  Alexander  in 
Top.  pp.  12,  47,  48,  ed.  Aid.  (Test  n.  10)— Themistius  in  Post.  An.  ff.  2, 
14,  15,  and  DC  An.  f.  00,  ed.  Aid. — Philoponus  (or  Ammonius),  in  Post.  An. 
f.  100,  ed.  Aid.  and  De  Anima,  Proem. — Eustratius  in  Post.  An.  f.  63,  sq., 
ed.  Aid.  in  Eth.  Nic.  f.  89  b,  ed.  Aid.  Of  the  Latin  expositors,  among 
many,  Fonseca,  in  Metaph.  L.  i.  c.  1,  q.  4 — Conimbricenses,  Org.  Post.  Anal. 
L.  i.  c.  1.  q.  1— Sonerus  in  Metaph.  L.  i.  c.  1,  p.  67,  sq.  Of  Testimonies 
infra,  see  Nos.  10,  20,  21,  22.  On  this  interpretation,  Aristotle  justly  views 
our  knowledge  us  chronologically  commencing  with  Sense,  but  logically 
originating  in  Intellect.  As  one  of  the  oldest  of  nis  modern  antagonists  has 
incomparably  enounced  it, — '  Cognitio  nostra  omnis  a  Mente  primam  oriyi- 
nem,  a  Sensibus  exordium  habet  primum ;' — a  text  on  which  an  appropriate 
commentary  may  be  sought  for  in  the  opening  chapter  of  Kant's  Critique  of 
pure  Eeason,  and  in  the  seventeenth  Lecture  of  Cousin  upon  Locke. 

The  second  mode  of  reconciling  the  contradiction,  and  which  has  not  I 
think  been  attempted,  is — that  on  the  supposition  of  the  mind  virtually 
containing,  antecedent  to  all  actual  experience,  certain  universal  principles 
of  knowledge,  in  the  form  of  certain  necessities  of  thinking ;  still  it  is  ouly 
by  repeated  and  comparative  experiment,  that  we  compass  the  certainty — 
on  the  one  hand,  that  such  and  such  cognitions  cannot  but  be  thought,  and 
are,  therefore,  as  necessary,  native  generalities,— and  on  the  other,  that,  such 
and  such  cognitions  may  or  may  not  be  thought,  and  are,  therefore,  as  con- 
tingent, factitious  generalizations.  To  this  process  of  experiment,  analysis, 
and  classification,  through  which  we  attain  to  a  scientific  knowledge  of  prin- 
ciples, it  might  bo  shown  that  Aristotle,  not  improbably,  applies  the  term 
Induction. 

In  regard  to  the  passage  (De  An.  L.  iii.  c.  5)  in  which  the  intellect  prior 
to  experience  is  compared  to  a  tablet  on  which  nothing  has  actually  been, 
written,  the  context  shows  that  the  import  of  this  simile  is  with  Aristotle 
very  different  from  what  it  was  with  the  Stoics ;  to  whom,  it  may  be  noticed, 
and  not,  as  is  usually  supposed,  to  the  Stagirite,  are  we  to  refer  the  first 
enouncemeut  of  the  brocard — In  Intellects,  nihil  est,  quod  non  pnusfuerit  in 
^  Scnsu. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  COMMON   SENSE.  89 

But  to  adduce  some  special  testimonies.  These  I  shall  translate.1 
a. — Top.  L.  i.  c.  1,  §  6. — '  First  truths  are  such  as  are  believed, 
not  through  aught  else,  but  through  themselves  alone.  For  in 
regard  to  the  principles  of  science  we  ought  not  to  require  the 
reason  Why  [but  only  the  fact  That  they  are  given] ;  for  each 
such  principle  behooves  to  be  itself  a  belief  in  and  of  itself.' 

b. — Pr.  Analyt.  L.  i.  c.  3,  §  4. — Maintaining  against  one  party 
that  demonstrative  science  is  competent  to  man,  and  against 
another,  that  this  science  cannot  itself  be  founded  on  propositions 
which  admit  of  demonstration,  Aristotle  says — '  We  assert  not 
only  that  science  does  exist,  but  also  that  there  is  given  a  certain 
beginning  or  principle  of  science,  in  so  far  as  [or  on  another 
interpretation  of  the  term  77 — '  by  which1]  we  recognize  the  im- 
port of  the  terms.'  On  the  one  interpretation  the  meaning  of 
the  passage  is — '  We  assert  not  only  that  [demonstrative]  science 
does  exist,  but  also  that  there  is  given  a  certain  [indemonstrable] 
beginning  or  principle  of  science  [that  is,  Intellect  which  comes 
into  operation],  so  soon  as  we  apprehend  the  meaning  of  the 
terms.'  For  example,  when  we  once  become  aware  of  the  sense 
of  the  terms  whole  and  part,  then  the  intellect  of  itself  spontane- 
ously enounces  the  axiom — The  whole  is  greater  than  its  part. — 
On  the  other  interpretation ; — '  We  assert  not  only  that  [demon- 
strative] science  does  exist,  but  also  that  there  is  given  a  certain 
[indemonstrable]  beginning  or  principle  of  science  [viz.  intellect] 
by  which  we  recognize  the  import  of  the  terms,'  i.  e.  recognize 
them  in  their  necessary  relation,  and  thereupon  explicitly  enounce 
the  axiom  which  that  relation  implies. 


In  making  intellect  a  source  of  knowledge,  Aristotle  was  preceded  by 
Plato.  But  the  Platonic  definition  of  '  Intellection1  is  '  The  principle  of 
science ;'  and  Aristotle's  merit  is  not  tbe  abolition  of  intellect  as  such,  but 
its  reduction  from  a  sole  to  a  conjunct  principle  of  science. 

1  The  original  of  the  more  essential  points  : — Zrirtlv  \tynv  aipivra;  TTJV  a'aBrj- 
CTII/,  dfiliiafla  TIS  l(i  liavolaf. — Aristotle.  IIpo<r/x«v  ov  i(1  irdvra  rols  Sia  fCtv  Adyuv, 
ilAAu  iroXXtficif  n~i\\ov  rots  (fiaivoiiivots. — Id.  Tfj  aiaOi'/aei  /iaA.W  ?  ria  Aoy<j>  iriotv- 
riov'  KOI  rots  Xoyoif,  lav  bno\oyovpcva  luxvvuri  rots'  tyaivopivots. — Id.  'H  aiaQwiS 
«(  fttvafttv. — Id 


90  PHILOSOPHY   OF  COMMON   SENSE. 

c. — Anal.  Post.  L.  i.  c.  2,  §  16. — '  But  it  is  not  only  necessary 
that  we  should  be  endowed  with  an  antecedent  knowledge  of 
first  principles — all  or  some — but  that  this  knowledge  should, 
likewise,  be  of  paramount  certainty.  For  whatever  communicates 
a  quality  to  other  things  must  itself  possess  that  quality  in  a 
still  higher  degree;  as  that  on  account  of  which  we  love  all 
objects  that  partake  of  it,  cannot  but  be  itself,  pre-eminently,  an 
object  of  our  love.  Hence  if  we  know  and  believe  through  cer- 
tain first  principles,  we  must  know  and  believe  these  themselves 
in  a  superlative  degree,  for  the  very  reason  that  we  know  and 
believe  [all]  secondary  truths  through  them.' 

In  connection  herewith,  compare  the  passages  quoted  above, 
p.  70  b. 

d. — Rhet.  L.  i.  c.  1. — 'By  nature  man  is  competently  organ- 
ized for  truth  ;  and  truth,  in  general,  is  not  beyond  his  reach.' 

e. — Metaph.  L.  ii.  (A  minor)  c.  1. — '  The  theory  of  Truth  is  in 
one  respect  difficult,  in  another  easy ;  as  shown  indeed  by  this 
— that  while  enough  has  been  denied  to  any,  some  has  been 
conceded  to  all.' 

f. — Elh.  Nic.  L.  x.  c.  2. — Arguing  against  a  paradox  of  certain 
Platonists,  in  regard  to  the  Pleasurable,  he  says — '  But  they  who 
oppose  themselves  to  Eudoxus,  as  if  what  all  nature  desiderates 
were  not  a  good,  talk  idly.  For  what  appears  to  all,  that  we 
affirm  to  be ;  and  he  who  would  subvert  this  belief,  will  himself 
assuredly  advance  nothing  more  deserving  of  credit. — Compare 
also  L.  vii.  c.  13  (14  Zuing.). 

In  his  paraphrase  on  the  above  passage,  the  Pseudo-Androni- 
cus  (Heliodorus  Prusensis)  in  one  place  uses  the  expression  com- 
mon opinion,  and  in  another  all  but  uses  (what  indeed  he  could 
hardly  do  in  this  meaning  as  an  Aristotelian,  if  indeed  in  Greek 
at  all)  the  expression  common  sense,  which  D.  Heinsius  in  his 
Latin  version  actually  employs.  '  But,  that  what  all  beings  de- 
sire is  a  good,  this  is  manifest  to  every  one  endowed  with  sense' 
-  —  (ifoitfi  TOI£  tv  al<f6v)<tei, '  omnibus  communi  sensu  praeditis'.)  See 
No.  31. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  91 

g. — Eth.  Eud.  L.  i.  c.  6. — '  But  of  all  these  we  must  endeavor 
to  seek  out  rational  grounds  of  belief,  by  adducing  manifest  testi- 
monies and  examples.  For  it  is  the  strongest  evidence  of  a  doc- 
trine, if  all  men  can  be  adduced  as  the  manifest  confessors  of  its 
positions ;  because  every  individual  has  in  him  a  kind  of  private 
organ  of  the  truth.  .  .  .  Hence  we  ought  not  always  to 
look  only  to  the  conclusions  of  reasoning,  but  frequently  rather 
to  what  appears  [and  is  believed]  to  be.'  See  Nos.  10,  30. 

h. — Ibid.  L.  vii.  c.  14. — 'The  problem  is  this: — What  is  the 
beginning  or  principle  of  motion  in  the  soul  ?  Now  it  is  evident, 
that  as  God  is  in  the  universe,  and  the  universe  in  God,  that  [I 
read  xwsiv  xai]  the  divinity  in  us  is  also,  in  a  certain  sort,  the 
universal  mover  of  the  mind.  For  the  principle  of  Reason  is  not 
Reason,  but  something  better.  Now  what  can  we  say  is  better 
than  even  science,  except  God  ?' — The  import  of  this  singular 
passage  is  very  obscure.  It  has  excited,  I  see,  the  attention,  and 
exercised  the  ingenuity  of  Pomponatius,  J.  C.  Scaliger,  De  Raei, 
Leibnitz,  Leidenfrost,  Jacobi,  &c.  But  without  viewing  it  as  of 
pantheistic  tendency,  as  Leibnitz  is  inclined  to  do,  it  may  be 
interpreted  as  a  declaration,  that  Intellect,  which  Aristotle  else- 
where allows  to  be  pre-existent  and  immortal,  is  a  spark  of  the 
Divinity ;  whilst  its  data  (from  which,  as  principles  more  certain 
than  their  deductions,  Reason,  Demonstration,  Science  must 
depart)  are  to  be  reverenced  as  the  revelation  of  truths  which 
would  otherwise  lie  hid  from  man.  That,  in  short, 

'  The  voice  of  Nature  is  the  voice  of  God.' 

By  the  by,  it  is  remarkable  that  this  text  was  not  employed  by 
any  of  those  Aristotelians  who  endeavored  to  identify  the  Active 
Intellect  with  the  Deity. 

i. — Phys.  L.  viii.  c.  3. — Speaking  of  those  who  from  the  con- 
tradictions in  our  conception  of  the  possibility,  denied  the  fact  of 
motion : — '  But  to  assert  that  all  things  are  at  rest,  and  to 
attempt  a  proof  of  this  by  reasoning,  throwing  the  testimony  of 
sense  out  of  account,  is  a  sign  not  of  any  strength,  but  of  a  cer- 


92  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

tain  imbecility  of  reason.'  And  in  the  same  chapter — '  Against 
all  these  reasonings,  there  suffices  the  belief  [of  sense]  alone.' 
See  Simplicius  ad  locum,  ed.  Aid.  ff.  276,  277. 

k. — De  Gen.  Anim.  L.  iii.  c.  10. — 'We  ought  to  accord  our 
belief  to  sense,  in  preference  to  reasoning;  and  of  reasonings, 
especially  to  those  whose  conclusions  are  in  conformity  with  the 
phenomena.'  And  somewhere  in  the  same  work  he  also  says, 
'  Sense  is  equivalent  to,  or  has  the  force  of  science.' 

1. — See  also  De  Ccelo,  L.  i.  c.  3,  text  22. 

m. — Ibid.  L.  iii.  c.  7,  text  61. 

n. — Meteor.  L.  i.  c.  13. 

4. — THEOPHRASTUS. — a. — Metaph.  c.  8  (ed.  Sylb.  p.  260, 
Brand,  p.  319).  The  following  testimony  of  this  philosopher  (if 
the  treatise  be  indeed  his)  is  important,  both  in  itself,  and  as  illus- 
trative of  the  original  peripatetic  doctrine  touching  the  cognition  of 
first  principles,  which  he  clearly  refuses  to  Sense  and  induction,  and 
asserts  to  Intelligence  and  intuition.  It  has,  however,  been  wholly 
overlooked ;  probably  in  consequence  of  being  nearly  unintelligible 
in  the  original  from  the  corruption  of  the  common  text,  and  in  the 
version  of  Bessarion — also  from  a  misapprehension  of  his  author's 
meaning. 

Having  observed  that  it  was  difficult  to  determine  up  to  what 
point,  and  in  regard  to  what  things  the  investigation  of  causes  or 
reasons  is  legitimate ; — that  this  difficulty  applies  to  the  objects 
both  of  Sense  and  of  Intelligence,  in  reference  to  either  of  which 
a  regress  to  infinity  is  at  once  a  negation  of  them  as  objects  of 
understanding  and  of  philosophy ; — that  Sense  and  Intelligence, 
severally  furnish  a  point  of  departure,  a  principle,  the  one  relative, 
or  to  us,  the  other  absolute,  or  in  nature ; — and  that  each  is  the 
converse  of  the  other,  the  first  in  nature  being  the  last  to  us ; — 
he  goes  on  to  state  what  these  counter  processes  severally  avail 
in  the  research,  or,  as  he  calls  it,  after  Aristotle,  the  speculation 
of  principles.  '  Up  to  a  certain  point,  taking  our  departure  from 
the  Senses,  we  are  able,  rising  from  reason  to  reason,  to  carry  on 
the  speculation  of  principles ;  but  when  we  arrive  at  those  which 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  COMMON   SENSE.  93 

are  [not  merely  comparatively  prior  but]  absolutely  supreme  and 
primary,  we  can  no  more ;  because,  either  that  a  reason  is  no 
longer  to  be  found,  or  of  our  own  imbecility,  unable,  as  it  were, 
to  look  from  mere  excess  of  light.  [Compare  Arist.  Metaph.  A 
minor,  c.  1 ;  which  supports  the  reading,  <pa£ivorara.]  But  the 
other  procedure  is  probably  the  more  authentic,  which  accords 
the  speculation  of  principles  to  the  touch,  as  it  may  be  called, 
and  feeling  of  Intelligence  (TCJ  vtJS  di'yovn  xai  olov  a-^a^s'vw). 
[Comp.  Aristot.  Metaph.  xii.  7.]  For  in  this  case  there  is  no 
room  for  illusion  in  regard  to  these.'  He  then  observes — '  That 
it  is  even  in  the  sciences  of  detail,  of  great,  but  in  the  universal 
sciences,  of  paramount  importance,  to  determine  wherein,  and  at 
what  point  the  limit  to  a  research  of  reasons  should  be  fixed.' 
And  why  ?  Because  they  who  require  a  reason  for  every  thing, 
subvert,  at  once,  the  foundations  of  reason  and  of  knowledge? 

b. — See  above,  p.  74  a,  where  from  his  doctrine  in  regard  to 
first  principles  it  appears  that  Theophrastus,  like  Aristotle,  founds 
knowledge  on  natural  Belief. 

5. — LUCRETIUS. — De  Eerum  Natura,  L.  i.  v.  423,  sq. 

'  Corpus  enim  per  se  communis  deliquat  esse 
Sensus ;  quo  nisi  prima^^e*  fundata  valebit, 
Ha\id  erit,  occultis  de  rebus  quo  referentes, 
Confirmare  animi  quicquam  ratione  queamus.' 

Sensus  communis  here  means  Sense,  strictly  so  called,  as  tes- 
tifying not  only  in  all  men,  but  in  all  animals.  It  is  a  transla- 
tion of  the  expression  of  Epicurus — »j  ofodqO'ig  M  itavruv  (Laert. 
x.  39) ;  and  as  in  the  Epicurean  philosophy  all  our  knowledge  is 
merely  an  educt  of  Sense,  the  truth  of  the  derived,  depends 
wholly  upon  the  truth  of  the  original  evidence.  See  L.  iv.  w, 
480,  sq. 

6. — CICERO. — a. — De  Fin.  L.  iv.  c.  19. — Speaking  of  the 
Stoical  paradoxes  ('  recte  facta  omnia  aequalia, — omnia  peccata 
paria,'  &c.)  he  says — '  Quse  cum  magnifice  primo  dici  videntur, 
considerata,  minus  probantur.  Sensus  enim  cuj usque  [i.  e.  S. 
communis]  et  natura  rerum,  atque  ipsa  veritas  clamat,  quodam 


94:  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

modo,  non  posse  adduci,  ut  inter  eas  res  quas  Zeno  exaequaret, 
nihil  interesset.'  (See  No.  7.) 

b. — Tusc.  Disp.  L.  i.  c.  13. — 'Omnia  autera  in  re  consensio 
omnium  gentium  lex  naturae  putanda  est.'  Compare  also  c.  15. 

c. — De  Nat.  Deor.  L.  i.  c.  16. — The  Epicurean  Velleius  there 
speaking  the  doctrine  of  his  sect : — '  Intelligi  necesse  est,  esse 
Deos,  quoniam  insitas  eorum,  vel  potius  innatas  cognitiones 
habemus.*  De  quo  autem,  omnium  natura  consentit,  id  verum 
esse  necesse  est.  Esse  igitur  Deos  confitendum  est.'  Compare 
Plato,  De  Legibus,  L.  x. ;  Aristotle,  De  Coelo,  L.  i.  c.  3 ;  Plutarch, 
Amatores;  Seneca,  Epistolse,  117. 

d. — For  'Sensus  Communis,'  and  'Sensus  Communes?  as  the 
sources  of  moral  judgment,  see  the  Orations  Pro  Cluentio  6. — Pro 
Plancio,  13,  14. — Pro  Domo,  36. 

e. — For  'Sensus  Communis1  as  criterion  of  judgment  in  the 
arts,  see  De  Orat.  L.  iii.  c.  50 ;  quoted  by  Reid,  p.  424,  b ;  com- 
pare L.  i.  c.  3. 

7. — HORACE. — Sermones,  I.  iii.  96.  Speaking  like  Cicero 
(No.  6,  a.)  of  the  Stoical  paradox,  he  says — 

'  Queis  paria  esse  fere  placuit  peccata,  laborant, 
Quum  ventum  ad  verum  est ;  Sensus  moresque  repugnant.' 

That  is,  as  Aero  (to  say  nothing  of  Torrentius,  Baxter,  and  other 
moderns)  interprets  it — '  communis  hominum  sensus?  f 


*  It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the  noival  fovotat,  Qvaixal  irpo>//^«iy,  of  the 
Stoics,  far  less  of  the  Epicureans  (however,  as  in  the  present  instance,  styled 
innate  or  implanted),  were  more  than  generalizations  a  posteriori.  Yet  this 
is  a  mistake,  into  which,  among  many  others,  even  Lipsius  and  Leibnitz 
have  fallen,  in  regard  to  the  former.  See  Manud.  ad  Stoic.  Philos.  L.  ii. 
diss.  11 ;  and  Nouv.  Ess.  Pref. 

t  This  gloss  of  Aero  is  not  to  be  found  in  any  of  the  editions  of  the  two 
Horatian  scholiasts.  But  I  am  in  possession  of  extracts  made  by  the  cele- 
uated  William  Canter,  from  a  more  complete  MS.  of  these  commentators, 
than  any  to  which  Fabricius  and  their  other  editors  had  access.  This  codex 
belonged  to  Canter  himself;  and  he  gives  its  character,  and  a  few  specimens 
of  its  anecdota,  in  his  Novaz  Lectioneg.  The  copy  of  Horace  (one  of  the  first 
editions  of  Lambinus)  in  which  these  extracts  are  found,  contains  also  the 
full  collation  of  Canter's  'Manuscript!  Codices  Antiquissimi'  of  the  poet  (two 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  95 

8. — SENECA. — a. — Epist.  117. — 'Multum  dare  solemus  prae- 
sumptioni  omnium  hominum.  Apud  nos  veritatis  argumentum 
est,  aliquid  omnibus  videri.' 

b. — Ep.  9.  '  Ut  scias  autem  hos  sensus  communes  esse,  natura 
scilicet  dictante,  apud  poetam  comicum  invenies, 

"  Non  est  beatus,  esse  se  qui  non  putet." ' 

c. — Ep.  120.  'Natura  semina  nobis  scientiae  dedit,  scientiam 
non  dedit.' 

9. — PLINY  the  Younger. — Paneg.,  c.  64. — 'Melius  omnibus 
quam  singulis  creditur.  Singuli  enim  decipere  et  decipi  possunt : 
nemo  omnes,  neminem  omnes  fefellerunt.' 

9* — QUINTILIAN. — Inst.,  L.  v.  c.  10,  §  12. — 'Pro  certis  habe- 
mus  ea,  in  quse  communi  opinione  consensum  est.' 

10. — ALEXANDER  OF  APHRODISIAS,  the  oldest  and  ablest  of 
the  interpreters  of  Aristotle  whose  writings  have  come  down  to 
us,  follows  his  master,  in  resting  truth  and  philosophy  on  the 
natural  convictions  of  mankind. 

a. — On  Fate,  §  2,  edd.  Lond.  et  Orell.  Ou  xevov  ou<P  aoVo^ov 
<r'  aXi^o'iIf  I)  xoivii  TWV  dv0£Wtfwv  <putfi£,  x.r.X.  '  The  common  na- 
ture of  man  is  neither  itself  void  of  truth,  nor  is  it  an  erring  in- 
dex of  the  true  ;*  in  virtue  whereof  all  men  are  on  certain  points 
mutually  agreed,  those  only  excepted,  who,  through  preconceived 
opinions,  and  a  desire  to  follow  these  out  consistently,  find  them- 
selves compelled  verbally f  to  dissent.'  And  he  adds,  that  '  An- 
axagoras  of  Clazomene,  however  otherwise  distinguished  as  a 
physical  philosopher,  is  undeserving  of  credit  in  opposing  his  tes- 
timony touching  fate  to  the  common  belief  of  mankind.'  This 
he  elsewhere  calls  their  '  common  presumptions?  their  '  common 
and  natural  notions'  See  §§  8,  14,  26,  of  the  same  work,  and 

only,  I  can  prove,  and  not  three,  as  the  Novse  Lectiones  fallaciously  state), 
and  which,  from  the  many  remarkable  readings  to  be  found  exclusively  in 
them,  must,  in  all  probability,  have  perished — perhaps  in  the  inundation  by 
which  Canter's  celebrated  library  was,  in  a  great  measure,  destroyed. 

*  See  Aristotle,  No.  3,  d. 

t  Verbally,  not  mentally.  He  has  Aristotle  (Anal.  Post.,  L.  i.  c.  10,  §  7)  in 
7iew.  See  Burner,  No.  63. 


96  PHILOSOPHY   OF  COMMON   SENSE. 

the  chapter  on  Fate  in  the  second  book  of  his  treatise  On  the 
Soul,  f.  161,  ed.  Aid.  1534. 

b.— On  the  Topics  of  Aristotle  (p.  48,  ed.  Aid.)  '  The  induc- 
tion useful  in  the  employment  of  axioms  is  useful  for  illustrating 
the  application  to  particulars  of  the  axiomatic  rule  [read  <resgi 
Xa(jL/3avo/A£va],  but  not  in  demonstrating  its  universality ;  for  this, 
as  an  object  of  intellect,  is  self-evident,  nor  can  it,  in  propriety,  be 
proved  by  induction  at  all.'  Compare  also  p.  12. 

1 1 . — CLEMENT  OF  ALEXANDRIA. — Stromata.  After  stating  (L.  v., 
Op.  ed.  16&8,  p.  544)  that  there  is  neither  knowledge  without  be- 
lief, nor  belief  without  knowledge,  and  having  shown  (L.  viii.  p. 
771),  after  Aristotle  and  others,  that  the  supposition  of  proof  or 
demonstration  being  founded  on  propositions  themselves  capable 
of  being  proved,  involves  the  absurdity  of  an  infinite  regress,  and 
therefore  subverts  the  possibility  of  demonstration,  he  says — '  Thus 
the  philosophers  confess  that  the  beginnings,  the  principles  of  all 
knowledge,  are  indemonstrable;  consequently  if  demonstration 
there  be,  it  is  necessary  that  there  should  be  something  prior,  be- 
lievable of  itself,  something  first  and  indemonstrable.  All  demon- 
stration is  thus  ultimately  resolved  into  an  indemonstrable  belief' 

12. — TERTULLIAN. — a. — De  Testimonio  animae  adversus  Gentes, 
c.  5. — 'Haec  testimonia  animae,  quanto  vera  tanto  simplicia. 
quanto  simplicia  tanto  vulgaria,  quanto  vulgaria  tanto  communia, 
quanto  communia  tanto  naturalia,  quanto  naturalia  tanto  divina ; 
non  putem  cuiquam  frivolum  et  frigidum  videri  posse,  si  recogitet 
naturae  majestatem,  ex  qua  censetur  auctoritas  animae.  Quantum 
dederis  magistrae,  tantum  adjudicabis  discipulae.  Magistra  natu- 
ra,  anima  discipula.  Quicquid  aut  ilia  edocuit,  aut  ista  perdidi- 
cit,  a  Deo  traditum  est,  magistro  scilicet  ipsius  magistrae.  Quid 
anima  possit  de  principali  institutore  praesumere,  in  te  est  aesti- 
mare  de  ea  quae  in  te  est.  .  .  .  Sed  qui  ejusmodi  eruptiones 
animae  non  putavit  doctrinam  esse  naturae,  et  congenita?  et  inge- 
nitae.  conscientice*  tacita  commissa,  dicet  potius  de  ventilatis  in 

*  Tertullian  is  the  only  ancient  writer  who  uses  the  word  Conscientia  in  a 
psychological  sense,  corresponding  with  our  Consciousness. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  97 

vulgus  opinionibus,  publicatarum  litterarum  usum  jam,  et  quasi 
vitium,  corroboratum  taliter  sermocinandi.  Certe  prior  anima 
quam  littera,  et  prior  sermo  quam  liber,  et  prior  sensus  quam  sty- 
lus, et  prior  homo  ipse  quam  philosophus  et  poeta.  Nunquid 
ergo  credendum  est  ante  litteraturam  et  divulgationem  ejus,  mutos 
absque  hujusmodi  pronunciationibus  homines  vixisse  ?  .  .  . 
Et  unde  ordo  ipsis  litteris  contigit,  nosse,  et  in  usum  loquelae  dis- 
seminare,  qua?  nulla  unquam  mens  conceperat,  aut  lingua  protu- 
lerat,  aut  auris  exceperat?' — He  alludes  to  I.  Corinthians  ii. 
9,  &c. 

b. — De  Resurrectione  Carnis,  c.  3. — '  Est  quidem  et  de  com- 
munibus  sensibus  sapere  in  Dei  rebus.  .  .  .  Utar  et  consci- 
entia  populi,  contestantis  Deum  Deorurn ;  utar  et  reliquis  com- 
munibus  sensibus,  etc.  .  .  Communes  enim  sensus  simplicitas 
ipsa  commendat,  et  compassio  sententiarum,  et  familiaritas  opini- 
onum,  eoque  fideliores  existimantur,  quia  nuda  et  aperta  et  omni- 
bus noto  definiunt.  Ratio  enim  divina  in  medulla  est,  non  in  su- 
perficie,  et  plerumque  semula  manifestis.' 

c. — Ibid.,  c.  5. — 'Igitur  quoniam  et  rudes  quique  de  commu- 
nibus  adhuc  sensibus  sapiunt,'  &c. 

d. — De  Anima,  c.  2. — Speaking  of  the  sources  from  which 
a  merely  human  philosophy  had  derived  its  knowledge  of 
the  mind,  he  concludes — 'Sed  et  natura  pleraque  suggerun- 
tur  quasi  de  publico  sensu,  quo  animam  Deus  dotare  digna- 
tus  est.' 

e. — Praescr.  28. — '  Quod  apud  multos  unum  invenitur,  non  est 
erratum  sed  traditum.' 

13. — ARNOBIUS. — Adversus  Gentes,  L.  ii.  p.  92,  ed.  1651. 
'  Quid  est  a  nobis  factum  contra  sensum  judiciumque  commune, 
si  rnajora  et  certiora  delegimus,  nee  sumus  nos  passi  falsorum  re- 
ligionibus  attineri  ?'  Add.,  pp.  66,  127. 

14. — LACTANTIUS. — Institut.,  L.  iii.  c.  5. — 'Debuit  ergo  Arce- 
silaus  siquid  saperet,  distinguere,  qua?  sciri  possent,  quzeve  ne- 
sciri.  Sed  si  id  fecisset,  ipse  se  in  populum  redigisset.  Nam 
vulgus  interdum  plus  sapit,  quia  tantum,  quantum  opus  est,  sapit.' 


98  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

I 

Quaere — Had  Lactantius  the  line  of  Martial  in  his  eye  ? 
'  Quisquis  plus  justo  non  sapit,  ille  sapit ;' 

or  tlie  precept  of  St.  Paul  ? — '  Non  plus  sapere  quam  oportet  sa- 
pere,  sed  sapere  ad  sobrietatem.' 

15. — ST.  AUGUSTINE. — a. — De  duabus  Aniinabus,  c.  10.  '  Qui- 
vis  enira  homines,  quos  modo  a  communi  sensu  generis  humani 
nulla  disrupisset  amentia,'  &c. 

b. — De  Trinitate.,  Lib.  xiii.  c.  1. — 'Novimus  certissima  scientia 
et  clamante  Conscientia.'  That  is,  Conscience,  not  Conscious- 
ness, as  sometimes  supposed. 

c. — De  Magistro,  c.  11. — 'Ait  Propheta  [Is.,  vii.  9],  Nisi  cre- 
dideritis  non  intelligetis ;  quod  non  dixisset  profecto,  si  nihil 
distare  judicasset.  Quod  ergo  intelligo,  id  etiam  credo ;  at  non 
omne  quod  credo,  etiam  intelligo.  Omne  autem  quod  intelligo  scio ; 
non  omne  quod  credo  scio.  Quare  pleraque  cum  scire  non  pos- 
sim,  quanta  tamen  utilitate  credantur  scio.' 

16. — PROCLUS  (In  Platonis  Theologiam,  Lib.  i.  c.  25)  has  still 
more  remarkable  declarations  of  the  truth,  that  Belief  is  the 
foundation  of  knowledge.  Speaking  of  the  faith  of  the  gods, 
which  he  describes  as  anterior  to  the  act  of  cognition  (*ps<f(3i>- 
rsgw  TVS  yvutfTixys  gve^si'og),  he  says  that  it  is  not  only  to  be  dis- 
tinguished from  our  belief,  or  rather  error,  in  regard  to  things  sen- 
sible ;  but  likewise  from  the  belief  we  have  of  what  are  called 
Common  Notions,  with  which  it,  however  agrees,  in  that  these 
common  notions  command  assent,  prior  to  all  reflection  or  reason- 
ing: (xcti  ya£  rats  xoivafc  svvoiaj  *£o  tfavrog  Xo'you  iritfrew/xsv).  See 
below,  Hermes,  No.  99.  Among  other  Platonists  the  same  doc- 
trine is  advanced  by  the  pseudo  Hermes  Trismegistus,  L.  xvi.  sub 
fine,  p.  436,  ed.  Patricii,  1593. 

17. — AMMONIUS  HERMIT  (as  extracted  and  interpolated  by 
Philoponus)  in  his  Commentary  on  Aristotle  '  On  the  Soul,'  In- 
troduction, p.  1-3,  ed.  Trincavelli,  1535.  '  The  function  of  Intel- 
tect  (voiJf)  is  by  immediate  application  [or  intuition,  a#Xa7j 
r/],  to  reach  or  compass  reality,  and  this  end  it  accom- 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  99 

plishes  more  certainly  than  through  the  medium  of  demonstra- 
tion. For  as  Sense,  by  applying  itself  at  once  to  a  colored  or 
figured  object,  obtains  a  knowledge  of  it  better  than  through 
demonstration — for  there  needs  no  syllogism  to  prove  that  this  or 
the  other  thing  is  white,  such  being  perceived  by  the  simple  ap- 
pliance of  the  sense ;  so  also  the  Intellect  apprehends  its  appro- 
priate object  by  a  simple  appliance  [a  simple  intuitive  jet,  cwrX*) 
sVjSoXT)],  better  than  could  be  done  through  any  process  of  demon- 
stration.' .  .  . 

'  I  say  that  the  rational  soul  has  in,  and  co-essential  with  it, 
the  reasons  (Xoyouj)  of  things ;  but,  in  consequence  of  being 
clothed  in  matter,  they  are,  as  it  were,  oppressed  and  smothered, 
like  the  spark  which  lies  hid  under  the  ashes.  And  as,  when  the 
ashes  are  slightly  dug  into,  the  spark  forthwith  gleams  out,  the 
digger  not  however  making  the  spark,  but  only  removing  an  im- 
pediment; in  like  manner,  Opinion,  excited  by  the  senses,  elicits 
the  reasons  of  existences  from  latency  into  manifestation.  Hence 
they  [the  Platonists]  affirm  that  teachers  do  not  infuse  into  us 
knowledge,  but  only  call  out  into  the  light  that  which  previously 
existed  in  us,  as  it  were,  concealed.  ...  It  is,  however,  more 
correct  to  say  that  these  are  Common  Notions  or  adumbrations  of 
the  Intellect ;  for  whatever  we  know  more  certainly  than  through 
demonstration,  that  we  know  in  a  common  notion.'  .... 
Such  common  notions  are — '  Things  that  are  equal  to  the  same 
are  equal  to  one  another,' — '  If  equals  be  taken  from  equals  the 
remainders  are  equal,' — '  Every  thing  must  be  either  affirmed  or 
denied.' 

18. — ST.  ANSELM  professes  the  maxim — 'Crede  ut  intelligas; 
which  became  celebrated  in  the  schools,  as  opposed  to  the  '  In- 
tellige  ut  credas'  of  Abelard. 

19. — ALGAZEL  of  Bagdad,  'the  Imaum  of  the  world,'  some- 
where (in  his  Destruction  of  the  Philosophers,  if  I  recollect  aright) 
says,  as  the  Latin  version  gives  it — '  Radix  cognitionis  fides.' 

20. — ST.  THOMAS  AQUINAS. — a. — De  veritate  ficlei  catholic* 
contra  Gentiles,  L.  i.  c.  7,  §  1.  'Ea  quse  naturaliter  rationi  insi- 


100  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

ta,  verissima  esse  constut ;  intantum,  ut  nee  ea  falsa  esse  possibile 

cogitare Principiorum  naturaliter  notorum  cognitio 

nobis  divinitus  est  indita,  cum  ipse  Deus  sit  auctor  nostne  natu- 
rae. Haec  ergo  principia  etiam  divina  sapientia  continet.  Quic- 
quid  igitur  principiis  liujusmodi  contrarium  est,  est  divinae  sapi- 
entiae  contrarium :  non  igitur  a  Deo  esse  potest.  Ea  igitur  qua; 
ex  revelatione  divina  per  fidem  tenentur,  non  possunt  natural! 
cognitioni  esse  contraria.' 

b. — Expositio  in  Libb.  Metaph.  Aristot.  Lect.  v. — '  Et  quia 
talis  cognitio  principiorum  (those  of  Contradiction  and  of  Ex- 
cluded Middle)  inest  nobis  statim  a  natura,  concludit,'  &c. 

c. — Sumraa  Theologiae,  P.  i.  Partis  ii.  Qu.  51,  art.  1. — '  Intel- 
lectus  principiorum  dicitur  esse  habitus  naturalis.  Ex  ipsa  enim 
natura  animae  intellectualis  convenit  homini,  quod,  statim  cogni- 
to  quid  est  totum  et  quid  est  pars,  cognoscat  quod  omne  totum 
est  inajus  sua  parte,  et  simile  in  cseteris.  Sed  quid  sit  totum  et 
quid  sit  pars  cognoscere  non  potest,  nisi  per  species  intelligibiles  a 
pbantasmatibus  acceptas,  et  propter  hoc  Philosophus,  in  fine  Poste- 
riorum,  ostendit  quod  cognitio  principiorum  provenit  ex  sensu.' 

d. — De  Veritate,  Qu.  xi.  De  Magistro,  conclusio. — '  Dicendum 
est  similiter  de  scientiae  acquisitione,  quod  pneexistunt  in  nobis 
principia  quae  statim  lumine  intellectus  agentis  cognoscuntur,  per 
species  a  sensibilibus  abstractas,  sive  sint  complexa  ut  diynitates, 
sive  incomplexa,  sicut  entis  et  unius  et  hujusmodi  qiue  statim 
intellectus  apprehendit.  Ex  istis  autem  principiis  universalibus 
omnia  principia  sequuntur,  sicut  ex  quibusdam  rationibus  semi- 
nalibus,'  <fec. 

e. — Summa  Theologiae,  P.  i.  Partis  ii.  Qu.  5,  art.  3. — '  Quod 
ab  omnibus  dicitur  non  potest  totaliter  falsum  esse.  Videtur 
enim  naturale  quod  in  pluribus  est ;  natura  autem  non  totaliter 
deficit.'  Compare  Nos.  1  and  3,  f. 

21. — JOANNES  DUNS  SCOTUS  holds  a  doctrine  of  Common 
Sense,  with  reference,  more  especially,  to  necessary  truths,  in 
which  the  genuine  doctrine  of  Aristotle  is  admirably  enounced, 
and  cogently  defended. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  101 

On  the  one  hand  he  maintains  (against  Averroes)  that  princi- 
ples are  not,  in  a  certain  sense,  innate  in  the  Intellect ;  i.  e.  not 
as  actual  cognitions  chronologically  anterior  to  experience. — '  Di- 
cendum  quod  non  habet  aliquam  cognitionem  naturalem  secun- 
dum  naturam  suam,  neque  simplicium,  neque  complexorura,  quia 
omnis  nostra  cognitio  ortum  habet  ex  sensu.  Primo  enim  move- 
tur  sensus  ab  aliquo  simplici  non  complexo,  et  a  sensu  inoto 
movetur  intellectus,  et  intelligit  simplicia,  quod  est  primus  actus 
intellectus ;  deinde  post  apprehensionem  simplicium,  sequitur 
alius  actus,  qui  est  componere  simplicia  ad  invicem ;  post  illam 
autem  compositionem,  habet  intellectus  ex  lumine  naturali  quod 
assentiat  illi  veritati  complexorum,  si  illud  complexum  sit  prin- 
cipium  primum.'  Qusestt.  super  libros  Metaph.  L.  ii.  q.  1,  §  2. 

On  the  other  hand  he  maintains  (against  Henry  of  Ghent) 
that,  in  a  different  sense,  principles  are  naturally  inherent  in  the 
mind.  For  he  shows  that  the  intellect  is  not  dependent  upon 
sense  and  experience,  except  accidentally,  in  so  far  as  these  are 
requisite,  in  affording  a  knowledge  of  the  terms,  to  afford  the 
occasion  on  which,  by  its  native  and  proper  light  (in  other 
words,  by  the  suggestion  of  common  sense),  it  actually  mani- 
fests the  principles  which  it  potentially  contained ;  and  that 
these  principles  are  certain,  even  were  those  phenomena  of  sense 
illusive,  in  reference  to  which  they  are  elicited.  '  Respondeo, 
quod  quantum  ad  istam  notitiam  (principiorum  sc.),  intellectus 
non  habet  sensus  pro  causa  [vel  origine,  as  he  elsewhere  has  it], 
sed  tantum  pro  occasione :  quia  intellectus  non  potest  habere 
notitiam  simplicium  nisi  acceptam  a  sensibus,  ilia  tamen  accepta 
potest  simplicia  virtute  sua  componere  et,  si  ex  ratione  talium 
simplicium  sit  complexio  evidenter  vera,  intellectus  virtute  pro- 
pria  et  terminorum  assentiet  illi  complexioni,  non  virtute  sensus, 
a  quo  accipit  terminos  exterius.  Exemplum ; — si  ratio  totius  et 
ratio  majoritatis  accipiantur  a  sensu,  et  intellectus  componat 
istam — Omne  totum  est  mams  sua  parte,  intellectus  virtute  sui 
et  istorum  terminorum  assentiet  indubitanter  isti  complexioni, 
et  non  tantum  quia  vidit  terminos  conjunctos  in  re,  sicut  assen- 


102  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

tit  isti — Socrates  est  albus,  quia  vidit  tenninos  in  re  uniri.  Immo 
dico,  quod  si  omnes  sensus  essent  falsi,'  &c.  In  Libros  Sent. 
Comm.  Oxon.  L.  i.  Dist.  3,  qu.  4,  §  8. — See  also  §§  12,  23  ;  and 
Quaestt.  super  M'etaph.,  L.  i.  qu.  4,  §§3,  4,  5,  11,  12,  14, 16  ;  L, 
ii.  qu.  1,  §§  2,  3,  et  alibi ;  where  it  is  frequently  repeated  that 
sense  and  experience  are  not  the  cause  or  origin,  but  only  the 
occasion  on  which  the  natural  light  of  Intellect  reveals  its  prin- 
ciples or  first  truths. 

I  may  observe,  that  like  Locke,  the  Subtle  Doctor  divides  our 
acquisition  of  knowledge  between  two  sources,  Sense  and  Reflec- 
tion.— '  Nihil  est  in  intellectu  quin  prius  fuerit  in  sensu,  vera  est 
de  eo  quod  est,  primum  intelligibile,  scilicet  quod  quid  est  [TO  oVi] 
rei  materialis,  non  autem  de  omnibus  per  se  intelligibilibus ;  nam 
multa  per  se  intelliguntur,  non  quia  speciem  faciunt  in  Sensu, 
sed  per  Reflexionem  intellectual  Qmestt.  super  Univ.  Porph. 
q.  3.  But  what  Locke  was  sometimes  compelled  virtually  to 
confess,  in  opposition  to  the  general  tenor  of  his  doctrine  (see 
No.  51),  Scotus  professedly  lays  down  as  the  very  foundation  of 
his — that  Reflection  finds  in  the  mind,  or  intellect  itself,  princi- 
ples, or  necessary  cognitions,  which  are  not  the  educts  of  experi- 
ence, howbeit  not  actually  manifested  prior  to,  or  except  on 
occasion  of,  some  empirical  act  of  knowledge.* 

22. — ANTONIUS  ANDREAS,  an  immediate  disciple  of  Scotus, — 
the  Doctor  Dulcifluus.  Quaestt.  super  libros  Metaph.  L.  ii.  qu.  1. 
— '  Respondeo,  et  dico  duo. 

'PRIMUM; — Quod  notitia  Primowim  Principiorum  non  est 
nobis  a  natura ;  quia  omnis  nostra  cognitio  intellectiva  habet 
ortum  a  sensu,  et,  per  consequens,  non  inest  a  natura.  .  .  Primo 

*  The  edition  I  use,  is  that  by  the  Irish  Franciscans,  Lyons,  1639,  of  the 
Opera  Omnia  of  Scotus,  12  vols.  in  folio.  This  is  the  only  edition  in  which 
the  Subtle  Doctor  can  be  conveniently  studied.  His  editor  and  commenta- 
tors of  course  maintain  him  to  be  a  countryman ;  but  the  patriotism  of 
Father  Maurice  (t.  iii.  p.  254),  makes  no  scruple  in  holding  him  out  as 
actually  inspired:— 'Suppono,  cum  Moyse  in  monte  hoc  vidit,  aut  cum 
Paulo  ad  tertium  ccelum  ascendit,  aut  certe  cum  alio  Joanne  supra  pectua 
sapientiw  recnbuit.' 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  103 

enim  motu  movetur  sensus  ab  objecto  simplici  uon  complexo ; 
et  a  sensu  moto  movetur  intellectus,  et  intelligit  simplicia,  qui  est 
primus  actus  intellectus.  Deinde  post  apprehensionem  simplicium 
sequitur  alius  actus,  qui  est  componere  simplicia  ad  invicem ;  et 
post  istam  compositionem  habet  intellectus,  ex  lumine  naturali  ut 
assentiat  illi  veritati  complex^,  si  illud  complexum  sit  primum 
principium. 

'SECUNDUM; — Quod  notitia  Primorum  Principiorum  [recte] 
dicitur  nobis  inesse  naturaliter,  quatenus,  ex  lumine  naturali 
intellectus,  sunt  nobis  inesse  nota,  habita  notitia  simplici  termi- 
norum,  quia  "  principia  cognoscimus  inquantum  terminos  cog- 
noscimus"  (ex  primo  Posteriorum).' 

To  this  schoolman  we  owe  the  first  enouncement  of  the  Princi- 
ple of  Identity. 

Those  who  are  curious  in  this  matter  will  find  many  acute 
observations  on  the  nature  of  principles  in  the  other  schoolmen ; 
more  especially  in  Averroes  on  the  Analytics  and  Metaphysics, 
in  Albertus  Magnus  on  the  Predicables  and  Pr.  Analytics,  and 
in  Hales,  3d  and  4th  books  of  his  Metaphysics. 

23. — BUD^EUS. — In  Pandectas,  Tit.  i. — '  Ista  igitur  fere  quae 
juri  naturali  ascribuntur,  id  est,  quse  natura  docuisse  nos  cre- 
ditur,  versantur  in  Sensu  Communi]  &c. 

24. — LUTHER. — Weisheit,  Th.  iii.  Abth.  2. — '  All  things  have 
their  root  in  Belief,  which  we  can  neither  perceive  nor  compre- 
hend. He  who  would  make  this  Belief  visible,  manifest,  and 
conceivable,  has  sorrow  for  his  pains.' 

25. — MELANCHTHOX. — a. — De  Dialectica,  ed.  Lugd.  1542,  p. 
90. — Speaking  of  the  Dicta  de  Omni  et  de  Nullo — '  Neo  opus  est 
procul  quserere  harum  regularum  interpretationem  ;  si  quis  sen- 
sum  communem  consuluerit,  statim  intelliget  eas.  Nam  uf? Arith- 
metica  et  alise  artes  initia  summit  a  sensu  communi,  ita  Dialec- 
tics principia  nobisctim  nascuntur.' 

b. — Ibid.,  p.  103. — Speaking  of  the  process  in  the  Expository 
Syllogism, — '  Habet  causam  luec  consequentia  in  natura  positam 
quandam  xoiv^v  svvoiav,  ut  vocant,  hoc  est,  sententiam  quam  om- 


104  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

nis  natura  docet,  de  qua  satis  est  sensum  communem  consulere.' 
And  again, — '  Est  et  hujus  consequentiae  ratio  sumpta  a  com- 
muni  sensu? 

c. — Eroteraata  Dialectica  L.  iv.  in  Loco,  ab  Absurdo,  p.  1040, 
ed.  3,  Strigelii,  1579 — '  Absurdum  in  Philosophia  vocatur  opinio 
pugnans  cum  Sensu  Communi,  id  est  vel  cum  principiis  naturae 
notis,  vel  cum  universal!  experientia.'  Reid  (see  n.  79  a)  says 
repeatedly  the  very  same. 

d. — Ibid.,  p.  853. — '  Quare  Principia  sunt  certa  ?  I.  Quia  noti- 
tia  principiorum  est  lumen  naturale,  insitum  humanis  mentibus 
divinitus.  II.  Quia  dato  opposite  sequitur  destructio  nature.' 
See  also  pp.  798,  857,  and  the  relative  commentary  of  Strigelius, 
What  Melanchthon  states  in  regard  to  the  cognition  of  Principles 
and  Light  of  Nature  is  borrowed  from  the  schoolmen.  See 
above,  Nos.  20,  21,  22.  Consult  also  his  treatise  De  Anima  in 
the  chapters  De  Intellectu  ;  more  especially  that  entitled — Estne 
verum  dictum,  notitias  aliquas  nobiscum  nasci  ? 

26. — JULIUS  CAESAR  SCALIGER. — De  Subtilitate,  Exerc.  cccvii. 
§18. — 'Sunt  cum  anima  nostra  quredan  cognatce  notitice,  quse 
idcirco  voZg  dicuntur  a  philosopho.  Nemo  enim  tarn  infans  est, 
quern  cognitio  lateat  pluris  et  paucioris.  Infanti  duo  poma 
apponito.  Uno  recepto,  alterum  item  poscet.  Ab  his  principiis 
actus  Mentis,  a  sensilibus  excitatus.' — Such  principles,  he  con- 
tends, are  innate  in  the  human  Intellect,  precisely  as  the  instincts 
of  the  lower  animals  are  innate  in  their  highest  power.  They 
may  therefore  be  denominated  Intellectual  Instincts.  Compare 

§&  91     99 
8  -41,    4*. 

The  doctrine  of  this  acute  philosopher  was  adopted  and  illus- 
trated, among  others,  by  his  two  expositors  Rodolphus  Goclenius 
of  Marlmrg,  and  Joannes  Sperlingius  of  Wittemberg ;  by  the  for- 
mer in  his  Adversaria  and  Scaligeri  Exercitationes,  1594  (qq.  41, 
51,  60);  by  the  latter,  not  indeed  in  his  Meditationes  ad  Scali- 
geri Exercitationes,  but  in  his  Physica  Anthropologica,  1C68  (L. 
i.  c.  3,  §  8).  In  these  the  arguments  of  Gassendi  and  Locke  for 
the  counter  opinion,  are  refuted  by  anticipation ;  though,  in  fact, 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE  105 

Locke  himself  is  at  last,  as  we  shall  see,  obliged  to  appeal  to 
Common  Sense,  identical  with  the  Intellectus,  Mem,  and  Lumen 
Naturale  of  these  and  other  philosophers.  (No.  51.)  Otto  Cas- 
mann,  the  disciple  of  Goclenius,  may  also  be  consulted  in  his 
Psychologia  Anthropologies,  1594.  (c.  5,  §  5.) 

27. — OMPHALIUS. — Nomologia,  f.  72  b.  'Non  eget  his  prse- 
ceptis  [dictis  scilicet  de  ornni  et  de  nullo]  qui  Sensum  Commu- 
nem  consulit.  Natura  siquidem  plerasque  xoivaj  gvvoiaj  animis 
nostris  insevit  quibus  rerum  naturam  pervidemus.' 

28. — ANTONIUS  GOVEANUS. — Pro  Aristotele  Responsio  aclver- 
sus  Petri  Kami  Calumnias.  Opera  Omnia,  ed.  Meerman«iana, 
p.  802  a. — 'An  non  ex  hominem  communi  sensu  desumptse  enun- 
ciationum  reciprocationes  hse  videntur  ?  .  .  .  Sumpta  hsec 
Rame,  sunt  e  communi  hominum  intelligentia,  cujus  cum  mater 
natura  sit,  quid  est,  quaeso,  cur  negemus  naturae  decreta  hsec  et 
praecepta  esse  ?' 

29. — NUNNESIUS. — De  Constitutione  Dialectics,  f.  56  b.  ed. 
1554. — '  Sed  cum  Dialectica  contenta  sit  Sensu  Communi?  &c. 

30. — MURETUS. — In  Aristotelus  Ethica  ad  Nicornachum  Com- 
mentarius,  1583.  Opera  Omnia,  Ruhnkenii,  t.  iii.  p.  230. 

In  proof  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  in  general,  and  in  par- 
ticular, in  disproof  of  an  old  and  ever-recurring  opinion — one,  in- 
deed, which  agitates,  at  the  present  moment,  the  divines  and  phi- 
losophers of  Germany — that  the  intellect  in  man,  as  a  merely  pas- 
sing manifestation  of  the  universal  soul,  the  Absolute,  can  pretend 
to  no  individual,  no  personal,  existence  beyond  the  grave ;  he  addu- 
ces the  argument  drawn  from  the  common  sense  of  mankind,  in  the 
following  noble,  though  hitherto  unnoticed  passage  : — touching 
the  eloquence  of  which,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind,  that  what  is 
now  read  as  a  commentary  was  originally  listened  to  by  a  great, 
and  mingled  auditory,  as  improvisations  from  the  mouth  of  him, 
for  whose  equal  as  a  Latin  orator,  we  must  ascend  to  Cicero  himself. 

'  Neque  laborandum  est  etiamsi  -hsec  [nisi]  naturalibus,  argu- 
mcntis  probare  nequeamus,  neque  fortassis  dissolvere  rationes 
quasdam,  quas  afferunt  ii,  qui  contrarias  opiniones  tuentur.  Na- 


106  PHILOSOPHY   OF  COMMON  SENSE. 

turalis  enim  omnium  gentium  consensus  multo  plus  ponderis  apud 
nos,  quam  omnia  istorum  argumenta,  habere  debet.  Neque  quic- 
quain  est  aliud  gigantum  more  bellare  cum  diis,  quam  repugnare 
naturae,*  et  insitas  ab  ea  in  omnium  animis  opiniones  acutis  ac 
fallacibus  conclusiunculis  velle  subvertere.  Itaque  ut  senes  illi 
Trojani,  apud  Homerum,  dicebant,  pulchram  quidam  esse  Hele- 
nam,  sed  tamen  ablegandum  ad  suos,  ne  exitio  esset  civitati ;  ita 
nos,  si  quando  afferetur  nobis  ab  istis  acutum  aliquod  argument- 
urn,  quo  colligatur  ....  animos  interire  una  cum  corpo- 
ribus,  aut  si  quid  supersit,  commune  quiddam  esse,  et  ut  unum 
soletB,f  ita  unum  esse  omnium  men  turn,  .  .  .  respondeamus : 
— Ingeniosus  quidem  es,  o  bone,  et  eruditus,  et  in  disputando  po- 
tens ;  sed  babe  tibi  istas  praeclaras  rationes  tuas ;  ego  eas,  ne 
mibi  exitiosse  sint,  admittere  in  animum  meum  nolo.  Accipite, 
enim,  gravissime  viri,  .  .  .  studiosissimi  adolescentes,  .  . 
praaclaram,  et  immortali  memoria  dignam,  summi  philosophi 
Aristotelis  sententiam,  quam  in  omnibus  hujus  generis  disputa- 
tionibus  teneatis,  quam  sequamini,  ad  quam  sensus  cogitationes- 
que  vestras  perpetuo  dirigatis.  Ex  illius  enim  divini  hominis 
pectore,  tanquam  ex  augustissimo  quodam  sapientiae  sacrario, 
hsec  prodierunt,  quae  primo  Ethicorum  ad  Eudemum  leguntur — 
Il^otfs^siv  oO  ds7  ifavra  roTg  Sia  <ruv  Xoywv,  ctXXa  <roXXaxi£  f^aXXov 
coif  <paivo|a='voi£.  Convertam  hsec  in  Latinum  sermonem,  utinain- 
que  possera  in  omnes  omnium  populorum  linguas  convertere,  at- 
que  in  omnium  Lominum  animis,  ita  ut  nunquam  delerentur,  in- 
sculpere : — non  semper,  neque  omnibus  in  rebus,  assentiendum  est 
Us  quce  rationibus  et  argumentis  probantur  ;  immo  potius  ea  pic- 

*  Cic.  De  Sen.  c.  2.  Quid  enim  est  aliud  gigantum  more  bellare  cum  diis, 
nisi  naturae  repugnare  ? 

t  Had  Muretus  the  following  passage  of  Bessarion  in  his  eye? — '•Intelkctum 
deforis  advenire  [Aristotle's  dictum],  Theophrastus,  Alexander,  Themistius, 
Avcrroes,  ita  accipiunt,  ut  jam  quisque  orttis,  illico  intellectus  sibi  applicatam 
excipiat  portionem,  ita  extinctus  relinquat  in  commune ;  non  aliter,  ac  si 
quis  Sole,  nasctns,  partieipare  dicatur,  morient,  privari  ;  et  non  esse  animani 
pnrticufarem,  quae  deforis  advenit,  sed  ex  communi  acceptam  applicatio- 
nem.'  In  Calumu.  Plat.  L.  iii.  c.  27. — The  simile  of  the  sun  is  however  to 
be  found  in  Plotinus,  and — I  think — in  Theinwtius. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  107 

rumque  tenenda,  quce  communi  hominum  sententia  comprdbantur. 
Quid  enim  est  tarn  falsum,  tamque  abhorrens  a  vero,  ut  non  ad 
id  probandum  ab  ingeniosis  et  exercitatis  hominibus  argumenta 
excogitari  queant  ?  .  .  .  .  Vidistisne  unquam  in  tenebrosa 
nocte  accensam  aliquam  facem  e  longinquo  loco  micantem  ?  II- 
lam,  igitur,  quamvis  dissitam,  videbatis ;  neque  tamen  quicquam, 
in  illo  longo,  interjecto  inter  oculum  vestrum  et  facem,  densis  ob- 
sito  tenebris  spatio,  videre  poteratis.  Idem  putatote  animis  acci- 
dere.  Ssepa  animus  noster  veritatem  alicujus  enunciationis  tan- 
quam  eminus  fulgentem  ac  collucentem  videt,  etiamsi  propter 
illam,  qua  circumfusus  est,  caliginem,  videre  ea  quse  intermedia 
sunt,  et  per  quse  ad  earn  pervenitur,  non  potest.  ...  Si  iter  ali- 
quod  ingressurus,  duas  videres  vias,  quee  eodem  ferrent ;  unara  ex- 
peditam,  planam,  tutam,  et  eo  quo  constituisses,  sine  ulla  erratione, 
ducentem  ;  alteram  tortuosam,  asperam,  periculosam,  et  quam  qui 
sequerentur,  propter  varies  et  multiplices  anfractus,saepe  aberarent ; 
— dubitares  utram  potius  eligeres  ?  Duee  sunt  viae  quibus  homines 
ad  aliquam  cognitionem  Dei  et  animi  sui  pervenire  posse  se  putant. 
Aut  enim  eo  contendunt  disputando,  et  cur  quicquam  ita  sit  sub- 
tiliter  inquirendo ;  aut  sine  dubitatione  ulla  assentiendo  iis,  quse 
majores  summo  consensu,  partim  naturali  lumine  cognita,  partim 
divinitus  inspirata,  tradiderunt.  Illam  qui  secuti  sunt,  omnibus  sse- 
culis  in  multiplices  en-ores  inciderunt.  At  hsec  illorum  signata 
est  vestigiis,  quos  in  coelum  sublatos  veneramur  et  colimus.'* 
31. — GIPHANIUS. — Commentarii  in  libros  Ethicorum  ad  Nico- 

*  Of  none  of  the  great  scholars  of  the  sixteenth  century — the  second  golden 
age  of  Latin  letters — have  the  works  been  so  frequently  republished,  so 
learnedly  annotated,  so  industriously  collected,  as  those  of  the  pattern  critic, 
the  incomparable  Muretus.  There  however  still  remains  a  considerable 
gleaning.  I  have  myself  taken  note  of  some  twenty  scattered  anecdota,  in 
prose  and  verse,  in  Greek,  Latin,  and  French,  which,  if  the  excellent  edi- 
tion (excellent,  even  after  that  of  Ruhnkenius)  of  the  Opera  Omnia,  by  Pro- 
fessor Frotschcr  of  Leipsic,  now  unfortunately  interrupted,  be  not  finally 
abandoned,  I  should  have  great  pleasure  in  communicating  to  the  learned 
editor. — How  is  it,  that  whilst  Italy,  Germany,  and  Holland  have,  for  centu- 
ries, been  emulating  each  other  in  paying  homage  to  the  genius  of  Muretus, 
France  has  done  absolutely  nothing  to  testify  her  admiration  of  so  illustrious 
a  son? 


108  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

machum,  L.  x.  c.  2. — '  Quod  omnibus  videtur,  id  (inquit  Aristo- 
teles)  esse  dicimus.  Nam  communis  hominum  sensus  et  judi- 
cium  est  tanquam  lex  naturae.'  See  n.  3,  f. 

32, — MARIANA.  De  Rege  et  Regis  institutione,  L.  i.  c.  6.  '  Et 
est  communis  sensus  quasi  quaedam  naturae  vox  [lex  ?]  mentibus 
nostris  indita,  auribus  insonans  lex  [vox  ?]  qua  a  turpi  honestum 
secenrimus.' 

33. — SIR  JOHN  DAVIES.  Of  the  immortality  of  the  Soul,  1 
ed.  1599,  pp.  63,  97. 

'  If  then  all  souls,  both  good  and  bad,  do  teach, 

With  general  voice,  that  souls  can  never  die ; 
'Tis  not  man's  flattering  gloss,  but  nature's  speech, 
Which,  like  God's  oracle,  can  never  lie.' 

******* 

'  But  how  can  that  be  false,  which  every  tongue 

Of  every  mortal  man  affirms  for  true  ? 
Which  truth  has  in  all  ages  stood  so  strong, 

That,  loadstone-like,  all  hearts  it  ever  drew. 
For  not  the  Christian  or  the  Jew  alone, 

The  Persian  or  the  Turk,  acknowledge  this ; 
This  mystery  to  the  wild  Indian  known, 

And  to  the  Cannibal  and  Tartar  is.' 

These  latter  stanzas  were  probably  suggested  by  a  passage  in 
the  first  Dissertation  of  Maximus  Tyrius.  This  'learned  poet'  re- 
quires and  eminently  deserves,  a  commentary. 

34. — KECKERMANNUS  (Systema  Logicum,  L.  iii.  c.  13),  treat- 
ing of  Necessary  Testimony  : — '  Testimonium  necessarium  est  vel 
Dei  vel  Sensuum.'  Having  spoken  of  the  former,  he  proceeds  : 
'  Restat  testimonium  sensuum,  quod  suus  cuique  sensus  dictat. 
Estque  vel  externum  vel  intemum.  Internum  est,  quod  leges  na- 
turae, tarn  theoreticce  quam  practicce  dictant ;  itemque  conscientia. 
Externum  est,  quod  sensus  externi,  ut  visus,  auditus,  &c.,  recte  dis- 
positi,  adeoque  ipsa  sensualis  observatio,  et  experientia  com  pro- 
bat.'  In  illustration  of  the  testimony  of  Internal  Sense,  Conscien- 
tia, he  says  : '  Magna  est  vis  testimonii  Conscientiae  in  utramque 
partem  ;  et  sicut  leges  seu  principia  naturee  duplicia  sunt — theo- 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  109 

retica,  ut,  totum  est  major  suaparte — et  practica,  ut,  quod  tibi  fieri 
non  vis,  alteri  ne  feceris :  ita  duplex  est  Conscientia,  theoretica 
nimirum  et  practica,  per  quam  conclusiones  theoreticee  et  practices 
firmiter  nobis  probantur.' 

The  employment  here  of  Conscientia,  for  the  noetic  faculty  or 
faculty  of  principles,  is  (if  we  except  the  single  precedent  of  Ter- 
tullian)  unexampled,  as  far  as  I  have  observed,  previous  to  the  ex- 
tension given  to  the  word  by  Descartes.  The  internal  and  ex- 
ternal sense  of  Keckermann  are,  taken  together,  nearly  equivalent 
to  the  expression  common  sense,  in  the  meaning  under  considera- 
tion ;  an  expression,  it  may  be  added,  which  this  author  had 
himself,  in  the  same  work,  previously  employed.  (L.  i.  c.  5.) 

35. — LORD  HERBERT  OF  CHERBURY. — In  1624,  at  Paris  and 
London,  was  first  published  his  work  '  De  Veritate ;'  and  to  the 
third  edition,  London,  1645,  was  annexed  his  correlative  treatise 
'  De  Causis  Errorum.'  These  works,  especially  the  former,  con- 
tain a  more  formal  and  articulate  enouncement  of  the  doctrine  of 
Common  Sense,  than  had  (I  might  almost  say  than  has)  hitherto 
appeared.  It  is  truly  marvellous,  that  the  speculations  of  so  able 
and  original  a  thinker,  and  otherwise  of  so  remarkable  a  man, 
should  have  escaped  the  observation  of  those  who,  subsequently, 
in  Great  Britain,  philosophized  in  a  congenial  spirit ;  yet  he  is 
noticed  by  Locke,  and  carefully  criticised  by  Gassendi.  The  fol- 
lowing is  an  abstract  of  his  doctrine — strictly  in  reference  to  our 
present  subject.  The  edition  I  use  is  the  third,  that  of  1645. 

Lord  Herbert  makes  a  fourfold  distribution  of  the  human  fac- 
ulties ; — into  Natural  Instinct — Internal  Sense — External  Sense 
and  the  Discursive  faculty  (Discursus)  p.  37.  These  names  he 
employs  in  significations  often  peculiar  to  himself.  Each  of  these 
powers  is  the  guarantee  of  a  certain  class  of  truths ;  and  there  is 
given  no  truth  which  is  not  made  known  to  us  through  one  or 
other  of  these  attesting  faculties.  Let  us  not,  therefore,  be  wise 
beyond  our  powers.  (Ne  sapiamus  ultra  facilitates.) 

But  of  these  there  is  one  whose  truths  are  of  a  relatively  higher 
order,  as  commanding  universal  assent,  and  therefore  of  indubita- 


110  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

ble  certainty.  This  faculty,  which  he  calls  Natural  Instinct 
(Instinctus  Naturalis),  might  with  more  discriminative  propriety 
have  been  styled  Intellectual  Instinct ;  and  it  corresponds,  as  is 
manifest,  with  the  Nou9  of  Aristotle,  the  Intelligentia  of  the 
schoolmen,  and  the  Common  Sense  of  philosophers  in  general. 
Natural  Instinct  may  be  considered  either  as  a  faculty  or  the 
manifestation  of  a  faculty.  In  the  former  signification,  Instinct, 
or  the  Noetic  faculty,  is  the  proximate  instrument  of  the  univer- 
sal intelligence  of  God ;  in  fact,  a  certain  portion  thereof  ingrafted 
on  the  mind  of  man.  In  the  latter  signification,  Natural  Instincts 
are  those  Catholic  Cognitions  or  Common  Notions  (xoivcu  two'tai, 
notitise  communes)  which  exist  in  every  human  being  of  sound 
and  entire  mind ;  and  with  which  we  are  naturally  or  divinely 
furnished,  to  the  end  that  we  may  truly  decide  touching  the 
objects  with  which  we  are  conversant  during  the  present  life  (pp. 
27,  29,  44).  These  Instincts  or  Common  Notions  he  denomi- 
nates also  Primary  Truths — Common  Principles — Received 
Principles  of  Demonstration — Sacred  Principles,  against  which 
it  is  unlawful  to  contend,  &c.  These  are  so  far  from  being  mere 
products  of  experience  and  observation,  that,  without  some  of 
them,  no  experience  or  observation  is  possible  (pp.  28,  48,  54). 
But,  unless  excited  by  an  object,  they  remain  silent ;  have  then 
a  virtual,  not  an  actual  existence  (pp.  39,  42).  The  comparison 
of  the  mind  to  a  tabula  rasa  or  blank  book,  on  which  objects 
inscribe  themselves,  must  be  rejected ;  but  it  may  be  resembled 
to  a  closed  book,  only  opened  on  the  presentation  of  objects  (p.  54). 
The  sole  criterion  by  which  we  can  discriminate  principles,  natu- 
ral or  divine,  is  universal  agreement ;  though,  at  the  same  time, 
the  higher  and  more  necessary  the  truth,  the  more  liable  it  is  to 
be  alloyed  with  error  (p.  52).  Our  natural  Instincts  operate 
irrationally ;  that  is,  they  operate  without  reasoning  or  discur- 
sion ;  and  Reason  (Ratio),  which  is  the  deduction  of  these  com- 
mon notions  to  their  lower  and  lowest  applications,  has  no  other 
appeal,  in  the  last  resort,  except  to  them  (p.  42). 

The  primary  truths,  or  tniths  of  Instinct,  are  discriminated 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  Ill 

from  secondary  truths  (those,  to  wit,  which  are  not  obtained 
without  the  intervention  of  the  Discursive  faculty)  by  six  charac- 
ters. 

1°.  By  their  Priority.  For  Natural  Instinct  is  the  first,  Dis- 
cursion  the  last  of  our  faculties. 

2°.  By  their  Independence.  For  if  a  truth  depend  upon  a 
common  notion,  it  is  only  secondary ;  whereas  a  truth  is  primary, 
which  itself  hanging  upon  no  superior  truth,  affords  dependence 
to  a  chain  of  subordinate  propositions. 

3°.  By  their  Universality.  Universal  consent  is  indeed  the 
most  unequivocal  criterion  of  an  instinctive  truth.  The  Particu- 
lar is  always  to  be  suspected  as  false,  or,  at  least,  as  partially 
erroneous ;  whereas  Common  Notions,  drawn,  as  it  were,  from 
the  very  wisdom  of  nature,  are,  in  themselves,  universal,  howbeit, 
in  reasoning,  they  may  be  brought  down  and  applied  to  particulars. 

4°.  By  their  Certainty.  For  such  is  their  authority,  that  he 
who  should  call  them  into  doubt,  would  disturb  the  whole  con- 
stitution of  things,  and,  in  a  certain  sort,  denude  himself  of  his 
humanity.  It  is,  therefore,  unlawful  to  dispute  against  these 
principles,  which,  if  clearly  understood,  cannot  possibly  be  gain- 
said. (Compare  No.  25,  d.) 

5°. — By  their  Necessity.  For  there  is  none  which  does  not 
conduce  to  the  conservation  of  man. 

6°. — By  the  Manner  of  their  Formation  or  Manifestation. 
For  they  are  elicited,  instantaneously  and  without  hesitation,  so 
soon  as  we  apprehend  the  significance  of  the  relative  objects  or 
words.  The  discursive  understanding,  on  the  other  hand,  is  in 
its  operation  slow  and  vacillating — advancing  only  to  recede — 
exposed  to  innumerable  errors — in  frequent  confliction  with  sense 
— attributing  to  one  faculty  what  is  of  the  province  of  another,  and 
not  observing  that  each  has  its  legitimate  boundaries,  transcend- 
ing which,  its  deliverances  are  incompetent  or  null  (pp.  60,  61).* 

*  I  was  surprised  to  find  an  eloquent  and  very  just  appreciation  of  Herbert 
(for  he  it  is  who  is  referred  to),  by  a  learned  and  orthodox  theologian  at 
Cambridge — Nathaniel  Culvenvell,  in  his  '  Discourse  of  the  Light  of  Nature,' 


112  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

36. — JOANNES  CAMERON,  the  celebrated  theologian. — De  EC- 
clesia  iv.  Op.  ed.  1642,  p.  — .  'Sensus  Communis  seu  Ratio,'  <fec. 

37. — DESCARTES  proclaims  as  the  leading  maxim  of  philosophy 
a  principle  which  it  would  have  been  well  for  his  own  doctrine 
had  he  always  faithfully  applied.  'Certum  autem  est,  nihil 
nos  unquam  falsum  pro  vero  admissuros,  si  tantum  iis  assen- 
sum  prsebearaus  quse  dare  et  distincte  percipiemus.  Certum, 
inquam,  quia  cum  Deus  non  sit  fallax,  facultas  percipiendi,  quam 
nobis  dedit  [sive  Lumen  Naturae],  non  potest  tendere  in  falsum ; 
ut  neque  etiam  facultas  assentiendi,  cum  tantum  ad  ea,  qute  clare 
percipiuntur,  se  extendit.  Et  quamvis  hoc  uulla  ratione  probare- 
tur,  ita  omnium  animis  a  natura  impressum  est,  ut  quoties  aliquid 
clare  percipimus,  ei  sponte  assentiamur,  et  nulla  modo  possimus 
dubitare  quin  sit  verum.'  Princ.  i.  §  43,  with  §§  30,  45 ;  De 
Meth.  §  4  ;  Med.  iii.  iv. ;  Resp,  ad"  Obj.  ii.  passim.  What  Des- 
cartes, after  the  schoolmen,  calls  the  '  Light  of  Nature,'  is  only 
another  term  for  Common  Sense  (see  Nos.  20,  21,  22,  25);  and 
Common  Sense  is  the  name  which  Descartes'  illustrious  disciple. 
Fenelon,  subsequently  gave  it.  See  No.  60.  There  are  some 
good  observations  on  Descartes'  Light  of  Nature,  <kc.  in  Gravii 
Specimina  Philosophise  Veteris,  L.  ii.  c.  16 ;  and  in  Regis,  Meta- 
physique,  L.  i.  P.  i.  ch.  12,  who  identifies  it  with  consciousness. 

That  Descartes  did  not  hold  the  crude  and  very  erroneous  doc- 
trine of  innate  ideas  which  Locke  took  the  trouble  to  refute,  1 
may  have  another  opportunity  of  more  fully  showing.  '  Nun- 
quam  scripsi  vel  judicavi  (he  says)  mentem  indigere  id  eis  innatis, 
qure  sint  aliquid  diversum  ab  ejus  facilitate  cogitandi?  Notae  in 
Programma  (Regii)  §  12. — Compare  §  13  with  Responsiones  et 
Objectiones  iii.  rr.  5,  10.  By  innate  ideas  in  general,  Descartes 
means  simply  the  innate  faculty  we  possess  of  forming  or  eliciting 
certain  manifestations  in  consciousness  (whether  of  necessary  or 

written  in  1C46,  p.  93.  Culvcrwell  does  not  deserve  the  oblivion  into  which 
he  has  fallen ;  for  he  is  a  compeer  worthy  of  More,  Spencer,  Smith,  Cud- 
worth,  and  Taylor — the  illustrious  and  congenial  band  by  which  that  univer- 
sity was  illustrated  during  the  latter  half  of  the  seventeenth  century. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  113 

contingent  truths)  on  occasion  of,  but  wholly  different  from,  both 
the  qualities  of  the  reality  affecting,  and  the  movements  of  the 
organism  affected ;  these  manifestations  or  ideas  being  nothing 
else  than  states  of  the  conscious  substance  itself.  On  this  ground 
he  occasionally  calls  the  secondary  qualities  innate ;  in  so  far  as 
they  are,  actually,  mere  modes  of  mind,  and,  potentially,  subjec- 
tive predispositions  to  being  thus  or  thus  modified. 

His  doctrine  in  regard  to  principles,  when  fully  considered, 
seems  identical  with  that  of  Aristotle,  as  adopted  and  expounded 
by  the  schoolmen ;  and  I  have  no  doubt  that  had  he  and  Locke 
expressed  themselves  with  the  clearness  and  precision  of  Scotus, 
their  opinions  on  this  subject  would  have  been  found  coincident 
both  with  each  other  and  with  the  truth. 

38. — SIR  THOMAS  BROWN  (Religio  Medici,  First  Part,  sect.  36) 
has  '  Common  Sense]  word  and  thing. 

39. — BALZAC  in  Le  Barbon  (Sallengre  Histoire  de  Pierre  de 
Montmauer,  t.  ii.  p.  88,  and  QEuvres  de  Balzac),  'Sens  Commun,' 
word  and  thing. 

40. — CHANET  (Traite  de  1'Esprit,  p.  15)  notices  that  the  term 
Common  Sense  had  in  French  a  meaning  different  from  its  Scho- 
lastic or  Aristotelic  signification,  '  being  equivalent  to  common  or 
universal  reason,  and  by  some  denominated  natural  logic? 

41. — P.  IREN^EUS  A  SANCTO  JACOBO,  a  Thomist  philosopher, 
and  Professor  of  Theology  at  Rennes. — Integra  Philosophia, 
1655  ;  Logica  c.  iv.  sectio  4.  §  2. — In  reference  to  the  question. 
'  Quid  sit  habitus  ille  primorum  principiorum  T  he  says — '  Proba- 
bilior  apparet  sententia  dicentium  habitum  primorum  principio- 
rum esse  lumen  naturale,  seu  naturaliter  inditum  (intellectus  sc.) 

.  .  .  Favet  communis  omnium  sensus,  qui  diffiteri  nequit 
aliqua  esse  naturaliter  et  seipsis  cognoscibilia ;  ergo  principium 
talis  cognitionis  debet  censeri  signatum  super  nos  natures  lu- 
men? 

42. — LESCALOPIER. — Humanitas  Theologica,  &c.,  L.  i.  p.  87. — 
'Quid  gravius  in  sentiendo,  quod  sequamur,  habere  possumus, 
quam  constans  naturae  judicium,  aetatum  omnium  cana  sapien- 


114  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

tia  et  perpetuo  suffragio  confirmatum  ?  Possunt  errare  singuli ; 
labi  possunt  viri  sapientes  sibi  suoque  arbitrio  permissi ;  at  totam 
hominis  naturam  tanta  erroris  contagio  invadere  non  potest.  .  .  . 
Quod  in  communibus  hominum  sensibus  positum,  id  quoque  in 
ipsa  natura  situm  atque  fixum  esse,  vel  ipse  Orator  coram  judice 
non  diffitetur.  [Pro  Cluentio,  c.  6.]  Itaque  communis  ille  sensus, 
naturae  certissima  vox  est ;  imnio, '  vox  Populi,'  ut  trito  fertur  ada- 
gio, '  vox  Dei.' 

43. — PASCAL. — Pensees  ;  editions  of  Bossut  and  Renouard. 

a. — Partie  i.  art.  x.  §  4  (ch.  31  old  editions),  'Tout  notre  rai- 
sonnement  se  reduit  a  ceder  au  Sentiment.'1  This  feeling  lie,  be- 
fore and  after,  calls  '  Sens  Commun.'  Art.  vi.  §  17,  (ch.  25) — 
art.  xi.  §  2  (wanting  in  old  editions). 

b. — Partie  ii.  art.  i.  §  1  (ch  21).  Speaking  the  doctrine  of  the 
Skeptics — '  Nous  n'avons  aucun  certitude  de  la  verite"  des  prmci- 
pes  (hors  la  foi  et  la  revelation)  sinon  en  ce  que  nous  les  sentons 
naturellement  en  nous.'  ....  And  having  stated  their  principal 
arguments  why  this  is  not  conclusive,  he  takes  up  the  doctrine  of 
the  Dogmatists. 

'  L'unique  fort  des  Dogmatistes,  c'est  qu'en  parlant  de  bonne 
foi  et  sincerement,  on  ne  peut  douter  des  principes  naturels. 
Nous  connoissons,  disent-ils,  la  verite,  non  seulement  par  rai- 
sonnement,  inais  aussi  par  sentiment,  et  par  une  intelligence  vive 
et  lumineuse  ;  et  c'est  de  cette  derniere  sorte  que  nous  connois- 
sons les  premiers  principes.  C'est  en  vain  que  le  raisonnement, 
qui  n'y  a  point  de  part,  essaie  de  les  combattre.  Les  Pyrrho- 
niens,  qui  n'ont  que  cela  pour  objet,  y  travaillent  inutilement.  Nous 
savons  que  nous  ne  revons  point,  quelque  impuissance  ou  nous 
soyons  de  le  prouver  par  raison  [which  he  uses  convertibly  with 
raisonnement\.  Cette  impuissance  ne  conclut  autre  chose  que  la 
foiblesse  de  notre  raison,  mais  non  pas  1'incertitude  de  toutes  nos 
connoissances,  comme  ils  le  pretendent :  car  la  connoissance  des 
premiers  principes,  comme,  par  exemple,  qu'il  y  a  espace,  temps, 
mouvement,  nombre,  matiere,  est  aussi  ferme  qu'aucune  de  celles 
que  nos  raisonnements  nous  donnent  Et  c'est  sur  ces  connois- 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   COMMON    SENSE.  115 

sances  <P  intelligence  et  de  sentiment  qu'il  faut  que  la  raison  s'ap- 
puie,  et  qu'elle  fonde  tout  son  discours.  Je  sens  qu'il  y  a  trois 
dimensions  dans  1'espace,  et  que  les  nombres  sent  infinis ;  et  la 
raison  demontre  ensuite  qu'il  n'y  a  point  deux  nombres  carres 
dont  1'un  soit  double  de  1'autre.  Les  principes  se  sentent;  les 
propositions  se  concluent ;  le  tout  avec  certitude,  quoique  par  dif- 
ferentes  voies.  Et  il  est  aussi  ridicule  que  la  raison  demande  au 
sentiment  et  a  F  intelligence  des  preuves  de  ces  premiers  principes 
pour  y  consentir,  qu'il  seroit  ridicule  que  V intelligence  demandat 
a  la  raison  un  sentiment  de  toutes  les  propositions  qu'elle  de- 
montre. Cette  impuissance  ne  pent  done  servir  qu'a  humilier  la 
raison  qui  voudroit  juger  de  tout,  mais  non  pas  a  combattre  no- 
tre  certitude,  comme  s'il  n'y  avoit  que  la  raison  capable  de  nous 
instruire.  Plut  a  Dieu  que  nous  n'en  eussions  au  contraire 
jamais  besoin,  et  que  nous  connussions  toutes  choses  par  instinct 
et  par  sentiment !  Mais  la  nature  nous  a  refuse  ce  bien  et  elle 
ne  nous  a  donne  que  tres  peu  de  connoissances  de  cette  sorte ; 
toutes  les  autres  ne  peu  vent  e"tre  acquises  que  par  le  raison  ne- 
ment.'  ... 

'  Qui  demfelera  cet  embrouillement  ?  La  nature  confond  les 
Pyrrhoniens,  et  la  raison  confond  les  Dogmatistes.  Que  devien- 
drez  vous  done,  6  homme,  qui  cherchez  votre  veritable  condition 
par  votre  raison  naturelle  ?  Vous  ne  pouvez  fuir  une  de  ces 
sectes,  ni  subsister  dans  aucune.  Voila  ce  qu'est  1'homme  a  1'e- 
gard  de  la  verite.' 

44. — LA  CHAMBRE. — Systeme  de  1'Ame,  L.  ii.  c.  3. — '  Sens 
CommunJ  word  and  thing. 

45. — HENRY  MORE. — Confutatio  Cabbalte  :  Opera  Omnia,  p. 
528.  '  Hoc  Externus  Sensus,  corporeave  Imaginatio  non  dictat, 
sed  Sensus  Intellectualis,  innataque  ipsius  mentis  sagacitas,  inter 
cujus  notiones  communes  seu  axiomata,  noematice  vel  immediate 
vera,  supra  numeratum  est.' — Compare  Epistola  H.  Mori,  ad. 
V.  C.  §  17,  Opera,  p.  117,  and  Enchiridion  Ethicum,  L.  i.  cc. 
4,5. 

46. — RAPIN. — Comparaison  de  Platon  et  d'Aristote,  ch.  vii.  § 


116  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

11. — '  Ce  consentement  general  de  tous  les  peuples,  est  un  instinct 
de  la  nature  qui  ne  peut  estre  faux,  estant  si  universe!.' 

47. — DUHAMEL. — Philosophia  Burgundiae,  t.  i.  Disp.  ii.  in  Ca- 
teg.  qu.  4,  art.  2.  '  Communis  Sensus?  name  and  thing. 

48. — MALEBRANCIIE. — Recherche  de  la  Verite — Entretiens  sur 
la  Metaphysique — Traite  de  Morale,  <fec.,  passim. 

He  holds,  1°,  that  there  is  a  supreme  absolute  essential  Reason 
or  Intelligence,  an  eternal  light  illuminating  all  other  minds,  con- 
taining in  itself  and  revealing  to  them  the  necessary  principles  of 
science  and  of  duty  ;  and  manifesting  also  to  us  the  contingent 
existence  of  an  external,  extended  universe.  This  Intelligence  is 
the  Deity  ;  these  revelations,  these  manifestations,  are  Ideas.  He 
holds,  2°,  that  there  is  a  natural  Reason  common  to  all  men — 
an  eye,  as  it  were,  fitted  to  receive  the  light,  and  to  attend  to  the. 
ideas  in  the  supreme  Intelligence ;  in  so  far  therefore  an  infallible 
and  '  Common  Sense?  But,  3o,  at  the  same  time,  this  Reason  is 
obnoxious  to  the  intrusions,  deceptions,  and  solicitations  of  the 
senses,  the  imagination,  and  the  passions  ;  and,  in  so  far,  is  per- 
sonal, fallible,  and  factitious.  He  opposes  objective  knowledge, 
'  par  idee,'  to  subjective  knowledge, '  par  conscience,'  or '  sentiment 
interieur.'  To  the  latter  belong  all  the  Beliefs  ;  which,  when  ne- 
cessary, as  determined  by  Ideas  in  the  Supernal  Reason,  are 
always  veracious. — It  could,  however,  easily  be  shown  that,  in  so 
far  as  regards,  the  representative  perception  of  the  external  world, 
his  principles  would  refute  his  theory.  A  similar  doctrine  in  re- 
gard to  the  infallibility  and  divinity  of  our  Intelligence  or  Com- 
mon Sense  was  held  by  Bossuet. 

49. — POIRET. — The  objects  of  our  cognitions  are  either  things 
themselves — realities  ;  or  the  representations  of  realities,  their 
shadows,  pictures, — ideas.  Realities  are  divided  into  two  classes  ; 
corporeal  things,  and  spiritual  things.  Each  of  these  species  of 
object  has  an  appropriate  faculty  by  which  it  is  cognized.  1°, 
Corporeal  realities  are  perceived  by  the  animal  or  sensual  Intel- 
lect— in  a  word  by  Sense  ;  this  is  merely  passive.  2°,  Spiritual 
realities — original  truths — are  perceived  by  the  passive  or  receptive 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   COMMON    SENSE.  117 

Intellect,  which  may  be  called  Intelligence  ;  it  is  the  sense  of  the  su- 
persensible. [This  corresponds  not  to  the  passive  intellect  of  Aris- 
totle, but  to  his  intellect  considered  as  the  place  of  principles  and  to 
Common  Sense  ;  it  coincides  also  with  the  Vernunft  of  Jacobi  and 
other  German  philosophers,  but  is  more  correctly  named.] — These 
two  faculties  of  apprehension  are  veracious,  as  God  is  veracious.  3°, 
The  faculty  of  calling  up  and  complicating  Ideas  is  the  active — 
ideal — reflective  Intellect,  or  human  Reason.  [This  answers  not 
to  the  active  or  efficient,  but  to  the  discursive  or  dianoetic,  intel- 
lect of  Aristotle  and  the  older  philosophers  in  general,  also  to  the 
Verstand  of  Kant,  Jacobi,  and  the  recent  philosophers  of  Germany, 
but  is  more  properly  denominated.]  (De  Eruditione  Solida,  &c., 
ed.  2.  Meth.  P.  i.  §  43-50,  and  Lib.  i.  §  4-7,  and  Lib.  ii.  §  3-8, 
and  Def.  p.  468  sq. — Cogitationes  Rationales,  &c.,  ed.  2,  disc, 
pr.  §  45,  L.  ii.  c.  4,  §  2. — Fides  et  ratio,  &c.,  p.  28  sq.  p.  81,  sq. 
p.  131  sq. — Defensio  Methodi,  &c.  Op.  post.  p.  113  sq. — (Econo- 
mia  Divina,  L.  iv.  c.  20-25. — Vera  et  Cognita,  passim.) — '  In- 
nate principles'  he  indifferently  denominates  '  Instincts.'  (Fides  et 
Ratio,  Pr.  pp.  13,  45.— Def.  Meth.  Op.  post.  pp.  131,  133,  136, 
172.— Vindiciffi,  ibid.  p.  602.) 

This  profound  but  mystical  thinker  has  not  yet  obtained  the 
consideration  he  deserves  from  philosophers  and  historians  of 
philosophy  ; — why,  is  sufficiently  apparent. 

50. — BOSSUET. — OEuvres  inedites,  Logique,  L.  iii.  c.  22. — 
'  Le  Sentiment  de  genre  kumain  est  considere  comme  la  voix  de 
toute  la  nature,  et  par  consequent  en  quelque  facon,  comme  celle 
de  Dieu.  C'est  pourquoi  la  preuve  est  invincible.' — Alibi. 

51. — LOCKE. — Essay,  B.  i.  c.  3.  §  4.  'He  would  be  thought 
void  of  common  sense,  who  asked  on  the  one  side,  or  on  the  other, 
went  to  give,  a  reason,  why  it  is  impossible  for  the  same  thing 
to  be  or  [and]  not  to  be.'  In  other  words — Common  Sense  or 
intellect,  as  the  source,  is  the  guarantee,  of  the  principle  of  con- 
tradiction. There  is  here  a  confession,  the  importance  of  which 
has  been  observed  neither  by  Locke  nor  his  antagonists.  Had 
Locke,  not  relying  exclusively  on  Gassendi,  prepared  himself  by 


118  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE 

a  study  of  the  question  concerning  the  origin  of  our  knowledge 
in  the  writings  of  previous  philosophers,  more  especially  of  Aris- 
totle, his  Greek  commentators,  and  the  Schoolmen  (see  Nos.  3, 
10,  20,  21,  22,  25, 26,  <kc.)  ;  and  had  he  not  been  led  astray  in  the 
pursuit  of  an  ignis  fatuus,  in  his  refutation,  I  mean  of  the  Carte- 
sian theory  of  Innate  Ideas,  which,  certainly,  as  impugned  by 
him,  neither  Descartes,  nor  the  representatives  of  his  school,  ever 
dreamt  of  holding  ;  he  would  have  seen,  that  in  thus  appealing 
to  common  sense  or  intellect,  he  was,  in  fact,  surrendering  his 
thesis — that  all  our  knowledge  is  an  educt  from  experience.  For 
in  admitting,  as  he  here  virtually  does,  that  experience  must  ulti- 
mately ground  its  procedure  on  the  laws  of  intellect,  he  admits 
that  intellect  contains  principles  of  judgment,  on  which  experience 
being  dependent,  cannot  possibly  be  their  precursor  or  their 
cause.  Compare  Locke's  language  with  that  of  the  intellect- 
ualist,  Price,  as  given  in  No.  78.  They  are,  in  substance,  identi- 
cal.— What  Locke  here  calls  common  sense,  he  elsewhere  by 
another  ordinary  synonym  denominates  Intuition  (B.  iv.  c.  2,  § 
1,  c.  3,  §  8  et  alibi) ;  also  Self-evidence  (13.  iv.  c.  7,  §  1,  sq.)  As 
I  have  already  observed,  had  Descartes  and  Locke  expressed  them- 
selves on  the  subject  of  innate  ideas  and  principles  with  due  pre- 
cision, the  latter  would  not  so  have  misunderstood  the  former, 
and  both  would  have  been  found  in  harmony  with  each  other 
and  with  the  truth. 

52. — BENTLEY. — Quoted  by  Reid,  I.  P.,  p.  423  a.  '  Common 
Sense,'  word  and  thing. 

53. — SERJEANT,  Locke's  earliest  antagonist. — Solid  Philosophy 
Asserted,  p.  296. — 'These  Ideas  of  Act  and  Power  are  so  natural 
that  common  sense  forces  us  to  acknowledge  them,'  <fec.  So  alibi. 

53.* — ABERCKOMBV. — Fur  Academicus,  Sectt.  2,  30. — '  Com- 
munis  hominum  Sensm? — name  and  thing. 

54. — LEIBNITZ. — This  great  philosopher  held  a  doctrine,  on  the 
point  in  question,  substantially  corresponding  to  that  of  Aristotle, 
the  Schoolmen,  and  Descartes.  It  is  most  fully  evolved  in  his 
posthumous  work  the  Nouveaux  Essais ;  which  I  refer  to  in  the 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  COMMON   SENSE.  119 

original  edition  by  Raspe.  Leibnitz  admitted  innate  trutho, 
which  he  explains  to  be  cognitions  not  actually,  but  only  virtually, 
existent  in  the  mind,  anterior  to  experience ;  by  which  they  are 
occasioned,  excited,  registered,  exemplified,  and  manifested,  but 
not  properly  caused  or  contributed,  or  their  infallibility  and  eter- 
nal certainty  demonstrated  (pp.  5,  6,  3 7).  For,  as  necessary  to 
be  thought,  and  therefore  absolutely  universal,  they  cannot  be  the 
product  of  sense,  experience,  induction ;  these  at  best  being  only 
competent  to  establish  the  relatively  general  (pp.  5,  sq.  36,  116). 
See  also  Opera  by  Dutens,  t.  v.  p.  358,  and  t.  vi.  p.  2 74.  These 
truths  are  consequently  given  '  as  natural  habitudes,  that  is,  dis- 
positions, aptitudes,  preformations,  active  and  passive,  which  ren- 
der the  intellect  more  than  a  mere  tabula  rasa1  (p.  62).  Truths 
thus  innate  are  manifested  in  two  forms ;  either  as  Instincts,  or  as 
the  Light  of  Nature  (p.  48).  But  both  become  known  to  us  as 
facts  of  consciousness,  that  is,  in  an  immediate,  internal  experi- 
ence ;  and  if  this  experience  deceive  us,  we  can  have  no  assurance 
of  any  truth,  be  it  one  of  fact,  or  be  it  one  of  reason  (p.  197). — 
Leibnitz's  Natural  Light  and  Instinct  are,  together,  equivalent  to 
Common  Sense. 

55. — TOLAND. — Christianity  not  Mysterious,  Sect.  i.  ch.  i.  p.  9. 
•  Common.  Sense,  or  Reason  in  general.'  See  Leibnitz  (Opera,  t. 
v.  p.  143).  This  testimony  belongs  perhaps  rather  to  the  third 
signification  of  the  term. 

56. — CHRISTIAN  THOMASIUS  gave  '  Fundamenta  Juris  Naturae 
et  Gentium  ex  Sensu  Communi  deducta;'  and  in  his  introduc- 
tory chapter,  §  26,  he  says — 'Rogo  ut  considerent,  quod  ubique 
mihi  posuerim  sequi  sensum  communem,  atque  non  stabilire  in- 
tenderim  sententias,  quee  multis  subtilibus  abstractionibus  opus 
liabent,  sed  quarum  veritatem  quilibet,  si  modo  paululum  atten- 
tior  esse  velit,  intra  se  sentit."1  Compare  also  his  Philosophia 
Aulica.,  c.  v.  §§  26,  35. 

57. — RIDIGER,  in  1709  published  his  work  '-De  Sensu  Veri  et 
Falsi?  By  this  he  does  not,  however,  designate  the  Common 
Sense  of  mankind  as  a  natural  principle,  but  the  dexterity, 


120  PHILOSOPHY   OF  COMMON   SENSE. 

'qua  quid  in  unaquaque  re  sit  verum,  falsumve,  sentire  quea- 
raus.' 

58. — FKUKRLIN. — De  genuina  ratione  probandi  a  consensu  gen- 
tium existentiam  Dei. — 'Haec  eat  praecipui  argument!  facies: — 
Ad  cujuscunque  rei  existentiam  agnoscendam  mentes  humanse 
[ab  instinctu  natural^  to  wit,  as  he  frequently  states],  peculiarem 
habent  inclinationem,  ea  vere  existit,'  &c.,  p.  28. 

59. — A.  TURRETINUS. — Cogitationes  et  Disputationes  Theologi- 
cae,  Vol.  i.  p.  43,  sq. 

'  DE  SENSU  COMMUNI. 

§  xv.  Religio  sensum  communem  supponit ;  nee  enim  truncos, 
ant  bruta,  aut  ebrios  aut  mente  captos,  sed  homines  sui  compotes, 
alloquitur. 

§  xvi.  In  artibus  omnibus  atque  disciplinis,  non  modo  licet,  sed 
et  necesse  est  adhibere  sensum  communem.  Quis  capiat  earn  so- 
lam  artem,  earn  solam  disciplinam,  quee  omnium  praestantissima 
est,  sensus  communis  usum  adimere  ? 

§  xvii.  Nisi  supponatur  sensus  communis,  nulla  fides,  nulla  re- 
ligio,  consistere  potest :  Etenim,  quo  organo  res  sacras  percipimus, 
verasque  a  falsis,  sequas  ab  iniquis,  utiles  a  noxiis,  dignoscimus, 
nisi  ope  sensus  communis? 

§  xviii.  Quomodo  gentes  notitiam  Dei  habuerunt,  nisi  ope  sen- 
sus communis  ? — Quid  est  '  Lex  in  cordibus  scripta,'  de  qua  Pau- 
lus  (Rom.  ii.),  nisi  ipsemet  sensus  communis,  quatenus  de  mori- 
bus  pronuntiat? 

§  xix.  Divinitas  Scripturae,  quibus  argumentis  probari  potest, 
nisi  argumentis  e  sensu  communi  depromptis  ? 

§  xx.  Sensus  Scripturae,  quibus  regulis  erui  potest,  nisi  regulis 
ii  sensu  communi  subministratis  I 

§  xxi.  Scriptura  perpetuo  provocat  ad  sensum  communem :  ete- 
uiin  quotiescunque  ratiocinatur,  toties  supponit  sensum  communem 
esse  in  nobis,  et  sensu  communi  utendum  esse. 

§  xxii.  In  syllogismis  theologicis  pene  omnibus,  quis  nescit 
praemissarum  alteram,  imo  saepissme  utramque,  a  sensu  communi 
desumptam  esse  ? 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   COMMON    SENSE.  121 

§  xxiii.  Divinae  veracitati  non  minus  repugnat,  sensum  commu- 
nem  nos  fallere,  quam  Scripturam  Sacram  aliquid  falsum  docere ; 
etenim  sensus  communis  non  minus  opus  Dei  quam  Scriptura 
Sacra.  t 

§  xxiv.  Pessimum  est  indicium,  cum  aliquis  non  vult  de  suis 
placitis  ex  sensu  communi  judicari. 

§  xxv.  Nullus  est  error  rnagis  noxius,  magisque  Religion!  inju- 
rius,  quam  isqui  statuit,  Religioni  credi  non  posse,  quin  sensui 
communi  nuntius  mittatur. 

§  xxvi.  Nulla  datur  major  absurditas,  quam  ea  quse  nullis  non 
absurditatibus  portam  aperit,  quaeque  ad  eas  revincendas  omnem 
praecludit  viam  :  atque  talis  est  eorum  sententia,  qui  nolunt  sen- 
sum  communem  adhiberi  in  Religione. 

§  xxvii.  Quse  hactenus  diximus  de  sensu  communi,  a  nemine, 
ut  quidem  putamus,  improbabuntur :  at  si  loco  Sensus  Commu- 
nis, vocem  Rationis  subjiciamus,  nrulti  illico  caperata  fronte  et 
torvis  oculis  nos  adspicient.  Quid  ita  ?  cum  sensus  communis, 
lumen  naturale,  et  ratio,  unum  idemque  sint.' 

60. — FENELON. — De  1'Existence  de  Dieu.  Partie  ii.  ch.  2. — 
'Mais  qu'est-ce  que  le  Sens  Commun?  N'est-ce  pasf  les  pre- 
mieres notions  que  tons  les  hommes  ont  egalement  des  mfimes 
choses  ?  Ce  Sens  Commun  qui  est  toujours  et  par-tout  le  meme, 
qui  previentf  tout  examen,  qui  rend  1'examen  rnfime  de  certaines 
questions  ridicule,  qui  reduit  1'liomme  a  ne  pouvoir  douterf  quel- 
que  effort  qu'il  fit  pour  se  mettre  dans  un  vrai  doute ;  ce  Sens 
Commun  qui  est  celui  de  tout  homme ;  ce  Sens,  qui  n'attend  que 
d'etre  consulte,  qui  se  montre  au  premier  coup-d'oeil,  et  qui  decou- 
vre  aussitot  1'evidence  ou  1'absurdite  de  la  question  ;  n'est-ce  pas 
ce  que  j'appelle  mes  idees  ?  Les  voila  done  ces  idees  ou  notions 
generates  que  je  ne  puis  ni  contredire  ni  examiner,  suivant  lesquelles 
au  contraire  j'examine  et'je  decide  tout :  en  sort  que  je  ris  au  lieu 
de  repondre,  toutes  les  fois  qu'on  me  propose  ce  qui  est  clairement 
oppose  a  ce  que  ces  idees  immuables  me  representent. 

'  Ce  principe  est  constant,  et  il  n'y  auroit  que  son  application 
qui  pourroit  etre  fautive :  c'est-a-dire  qu'il  fciut  sans  hesiter  sui- 

6 


122  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

vre  toutes  mes  idces  claires  ;  mais  qu'il  faut  bien  prendre  garde 
de  ne  prendre  jamais  pour  idee  clair  celle  qui  renferme  quelque 
chose  d'obscur.  Aussi  veux-je  suivre  exactement  cette  regie  dans 
les  choses  que  je  vais  mediter.'  » 

Common  Sense  is  declared  by  Fenelon  to  be  identical  with  the 
Natural  Light  of  Descartes.  See  No.  37.  The  preceding  pas- 
sage is  partly  quoted  by  Reid  from  a  garbled  and  blundering 
translation  (p.  424).  The  obeli  mark  the  places  where  the  prin- 
cipal errors  have  been  committed.  Like  Melanchthon,  Reid,  &c. 
(Nos.  25,  79),  Fenelon  calls  what  is  contrary  to  common  sense, 
the  absurd. 

61. — SHAFTESBURY. — Quoted  by  Reid,  I.  P.  p.  424  a.,  '  Com- 
mon Sense,'  word  and  thing. 

62.  D'AGUESSEAU. — Meditations  Metaphysiques,  Med.  iv.  (Eu- 
vres,  4°  t.  xi.  p.  127. — '  Je  m'arrete  done  a  ces  deux  principes, 
qui  sont  comme  la  conclusion  generale  de  tout  ce  que  je  viens 
d'etablir  sur  1'assurance  ou  1'homme  pent  etre  d'avoir  decouvert 
la  verite. 

1  L'un,  que  cet  etat  de  certitude  n'est  en  lui-meme  qu'un  senti- 
ment ou  une  conscience  interieure. 

'  L'autre,  que  les  trois  causes  que  j'en  eu  distinguees  se  reduis- 
sent  encore  a  un  autre  sentiment. 

1  Sentiment  simple,  qui  se  prouve  Iui-m6me  comme  dans  ces 
verites,  fexiste,  je  pense,  je  veux,je  suis  libre,  et  que  je  puis  appel- 
ler  un  sentiment  de  pure  conscience. 

1  Sentiment  justifie,  ou  sentiment  de  1'evidence  qui  est  dans  le 
chose  meme,  ou  de  cette  proposition,  que  tout  ce  qui  est  evident 
est  vrai,  et  je  Iflppellerai  un  sentiment  d'evidence. 

'  Enfin,  sentiment  que  peut  aussi  etre  appelle,  un  sentiment  jus- 
tifie par  le  poids  du  temoignage  qui  1'excite,  et  qui  a  pour  fonde- 
ment  une  evidence  d'autorite.  Je  1'appellerai  done  par  cette  rai- 
son,  le  sentiment  d'une  autorite  evidente.' 

62.* — BERKELEY. — Quoted  by  Reid,  I.  P.  pp.  283,  284 ;  com- 
pare p.  423  :u  '  Common  Sense,'  name  and  reality. 

63. — BUFFIER'S  '  Traite  des  Premieres  Veritez,'  was  first  pub- 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  123 

lished  in  171 7,  his  '  Elemens  de  Metaphysique'  in  1724.  If  we  ex- 
cept Lord  Herbert's  treatise '  De  Veritate,'  these  works  exhibit  the 
first  regular  and  comprehensive  attempt  to  found  philosophy  on  cer- 
tain primary  truths,  given  in  certain  primary  sentiments  or  feelings : 
these  feelings,  and  the  truths  of  which  they  are  the  sources,  he  dis- 
tinguishes into  two  kinds.  One  is  Internal  Feeling  (sentiment 
intime),  the  self-consciousness  of  our  existence,  and  of  what  passes 
in  our  minds.  By  this  he  designates  our  conviction  of  the  facts  of 
consciousness  in  themselves,  as  merely-  present  and  ideal  phe- 
nomena. But  these  phenomena,  as  we  have  seen,  testify  also 
to  the  reality  of  what  lies  beyond  themselves ;  and  to  our  instinc- 
tive belief  in  the  truth  of  this  testimony,  he  gives,  by  perhaps  an 
arbitrary  limitation  of  words,  the  name  of  common  natural  feel- 
ing (sentiment  commun  de  la  nature),  or  employing  a  more  famil- 
iar expression,  Common  Sense  (sens  commun).  Buffier  did  not 
fall  into  the  error  of  Mr.  Stewart  and  others,  in  holding  that  we 
have  the  same  evidence  for  the  objective  reality  of  the  external 
world,  as  we  have  for  the  subjective  reality  of  the  internal.  '  If,' 
he  says,  '  a  man  deny  the  truths  of  internal  feeling,  he  is  self- 
contradictory  ;  if  he  deny  the  truths  of  common  sense,  he  is  not 
self-contradictory — he  is  only  mad.' 

Common  Sense  he  thus  defines: — 'J'entens  done  ici  par  le 
Sens  Commun  la  disposition  que  la  nature  a  mise  dans  tous  les 
hommes  ou  manifestment  dans  la  plupart  d'entre  eux ;  pour 
leur  faire  porter,  quand  ils  ont  ateint  1'usage  de  la  raison ; 
un  jugement  commun  et  uniforme,  sur  des  objets  diferens  du 
sentiment  intime  de  leur  propre  perception  ;  jugement  qui  n'est 
point  la  consequence  d'aucun  principe  interieur.' — Prem.  Ver. 
§  33.  And  in  his  '  Metaphysique,' — Le  sentiment  qui  est  mani- 
festement  le  plus  commun  aux  hommes  de  tous  les  temps  et 
de  tous  les  pays,  quand  ils  ont  ateint  1'usage  de  la  raison,  et 
des  choses  sur  quoi  ils  portent  leur  jugement.' — §  67. 

He  then  gives  in  both  works  not  a  full  enumeration,  but  exam- 
ples, of  First  Truths  or  sentiments  common  to  all  men.  These 
are  more  fully  expressed  in  the  '  Metaphysique,'  from  which  as 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

the  later  work,  and  not  noticed  by  Reid  (p.  467  b),  I  quote, 
leaving  always  the  author's  orthography  intact. 

1.  II  est  quelque  chose  qui  existe  hors  de  moi ;   et  ce  qui 
existe  hors  de  moi,  est  autre  que  moi. 

2.  II  est  quelque  chose  que  j'apelle  Ame,  esprit,  pensee,  dans 
les  autres  hommes  et  dans  moi,  et  la  pensee  n'est  point  ce  qui 
s'apelle  corps  ou  matiere. 

3.  Ce  qui  est  connu  par  le  sentiment  ou  par  1'experience  de 
tous  les  hommes,  doit  etre  recu  pour  vrai ;  et  on  n'en  peut  dis- 
convenir  sans  se  brouiller  avec  le  sens  commun.' — §  78. 

[These  three  he  calls  '  veritez  externes,  qui  soient  des  senti- 
ments communs  a  tous  les  hommes.'  The  third  is  not  given  in 
the  '  Traito  des  Premieres  Veritez.'] 

'  4.  II  est  dans  les  hommes  quelque  chose  qui  s'apelle  raison 
et  qui  est  opose  a  f  extravagance  ;  quelque  chose  qui  s'apelle  pru- 
dence, qui  est  opose  a  Fimprudence ;  quelque  chose  qui  s'apelle 
liberte,  opose  a  la  necessite  d*agir. 

5.  Ce  qui  reunit  un  grand  nombre  de  parties  diferentes  pour 
un  effet  qui  revient  regulierement,  ne  sauroit  etre  le  pur  eftet  du 
hazard ;  mais  c'est  1'effet  de  ce  que  nous  apellons  une  intelligence. 

6.  Un  fait  ateste  par  un  tres  grand  nombre  de  gens  sensez, 
qui  assurent  en  avoir  ete  les  temoins,  ne  peut  sensement  etre 
revoque  en  doute.' — §  82. 

These  examples  are  not  beyond  the  reach  of  criticism. 

In  the  Treatise  on  First  Truths  he  gives  a  statement  and 
exposition  of  their  three  essential  characters.  The  statement  is 
as  follows : 

'  1.  Le  premier  de  ces  caracteres  est,  qu'elles  soient  si  claires, 
que  quand  on  entreprend  de  les  prouver,  ou  de  les  ataquer,  on 
ne  le  puisse  faire  que  par  des  propositions,  qui,  manifestement,  ne 
sont  ni  plus  clairs  ni  plus  certaines. 

2.  D'etre  si  universellement  reques  parmi  les  hommes  en  tous 
terns,  en  tous  lieux,  et  par  toutes  sortes  d'esprits ;  que  ceux  qui 
les  ataquent  se  trouvent  clans  le  genre  hutnain,  etre  manifestement 
moins  d'un  centre  cent,  ou  mfime  contre  mille. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMMON   SENSE.  125 

3.  D'etre  si  fortement  imprimees  dans  nous,  que  nous  y  con- 
formions  notre  conduite,  malgre  les  rafinemens  de  ceux  qui  imagi- 
nent  des  opinions  contraires;  et  qui  eux-memes  agissent  con- 
formement,  non  a  leurs  opinions  imaginees,  mais  aux  premieres 
veritez  universellement  recues.' — §  51-52.  Compare  Alexander, 
n.  10  a.* 


*  We  are  now  only  considering  the  natural  data  of  consciousness  in  their 
most  catholic  relations, — and  it  would  be  out  of  place  to  descend  to  any  dis- 
cussion of  them  in  a  subordinate  point  of  view.  But,  though  alluding  to 
matters  beyond  our  present  purpose,  I  cannot  refrain  from  doing,  by  the 
way,  an  act  of  justice  to  this  acute  philosopher,  to  whom,  as  to  Gassendi,  his 
countrymen  have  never,  I  think,  accorded  the  attention  he  deserves. 
"  No  subject,  perhaps,  in  modern  speculation,  has  excited  an  intenser  inter- 
est or  more  vehement  controversy  than  Kant's  famous  distinction  of  Analyt- 
ic and  Synthetic  judgments  a  priori,  or,  as  I  think  they  might  with  far  less  of 
ambiguity  be  denominated,  Explicative  and  Ampliative  judgments.  The 
interest  in  the  distinction  itself  was  naturally  extended  to  its  history.  The 
records  of  past  philosophy  were  again  ransacked ;  and,  for  a  moment,  it  was 
thought  that  the  Prussian  sage  had  been  forestalled,  in  the  very  ground- 
work of  his  system,  by  the  Megaric  Stilpo.  But  the  originality  (I  say  noth- 
ing of  the  truth)  of  Kant's  distinction  still  stands  untouched ;  the  origi- 
nality of  its  author,  a  very  diiferent  question,  was  always  above  any  reason- 
able doubt.  Kant  himself  is  disposed,  indeed,  to  allow,  that  Locke  (B.  iv. 
ch.  3,  §  9,  sq.)  had,  perhaps,  a  glimpse  of  the  discrimination  ;  but  looking 
tc  the  place  referred  to,  this  seems,  on  the  part  of  Kant,  an  almost  gratui- 
tous concession.  Locke,  in  fact,  came  far  nearer  to  it  in  another  passage  (B. 
i.  ch.  2,  §§  19,  20)  ;  but  there  although  the  examples  on  which  the  distinc- 
tion could  have  been  established  are  stated,  and  even  stated  in  contrast,  the 
principle  was  not  apprehended,  and  the  distinction,  consequently  permit- 
ted to  escape. 

But  this  passage  and  its  instances  seem  to  have  suggested,  what  was 
overlooked  by  Locke  himself,  to  Burner ;  who,  although  his  name  has  not, 
as  far  as  I  am  aware,  ever  yet  been  mentioned  in  connection  with  this  sub- 
ject, may  claim  the  honor  of  having  been  the  first  to  recognize,  to  evolve, 
and  even  to  designate,  this  celebrated  distinction,  almost  as  precisely  as  the 
philosopher  who  erected  on  it  so  splendid  an  edifice  of  speculation.  I  can- 
not now  do  more  than  merely  indicate  the  fact  of  the  anticipation ;  men- 
tioning only  that,  leaving  to  Kant's  analytic  judgment  its  previous  title  of 
identical,  Buffier  preoccupies  Kant's  designation  of  synthetic  in  that  of  con- 
junctive (or  logical)  judgment,  which  he  himself  proposes.  Those  inter- 
ested in  the  question  will  find  the  exposition  in  the  '  Veritez  de  Conse- 
quence,' Log.  ii.  Art.  xxi. 

I  may  further,  however,  when  on  this  matter,  notice,  that  before  Kant, 
another  philosopher  had  also  signalized  the  same  distinction.  I  refer  to 


126  PHILOSOPHY   OF  COMMON   SENSE. 

I  should  not  have  deemed  it  necessary  to  make  any  comment 
on  Buffer's  doctrine  of  Common  Sense,  were  it  not  that  it  is 
proper  to  warn  my  readers  against  the  misrepresentations  of  the 
anonymous  English  translator  of  his  Treatise  on  Primary  Truths ; 
for  not  only  have  these  never  been  exposed,  but  Mr.  Stewart  has 
bestowed  on  that  individual  an  adventitious  importance,  by  laud- 
ing his  '  acuteness  and  intelligence,'  while  acquiescing  in  his 
1  severe  but  just  animadversions'  on  Dr.  Beattie.  (Elements,  vol. 
ii.  c.  1,  §  3,  pp.  87,  89,  2  ed.) 

Buffier  does  not  reduce  Reason  (which  he  employs  for  the 
complement  of  our  higher  faculties  in  general)  to  Reasoning ;  he 
does  not  contra-distinguish  Common  Sense  from  Reason,  of 
which  it  is  constituent;  but  while  he  views  the  fonner  as  a  nat- 
ural sentiment,  he  views  it  as  a  sentiment  of  our  rational  nature ; 
and  he  only  requires,  as  the  condition  of  the  exercise  of  common 
sense  in  particular,  the  actual  possession  of  Reason  or  under- 
standing in  general,  and  of  tiie  object  requisite  to  call  that 
Reason  into  use.  Common  Sense,  on  Buffier's  doctrine,  is  thus 
the  primary,  spontaneous,  unreasoning,  and  as  it  were,  instinctive 
energy  of  our  rational  constitution.  Compare  Pr.  Ver.  §§41,  66 
-72,  93.  Met.  §§  65,  72,  73. 

The  translator  to  his  version,  which  appeared  in  1780,  has 
annexed  an  elaborate  Preface,  the  sole  purport  of  which  is  to 


Principal  Campbell  of  Aberdeen,  in  the  chapter  on  intuitive  evidence,  of 
his  philosophy  of  Rhetoric  (B.  i.  c.  5,  S.  1,  p.  1) — first  published  in  1776, 
and  therefore  four  years  prior  to  the  Critique  on  Pure  Reason ;  for  the  dis- 
tinction in  question  is  to  be  found,  at  least  explicitly,  neither  in  the  treatise 
'  Ueber  die  Evidenz,'  nor  in  the  Dissertation  '  De  Mundi  Sensibilis  atque 
Inteligibilis  forma  et  principiis,'  which  appeared  in  1763  and  1770.  But  Camp- 
bell manifestly  only  repeats  Buffier  (with  whose  works  he  was  intimately  ac- 
quainted, and  from  which  he  frequently  borrows),  and  with  inferior  preci- 
sion ;  so  that,  if  we  may  respect  the  shrewdness,  which  took  note,  and  ap- 
preciated the  value,  of  the  observation,  we  must  condemn  the  disingenuity 
which  palmed  it  on  the  world  as  his  own.  Campbell's  doctrine,  I  may  finally 
observe,  attracted  the  attention  of  Mr.  Stewart  (El.  ii.  p.  32  sq.) ;  but  he 
was  not  aware  either  of  its  relation  to  Buffier  or  of  its  bearing  upon 
Kant. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   COMMON   SENSE.  127 

inveigh  against  Reid,  Beattie,  and  Oswald — more  especially  the 
two  last — for  at  once  stealing  and  spoiling  the  doctrine  of  the 
learned  Jesuit. 

In  regard  to  the  spoiling,  the  translator  is  the  only  culprit. 
According  to  him,  Buffier's  '  Common  Sense  is  a  disposition  of 
mind  not  natural  but  acquired  by  age  and  time'  (pp.  iv.  xxxiv.) 
'  Those  first  truths  which  arc  its  object  require  experience  and 
meditation  to  be  conceived,  and  the  judgments  thence  derived 
are  the  result  of  exercising  reason,'  (p.  v.)  '  The  use  of  Reason  is 
Reasoning;'  and  Common  Sense  is  that  degree  of  understanding 
in  all  things  to  which  the  generality  of  mankind  are  capable  of 
attaining  by  the  exertion  of  their  rational  faculty'  (p.  xvii.)  In 
fact  Buffier's  first  truths,  on  his  translator's  showing,  are  last 
truths ;  for  when  '  by  time  we  arrive  at  the  knowledge  of  an 
infinitude  of  things,  and  by  the  use  of  reason  (i.  e.  by  reasoning) 
form  our  judgment  on  them,  those  judgments  are  then  justly  to 
be  considered  as  first  truths'  ///  (p.  xviii.) 

But  how,  it  will  be  asked,  does  he  give  any  color  to  so  unpar- 
alleled a  perversion  ?  By  the  very  easy  process  of — 1°,  throwing 
out  of  account,  or  perverting,  what  his  author  does  say  ; — 2°,  of 
interpolating  what  his  author  not  only  does  not  say,  but  what  is 
in  the  very  teeth  of  his  assertions ;  and  3°,  by  founding  on  these 
perversions  and  interpolations  as  on  the  authentic  words  of  his 
author. 

As  to  the  plagiarism,  I  may  take  this  opportunity  of  putting 
down,  once  and  for  ever,  this  imputation,  although  the  character 
of  the  man  might  have  well  exempted  Reid  from  all  suspicion  of 
so  unworthy  an  act.  It  applies  only  to  the  '  Inquiry ;'  and  there 
the  internal  evidence  is  almost  of  itself  sufficient  to  prove  that 
Reid  could  not,  prior  to  that  publication,  have  been  acquainted 
with  Buffier's  Treatise.  The  strongest,  indeed  the  sole,  presump- 
tion arises  from  the  employment,  by  both  philosophers,  of  the 
term  Common  Sense,  which,  strange  to  say,  sounded  to  many  in 
this  country  as  singular  and  new ;  whilst  it  was  even  commonly 
believed,  that  before  Reid  Buffier  was  the  first,  indeed  the  only 


128  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

philosopher,  who  had  taken  notice  of  this  principle,  as  one  of  the 
genuine  sources  of  our  knowledge.  See  Beattie,  n.  82  ;  Camp- 
bell's Philosophy  of  Rhetoric,  B.  i.  c.  5,  part  3  ;  and  Stewart's 
Account  of  Reid,  p.*  27. 

After  the  testimonies  now  adduced,  and  to  be  adduced,  it 
would  be  the  apex  of  absurdity  to  presume  that  none  but  Buffier 
could  have  suggested  to  Reid  either  the  principle  or  its  designa- 
tion. Here  are  given  forty-eight  authorities,  ancient  and  mod- 
em, for  the  philosophical  employment  of  the  term  Common 
Sense,  previous  to  Reid,  and  from  any  of  these  Reid  may  be  said 
to  have  borrowed  it  with  equal  justice  as  from  Buffier;  but,  taken 
together,  they  concur  in  proving  that  the  expression,  in  the  ap- 
plication in  question,  was  one  in  general  use,  and  free  as  the  air 
to  all  and  each  who  chose  thus  to  employ  it. — But,  in  fact,  what 
has  not  been  noticed,  we  know,  from  an  incidental  statement  of 
Reid  himself — and  this,  be  it  noticed,  prior  to  the  charge  of 
plagiarism, — that  he  only  became  acquainted  with  the  treatise 
of  Buffier,  after  the  publication  of  his  own  Inquiry.  For  in  his 
Account  of  Aristotle's  Logic,  written  and  published  some  ten 
years  subsequently  to  that  work,  lie  says — '  I  have  lately  met 
with  a  very  judicious  treatise  written  by  Father  Buffier,'  &c.,  p. 
713,  b.  Compare  also  Intellectual  Powers,  p.  468,  b.  In  this 
last  work,  however,  published  after  the  translation  of  Buffier, 
though  indirectly  defending  the  less  manifestly  innocent  partners 
in  the  accusation,  from  the  charge  advanced,  his  self-respect  pre- 
vents him  from  saying  a  single  word  in  his  own  vindication. 

64. — LYONS. — About  the  year  1720  was  published  the  first 
edition  of  the  following  curious,  and  now  rare,  work : 

'  The  Infallibility  of  Human  Judgment,  its  Dignity  and  Excel- 
lence. Being  a  New  Art  of  Reasoning,  and  discovering  Truth, 
by  reducing  all  disputable  cases  to  general  and  self-evident 
propositions.  Illustrated  by  bringing  several  well-known  disputes 
to  such  self-evident  and  universal  conclusions.  With  the  Supple- 
ment answering  all  objections  which  have  been  made  to  it  and 
the  design  thereby  perfected,  in  proving  this  method  of  Reasoning 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  129 

to  be  as  forcibly  conclusive  and  universal  as  Arithmetick  and 
as  easie.  Also  a  Dissertation  on  Liberty  and  Necessity.  The 
fourth  edition.  To  which  is  now  added  a  postscript  obviating 
the  complaints  made  to  it,  and  to  account  for  some  things 
which  occurred  to  it  and  the  author.  By  Mr.  Lyons.  London, 
1724.' 

He  gives  (p.  83-94)  '  A  Recapitulation  of  the  whole  work, 
being  the  principles  of  a  Rationalist  reduced  to  certain  stated 
articles  containing  the  Laws  of  Reason,  the  Elements  of  Religion, 
of  Morals,  and  of  Politicks  ;  with  the  Art  of  reducing  all  disputes 
to  universal  determinations.'  From  these  articles  (twenty-three 
in  number)  I  extract  the  first  three. 

1.  'Reason  is  the  distinguishing  excellency,  dignity,  and  beauty 
of  mankind. 

2.  '  There  is  no  other  use  of  Reason — than  to  judge  of  Good 
and  Bad,  Justice  and  Injustice,  Wisdom  and  Folly,  and  the  like  ; 
that  a  man  may  thereby  attain  Knowledge  to  distinguish  Truth 
from  Error,  and  to  determine  his  Actions  accordingly. 

3.  '  This  Reason  is  known  to  us  also  by  the  names  of  Judg- 
ment, Light  of  Nature,  Conscience,  and   Common  Sense ;    only 
varying  its  name  according  to  its  different  uses  and  appearances, 
but  is  one  and  the  same  thing.' 

The  conclusion  of  the  whole  is  given  in  the  maxim — 'Exert 
with  Diligence  and  Fortitude  the  Common  Use  of  Common 
Sense? 

It  is  probable  that  Lyons  was  not  unacquainted  with  the  treat- 
ise of  Turretini. 

65. — AMHERST. — Terra3  Filius,  No.  21. — 'Natural  reason  and 
common  sense]  used  as  convertible  terms. 

66. — WOLLASTON. — Religion  of  Nature  Delineated  (ed.  1721, 
p.  23).  '  They  who  deduce  the  difference  between  good  and  evil 
from  the  Common  Sense  of  mankind,  and  certain  principles  that 
are  born  with  us,  put,'  &c. 

67. — VULPIUS  (Volpi). — Scholae  Dua3>  p.  45.  'Non  certe 
quod  putaret  Aristoteles,  summos  illos  viros  (Parmenidem  et 

6* 


130  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

Melissum)  tarn  longe  a  communi  sensu  abhorruisse,  ut  opinarentur 
nullam  esse  omnino  rerum  dissimilitudinem,'  <fec. 

68. — Vico  frequently  employs  the  terms  *  communis  sensus' 
and  '  senso  comune1  for  our  primary  beliefs.  See  his  Latin  and 
Italian  works,  passim. 

69. — WOLFIUS. — Ontologia,  §  125.  —  'Veritates  ad  sensum 
commnnem  reducimus,  dum  in  notiones  resolvuntur,  quas  ad  judi- 
candum  utitur  ipsum  vulgus  imperitum  naturali  quodam  acumine, 
quae  distincte  enunciata  maxime  abstracta  sunt,  in  rebus  obviis 
confuse  percipiens.  ...  Id  igitur  in  Philosophia  prima  agi- 
mus,  ut  notiones  quae  confusae  vulgo  sunt,  distinctas  reddamus,  et 
terminis  generalibus  enunciemus :  ita  enim  demum  in  disciplinis 
caeteris,  quae  sublimia  sunt,  et  a  cognitione  vulgi  remota,  ad  noti- 
ones eidem  familiares  revocare,  sicque  ad  Sensum  Communem 
reducere  licebit.'  .  .  . 

§  245.  .  .  .  '  Nemo  miretur,  quod  notiones  primas,  quas  fun- 
damentales  merito  dixeris,  cum  omnis  tandem  nostra  cognitio 
iisdem  innitatur,  notionibus  vulgi  conformes  probemus.  Miran- 
dum  potius  esset,  quod  non  dudum  de  reductione  philosophise  ad 
notiones  communes  cogitaverint  philosophi,  nisi  constaret  singu- 
lare  requiri  acumen,  ut,  quid  notionibus  communibus  insit,  dis- 
tincte et  pervidere,  et  verbis  minime  ambiguis  enunciare  vale- 
amus,  quod  nonnisi  peculiar!  et  continue  quodam  exercitio  obti- 
netur  in  Psychologia  exponendo.' — See  also  a  curious  letter  of 
Wolf  among  the  'Epistolae  Physicae'  of  Krazenstein,  regarding 
Common  Sense. 

70. — HUBER. — In  1732  appeared  the  first  edition  of  Le  Monde 
Fou  prefere  au  Monde  Sage.  This  treatise  is  anonymous,  but 
known  to  be  the  work  of  Mademoiselle  Huber.  Its  intrinsic 
merit,  independently  of  its  interest  as  the  production  of  a  Lady, 
might  have  saved  it  from  the  oblivion  into  which  it  seems  to 
have  fallen. — Consciousness  (conscience)  is  considered  as  the 
faculty  of  '  uncreated,  primary,  simple,  and  universal  truths,'  in 
contrast  to  'truths  created,  particular,  distinct,  limited'  (i.  pp.  180, 
220).  Consciousness  is  superior  to  Reasoning ;  and  as  primitive 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  131 

is  above  all  definition  (fc  pp.  103,  130,  140).  'Les  veritez  lea 
plus  simples  sont,  par  leur  relation  avec  la  verite  primitive  si  fort 
audessus  des  preuves,  qu'elles  ne  paroissent  douteuses  que  parce 
qu'on  entrepend  de  les  prouver ;  leur  idee  seule,  ou  le  sentiment 
que  1'on  en  a,  prouve  qu'elles  existent ;  1'existence  de  la  Con- 
science, par  example,  est  prouve  par  son  langage  m6me ;  elle  se 
fait  entendre,  done  elle  est ;  son  temoignage  est  invariablement 
droit,  done  il  est  infaillible,  done  les  veritez  particulieres  qu'il 
adopte  sont  indubitables,  par  cela  seul  qu'elles  n'ont  pas  besoin 
d'autres  preuves'  (i.  p.  189). 

71. — GENOVESI. — Elementorum  Metaphysics,  Pars  Prior,  p. 
94.  In  reference  to  our  moral  liberty,  he  says — 'Appello  ad 
sensum,  non  plebeiorum  modo,  ne  tantas  res  judicio  imperitorum 
judicari  quis  opponat,  sed  philosophorum  maxime,  communem, 
quern  qui  eiToris  reprehendere  non  veretur,  is  vecors  sit  oportet.' 
See  also  Pars  Altera,  p.  160,  et  alibi. 

72. — HUME. — Quoted  by  Reid,  p.  424  b.  'Common  Sense' 
word  and  thing. 

73. — Cnusius. — a. — Wegzur  Gewissheit,  §  256,  et  alibi.  'The 
highest  principle  of  all  knowledge  and  reasoning  is — That  which 
we  cannot  but  think  to  be  true,  is  true  ;  and  that  ichich  we  abso- 
lutely cannot  think  at  all,  [?]  or  cannot  but  think  to  be  false,  is  false.'1 

b. — Entwurf  nothwendigen  Vernunftwahrheiten,  Pref.  2  ed. 
'  The  Leibnitio-Wolfian  system  does  not  quadrate  with  the  com- 
mon sense  of  mankind  (sensus  communis).'  His  German  expres- 
sion is  '  gemeiner  Menschensinn.' 

74. — D'ALEMBERT  holds  that  philosophy  is  an  evolution  from, 
and  must,  if  legitimate,  be  conformed  to,  the  primary  truths  of 
which  all  men  are  naturally  in  possession.  The  complement  of 
these  truths  is  '  sens  commun?  Compare  Melanges,  t.  iv.  §§  4,  6, 
pp.  28,  46  t.  v.  §  76,  p.  269,  ed.  Amst.  1763. 

75. — OETINGER. — Inquisitio  in  Sensum  Communem  et  Ratio- 
nem,  necnon  utriusque  regulas,  pro  dijudicandis  philosophorum 
theoriis,  &c.  Tubingse,  1753. — ' Sensus  Communis1  is  defined 
(§  11),  'Viva  et  penetrans  perceptio  objectorum,  toti  humanitati 


132  PHILOSOPHY    OF   COMMON    SENSE. 

obviorum,  ex  immediate  tactu  et  intuvtu  eorum,  quae  sunt  sim- 
plicissima,  utilissima  et  maxime  necessaria,'  &c. — §  18.  .  .  . 
'  Objecta  Sensus  Communis  sunt  veritates  omni  tempore  et  loco 
omnibus  utiles,  appreliensu  faeiles,  ad  quas  eonservandas  Deus 
illos  secreto  impulsu  indesinenter  urget,  ut  sunt  moralia,'  <fcc.,  <fec. 
So  far,  so  well.  The  book,  however,  turns  out  but  a  mystical 
farrago.  The  author  appears  to  have  had  no  knowledge  of  Buf- 
fier's  treatise  on  First  Truths.  Solomon  and  Confucius  are  his 
staple  authorities.  The  former  affords  him  all  his  rules;  and 
even  materials  for  a  separate  publication  on  the  same  subject, 
in  the  same  year — '  Die  Wahrheit  des  Sensus  Communis  in  den 
erklaerten  Spruechen  Salomonis.'  This  I  have  not  seen. 

76. — ESCIIENBAOH. — Sammlung,  <fcc.  1756.  In  the  appendix 
to  his  translation  of  the  English  Idealists,  Berkeley  and  Collier, 
after  showing  that  the  previous  attempts  of  philosophers  to 
demonstrate  the  existence  of  an  external  world  were  inconclusive, 
the  learned  Professor  gives  us  his  own,  which  is  one  of  common 
sense. — '  How  is  the  Idealist  to  prove  his  existence  as  a  thinking 
reality  ?  He  can  only  say— /  know  that  I  so  exist,  because  I  feel 
that  I  so  exist.1  This  feeling  being  thus  the  only  ground  on 
which  the  Idealist  can  justify  the  conviction  he  has  of  his  exist- 
ence, as  a  mind,  our  author  goes  on  to  show,  that  the  same  feel- 
ing, if  allowed  to  be  veracious,  will  likewise  prove  the  existence, 
immediately,  of  our  bodily  organism,  and,  through  that,  of  a 
material  world.  P.  549-552. 

77. — GESNER,  prelecting  on  his  '  Isagoge  in  Eruditionem  Uni- 
versalem,'  §  808>  speaking  of  Grotius,  says : — 'De  jure  gentium 
eleganter  scripsit,  et  auctor  classicus  est.  Imprimis,  quod  repre- 
hendunt  imperiti,  laudandum  in  eo  libro  est  hoc,  quod  omnia 
veterum  auctorum  locis  ac  testimoniis  probat.  Nam  ita  provoca- 
tur  quasi  ad  totum  genus  humanum.  Nam  si  videmus,  illos 
viros  laudari,  et  afferri  eorum  testimonia,  qui  dicuntur  sensum 
communem  omnium  hominum  habuisse ;  si  posteri  dicant,  se  ita 
sentire,.  ut  illi  olim  scripserint :  est  hoc  citare  genus  humanum. 
Proferontur  enim  illi  in  medium,  quos  omnes  pro  sapientibus 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMMON   SENSE.  133 

habuerunt.  Verum  est,  potest  unusquisque  stultus  dicere ;  '  Ego 
habeo  sens-urn  communem  ;'  sed  sensus  communis  est,  quod  con- 
sensu  humano  dictum  sit  per  omnia  specula.  Ita  etiam  in  reli- 
gione  naturali  videndum  est,  quid  olim  homines  communi  con- 
sensu  dixerint:  nee  ea  ad  religionem  et  theologiam  naturalem 
referenda  sunt,  quae  aliunde  accepimus.  Sic  egit  Grotius  in  opere 
praastantissimo.  Ostendit,  hoc  Romanorum,  hoc  Gallorum,  lega- 
tos  dixisse ;  hoc  ab  omni  tempore  fuisse  jus  gentium,  hoc  est, 
illtid  jus,  ex  quo  totse  gentes  judicari,  et  agi  secum,  voluerint. 
Sermo  est  de  eo  jure  quod  toti  populi  et  illi  sapientissimi  scrip- 
tores  nomine  et  consensu  populorum  totorum,  pro  jure  gentium 
habuere ;  de  eo,  quo  gentes  inter  se  teneantur ;  non  de  jure  put£- 
tivo,  quod  unusquisque  sibi  excogitavit.  Haec  enim  est  labes, 
hoc  est  vitium  sseculi  nostri,  quod  unusquisque  ponit  principium, 
ex  quo  deducit  deinde  conclusiones.  Bene  est,  et  laudandi  sunt, 
quod  in  hoc  cavent  sibi,  ut  in  fine  conveniant  in  conclusionibus ; 
quod  ex  diversis  principiis  efficiunt  easdem  conclusiones :  Sed 
Grotius  provocat  simpliciter  ad  consensum  generis  humani  et 
sensum  communem} 

78. — PRICE,  in  his  Review  of  the  principal  Questions  on  Mor- 
als, 1  ed.  1758,  speaking  of  the  necessity  of  supposing  a  cause 
for  every  event,  and  having  stated  examples,  says — '  I  know 
nothing  that  can  be  said  or  done  to  a  person  who  professes  to 
deny  these  things,  besides  referring  him  to  common  sense  and 
reason]  p.  35.  And  again :  '  Were  the  question — whether  our 
ideas  of  number,  diversity,  causation,  proportion,  <fec.,  represent 
truth  and  reality  perceived  by  the  understanding,  or  particular 
impressions  made  by  the  object  to  which  we  ascribe  them  on  our 
minds ; — were  this,  I  say,  the  question,  would  it  not  be  sufficient 
to  appeal  to  common  sense,  and  to  leave  it  to  be  determined  by 
every  person's  private  consciousness?  p.  65.  See  also  2  ed.  p. 
81,  note :  '  Common  sense  the  faculty  of  self-evident  truths.' 

79. — REID. — a. — Inquiry,  <fec.,  p.  108' — 'If  there  be  certain 

1  Here,  as  elsewhere,  Hamilton  refers  to  his  own  edition  of  Reid.—  W. 


134  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

principles,  as  I  think  there  are,  which  the  constitution  of  our 
nature  leads  us  to  believe,  and  which  we  are  under  a  necessity  to 
take  for  granted  in  the  common  concerns  of  life,  without  being 
able  to  give  a  reason  for  them  ;  these  are  what  we  call  the  prin- 
ciples of  common  sense  ;  and  what  is  manifestly  contrary  to  them 
is  what  we  call  absurd.1 — See  also  p.  209.  Compare  Melanchthon 
n.  25,  c.,  Fenelon  n.  60,  Buffier  n.  63. 

b. — Intellectual  Powers,  p.  425. — '  It  is  absurd  to  conceive  that 
there  can  be  any  opposition  between  Reason  and  Common  Sense. 
Common  Sense  is  indeed  the  first-born  of  Reason ;  and  they  are 
inseparable  in  their  nature.  We  ascribe  to  Reason  two  offices  or 
two  degrees ;  the  first  is  to  judge  of  things  self-evident ;  [this  is 
Intellect,  vofe.]  The  second  is  to  draw  conclusions  that  are  not 
self-evident  from  those  that  are  ;  [this  is  Reasoning,  or  &avoia.] 
The  first  of  these  is  the  province,  and  the  sole  province  of  Com- 
mon Sense ;  and  therefore  it  coincides  with  Reason  in  its  whole 
extent,  and  is  only  another  name  for  one  branch  or  one  degree 
of  Reason.' — I  have  already  observed  that  of  these  offices,  the 
former  (Common  Sense)  might  be  well  denominated  thu  noetic 
function  of  Reason,  or  rather  Intellect,  and  the  latter  (Reasoning) 
its  dianoetic  or  discursive.  See  p.  81. 

80. — HILLER. — Curriculum  Philosophize,  1765.  Pars  iii.  § 
34. — lSensus  communis*  used  in  its  philosophical  meaning. 

81. — HEMSTERHUIS,  'the  Batavian  Plato,'  founds  his  philoso- 
phy on  the  original  feelings  or  beliefs  of  our  intelligent  nature,  as 
on  ultimate  facts.  Feeling,  or  the  faculty  of  primitive  intuition 
(sentiment,  sensation,  faculte  intuitive)  is  prior  to  reasoning ;  on 
which  it  confers  all  its  validity,  and  which  it  supplies  with  the 
necessary  conditions  of  its  activity.  It  is  not  logical  inference 
which  affords  us  the  assurance  of  any  real  existence ;  it  is  belief — 
feeling — the  instinctive  judgment  of  the  intuitive  faculty.  (This 
he  sometimes  calls  common  sense — sens  commun.)  Demonstra- 
tion is  the  ladder  to  remoter  truths.  But  demonstrations  can 
yield  us  information  neither  as  to  the  ground  on  which  the  lad- 
der rests,  nor  as  to  the  points  on  which  it  is  supported. — Of  his 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  135 

works,  see  in  particular,  '  Sophyle'  and  '  Lettre  sur  1'Homme  et 
ses  Rapports,'  passim. 

82. — BEATTIE. — Essay  on  Truth,  1773,  p.  40.  'The  term 
Common  Sense  hath,  in  modern  times,  been  used  by  philoso- 
phers, both  French  and  British,  to  signify  that  power  of  the  mind 
which  perceives  truth,  or  commands  belief,  not  by  progressive 
argumentation,  but  by  an  instantaneous,  instinctive,  and  irresisti- 
ble impulse ;  derived  neither  from  education  nor  from  habit,  but 
from  nature;  acting  independently  of  our  will,  whenever  its 
object  is  presented,  according  to  an  established  law,  and  therefore 
properly  called  Sense  ;  and  acting  in  a  similar  manner  upon  all, 
or  at  least  upon  a  great  majority  of  mankind,  and  therefore 
properly  called  Common  Sense? 

I  should  hardly  have  thought  it  necessary  to  quote  Beattie's 
definition  of  common  sense  any  more  than  those  of  Campbell, 
Oswald,  Fergusson,  and  other  Scottish  philosophers  in  the  train 
of  Reid,  were  it  not  to  remark  that  Mr.  Stewart  (Elements,  vol. 
ii.  c.  1,  sect.  3),  contrary  to  his  usual  tone  of  criticism,  is  greatly 
too  unmeasured  in  his  reprehension  of  this  and  another  passage 
of  the  same  Essay.  In  fact  if  we  discount  the  identification  of 
Reason  with  Reasoning — in  which  Beattie  only  follows  the  great 
majority  of  philosophers,  ancient  and  modern — his  consequent 
distinction  of  Reason  from  Common  Sense,  and  his  error  in 
regard  to  the  late  and  limited  employment  of  this  latter  term,  an 
error  shared  with  him  by  Mr.  Stewart,  there  is  far  more  in  this 
definition  to  be  praised  than  censured.  The  attack  on  Beattie 
by  the  English  translator  of  Buffier  is  futile  and  false.  Mr. 
Stewart's  approbation  of  it  is  to  me  a  matter  of  wonder.  See 
No.  63. 

83. — VON  STORCHKNAU. — Grundsaetze  der  Logik,  1774.  Com- 
mon Sense  (der  allgemeine  Menschensinn)  defined  and  founded 
on,  as  an  infallible  criterion  of  truth,  in  reference  to  all  matters 
not  beyond  its  sphere. 

84. — STATTLER. — Dissertatio  Logica  de  valore  Sensus  Commu- 
nis,  1780. — A  treatise  chiefly  in  reference  to  the  proof  of  the 


136  PHILOSOPHY    OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

being  of  a  God  from  the  general  agreement  of  mankind. — See 
also  his  Logica. 

85. — HENNERT. — Aphorism!  philosophici  Utrecht,  1781. — 
•Sensus  Co/nmunis,  seu  sensus  immediate  evidential,  intimus  est 
sensus,'  §  112.  ' Sensus  Communis  est  cos  et  norma  omnis  veri,' 
§  2.  '  Natura  mortalibus  tribuit  sensum  communem,  qui  omnes 
edocet  quibus  in  rebus  consentire  debeant,'  &c.,  §  1. 

86. — KANT  is  a  remarkable  confessor  of  the  supreme  authority 
of  natural  belief;  not  only  by  reason  of  his  rare  profundity  as  a 
thinker,  but  because  we  see  him,  by  a  signal  yet  praiseworthy 
inconsequence,  finally  re-establishing  in  authority  the  principle, 
which  he  had  originally  disparaged  and  renounced.  His  theo- 
retical philosophy,  which  he  first  developed,  proceeds  on  a  rejec- 
tion, in  certain  respects,  of  the  necessary  convictions  of  mankind  ; 
while  on  these  convictions  his  practical  philosophy,  the  result  of 
his.maturer  contemplations,  is  wholly  established.  As  Jacobi 
well  expresses  it — '  The  Critical  philosophy,  first  out  of  love  to 
science,  theoretically  subverts  metaphysic;  then — when  all  is 
about  to  sink  into  the  yawning  abyss  of  an  absolute  subjectivity 
— it  again,  out  of  love  to  metaphysic,  subverts  science'  ( Werke  ii. 
p.  44).  The  rejection  of  the  common  sense  of  mankind  as  a 
criterion  of  truth,  is  the  weakest  point  of  the  speculative  philos- 
ophy of  Kant.  When  he  says — '  Allowing  idealism  to  be  as 
dangerous  as  it  truly  is,  it  would  still  remain  a  scandal  to  phi- 
losophy and  human  reason  in  general,  to  be  forced  to  accept  the 
existence  of  external  things  on  the  testimony  of  mere  belief  (Cr. 
d.  r.  V.  Vorr.) :  yet,  that  very  belief  alone  is  what  makes  the  sup- 
position of  an  external  world  incumbent ;  and  the  proof  of  its 
reality  which  Kant  attempted,  independently  of  that  belief,  is 
now  admitted  by  one  and  all  of  his  disciples,  to  be  so  inconse- 
quent that  it  may  reasonably  be  doubted  whether  he  ever 
intended  it  for  more  than  an  exoteric  disclaimer  of  the  esoteric 
idealism  of  his  doctrine.  But  the  philosopher  who  deemed  it '  a 
scandal  to  philosophy  and  human  reason'  to  found  the  proof  of  a 
material  world — in  itself  to  us  a  matter  of  supreme  indifference — 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  137 

on  belief;  on  belief,  on  feeling,  afterwards  established  the  proof 
of  all  the  highest  objects  of  our  interest — God — Free  Will — and 
Immortality.  In  the  character  he  ascribes  to  this  Feeling  and 
Belief,  Kant,  indeed,  erred.  For  he  ought  to  have  regarded  it, 
not  as  a  mere  spiritual  craving,  but  as  an  immediate  manifesta- 
tion to  intelligence ;  not  as  a  postulate,  but  as  a  datum ;  not  as 
an  interest  in  certain  truths,  but  as  the  fact,  the  principle,  the 
warrant  of  their  cognition  and  reality.  Kant's  doctrine  on  this 
point  is  too  prominent  and  pervading,  and  withal  too  well  known, 
to  render  any  quotation  necessary ;  and  I  only  refer  to  his  Cri- 
tique of  Practical  Reason,  and  his  moral  treatises  in  general. — 
See  also  on  Kant's  variation  in  this  respect,  among  others,  Jaco- 
bi's  Introduction  to  his  collected  philosophical  writings  (Werke 
vol.  ii.  p.  3-126),  with  the  Appendix  on  Transcendental  Idealism 
(ibid.  p.  289-309) ;  and  Platner's  Philosophical  Aphorisms  (vol. 
i.  Pref.  p.  vi.) ;  to  which  may  be  added  Schoppenhauer's  letter  in 
preface  to  the  first  volume  of  Kant's  collected  works  by  Rosen- 
krantz  and  Schubert. 

87. — JACOBI. — The  philosophy  of  Jacobi — who  from  the  char- 
acter and  profundity  of  his  speculations  merited  and  obtained  the 
appellation  of  the  Plato  of  Germany — in  its  last  and  most  per- 
fect exposition  establishes  two  faculties  immediately  apprehensive 
(vernehmend,  wahrnehmend)  of  reality  ;  Sense  of  corporeal  ex- 
istence, Reason  (Vernunft)  of  supersensible  truths.*  Both  as 
primary  are  inconceivable,  being  only  cognitions  of  the  fact. 
Both  are  therefore  incapable  of  definition,  and  are  variously  and 
vaguely  characterized  as  revelations,  intuitions,  feelings,  beliefs, 
instincts. 


*  This  last  corresponds  to  the  vovf  proper  of  the  Greek  philosophers  ;  and 
the  employment  of  the  term  Reason  in  this  limitation  by  Jacobi  in  his  later 
works  (to  which  he  was  manifestly  led  by  Kant),  is  not  a  fortunate  nomen- 
clature. In  his  earlier  writings  lie  does  not  discriminate  Reason  from  Under- 
standing (Verstand),  viewing  it  as  a  faculty  of  mediate  knowledge,  and  as 
opposed  to  Belief,  in  which  Jacobi  always  held  that  we  obtain  the  revelation 
of  all  reality — all  original  cognition.  See  p.  80. 


138  PHILOSOPHY   OF  COMMON   SENSE. 

The  resistless  belief  or  feeling  of  reality  which  in  either  cogni 
tion  affords  the  surrogate  of  its  truth,  is  equivalent  to  the  com 
mon  sense  of  Reid.  Reid  was  an  especial  favorite  with  Jacohi ; 
and  through  Jacobi's  powerful  polemic  we  may  trace  the  influence 
of  the  Scottish  philosophy  on  the  whole  subsequent  speculation 
of  Germany.  See  Preface. 

a. — Die  Lehre  des  Spinoza,  <fec.,  1785,  p.  162.  sq. — Werke, 
vol.  iv.  p.  210.  '  Dear  Mendelsohn,  we  are  all  born  in  belief 
(Glaube*),  and  in  belief  we  must  remain,  as  we  were  all  born  in 
society,  and  in  society  must  remain.  How  can  we  strive  after 
certainty,  were  certainty  not  already  known  to  us ;  and  known  to 
us,  how  can  it  be  unless  through  something  which  we  already 
know  with  certainty  ?  This  leads  to  the  notion  of  an  immediate 
certainty,  which  not  only  stands  in  need  of  no  proof,  but  abso- 
lutely excludes  all  proof,  being  itself,  and  itself  alone,  the  repre- 
sentation (Vorstellungf )  corresponding  with  the  represented  thing, 
and  therefore  having  its  sufficient  reason  within  itself.  The  con- 
viction, through  proof  or  demonstration,  is  a  conviction  of  sec- 
ond hand ;  rests  upon  comparison ;  and  can  never  be  altogether 
sure  and  perfect.  If,  then,  all  assent,  all  holding  for  true  (Fuer- 
wahrhalten),  not  depending  on  such  grounds  of  reasoning,  be  a 
belief;  it  follows,  that  the  conviction  from  reasoning  itself,  must 
spring  out  of  belief,  and  from  belief  receive  all  the  cogency  it 
possesses. 

'  Through  belief  we  know  that  we  have  a  body,  and  that,  ex- 
ternal to  us,  there  are  found  other  bodies,  and  other  intelligent 
existences.  A  truly  miraculous  [marvellousj]  revelation !  For 


*  The  Germans  have  only  this  one  word  for  philosophical  Belief  and  theo- 
logical Faith.  Hence  much  scandal,  confusion,  and  misrepresentation,  on 
its  first  employment  by  Jacobi. 

t  Vorstellung  in  this  place  might  perhaps  be  rendered  presentation.  But  I 
adhere  to  the  usual  translation  ;  for  Jacobi  never  seems  to  have  risen  to  the 
pure  doctrine  of  Natural  Realism. 

J  The  Germans  have  only  one  word,  wunder,  wunderbar,  to  express  marvel 
and  miracle,  marvellous  and  miraculous.  Hence  often  confusion  and  ambi- 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  139 

we  have  only  a  sensation  (Empfinden)  of  our  body,  under  this  or 
that  modification ;  and  whilst  we  have  a  sensation  of  our  body 
thus  modified,  we  are  at  the  same  time,  aware  or  percipient,  not 
only  of  its  changes,  but  likewise  of — what  is  wholly  different 
from  mere  sensation,  or  a  mere  thought — we  are  aware  or  per- 
cipient of  other  real  things,  and  this  too  with  a  certainty,  the  same 
as  that  with  which  we  are  percipient  of  our  own  existence ;  for 
without  a  Thou  an  /is  impossible.  [? — See  above,  p.  19.  sq.] 

'  We  have  thus  a  revelation  of  nature,  which  does  not  recommend 
merely,  but  compels,  all  and  each  of  us  to  believe,  and,  through  be- 
lief, to  receive  those  eternal  truths  which  are  vouchsafed  to  man.' 

P.  223. — '  V.  We  can  only  demonstrate  similarities  (coinci- 
dences, conditioned  necessary  truths)  in  a  series  of  identical  pro- 
positions. Every  proof  supposes,  as  its  basis,  something  already 
established,  the  principle  of  which  is  a  revelation. 

'  VI.  The  element  of  all  human  knowledge  and  activity  is  Be- 
lief.' 

P.  193.  (Given  as  an  aphorism  of  Spinoza.) — '  An  immediate 
cognition,  considered  in  and  for  itself,  is  without  representation — 
is  a  Feeling.' — The  three  last  words  do  not  appear  in  the  original 
edition  ;  and  I  cannot  find  their  warrant  in  Spinoza. 

b. — From  the  Dialogue  entitled  '  David  Hume  upon  Belief, 
or  Idealism  and  Realism,'  which  appeared  two  years  later  (1787), 
Werke,  vol.  ii.  p.  143,  sq. 

'/. — That  things  appear  as  external  to  us,  requires  no  argument. 
But  that  these  things  are  not  mere  appearances  in  us — are  not 
mere  modifications  of  our  proper  self,  and  consequently  null  as 
representations  of  aught  external  to  ourselves  ;  but  that  as  repre- 
sentations in  us,  they  have  still  reference  to  something  really  ex- 
ternal and  self-existent,  which  they  express,  and  from  which  they 
are  taken — in  the  face  of  this,  not  only  is  doubt  possible,  it  has 

fjuity  in  their  theology.  The  superiority  we  have  over  them  in  the  two  in- 
stances noticed  in  this  and  the  penult  note  is,  however,  rare.  The  making 
perception  a  revelation  and  not  an  apprehension  of  existence  belongs  also  to 
a  Cosmothetic  Idealism,  struggling  into  Natural  Realism. 


140  PHILOSOPHY   OP  COMMON   SENSE. 

been  often  satisfactorily  demonstrated,  that  such  doubt  cannot  be 
solved  by  any  process  of  reasoning  strictly  so  denominated.  Your 
immediate  certainty  of  external  things  would,  therefore,  on  the 
analogy  of  my  Belief,  be  a  blind  certainty.'1 

(After  defending  the  propriety  of  the  term  Glaube  employed 
by  him  in  his  previous  writings  (which,  in  consequence  of  the 
word  denoting  in  German  both  positive  faith  and  general  belief, 
had  exposed  him  to  the  accusation  of  mysticism),  by  examples  of 
a  similar  usage  of  the  word  Belief,  in  the  philosophical  writings 
of  Hume,  Reid,  <fec. ;  he  proceeds  to  vindicate  another  term  he 
had  employed — Offenbarung,  revelation.) 

'  /. — In  so  far  as  the  universal  usage  of  language  is  concerned, 
is  there  required  any  special  examples  or  authorities  ?  We  say 
commonly  in  German,  that  objects  offenbaren,  reveal,  i.  e.  mani- 
fest, themselves  through  the  senses.  The  same  expression  is  prev- 
alent in  French,  English,  Latin,  and  many  other  languages. 
With  the  particular  emphasis  which  I  have  laid  on  it,  this  expres- 
sion does  not  occur  in  Hume  ; — among  other  reasons  because  he 
leaves  it  undetermined,  whether  we  perceive  things  really  external 
or  only  as  external.  .  .  .  The  decided  Realist,  on  the  contrary, 
who  unhesitatingly  accepts  an  external  existence,  on  the  evidence 
of  his  senses,  considers  this  certainty  as  an  original  conviction, 
and  cannot  but  think,  that  on  this  fundamental  experience,  all 
our  speculation  touching  a  knowledge  of  the  external  world  must 
rest — such  a  decided  Realist,  how  shall  he  denominate  the  mean 
through  which  he  obtains  his  certainty  of  external  objects,  as  of 
existences  independent  of  his  representation  of  them  ?  He  has 
nothing  on  which  his  judgment  can  rest,  except  the  things  them- 
selves— nothing  but  the  fact,  that  the  objects  stand  there,  actually 
before  him.  In  these  circumstances,  can  he  express  himself  by  a 
more  appropriate  word  than  the  word  Revelation.*  And  should 
we  not  rather  inquire,  regarding  the  root  of  this  word,  and  the 
origin  of  its  employment. 

*  This  looks  very  like  Natural  Realism. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  141 

'  He. — So  it  certainly  appears. 

'  /. — That  this  Revelation  deserves  to  be  called  truly  miracu- 
lous [marvellous]  follows  of  course.  For  if  we  consider  suffi- 
ciently the  reasons  for  the  proposition — "  That  consciousness  is 
exclusively  conversant  with  the  modifications  of  our  proper  self," 
Idealism  will  appear  in  all  its  force,  and  as  the  only  scheme 
which  our  speculative  reason  can  admit.  Suppose,  however,  that 
our  Realist,  notwithstanding,  still  remains  a  Realist,  and  holds 
fast  by  the  belief  that — for  example — this  object  here,  which  we 
call  a  table,  is  no  mere  sensation — no  mere  existence  found  only 
in  us,  but  an  existence  external  and  independent  of  our  represen- 
tation, and  by  us  only  perceived  ;  I  would  boldly  ask  him  for  a 
more  appropriate  epithet  for  the  Revelation  of  which  he  boasts, 
inasmuch  as  he  maintains  that  something  external  to  him  is 
presented  (sich  darstelle)  to  his  consciousness.  For  the  presented 
existence  (Daseyn)  of  such  a  thing  external  to  us,  we  have  no 
other  proof  than  the  presented  existence  of  this  thing  itself ;  and 
we  must  admit  it  to  be  wholly  inconceivable,  how  that  existence 
can  possibly  be  perceived  by  us.  But  still,  as  was  said,  we  main- 
tain that  we  do  perceive  it ;  maintain  with  the  most  assured  con- 
viction, that  things  there  are,  extant  really  out  of  us,  that  our  rep- 
resentations and  notions  are  conformed  to  these  external  things, 
and  that  not  the  tilings  which  we  only  fancy  external  are  con- 
formed to  our  representations  and  notions.  I  ask  on  what  does 
this  conviction  rest  ?  In  truth  on  nothing,  except  on  a  revela- 
tion, which  we  can  denominate  no  otherwise  than  one  truly  mi- 
raculous [marvellous].' 

c. — Allwills  Briefsammlung,  1792.  Werke,  vol.  i.  p.  120. — 
'  "We  admit,  proceeded  Allwill,  freely  and  at  once,  that  we  do  not 
comprehend  how  it  is  that,  through  the  mere  excitation  and 
movement  of  our  organs  of  sense,  we  are  not  only  sensitive  but 
sensitive  of  something ; — become  aware  of,  perceive,  something 
wholly  different  from  us ;  and  that  we  comprehend,  least  of  all, 
how  we  distinguish  and  apprehend  our  proper  self,  and  what  per- 
tains to  our  internal  states,  in  a  manner  wholly  different  from  all 


142  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

sensitive  perception.  But  we  deem  it  more  secure  here  to  appeal 
to  an  original  Instinct,  with  which  every  cognition  of  truth  be- 
gins, than,  on  account  of  that  incomprehensibility,  to  maintain — 
that  the  mind  can  conceive  and  represent  in  an  infinitely  various 
fashion  not  itself,  and  not  other  things,  but,  exclusively  and  alone, 
what  is  neither  itself,  nor  any  other  thing?* 

d. — From  the  Preface  to  the  second  volume  of  his  Works,  form- 
ing the  '  Introduction  to  the  author's  collected  philosophical 
writings  ;'  this  was  published  in  1815,  and  exhibits  the  last  and 
most  authentic  view  of  the  Jacobian  doctrine. 

P.  58  sq. — '  Like  every  other  system  of  cognitions,  Philosophy 
receives  its  Form  exclusively  from  the  Understanding  (Verstand) 
as,  in  general,  the  faculty  of  Concepts  (Begriffe).  Without  no- 
tions or  concepts  there  can  be  no  reconsciousness,  no  conscious- 
ness of  cognitions,  consequently  no  discrimination  and  compari- 
son, no  separation  and  connection,  no  weighing,  re-weighing, 
estimating,  of  these ;  in  a  word,  no  seizing  possession  (Besitzer- 
greifung)  of  any  truth  whatever.  On  the  other  hand  the  con- 
tents— the  peculiar  contents,  of  philosophy  are  given  exclusively 
by  the  Reason  (Vernunft),f  by  the  faculty,  to  wit,  of  cognitions, 
independent  of  sense,  and  beyond  its  reach.  The  Reason  fash- 
ions no  concepts,  builds  no  systems,  pronounces  no  judgments, 
but,  like  the  external  senses,  it  merely  reveals,  it  merely  announces 
the  fact. 

4  Above  all,  we  must  consider — that  as  there  is  a  sensible  in- 
tuition, an  intuition  through  the  Sense,  so  there  is  likewise  a  ra- 
tional intuition  through  the  Reason.  Each,  as  a  peculiar  source 
of  knowledge,  stands  counter  to  the  other ;  and  we  can  no  more 
educe  the  latter  from  the  former,  than  we  can  educe  the  former 
from  the  latter.  So  likewise,  both  hold  a  similar  relation  to  the 
Understanding  (Verstand),  and  consequently  to  demonstration. 


*  And  to  be  represented,  a  thing  must  be  known.    But  ex  Jiypothesi,  the 
external  reality  is  unknown ;  it  cannot  therefore  be  represented, 
t  See  note  at  p.  137  a,  and  references. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  143 

Opposed  to  the  intuition  of  sense  no  demonstration  is  valid ;  for 
all  demonstration  is  only  a  reducing,  a  carrying  back  of  the  con- 
cept to  the  sensible  intuition  (empirical  or  pure),  which  affords 
its  guarantee :  and  this,  in  reference  to  physical  science,  is  the  first 
and  the  last,  the  unconditionally  valid,  the  absolute.  On  the 
same  principle,  no  demonstration  avails  in  opposition  to  the  in- 
tuition of  reason,  which  affords  us  a  knowledge  of  supersensible 
objects,  that  is,  affords  us  assurance  of  their  reality  and  truth.* 

'  We  are  compelled  to  employ  the  expression  rational  intuition, 
or  intuition  of  reason  (Vernunft-Anschauung),  because  the  lan- 
guage possesses  no  other  to  denote  the  mean  and  the  manner,  in 
which  the  understanding  is  enabled  to  take  cognizance  of  what, 
unattainable  by  the  sense,  is  given  by  Feeling  alone,  and  yet,  not 
as  a  subjective  excogitation,  but  as  an  objective  reality. 

'  When  a  man  says — /  know,  we  have  a  right  to  ask  him — 
Whence  he  knows  ?  And  in  answering  our  question,  he  must,  in 
the  end,  inevitably  resort  to  one  or  other  of  these  two  sources — 
either  to  the  Sensation  of  Sense  (Sinnes-Empfindung),  or  to  the 
feeling  of  the  Mind  (Geistes-Gefuehl).  Whatever  we  know 
from  mental  feeling,  that,  we  say,  we  believe.  So  speak  we  all. 
Virtue — consequently,  Moral  Liberty — consequently,  Mind  and 
God — these  can  only  be  believed.  But  the  sensation  on  which 
knowledge  in  the  intuition  of  sense — knowledge  properly  so  call- 
ed— reposes,  is  as  little  superior  to  the  Feeling  on  which  the 
knowledge  in  belief  is  founded,  as  the  brute  creation  is  to  the  hu- 
man, the  material  to  the  intellectual  world,  nature  to  its  creator.f 

'  The  power  of  Feeling,  I  maintain,  is  the  power  in  man  para- 
mount to  every  other  ;  it  is  that  alone  which  specifically  distin- 
guishes him  from  the  brutes,  that  is,  which,  affording  a  differ- 


*  Compare  this  with  Aristotle's  doctrine,  No.  8,  especially  a.  b.  c.  f.  and 
p.  86,  b. 

t  As  will  be  seen  from  what  follows,  Jacob!  applies  the  terms  Feeling  and 
Belief  to  both  Sense  and  Eeason.  Sensation,  as  properly  the  mere  conscious- 
ness of  a  subjective  sensual  state, — of  the  agreeable  or  disagreeable  in  our 
corporeal  organism,  is  a  term  that  ought  to  have  been  here  avoided. 


144  PHILOSOPHY  OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

ence  not  merely  in  degree  but  in  kind,  raises  him  to  an  incom- 
parable eminence  above  them :  it  is,  I  maintain,  one  and  the 
same  with  reason ;  or,  as  we  may  with  propriety  express  our- 
selves— what  we  call  Reason,  what  transcends  mere  understand- 
ing solely  applied  to  nature,  springs  exclusively  and  alone  out  of 
the  power  of  Feeling.  As  the  senses  refer  the  understanding  to 
Sensation,  so  the  Reason  refers  it  to  Feeling.  The  consciousness 
of  that  which  Feeling  manifests,  I  call  Idea.1* 

P.  107. — 'As  the  reality,  revealed  by  the  external  senses,  re- 
quires no  guarantee,  itself  affording  the  best  assurance  of  its 
truth  ;  so  the  reality,  revealed  by  that  deep  internal  sense  which 
we  call  Reason,  needs  no  guarantee,  being,  in  like  manner,  alone 
and  of  itself  the  most  competent  witness  of  its  veracity.  Of  neces- 
sity, man  believes  his  senses  ;  of  necessity,  he  believes  his  reason ; 
and  there  is  no  certainty  superior  to  the  certainty  which  this  be- 
lief contains. 

'  When  men  attempted  to  demonstrate  scientifically  the  truth 
of  our  representations  (Vorstellungen)  of  a  material  world,  exist- 
ing beyond,  and  independent  of,  these  representations,  the  object 
which  they  wished  to  establish  vanished  from  the  demonstrators ; 
there  remained  naught  but  mere  subjectivity,  mere  sensation  : 
they  found  Idealism. 

'  When  men  attempted  to  demonstrate  scientifically  the  truth 
of  our  representations  of  an  immaterial  world,  existing  beyond 
these  representations, — the  truth  of  the  substantiality  of  the  hu- 
man mind, — and  the  truth  of  a  free  creator  of  the  universe,  dis- 
tinct from  the  universe  itself,  that  is,  an  administrator,  endowed 
with  consciousness,  personality,  and  veritable  providence  ;  in  like 
manner  the  object  vanished  from  the  demonstrators ;  there  re- 
mained for  them  mere  logical  phantasms:  they  found — Nihil- 
ism. 

'  All  reality,  whether  corporeal,  revealed  by  the  senses,  or  spir- 

*  Without  entering  on  details,  I  may  observe  that  Jacobi,  like  Kant,  lim- 
its the  term  Idea  to  the  highest  notions  of  pure  intellect,  or  Reason. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMMON   SENSE.  145 

itual,  revealed  by  the  reason,  is  assured  to  us  alone  by  Feeling  ;* 
beyond  and  above  this  there  is  no  guarantee.' 

Among  those  who  have  adopted  the  principles  of  Jacobi,  and 
who  thus  philosophize  in  a  congenial  spirit  with  Reid,  besides 
Koeppen  and  Ancillon  (Nos.  96,  97),  I  may  refer,  in  general,  to 
Bouterwek,  Lehrb.  d.  philos.  Wissensch.,  i.  §  26,  27,  and  Lehrb. 
d.  philos.  Vorkent.,  §§  12,  27. — Neeb,  Verm.  Schr.,vol.  i.  p.  154 
sq.  vol.  ii.  p.  18,  70,  245  sq.  251,  vol.  iii.  p.  141  sq. 

88. — HEIDENREICH,  one  of  the  most  distinguished  of  the  older 
Kantians.  Betrachtungen,  &c.,  P.  i.  p.  213,227. — 'Inasmuch 
as  the  conviction  of  certain  cognitions  (as  of  our  own  existence,  of 
the  existence  of  an  external  world,  &c.),  does  not  depend  upon  an 
apprehension  of  reasons,  but  is  exclusively  an  immediate  innate 
reliance  of  the  subject  on  self  and  nature,  I  call  it  natural  belief 
(Natur-glaube).  Every  other  cognition,  notion,  and  demonstra- 
tion, reposes  upon  this  natural  belief,  and  without  it  cannot  be 
brought  to  bear.' 

89.— L.  CREUZER. — Skeptische  Betrachtungen,  <fec.,  p.  110. — 
4  We  accord  reality  to  the  external  world  because  our  conscious- 
ness impels  us  so  fo  do That  we  are 

unable  to  explain,  conceive,  justify  all  this,  argues  nothing  against 
its  truth.  Our  whole  knowledge  rests  ultimately  on  facts  of  con- 
sciousness, of  which  we  not  only  cannot  assign  the  reason,  but 
cannot  even  think  the  possibility.'  He  does  not  however  rise 
above  Hypothetical  Realism  ;  see  p.  108. 

90. — PLAINER. — Philosophische  Aphorismen,  2d  ed.  Pref.  p.. 
vi. — '  There  is,  I  am  persuaded,  only  one  philosophy  ;  and  that  the 
true  ;  which  in  the  outset  of  its  inquiries  departs  from  the  princi- 
ple, that  the  certainty  of  human  knowledge  is  demonstrable,  only 
relatively  to  our  faculty  of  knowing,  and  which,  at  the  end  of  its 
speculative  career,  returns  within  the  thoughts — Experience,  Com- 
mon Sense,  and  Morality — the  best  results  of  our  whole  earthly 
wisdom.' 


*  In  regard  to  the  term  Feeling,  see  p.  60, 

7 


146  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

91. — FICHTE  is  a  more  remarkable,  because  a  more  reluctant, 
confessor  of  the  paramount  authority  of  Belief  than  even  Kant 
Departing  from  the  principle  common  to  Kant  and  philosophers 
in  general,  that  the  mind  cannot  transcend  itself,  Fichte  devel- 
oped, with  the  most  admirable  rigor  of  demonstration,  a  scheme 
of  Idealism,  the  purest,  simplest,  and  most  consistent  which  the 
history  of  philosophy  exhibits.  And  so  confident  was  Fichte  in' 
the  necessity  of  his  proof,  that  on  one  occasion  he  was  provoked 
to  imprecate  eternal  damnation  on  his  head,  should  he  ever 
swerve  from  any,  even  the  least,  of  the  doctrines  which  he  had  so 
victoriously  established.  But  even  Fichte  in  the  end  confesses 
that  natural  belief  is  paramount  to  every  logical  proof,  and  that 
his  own  idealism  he  could  not  believe. 

In  the  foot-note  at  page  129  b,1  I  have  given  the  result  as 
stated  by  himself  of  his  theoretical  philosophy — Nihilism.  After 
the  passage  there  quoted,  he  thus  proceeds  : — '  All  cognition 
strictly  so  called  (Wissen)  is  only  an  effigiation  (Abbildung),  and 
there  is  always  in  it  something  wanted,  that  to  which  the  image 
or  effigies  (Bild)  corresponds.  This  want  can  be  supplied  through 
no  cognition ;  and  a  system  of  cognitions  is  necessarily  a  system 
of  mere  images,  destitute  of  reality,  significance,  or  aim.'  These 
passages  are  from  the  conclusion  of  the  second  book  of  his  '  Bes- 
timmung  des  Menschen,'  entitled  'Wissen,' pp.  130,  132,  ed. 
1825. 

But  in  his  Practical  Philosophy  Fichte  became  convinced  that 
he  had  found  an  organ  by  which  to  lay  hold  on  the  internal  and 
external  worlds,  which  had  escaped  from  him  in  his  Theoretical. 
'  I  have  discovered,  he  says,  the  instrument  by  which  to  seize  on 
this  Reality,  and  therewith,  in  all  likelihood,  on  every  other. 
Knowledge  (das  Wissen)  is  not  this  instrument :  no  cognition  can 
be  its  own  basis  and  its  own  proof;  every  cognition  supposes 
another  still  higher,  as  its  reason,  and  this  ascent  has  no  termina- 
tion. The  instrument  I  mean,  is  Belief  (Glaube).'  (Ib.  book 


1  The.  note  may  be  found  above  p.    24.— 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   COMMON   SENSE.  147 

third,  entitled  'Glaube,'  p.  146.) — 'All  my  conviction  is  only  Be- 
lief, and  it  proceeds  from  Feeling  or  Sentiment  (Gesinnung),  not 
from  the  discursive  Understanding  (Verstand).'  (Ib.  p.  147.)  'I 
possess,  when  once  I  am  aware  of  this,  the  touchstone  of  all  truth 
and  of  all  conviction.  The  root  of  truth  is  in  the  Conscience  (Ge- 
wissen)  alone.'  (Ib.  p.  148.)  Compare  St.  Austin,  supra,  No.  15, 
b. — See  also  to  the  same  effect  Fichte's  '  System  der  Sittenlehre,' 
p.  18  ;  his  work  '  Ueber  den  Begriffder  Wissenschaftslehre,  p.  21, 
sq.,  and  the  '  Philosophische  Journal,'  vol.  x.  p.  7.  Still  more 
explicit  is  the  recognition  of  'internal  sense'  and  'belief  as  an 
irrecusable  testimony  of  the  reality  of  our  perception  of  external 
realities,  subsequently  given  by  Fichte  in  his  lectures  at  Erlangen 
in  1 805,  and  reported  by  Gley  in  his  '  Essai  sur  les  Elements  de 
la  Philosophic,'  p.  141,  sq.,  and  in  his  'Philosophia  Turonensis,' 
vol.  i.  p.  237. — I  regret  that  I  have  not  yet  seen  Fichte's  'Hinter- 
lassene  Schriften,'  lately  published  by  his  son. 

After  these  admissions  it  need  not  surprise  us  to  find  Fichte 
confessing,  that  'How  evident  soever  may  be  the  demonstration 
that  every  object  of  consciousness  (Vorstellung)  is  only  illusion 
and  dream,  I  am  unable  to  believe  it ;'  and  in  like  manner  main- 
taining, that  Spinoza  never  could  have  believed  the  system  which 
he  deduced  with  so  logical  a  necessity.  (Philos.  Journ.  vii.  p.  35.) 

93. — KRUG. — The  Transcendental  Synthetism  of  this  philoso- 
pher is  a  scheme  of  dualism  founded  on  the  acceptance  of  the  ori- 
ginal datum  of  consciousness,  that  we  are  immediately  cognizant, 
at  once,  of  an  internal,  and  of  an  external  world.  It  is  thus  a 
scheme  of  philosophy,  really,  though  not  professedly,  founded  on 
Common  Sense.  Krug  is  a  Kantian ;  and  as  originally  promul- 
gated in  his  'Entwurf  eines  neuen  Organons,'  1801  (§5),  his 
system  was,  like  Kant's,  a  mere  Cosmothetic  Idealism ;  for  while 
he  allowed  a  knowledge  of  the  internal  world,  he  only  allowed  a 
belief  of  the  external.  The  polemic  of  Schulze  against  the  com- 
mon theory  of  sensitive  representation,  and  in  professed  conform- 
ity with  Reid's  doctrine  of  perception,  was  published  in  the  same 
year  ;  and  it  was  probably  the  consideration  of  this  that  deter- 


148  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

mined  Krug  to  a  fundamental  change  in  his  system.  For  in  his 
treatise  'Ueber  die  verschiedenen  Methoden,'  <fec.  1802  (p.  44), 
and  still  more  explicitly  in  his  '  Fundamental  Philosophic,'  1 803 
(§  68),  the  mere  belief  in  the  unknown  existence  of  external  things 
is  commuted  into  a  cognition,  and  an  immediate  perception  appa- 
rently allowed,  as  well  of  the  phenomena  of  matter,  as  of  the  phe- 
nomena of  mind.  See  also  his  pamphlet  '  Ueber  das  Verhaelt- 
niss  der  Philosophic  zum  gesunden  Menschenverstaude,'  1835,  in 
reference  to  Hegel's  paradox, — '  That  the  world  of  Common 
Sense,  and  the  world  of  Philosophy,  are,  to  each  other,  worlds  up- 
side down.' 

94. — DEGERANDO. — Histoire  comparee  des  Systemes  de  Philo- 
sophic, t.  iii.  p.  343,  original  edition.  '  Concluons :  la  realite  de 
nos  connaissances  [of  the  external  world]  ne  se  demontre  pas  ;  elle 
se  recommit.  Elle  se  reconnait,  par  1'eftet  de  cette  meme  conscience 
qui  nous  revele  notre  connaissance  elle-me'me.  Tel  est  le  privi- 
lege de  l'intelligence*humaine.  Elle  apercoit  les  objets,  elle  s'aper- 
coit  ensuite  elle-meme,  elle  apercoit  qu'elle  a  apercu.  Elle  est 
toute  lumiere,  mais  une  lumiere  qui  reflechit  indefiniment  sur  elle- 
meme.  On  nous  opposera  ce  principe  abstrait:  qvfune  sensation 
ne  peut  nous  instruire  que  de  notre  propre  existence.  .  .  .  Sans 
doute  lorsqu'on  commence  par  confondre  la  sensation  avec  la  per- 
ception, par  definir  celle-ci  une  maniere  cTdtre  du  moi,  on  ne  peut 
leur  attribuer  d'autre  instruction  que  celle  dont  notre  propre  exis- 
tence est  Pobjet.  Mais  6 vitons  ici  les  disputes  de  mots ;  il  s'agit 
seulement  de  constater  un  fait;  savoir,  si  dans  certains  cas,  en  re- 
flechissant  sur  nos  operations,  en  demelant  toutes  leurs  circons- 
tances,  nous  n'y  decouvrons  pas  la  perception  immediate  et  primi- 
tive d'une  existence  etrangere,  perception  a  la  quelle  on  donnera 
tel  nom  qu'on  jugera  convenable.  Si  ce  fait  est  exact,  constant, 
universel,  si  ce  fait  est  primitif,  il  est  non  seulement  inutile,  mais 
absurde,  d'en  demander  le  jiourqvoi  et  le  comment.  Car  nous 
n'avons  aucune  donn6e  pour  1'expliquer.' 

95. — FRIES,  a  distinguished  philosopher  of  the  Kantian  school, 
but  whose  opinions  have  been  considerably  modified  by  the  infiu- 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   COMMON    SENSE.  149 

ence  of  the  Jacobian  philosophy  of  belief,  professes  in  his  Feeling 
of  Truth  (Wahrheitsgefuehl)  a  doctrine  of  common  sense.  This 
doctrine  is  in  every  essential  respect  the  same  as  Reid's  ;  for  Fries 
is  altogether  wrong  in  the  assertion  which,  in  different  works,  he 
once  and  again  hazards,  that,  under  Common  Sense,  Reid  had  in 
view  a  special  organ  of  truth — a  peculiar  sense,  distinct  from  rea- 
son or  intelligence  in  general.  See  in  particular  his  Krit.  vol.  i. 
§  85.— Metaph.  §  17.— Gesch.  d.  Phil.  vol.  ii.  §  172.  Anthr.  vol. 
i.  §  52.  ii.  Vorr.  p.  xvi. — Log.  §  84. 

96. — KOEPPEN — a  philosopher  of  the  school  of  Jacobi. — Dars- 
tellung  des  Wesens  der  Philosophic,  §  11. — '  Human  knowledge, 
(Wissen)  considered  in  its  totality,  exhibits  a  twofold  character.  It 
is  either  Apprehension  (Wahrnehmung)  or  Conception  (Begriff)  ; 
either  an  immediate  conviction,  or  a  mediate  insight  obtained 
through  reasons.  By  the  former  we  are  said  to  believe,  by  the 
latter  to  conceive  [or  comprehend].'  After  an  articulate  exposition 
of  this,  and  having  shown,  with  Jacobi  and  Hume,  that  belief  as 
convertible  with  feeling  constitutes  the  ultimate  ground  both  of 
action  and  cognition,  he  proceeds  : — '  In  a  philosophical  sense,  be- 
lieved is  tantamount  to  apprehended.  For  all  apprehension  is  an 
immediate  conviction  which  cannot  be  founded  upon  reflection 
and  conception.  In  our  human  individuality  we  possess  a  double 
faculty  of  apprehension — Reason  [intelligence,  voUj]  and  sense. 
What,  therefore,  through  reason  and  sense  is  an  object  of  our 
apprehension  is  believed.  .  .  .  The  belief  of  reason  and  the  belief 
of  sense,  are  our  guarantees  for  the  certainty  of  what  we  appre- 
hend. The  former  relies  on  the  testimony  of  reason,  the  latter  on 
the  testimony  of  sense.  Is  this  twofold  testimony  false,  there  is 
absolutely  no  truth  of  apprehension.  The  combinations  of  con- 
ceptions afford  no  foundation  for  this  original  truth.  Belief  is 
thus  the  first  in  our  cognition,  because  apprehension  is  the  first : 
conception  is  the  second,  because  it  regards  the  relations  of  what  is 
given  through  apprehension.  If,  then,  I  exclusively  appropriate 
to  the  result  of  conceptions  the  name  of  knowledge  (Wissen) — still 
all  knowledge  presupposes  belief,  and  on  belief  does  the  truth  of 


150  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

knowledge  repose.  Belief  lays  hold  on  the  originally  given ; 
knowledge  develops  the  relations  of  the  given,  in  conformity  with 
the  laws  of  thought,'  <fec. 

97. — ANCILLON  (the  Son). — German  by  birth,  French  by  line- 
age, writing  in  either  language  with  equal  elegance,  and  repre- 
senting in  himself  the  highest  and  most  peculiar  qualities  of  both 
his  nations ;  we  have  still  farther  to  admire  in  the  prime  minister 
of  Prussia,  at  once,  the  metaphysician  and  moralist,  the  historian 
and  statesman,  the  preacher  and  man  of  the  world.  He  philoso- 
phized in  the  spirit  of  Jacobi ;  and  from  his  treatise  Ueber  Glaube 
(On  Belief),  one  of  his  later  writings,  I  translate  the  following 
passages : — 

P.  36. — '  Existences,  realities,  are  given  us.  We  apprehend 
them  by  means  of  an  internal  mental  intuition  (geistige  Anschau- 
ung),  which,  in  respect  of  its  clearness,  as  in  respect  of  its  cer- 
tainty, is  as  evident  as  universal,  and  as  resistless  and  indubitable 
as  evident. 

4  Were  no  such  internal,  immediate,  mental  intuition  given  us, 
there  would  be  given  us  no  existence,  no  reality.  The  universe — 
the  worlds  of  mind  and  matter — would  then  resolve  themselves 
into  apparency.  All  realities  would  be  mere  appearances,  appear- 
ing to  another  mere  appearance — Man  ;  whilst  no  answer  could 
be  afforded  to  the  ever-recurring  questions —  What  is  it  (hat  ap- 
pears ?  and  To  whom  is  the  appearance  made  ?  Even  language 
resists  such  assertions,  and  reproves  the  lie. 

'Had  we  no  such  internal,  immediate,  mental  intuition,  exist- 
ences would  be  beyond  the  reach  of  every  faculty  we  possess. 
For  neither  our  abstractive  nor  reflective  powers,  neither  the  anal- 
ysis of  notions,  nor  notions  themselves,  neither  synthesis  nor  rea- 
soning, could  ever  lead  us  to  reality  and  existence.'* 

(Having  shown  this  in  regard  to  each  of  these  in  detail,  he 
proceeds  :  p.  40.) — '  This  root  of  all  reality,  this  ground  of  exist- 

*  Fichte  says  the  same  : — '  From  cognition  to  pass  out  to  an  object  of  cog- 
nition— this  is  impossible ;  we  must  therefore  depart  from  the  reality,  other- 
wise we  should  remain  forever  unable  to  reach  it.' 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   COMMON    SENSE.  151 

ence,  is  the  Reason  (Vernunft),1  out  of  which  all  reasonings  pro- 
ceed, and  on  which  alone  they  repose. 

4  The  Reason  of  which  I  here  speak  is  not  an  instrument  which 
serves  for  this  or  that  performance,  but  a  true  productive  force,  a 
creative  power,  which  has  its  own  revelation ;  which  does  not 
show  what  is  already  manifested,  but,  as  a  primary  conscious- 
ness, itself  contemplates  existence ;  which  is  not  content  to  collect 
data,  and  from  these  data  to  draw  an  inference,  but  which  itself 
furnishes  Reality  as  a  datum.  This  Reason  is  no  arithmetical 
machine,  but  an  active  principle ;  it  does  not  reach  the  truth 
after  toil  and  time,  but  departs  from  the  truth,  because  it  finds 
the  truth  within  itself. 

4 This  Reason,  this  internal  eye,*  which  immediately  receives 
the  light  of  existence,  and  apprehends  existences,  as  the  bodily 
eye  the  outlines  and  the  colors  of  the  sensuous  world,  is  an  im- 
mediate sense  which  contemplates  the  invisible. 

'  This  Reason  is  the  ground,  the  principle,  of  all  knowledge 
(Wissen)  ;  for  all  knowledge  bears  reference  to  reality  and  exist- 
ences. 

'  All  knowledge  must,  first  or  last,  rest  on  facts  (Thatsachen), 
universal  facts,  necessary  facts,  of  the  internal  sense ; — on  facts 
which  give  us  ourselves,  our  own  existence,  and  a  conviction  of 
the  existence  of  other  supersensible  beings. 

4  These  facts  are  for  us  mental  intuitions.  Inasmuch  as  they 
give  us  an  instantaneous,  clear,  objective  perception  of  reality, 
they  are  entitled  to  the  name  of  Intuition  (Anscahaung)  ;  inas- 
much as  this  intuition  regards  the  objects  of  the  invisible  world, 
they  deserve  the  attribute  of  mental. 

4  Such  an  intuition,  such  a  mental  feeling  (Gefuehl),  engenders 
Philosophical  Belief.  This  belief  consists  in  the  immediate  ap- 
prehending of  existences  wholly  concealed  and  excluded  from  the 


1  On  the  employment  of  the  word  Reason  by  the  German  philosophers,  su- 
pra, p.  79,  eq.—  W. 

*  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  many  philosophers  after  them,  say  this  of  Intelli- 
gence, voDf. 


152  PHILOSOPHY    OF  COMMON   SENSE. 

senses,  which  reveal  themselves  to  us  in  our  inmost  consciousness, 
and  this  too  with  a  necessary  conviction  of  their  objectivity 
(reality). 

'Belief,  in  the  philosophical  sense,  means,  the  apprehension 
without  proof,  reasoning  or  deduction  of  any  kind,  of  those  higher 
truths  which  belong  to  the  supersensible  world,  and  not  to  the 
world  of  appearances.'  .... 

P.  43. — '  Philosophical  belief  apprehends  existences  which  can 
neither  be  conceived  nor  demonstrated.  Belief  is  therefore  a 
knowledge  conversant  about  existences,  but  it  does  not  know  ex- 
istences, if  under  knowledge  be  understood — demonstrating,  com- 
prehending, conceiving.'  .... 

P.  44. — '  The  internal  intuition  which  affords  us  the  apprehen- 
sion of  certain  existences,  and  allows  us  not  to  doubt  in  regard  to 
the  certainty  of  their  reality,  does  not  inform  us  concerning  their 
nature.  This  internal  intuition  is  given  us  in  Feeling  and  through 
Feeling.'  .... 

P.  48. — '  This  internal  universal  sense,  this  highest  power  of 
mental  vision  in  man,  seems  to  have  much  in  it  of  the  instinctive, 
and  may  therefore  appropriately  be  styled  intellectual  Instinct.- 
For  on  the  one  hand  it  manifests  itself  through  sudden,  rapid, 
uniform,  resistless  promptings ;  and  on  the  other  hand,  these 
promptings  relate  to  objects,  which  lie  not  within  the  domain  of 
the  senses,  but  belong  to  the  supersensible  world. 

'Let  no  offence  be  taken  at  the  expression  Instinct.  For, 
Ac.'  .... 

P.  50. — 'Had  man  not  an  intellectual  instinct,  or  a  reason 
giving  out,  revealing,  but  not  demonstrating,  truths  rooted  in 
itself,  for  want  of  a  point  of  attachment  and  support,  he  would 
move  himself  in  all  directions,  but  without  progress;  and  on  a 
level,  too,  lower  than  the  brutes,  for  he  could  not  compass  that 
kind  of  perfection  which  the  brute  possesses,  and  would  be  dis- 
qualified from  attaining  any  other. 

'The  immediate  Reason  elicits  internal  mental  intuitions  ;  these 
intuitions  have  an  evidence,  which  works  on  us  like  an  intellec- 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  153 

tual  instinct,  and  generates  in  us  a  philosophical  belief,  which 
constitutes  the  foundation  of  our  knowledge.  To  which  soever  of 
these  expressions  the  preference  be  accorded,  all  their  notions 
have  a  common  character,  and  are  so  interlinked  together,  that 
they  all  equally  result  in  the  same  very  simple  proposition : — 
There  is  either  no  truth,  or  there  are  fundamental  truths,  which 
admit  as  little  of  demonstration  as  of  doubt.1  .... 

P.  51. — 'Had  we  not  in  ourselves  an  active  principle  of  truth, 
we  should  have  neither  a  rule,  nor  a  touchstone,  nor  a  standard, 
of  the  true.  Had  we  not  in  ourselves  the  consciousness  of  exist- 
ences, there  would  be  for  us  no  means  of  knowing,  whether  what 
comes  from  without  be  not  mere  illusion,  and  whether  what  the 
mind  itself  fashions  and  combines  be  aught  but  an  empty  play 
with  notions.  In  a  word — the  truth  must  be  in  us,  as  a  consti- 
tutive, and  as  a  regulative,  principle ;  or  we  should  never  attain 
to  truth.  Only  with  determinate  points  of  commencement  and 
termination,  and  with  a  central  point  of  knowledge,  from  which 
every  thing  departs,  and  to  which  every  thing  tends  to  return, 
are  other  cognitions  possible ;  failing  this  primary  condition, 
nothing  can  be  given  us  to  know,  and  nothing  certain  can  exist.' 

And  in  the  Preface  (p.  xi.)  he  had  said : — '  The  Reason  in- 
vents, discovers,  creates,  in  propriety,  nothing  ;  it  enounces  only 
what  it  harbors,  it  only  reveals  what  God  himself  has  deposited 
within  it ;  but  so  soon  as  it  is  conscious  to  itself  of  this,  it  speaks 
out  with  a  force  which  inspires  us  with  a  rational  belief,  a  faith 
of  reason  (Vernunftglaube), — a  belief  which  takes  priority  of  every 
other,  and  which  serves  to  every  other  as  a  point  of  departure  and 
of  support.  How  can  we  believe  the  word  of  God,  if  we  do  not 
already  believe  that  a  God  exists  ?' 

Compare  also  his  'Zur  Vermittlung  der  Extreme,'  vol.  ii. 
p.  253,  sq.,  and  his  '  Moi  Hmnain'  passim. 

98. — GERLACH. — Fundamental  Philosophic,  §  16. — 'So  soon 
as  a  man  is  convinced  of  any  thing — be  his  conviction  of  the 
True,  of  the  Good,  or  of  the  Beautiful — he  rests  upon  his  Con- 
sciousness ;  for  in  himself  and  in  his  Consciousness  alone  does  he 

7* 


154:  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

possess  the  elements  which  constitute  the  knowledge  of  things, 
and  it  is  herein  alone  that  lie  finds  the  necessity  of  all  and  each 
of  his  judgments.  In  a  word,  that  only  has  an  existence  for  us 
of  which  we  are  conscious.' 

99. — HERMES,  the  late  illustrious  ornament  of  the  Catholic  fac- 
ulty of  Theology  in  Bonn,  a  thinker  of  whom  any  country  may 
well  be  proud,  is  the  author  of  a  philosophy  of  cognition  which, 
in  its  fundamental  principles,  is  one  of  Common  Sense.  It  is  con- 
tained in  the  first  volume  of  his  '  Introduction  to  Christian  Cath- 
olic Theology,'  a  work  which,  since  the  author's  death,  has  ob- 
tained a  celebrity,  apart  from  its  great  intrinsic  merits,  through 
the  agitation  consequent  on  its  condemnation  at  Rome,  for  doc- 
trines, which,  except  on  some  notoriously  open  questions,  the 
Hermesians — in  Germany,  now  a  numerous  and  able  school — 
strenuously  deny  that  it  contains. 

To  speak  only  of  his  theoretical  philosophy. — For  the  terms 
Feeling  of  Truth,  Belief,  &c.,  Hermes  substitutes  the  term  Hold- 
ing-for-true  (Fuerwahrhalten)  which  is  only  inadequately  express- 
ed by  the  Latin  assensus,  assentio,  adhcesio,  the  Greek  <fvyxa.ra&e<fi£, 
or  any  English  term.  Holding-for-true  involves  in  it  a  duplicity  ; 
— viz :  a  Holding-for-frwe  of  the  knowledge,  and  a  Holding-for- 
real  (Fuerwirklichhalteri)  of  the  thing  known.  Both  of  these  parts 
are  united  in  the  decision — that  the  knowledge  and  the  thing 
known  coincide. 

Holding-for-real  is  not  consequent  on  reflection  ;  it  is  not  the 
result  of  a  recognition ;  it  is  the  concomitant,  not  the  consequent 
of  apprehension.  It  is  a  constituent  element  of  the  primary  con- 
sciousness of  a  perception  external  or  internal ;  it  is  what,  in  the 
language  of  the  Scottish  philosophers,  might  be  called  an  instinct- 
ive belief.  'This  holding-for-real  (says  Hermes)  is  manifestly 
given  in  me  prior  to  all  Reflection  ;  for,  with  the  first  conscious- 
ness, with  the  consciousness  "  that  I  know,"  from  which  all  Reflec- 
tion departs,  the  consciousness  is  also  there,  "  that  I  hold  the 
thing  known  for  real,"'  Einl.,  vol.  i.  p.  182.  See  Nos.  3,  15*  (at 
end),  16,  <kc. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  155 

The  necessity  we  find  of  assenting  or  holding  is  the  last  and 
highest  security  we  can  obtain  for  truth  and  reality.  The  neces- 
sary holding  of  a  thing  for  real  is  not  itself  reality  ;  it  is  only  the 
instrument,  the  mean,  the  surrogate,  the  guarantee,  of  reality.  It 
is  not  an  objective,  it  is  only  a  subjective,  certainty.  It  constitutes, 
however,  all  the  assurance  or  certainty  of  which  the  human  mind 
is  capable.  '  The  [necessary]  Holding,'  says  Hermes,  '  of  some- 
thing known  [for  real],  can  afford  no  other  certainty  of  the  ob- 
jective existence  of  what  is  known  but  this  —  that  I  (the 
subject)  must  hold  the  thing  known  for  objectively  existent ;  or 
(meaning  always  by  the  word  subjective  what  is  in  me,  in  the 
subject) — of  the  objective  existence  of  a  thing  known  there  can 
possibly  be  given  only  the  highest  subjective  certainty.  But  no 
one  who  knows  what  he  would  be  at,  will  ever  ask  after  any 
other  certainty ;  not  merely  because  it  is  unattainable,  but  be- 
cause it  is  contradictory  for  human  thought :  in  other  words,  can 
a  subject  be  any  otherwise  certain  than  that  it  is  certain — than 
that  itself,  the  siibject,  is  certain  ?  To  be  objectively  certain  (tak- 
ing the  term  objective  in  a  sense  corresponding  to  the  term  sub- 
jective as  here  employed)  the  subject,  must,  in  fact,  no  longer  re- 
main the  subject,  it  must  also  be  the  object,  and,  as  such,  be  able 
to  become  certain ;  and  yet  in  conformity  to  our  notion  of  cer- 
tainty (Gewissheit) — or  whatever  more,  suitable  expression  may 
be  found  for  it — all  questions  concerning  certainty  must  be  re- 
ferred to  the  subject  (to  the  Ego) :  the  attempt  to  refer  them  to 
the  object  involves  a  contradiction.'  Ibid.  p.  186. 

This  is  clearly  and  cogently  stated  ;  and  it  would  seem  as  if 
we  had  only  to  appeal  to  the  subjective  certainty  we  have,  in  our 
being  compelled  to  hold  that  in  perception  the  ego  is  immedi- 
ately cognisant,  not  only  of  itself  as  subject,  but  of  a  non-ego  as 
object — to  prove  that  the  external  world  being  actually  known 
as  existing,  actually  exists.  (See  above,  p.  26,  sq.)  This 
Hermes  does  not,  however,  do.  He  seems  not,  indeed,  to  have 
contemplated  the  possibility  of  the  mind  being  conscious  or  im- 
mediately cognitive  of  aught  but  self;  and  only  furnishes  us 


156  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

with  an  improved  edition  of  the  old  and  inconclusive  reasoning, 
that  an  external  world  must  be  admitted,  as  the  necessary  ground 
or  reason  of  our  internal  representation  of  it. 

100.  —  COUSIN.  —  Fragraens  Philosophiques,  Third  edition, 
Vol.  i. 

a. — P.  243. — '  Philosophy  is  already  realized,  for  human 
thought  is  there. 

'There  is  not,  and  there  cannot  be,  a  philosophy  absolutely 
false ;  for  it  would  behoove  the  author  of  such  a  philosophy  to 
place  himself  out  of  his  own  thought,  in  other  words  out  of  his 
humanity.  This  power  has  been  given  to  no  man. 

'  How  then  may  philosophy  err  ? — By  considering  thought 
only  on  a  single,  side,  and  by  seeing,  in  that  single  side,  the  total- 
ity of  thought.  There  are  no  false,  but  many  incomplete  sys- 
tems ; — systems  true  in  themselves,  but  vicious  in  their  preten- 
sions, each  to  comprise  that  absolute  truth  which  is  only  found 
distributed  through  all. 

'The  incomplete,  and  by  consequence,  the  exclusive — this  is  the 
one  only  vice  of  philosophy, -or  rather,  to  speak  more  correctly, 
of  philosophers,  for  philosophy  rises  above  all  the  systems.  The 
full  portrait  of  the  real,  which  philosophy  presents,  is  indeed 
made  up  of  features  borrowed  from  every  several  system  ;  for  of 
these  each  reflects  reality  ;  but  unfortunately  reflects  it  under  a 
single  angle.* 

'  To  compass  possession  of  reality  full  and  entire,  it  is  requi- 
site to  sist  ourselves  at  the  centre.  To  reconstitute  the  intellect- 
ual life,  mutilated  in  the  several  systems,  it  behooves  us  to  re- 
enter  Consciousness,  and  there,  weaned  from  a  systematic  and 
exclusive  spirit,  to  analyze  thought  into  its  elements,  and  all  its 
elements,  and  to  seek  out  in  it  tJie  characters,  and  all  the  diame- 
ters under  which  it  is  at  present  manifested  to  the  eye  of  conscious- 
ness? — Du  Fait  de  Conscience. 

b. — P.  181. — 'The  fundamental  principle  of  knowledge  and 


*  The  like  has  been  said  by  Leibnitz  and  Hegel ;  but  not  so  finely. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   COMMON    SENSE  157 

intellectual  life  is  Consciousness.  Life  begins  with  consciousness, 
and  with  consciousness  it  ends :  in  consciousness  it  is  that  we 
apprehend  ourselves ;  and  it  is  in  and  through  consciousness 
that  we  apprehend  the  external  world.  Were  it  possible  to  rise 
above  consciousness,  to  place  ourselves,  so  to  speak,  behind  it,  to 
penetrate  into  the  secret  workshop  where  intelligence  blocks  out 
and  fabricates  the  various  phenomena,  there  to  officiate,  as  it 
were,  at  the  birth,  and  to  watch  the  evolution  of  consciousness ; 
— then  might  we  hope  to  comprehend  its  nature,  and  the  different 
steps  through  which  it  rises  to  the  form  in  which  it  is  first  actu- 
ally revealed.  But,  as  all  knowledge  commences  with  conscious- 
ness, it  is  able  to  remount  no  higher.  Here  a  prudent  analysis 
mil  therefore  stop,  and  occupy  itself  with  what  is  given? 

Other  testimonies  might  easily  be  quoted  from  the  subsequent 
writings  of  M.  Cousin — were  this  not  superfluous ;  for  I  presume 
that  few  who  take  an  interest  in  philosophical  inquiries  can  now 
be  ignorant  of  these  celebrated  works. 

100. — DE  LA  MENNAIS. — See  No.  2. 

OMITTED. 

9**. — JEuus  ARISTIDES. — Platonic  Oration,  ii.  (Opera,  ed. 
Canter,  t.  iii.  p.  249  ;  ed.  Jebb.  t.  ii.  p.  150) — '  That  the  Many 
are  not  to  be  contemned,  and  their  opinion  held  of  no  account; 
but  that  in  them,  too,  there  is  a  presentiment,  an  unerring  in- 
stinct, which  by  a  kind  of  divine  fatality,  seizes  darkling  on  the 
truth  ;  this  we  have  Plato  himself  teaching,  and  ages  earlier  than 
Plato,  this  old  Hesiod,  with  posterity  in  chorus,  in  these  familiar 
verses  sang: — 

'  Tfte  Fame,  torn  of  tlie  jnany-natiori'd  voice 
Of  mankind,  dies  not ;  for  it  lives  as  God.'' 

For  Hesiod,  see  No.  1.  These  verses  are  likewise  adduced  by 
Aristotle  as  proverbial.  (Eth.  Nic.  vii.  13  [14]).  They  may 
be  also  rendered  thus : — 

'  The  Word,  forth  sent  Iry  the  conclamant  voice 
Of  mankind,  errs  not ;  for  its  truth  is  God's.' 


158  PHILOSOPHY    OF   COMMON   SENSE. 

Fame  (Public  Opinion)  had  her  temple  in  Athens.  See  Pausa- 
nias. 

Plato  is  referred  to  in  the  Laws  (L.  xii.  §  5,  ed.  Bekk.  t.  ii. 
p.  950,  ed.  Steph.).  Another  passage,  in  the  Crito,  which  Canter 
indicates,  is  irrelevant.  In  the  former,  Plato  attributes  to  man- 
kind at  large  a  certain  divine  sense  or  vaticination  of  the  truth 
(6e7ov  <rixai  sUoVo^ov),  by  which,  in  our  natural  judgments,  we  are 
preserved  from  error.  I  did  not,  however,  find  the  statement 
sufficiently  generalized  to  quote  the  context  as  a  testimony. 

15*. — THEODORET. — The  Curative  of  Greek  Affections,  Ser- 
mon i.,  on  Belief.  (Opera,  ed.  Sirmondi,  t.  iv.  p.  178.) — '  Belief 
[or  Faith],  therefore,  is  a  matter  of  the  greatest  moment  For, 
according  to  the  Pythagorean  Epicharmus, 

Mind,  it  seeth ;  Mind;  it  heareth  ; 
All  beside  is  deaf  and  Uind  : 

and  Heraclitus,  in  like  manner,  exhorts  us  to  submit  to  the 
guidance  of  belief,  in  these  words : —  Unless  ye  hope,  ye  shall  not 

find  the  unhoped  for,  which  is  inscrutable  and  impermeable 

And  let  none  of  you,  my  friends,  say  aught  in  disparagement  of 
belief.  For  belief  is  called  by  Aristotle  the  Criterion  of  Science  ; 
whilst  Epicurus  says,  that  it  is  the  Anticipation  of  Reason,  and 
that  anticipation,  having  indued  Knowledge,  results  in  Compre- 
hension.— But,  as  we  define  it,  Belief  is — a  spontaneous  assent 
or  adhesion  of  the  mind, — or  the  intuition  of  the  unapparent, 
— or  the  taking  possession  of  the  real  (ifigi  TO  ov  sWratfis — v. 
Bud.  in  Pand.  et  Com.  L.  G.),  and  natural  apprehension  of 
the  unperceivable, — or  an  unvacillating  propension  established, 
in  the  mind  of  the  believer. — But,  on  the  one  hand,  Belief  re- 
quires knowledge,  as  on  the  other,  Knowledge  requires  belief. 
For  there  can  subsist,  neither  belief  without  knowledge,  nor 
knowledge  without  belief.  Belief  precedes  knowledge,  knowl- 
edge follows  belief;  while  desire  is  attendant  upon  knowledge, 
and  action  consequent  upon  desire.  For  it  is  necessary, — to 
believe  first ;  then  to  learn  ;  knowing,  to  desire ;  and  desiring  to 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   COMMON    SENSE.  159 

act  .  .  . — Belief,  therefore,  my  friends,  is  a  concern  common 
to  all ;  .  .  .  for  all  who  would  learn  any  thing  must  first 
believe.  [So  Aristotle.]  Belief  is,  therefore,  the  foundation  and 
basis  of  science.  For  your  philosophers  have  defined  Belief — a 
voluntary  assent  or  adhesion  of  the  mind  ;  and  Science — an  im- 
mutable habit,  accompanied  with  reason? — This  is  a  testimony 
which  I  should  regret  to  have  totally  forgotten.  Compare  Nos. 
3,  11,  15,  16,  18,  19,  24,  81,  86,  87,  91,  96,  97,  99,  &c. 

17*. — SIMPLICIUS. — Commentary  on  the  Manual  of  Epictetus ; 
and  there  speaking  in  the  language  of  the  Porch,  rather  than  in 
that  of  the  Lyceum  or  the  Academy. 

a. — C.  33,  Heins.  23,  Schweigh. — 'The  Common  Notions  of 
men  concerning  the  nature  of  things,  according  to  which,  in  place 
of  varying  from  each  other,  they  are  in  opinion  mutually  agreed 
(as,  that  the  good  is  useful,  and  the  useful  good,  that  all  things 
desiderate  the  good,  that  the  equal  is  neither  surpassing  nor  sur- 
passed, that  twice  two  is  four) — these  notions,  and  the  like,  sug- 
gested in  us  by  right  reason,  and  tested  by  experience  and  time, 
are  true,  and  in  accordance  with  the  nature  of  things  ;  whereas 
the  notions  proper  to  individual  men  are  frequently  fallacious.' 

b. — C.  72,  Heins.  48,  Schweigh. — 'But  Reason,  according  to 
the  proverb,  is  a  Mercury  common  to  all ;  for,  although,  as  in 
us  individually,  reasons  are  plural,  or  numerically  different,  they 
are  in  species  one  and  the  same ;  so  that,  by  reason  all  men  fol- 
low after  the  same  things  as  good,  and  eschew  the  same  things 
as  bad,  and  think  the  same  things  to  be  true  or  to  be  false.' 

In  these  passages,  Reason,  in  the  vaguer  meaning  of  the 
Stoics,  is  employed,  where  Intellect,  in  the  precise  acceptation  of 
the  Aristotelians  and  Platonists,  might  have  been  expected  from 
Simplicius.  But  he  is  here  speaking  by  accommodation  to  his 
author. 


160  PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE. 


As  a  chronological  table  was  luckily  omitted  at  the  head  of 
the  Series,  I  here  append,  ethnographically  subarranged,  the  fol- 
lowing 

LIST  OF  THE  PRECEDING  TESTIMONIES. 


GREEK. — 1,  Hesiod;  2,  Heraclitus;  3,  Aristotle;  4,  Theophrastus ; 
9  *  *,  ^Elius  Aristides,  see  at  end ;  10,  Alexander  Aphrodisiensis ; 
11,  Clemens  Alexandrinus ;  15,  Theodoret,  see  at  end;  16,  Proclus; 
17,  Ammonias  Hermise ;  17  *,  Simplicius,  see  at  end. 

ROMAN. — 5,  Lucretius ;  6,  Cicero ;  7,  Horace ;  8,  Seneca ;  9,  Pliny 
the  younger;  9*,  Quintilian;  12,  Tertnllian;  13,  Arnobius;  14. 
Lactantius;  15,  St.  Augustin. 

ARABIAN. — 19,  Algazel. 

ITALIAN. — 18,  St.  Anselm  (ambiguously  French);  20,  Aquinas; 
26,  Julius  Caesar  Scaliger;  67,  Vulpius;  68,  Vico  ;  71,  Genovesi. 

SPANISH. — 22,  Antonius  Andreas;  28,  Antonius  Goveanus  (Por- 
tuguese): 29,  Nunnesius;  32,  Mariana. 

FRENCH. — 23,  Budseus ;  27,  Omphalius ;  30,  Muretus ;  37,  Des- 
cartes ;  39,  Balzac ;  40,  Chanet ;  41,  Irenseus  a  Sancto  Jacobo ;  42. 
Lescalopier ;  43,  Pascal;  44,  La  Chambre;  46,  Le  Pere  Rapin;  47. 
Du  Ilamel;  48,  Malebrauche;  49,  Poiret;  50,  Bossuet;  59,  John 
Alphonso  Turretini  (Gencvese)-  60,  Fenelon;  62,  D'Aguesseau;  63, 
Buffier;  70,  Huber;  74,  D'Alembert;  94,  Degerando;  100,  Cousin: 
101,  De  La  Mennais. 

BRITISH. — 21,  Duns  Scotus;  33,  Sir  John  Davies;  35,  Lord  Her- 
bert; 36,  Cameron;  38,  Sir  Thomas  Brown;  45,  Henry  More ;  51, 
Locke ;  52,  Bentley ;  53,  John  Serjeant ;  53  *,  Abercromby ;  55, 
Toland;  61,  Shaftesbury;  62  *,  Berkeley;  64,  Lyons;  65,  Amherst; 
66,  Wollaston;  72,  Hume;  78,  Price;  79,  Reid;  82,  Beattie.  (Of 
these,  21,  [?]  36,  53  *,  72,  79,  82,  are  Scottish.) 

GERMAN. — 24,  Luther ;  25,  Melanchthon ;  34,  Keckermann ;  54, 
Leibnitz;  56,  Christian  Thomasius;  57,  Ridiger;  58,  Fuerlin;  69, 
Christian  Wolf;  73,  Crusius;  75,  (Etinger;  76,  Eschenbach;  77, 
John  Matthew  Gesner ;  80,  Ililler ;  83,  Storchenau ;  84,  Stattler ; 
86,  Kant ;  87,  Jacobi ,  88,  Heidenreich ;  89,  Leonhard  Creuzer ;  90. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   COMMON   SENSE.  161 

Platner;  91,  Fichte;  93,  Krug;  95,  Fries;  96,  Kceppen;  97,  Ancil- 
lon,  the  son ;  98,  Gerlach ;  99,  George  Hermes. 

BELGIAN. — 31,  Giphanius;  81,  Hemsterhuis;  85,  Hennert. 

In  all,  one  hundred  and  six  Witnesses. 


We  are  amazed  at  such  a  shoreless  sea  of  erudition,  but  it  has  a  use  beyond 
mere  show,  for  it  is  an  important  contribution  to  the  history  of  opinion.  Our 
confidence  in  the  Common  Sense  Philosophy  is  increased  when  we  see  that 
the  greatest  thinkers  of  every  age  have,  directly  or  indirectly,  recognized  its 
principles.  The  pursuit  of  Philosophy  is  ennobled  when  some  higher 
ground  is  reached,  whereon  apparently  conflicting  systems  may  be  con- 
ciliated. Bossuet  somewhere  says, '  Every  error  is  a  truth  abused.'  Cousin, 
the  most  catholic  of  all  the  historians  of  Philosophy,  continually  repeats  the 
same  pregnant  truth.  Hamilton  claims  that  in  his  own  system  may  be  found 
'  a  centre  and  conciliation  for  the  most  opposite  of  philosophical  opinions.' 
—  W. 


PART   SECOND. 


PHILOSOPHY 


PERCEPTION 


"  No  man  seeks  a  reason  for  believing  what  he  sees  or  feels ;  and,  if  he 
did,  it  would  be  difficult  to  find  one.  But,  though  he  can  give  no  reason  for 
believing  his  senses,  his  belief  remains  as  firm  as  if  it  were  grounded  on 
demonstration.  .  .  .  The  statesman  continues  to  plod,  the  soldier  to 
fight,  and  the  merchant  to  export  and  import,  without  being  in  the  least 
moved  by  the  demonstrations  that  have  been  offered  of  the  non-existence 
of  those  things  about  which  they  are  so  seriously  employed.  And  a  man 
may  a#  soon,  by  reasoning,  pull  the  moon  out  of  her  orbit,  as  destroy  the 
belief  of  the  objects  of  sense." — REID,  Essay  ii.  chap.  xx.  pp.  278-4. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION, 


CHAPTER  I.. 

ELUCIDATION  OF  EEID'S  DOCTKINE  OF  PEKCEPTION,  AND  ITS 
DEFENCE  AGAINST  SIR  THOMAS  BEOWN.1 

WE  rejoice  in  the  appearance  of  this  work,2  and  for  two  rea- 
sons. We  hail  it  as  another  sign  of  the  convalescence  of  Philos- 
ophy in  a  great  and  influential  nation ;  and  prize  it  as  a  seasona- 
ble testimony,  by  intelligent  foreigners,  to  the  merits  of  a  philos- 
opher whose  merits  are  under  a  momentary  eclipse  at  home. 

Apart  from  the  practical  corruption,  of  which  (in  the  emphatic 
language  of  Fichte)  '  the  dirt  philosophy'  may  have  been  the 
cause,  we  regard  the  doctrine  of  mind,  long  dominant  in  France, 
as  more  pernicious,  through  the  stagnation  of  thought  which  it 
occasioned,  than  for  the  speculative  errors  which  it  set  afloat. 
The  salutary  fermentation  which  the  skepticism  of  Hume 3  deter- 


1  The  substance  of  this  chapter  was,  originally,  an  article  in  the  Edinburgh 
Review  for  October,  1830.  It  may  be  found  in  'The  Discussions  on  Philos- 
ophy, etc.,'  pp.  38-98.  It  has  been  translated  into  French  by  M.  Peisse ; 
into  Italian  by  S.  Lo  Gatto ;  and  is  contained  in  Cross's  Selections  from  the 
Edinburgh  Review. —  W. 

*  The  work  referred  to  is  the  '  (Euvres  Completes  de  Thomas  Reid,  Chef 
de  1'ficole  Ecossaise.  Publiees  par  M.  Th.  Jouffroy,  avec  des  Fragments  de 
M.  Royer-Collard,  et  une  Introduction  de  1'Editeur.'  Tomes  ii.-vi.  8vo., 
Paris,  1828-9,  (not  completed).—  W. 

3  The  usual  criticism  of  Hume,  as  Hamilton  well  remarks  (Reid,  p.  444), 
proceeds  upon  the  erroneous  hypothesis  that  he  was  a  Dogmatist.  He  was 
a  Skeptic,  that  is,  he  accepted  the  principles  asserted  by  the  prevalent  Dog- 
matism ;  and  only  showed  that  such  and  such  conclusions  were,  on  these  prin- 
ciples, inevitable.  Hume  destroyed  Sensualism  (Sensuism  is  better,  and  still 
better  is  Sensism,  as  Mr.  Brownson  lias  it)  by  reducing  it  to  absurdity.  Yet 


166  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 

• 

mined  in  Scotland  and  in  Germany,  did  not  extend  to  that  coun- 
try ;  and  the  dogmatist  there  slumbered  on,  unsuspicious  of  his 
principles,  nay  even  resigned  to  conclusions  which  would  make 
philosophy  to  man  the  solution  of  the  terrific  oracle  to  (Edipus : 

'  Mayst  thou  ne'er  learn  the  truth  of  what  thon  art !' 

The  present  contrast,1  indeed,  which  the  philosophical  enthusi- 
asm of  France  exhibits  to  the  speculative  apathy  of  Britain,  is 
any  thing  but  flattering  to  ourselves.  The  new  spirit  of  meta- 
physical inquiry,  which  the  French  imbibed  from  Germany  and 
Scotland,  arose  with  them  precisely  at  the  time  when  the  popu- 
larity of  psychological  researches  began  to  decline  with  us ;  and 
now,  when  all  interest  in  these  speculations  seems  here  to  be 
extinct,  they  are  there  seen  flourishing,  in  public  favor,  with  a 
universality  and  vigor  corresponding  to  their  encouragement. 

The  only  example,  indeed,  that  can  be  adduced  of  any  interest 
in  such  subjects,  recently  exhibited  in  this  country,  is  the  favor- 
able reception  of  Dr.  Brown's  Lectures  an  the  Philosophy  of  the 
Mind.  This  work,  however,  we  regard  as  a  concurrent  cause  of 
the  very  indifference  we  lament,  and  as  a  striking  proof  of  its 
reality. 

As  a  cause : — These  lectures  have  certainly  done  much  to  jus- 
tify the  general  neglect  of  psychological  pursuits.  Dr.  Brown's 
high  reputation  for  metaphysical  acuteness,  gave  a  presumptive 
authority  to  any  doctrine  he  might  promulgate ;  and  the  personal 
relations  in  which  he  stood  to  Mr.  Stewart  afforded  every  assu- 
rance that  he  would  not  revolt  against  that  philosopher's  opin- 

in  the  human  mind  there  is  something  that  could  see  the  absurdity,  some- 
thing that  could  make  the  absurdity  apparent ;  '  intelligence  supposes  prin- 
ciples, which,  as  the  conditions  of  its  activity,  cannot  be  the  results  of  its 
operation.'  Seizing  this  higher  truth,  Eeid  and  Kant  have  reared  a  new 
philosophy,  the  last  word  of  which  is  the  incomparable  system  of  Hamilton. 
—  W. 

1  We  have  omitted  six  paragraphs  and  part  of  another,  which  were  omit- 
ted when  the  article  was  first  published  in  the  Edinburgh  Review.  They 
are,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  lines,  contained  in  the  Introduction  to  this 
volume.  See  p.  7.—  W. 


,  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  167 

ions,  rashly,  or  except  on  grounds  that  would  fully  vindicate  his 
dissent.  In  these  circumstances,  what  was  the  impression  on  the 
public  mind ;  when  all  that  was  deemed  best  established — all 
that  was  claimed  as  original  and  most  important  in  the  philoso- 
phy of  Reid  and  Stewart,  was  proclaimed  by  their  disciple  and 
successor  to  be  naught  but  a  series  of  misconceptions,  only  less 
wonderful  in  their  commission  than  in  the  general  acquiescence  in 
their  truth  ?  Confidence  was  at  once  withdrawn  from  a  pursuit, 
in  which  the  most  sagacious  inquirers  were  thus  at  fault ;  and 
the  feyr  who  did  not  relinquish  the  study  in  despair,  clung  with 
implicit  faith  to  the  revelation  of  the  new  apostle. 

As  a  proof: — These  lectures  afford  evidence  of  how  greatly 
talent  has,  of  late,  been  withdrawn  from  the  field  of  metaphysical 
discussion.  This  work  has  now  been  before  the  world  for  ten 
years.  In  itself  it  combines  many  of  the  qualities  calculated  to 
attract  public,  and  even  popular  attention ;  while  its  admirers 
have  exhausted  hyperbole  in  its  praise,  and  disparaged  every 
philosophic  name  to  exalt  the  reputation  of  its  author.  Yet, 
though  attention  has  been  thus  concentred  on  these  lectures  for 
so  long  a  period,  and  though  the  high  ability  and  higher  author- 
ity of  Dr.  Brown,  deserved  and  would  have  recompensed  the 
labor ;  we  are  not  aware  that  any  adequate  attempt  has  yet  been 
made  to  subject  them,  in  whole  or  in  part,  to  an  enlightened  and 
impartial  criticism.  The  radical  inconsistencies  which  they 
involve,  in  every  branch  of  their  subject,  remain  undeveloped ; 
their  unacknowledged  appropriations  are  still  lauded  as  original ; 
their  endless  mistakes,  in  the  history  of  philosophy,  stand  yet 
uncorrected ;  and  their  frequent  misrepresentations  of  other  phi- 
losophers continue  to  mislead.*  In  particular,  nothing  has  more 


*  We  shall,  in  the  sequel,  afford  samples  of  these  'inconsistencies,' 
'mistakes,'  'misrepresentations,' — but  not  of  Brown's  'appropriations.' 
To  complete  the  cycle,  and  vindicate  our  assertion,  we  may  here  adduce  one 
specimen  of  the  way  in  which  discoveries  have  been  lavished  on  him,  iu 
consequence  of  his  omission  (excusable,  perhaps,  in  the  circumstances)  to 
advertise  his  pupil  when  he  was  not  original.  Brown's  doctrine  of  General- 


168  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

I 

convinced  us  of  the  general  neglect,  in  this  country,  of  psycholo- 
gical science,  than  that  Dr.  Brown's  ignorant  attack  on  Reid, 
and,  through  Reid,  confessedly  on  Stewart,  has  not  long  since 
been  repelled; — except,  indeed,  the  general  belief  that  it  was 
triumphant 

In  these  circumstances,  we  felt  gratified,  as  we  said,  with 
the  present  honorable  testimony  to  the  value  of  Dr.  Reid's  spec- 
ulations in  a  foreign  country ;  and  have  deemed  this  a  seasonable 
opportunity  of  expressing  our  own  opinion  on  the  subject,  and  of 
again  vindicating,  we  trust,  to  that  philosopher,  the  well-earned 
reputation  of  which  he  has  been  too  long  defrauded  in  his  own. 
If  we  are  not  mistaken  in  our  view,  we  shall,  in  fact,  reverse  the 
marvel,  and  retort  the  accusation ;  in  proving  that  Dr.  Brown 
himself  is  guilty  of  that '  series  of  wonderful  misconceptions,'  of 
which  he  so  confidently  arraigns  his  predecessors. 

'Turpe  est  doctori,  cum  culpa  redarguit  ipsum.' 

This,  however,  let  it  be  recollected,  is  no  point  of  merely  per- 
sonal concernment.  It  is  true,  indeed,  that  either  Reid  accom- 
plished nothing,  or  the  science  has  retrograded  under  Brown. 
But  the  question  itself  regards  the  cardinal  point  of  metaphysical 
philosophy ;  and  its  determination  involves  the  proof  or  the  refu- 
tation of  skepticism. 

The  subject  we  have  undertaken  can,  with  difficulty,  be  com- 
pressed within  the  limits  of  a  single  article.  This  must  stand  our 
excuse  for  not,  at  present,  noticing  the  valuable  accompaniment 

ization  is  identical  with  that  commonly  taught  by  philosophers — not  Scot- 
tish ;  and,  among  these,  by  authors,  with  whose  works  his  lectures  prove 
him  to  have  been  well  acquainted.  But  if  a  writer,  one  of  the  best  informed 
of  those  who,  in  this  country,  have  of  late  cultivated  this  branch  of  philoso- 
phy, could,  among  other  expressions  equally  encomiastic,  speak  of  Brown's 
return  to  the  vulgar  opinion,  on  such  a  point,  as  of  '  a  discovery,  <&c.,  which 
will,  in  aXL  future  ages,  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  most  important  steps  ever 
made  in  metaphysical  science ;'  how  incompetent  must  ordinary  readers  be 
to  place  Brown  on  his  proper  level — how  desirable  would  have  been  a  criti- 
cal examination  of  his  Lectures  to  distribute  to  him  his  own,  and  to  estimate 
his  property  at  its  true  value. — See  Part  ii.  chap.  v.  p.  398,  899,  alibi. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF   PERCEPTION.  169 

to  Reid's  Essays  on  the  Intellectual  Powers,  in  the  Fragments  of 
M.  Royer-Collard's  Lectures,  which  are  appended  to  the  third  and 
fourth  volumes  of  the  translation.  A  more  appropriate  occasion ' 
for  considering  these  may,  however,  occur,  when  the  first  volume, 
containing  M.  Jouffroy's  Introduction,  appears ;  of  which,  from 
other  specimens  of  his  ability,  we  entertain  no  humble  expec- 
tations. 

'  Reid,'  says  Dr.  Brown, '  considers  his  confutation  of  the  ideal 
system  as  involving  almost  every  thing  which  is  truly  his.  Yet 
there  aie  few  circumstances  connected  with  the  fortune  of  modern 
philosophy,  that  appear  to  me  more  wonderful,  than  that  a  mind 
like  Dr.  Reid's,  so  learned  in  the  history  of  metaphysical  science, 
should  have  conceived,  that  on  this  point,  any  great  merit,  at  least 
any  merit  of  originality,  was  justly  referable  to  him  particularly. 
Indeed,  the  only  circumstance  which  appears  to  me  wonderful,  is, 
that  the  claim  thus  made  by  him  should  have  been  so  readily  and 
generally  admitted.'  (Lect.  xxv.  p.  155.) 

Dr.  Brown  then  proceeds,  at  great  length,  to  show :  1°,  That 
Reid,  in  his  attempt  to  overthrow  what  he  conceived  '  the  com- 
mon theory  of  ideas,'  wholly  misunderstood  the  catholic  opinion, 
which  was,  in  fact,  identical  with  his  own ;  and  actually  attrib- 
uted to  all  philosophers  '  a  theory  which  had  been  universally,  or, 
at  least,  almost  universally,  abandoned  at  the  time  he  wrote ;' 
and  2°,  That  the  doctrine  of  perception,  which  Reid  so  absurdly 
fancies  he  had  first  established,  affords,  in  truth,  no  better  evi- 
dence of  the  existence  of  an  external  world,  than  even  the  long 
abandoned  hypothesis  which  he  had  taken  such  idle  labor  to 
refute. 

In  every  particular  of  this  statement,  Dr.  Brown  is  completely, 
and  even  curiously,  wrong.  He  is  out  in  his  prelusive  flourish, — 
out  in  his  serious  assault.  Reid  is  neither  'so  learned  in  the 
history  of  metaphysical  science'  as  he  verbally  proclaims,  nt>r  so 
sheer  an  ignorant  as  he  would  really  demonstrate.  Estimated  by 

1  The  hopes  of  Sir  William,  like  those  of  every  mortal,  have  not  all  been 
fulfilled.—  W. 


170  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

aught  above  a  very  vulgar  standard,  Reid's  knowledge  of  Philo- 
sophical opinions  was  neither  extensive  nor  exact ;  and  Mr.  Stew- 
art was  himself  too  competent  and  candid  a  judge,  not  fully  to 
acknowledge  the  deficiency.*  But  Reid's  merits  as  a  thinker  are 
too  high,  and  too  securely  established,  to  make  it  necessary  to 
claim  for  his  reputation  an  erudition  to  which  he  himself  advances 
no  pretension.  And  be  his  learning  what  it  may,  his  critic,  at 
least,  has  not  been  able  to  convict  him  of  a  single  error  ;  while 
Dr.  Brown  himself  rarely  opens  his  mouth  upon  the  older  authors, 
without  betraying  his  absolute  unacquaintance  with  the*natters 
on  which  he  so  intrepidly  discourses. — Nor,  as  a  speculator,  does 
Reid's  superiority  admit,  we  conceive,  of  doubt.  With  all  admi- 
ration of  Brown's  general  talent,  we  do  not  hesitate  to  assert, 
that,  in  the  points  at  issue  between  the  two  philosophers,  to  say 
nothing  of  others,  he  has  completely  misapprehended  Reid's  phi- 
losophy, even  in  its  fundamental  position, — the  import  of  the 
skeptical  reasoning, — and  the  significance  of  the  only  argument  by 
which  that  reasoning  is  resisted.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  as 
Reid  can  only  be  defended  on  the  ground  of  misconception,  the 
very  fact,  that  his  great  doctrine  of  perception  could  actually  be 
reversed  by  so  acute  an  intellect  as  Brown's,  would  prove  that 
there  must  exist  some  confusion  and  obscurity  in  his  own  devel- 
opment of  that  doctrine,  to  render  such  a  misinterpretation  pos- 
sible. Nor  is  this  presumption  wrong.  In  truth,  Reid  did  not 
generalize  to  himself  an  adequate  notion  of  the  various  possible 
theories  of  perception,  some  of  which  he  has  accordingly  con- 
founded: while  his  error  of  commission  in  discriminating  con- 
sciousness as  a  special  faculty,  and  his  error  of  omission  in  not  dis- 
criminating intuitive  from  representative  knowledge, — a  distinction 
without  which  his  peculiar  philosophy  is  naught, — have  contrib- 
uted to  render  his  doctrine  of  the  intellectual  faculties  prolix, 
vacillating,  perplexed,  and  sometimes  even  contradictory. 

Before  proceeding  to  consider  the  doctrine  of  perception  in 

*  (Dissertation,  &c.,  Part  ii.  p.  107.)    [In  my  foot-notes  to  Eeid  will  be 
found  abundant  evidence  of  this  deficiency.] 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PEKCEFflON.  171 

relation  to  the  points  at  issue  between  Reid  and  his  antagonist, 
it  is  therefore  necessary  to  disintricate  the  question,  by  relieving 
it  of  these  two  errors,  bad  in  themselves,  but  worse  in  the  confu- 
sion which  they  occasion ;  for,  as  Bacon  truly  observes, — '  citius 
emergit  veritas  ex  errore  quam  ex  confusione.'  And,  first,  of 
consciousness. 

Aristotle,  Descartes,  Locke,  and  philosophers  in  general,  have 
regarded  Consciousness,  not  as  a  particular  faculty,  but  as  the 
universal  condition  of  intelligence.  Reid,  on  the  contrary,  fol- 
lowing, probably,  Hutcheson,  and  followed  by  Stewart,  Royer- 
Collard,  and  others,  has  classed  consciousness  as  a  co-ordinate 
faculty  with  the  other  intellectual  powers;  distinguished  from 
them,  not  as  the  species  from  the  individual,  but  as  the  individual 
from  the  individual.  And  as  the  particular  faculties  have  each 
their  peculiar  object,  so  the  peculiar  object  of  consciousness  is,  the 
operations  of  the  other  faculties  themselves,  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
objects  about  which  these  operations  are  conversant. 

This  analysis  we  regard  as  false.  For  it  is  impossible :  in  the 
first  place,  to  discriminate  consciousness  from  all  the  other  cogni- 
tive faculties,  or  to  discriminate  any  one  of  these  from  conscious- 
ness ;  and,  in  the  second,  to  conceive  a  faculty  cognizant  of  the 
various  mental  operations,  without  being  also  cognizant  of  their 
several  objects. 

We  know  ;  and  We  knoio  that  ice  know  : — these  propgsitions, 
logically  distinct,  are  really  identical ;  each  implies  the  other. 
We  know  (i.  e.  feel,  perceive,  imagine,  remember,  &c.)  only  as  we 
know  that  we  thus  know  ;  and  we  know  that  we  knoio,  only  as  we 
know  in  some  particular  manner  (i.  Q.feel,  perceive,  <fec.).  So  true 
is  the  scholastic  brocard : — '  Non  sentimus  nisi  sentiamus  nos 
sentire ;  non  sentimus  nos  sentire  nisi  sentiamus'  The  attempt 
to  analyze  the  cognition  I  know,  and  the  cognition  /  know  that  I 
know,  into  the  separate  energies  of  distinct  faculties,  is  therefore 
vain.  But  this  is  the  analysis  of  Reid.  Consciousness,  which 
the  formula  /  know  that  I  knoio  adequately  expresses,  he  views  as 
a  power  specifically  distinct  from  the  various  cognitive  faculties 


172  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

comprehended  under  the  formula  I  know,  precisely  as  these  facul- 
ties are  severally  contradistinguished  from  each  other.  But  here 
the  parallel  does  not  hold.  I  can  feel  without  perceiving,  I  can 
perceive  without  imagining,  I  can  imagine  without  remembering, 
I  can  remember  without  judging  (in  the  emphatic  signification), 
I  can  judge  without  willing.  One  of  these  acts  does  not  imme- 
diately suppose  the  other.  Though  modes  merely  of  the  same 
indivisible  subject,  they  are  modes  in  relation  to  each  other, 
really  distinct,  and  admit,  therefore,  of  psychological  discrimina- 
tion. But  can  I  feel  without  being  conscious  that  I  feel  ? — can  I 
remember,  without  being  conscious  that  I  remember  ?  or,  can  I 
be  conscious,  without  being  conscious  that  I  perceive,  or  imagine, 
or  reason, — that  I  energize,  in  short,  in  some  determinate  mode, 
which  Reid  would  view  as  the  act  of  a  faculty  specifically  differ- 
ent from  consciousness  ?  That  this  is  impossible,  Reid  himself 
admits.  '  Unde,'  says  Tertullian, — '  unde  ista  tormenta  cruciandae 
simplicitatis  et  suspendendae  veritatis  ?  Quis  mihi  exhibebit  sen- 
sum  non  intelligentem  se  sentire  ?'  But  if,  on  the  one  hand,  con- 
sciousness be  only  realized  under  specific  modes,  and  cannot  there- 
fore exist  apart  from  the  several  faculties  in  cumulo ;  and  if,  on 
the  other,  these  faculties  can  all  and  each  only  be  exerted  under 
the  condition  of  consciousness ;  consciousness,  consequently,  is  not 
one  of  the  special  modes  into  which  our  mental  activity  may  be 
resolved,  but  the  fundamental  form, — the  generic  condition  of 
them  all.  Every  intelligent  act  is  thus  a  modified  consciousness ; 
and  consciousness  a  comprehensive  term  for  the  complement  of  our 
cognitive  energies. 

But  the  vice  of  Dr.  Reid's  analysis  is  further  manifested  in  his  ar- 
bitrary limitation  of  the  sphere  of  consciousness ;  proposing  to  it  the 
various  intellectual  operations,  but  excluding  their  objects.  '  I  am 
conscious,'  he  says,  '  of  perception,  but  not  of  the  object  I  perceive ; 
I  am  conscious  of  memory,  but  not  of  the  object  I  remember.' 

The  reduction  of  consciousness  to  a  particular  faculty  entailed 
this  limitation.  For,  once  admitting  consciousness  to  be  cogni- 
zant of  objects  as  of  operations,  Reid  could  not,  without  ab- 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  173 

surdity,  degrade  it  to  the  level  of  a  special  power.  For  thus,  in 
the  first  place,  consciousness  coextensive  with  all  our  cognitive 
faculties,  would  yet  be  made  co-ordinate  with  each  ;  and,  in  the 
second,  two  faculties  would  be  supposed  to  be  simultaneously 
exercised  about  the  same  object,  to  the  same  intent. 

But  the  alternative  which  Reid  has  chosen  is,  at  least,  equally 
untenable.  The  assertion,  that  we  can  be  conscious  of  an  act  of 
knowledge,  without  being  conscious  of  its  object,  is  virtually  sui- 
cidal. A  mental  operation  is  only  what  it  is,  by  relation  to  its 
object ;  the  object  at  once  determining  its  existence,  and  specify- 
ing the  character  of  its  existence.  But  if  a  relation  cannot  be 
comprehended  in  one  of  its  terms,  so  we  cannot  be  conscious  of 
an  operation,  without  being  conscious  of  the  object  to  which  it 
exists  only  as  correlative.  For  example,  We  are  conscious  of  a 
perception,  says  Reid,  but  are  not  conscious  of  its  object.  Yet 
how  can  we  be  conscious  of  a  perception,  that  is,  how  can  we 
know  that  a  perception  exists, — that  it  is  a  perception,  and  not 
another  mental  state, — and  that  it  is  the  perception  of  a  rose, 
and  of  nothing  but  a  rose ;  unless  this  consciousness  involve  a 
knowledge  (or  consciousness)  of  the  object,  which  at  once  deter- 
mines the  existence  of  the  act, — specifies  its  kind, — and  distin- 
guishes its  individuality  ?  Annihilate  the  object,  you  annihilate 
the  operation  ;  annihilate  the  consciousness  of  the  object,  you  an- 
nihilate the  consciousness  of  the  operation.  In  the  greater  num- 
ber indeed  of  our  cognitive  energies,  the  two  terms  of  the  relation 
of  knowledge  exist  only  as  identical ;  the  object  admitting  only 
of  a  logical  discrimination  from  the  subject.  I  imagine  a  Hip- 
pogryph.  The  Hippogryph  is  at  once  the  object  of  the  act  and 
the  act  itself.  Abstract  the  one,  the  other  has  no  existence  :  de- 
ny me  the  consciousness  of  the  Hippogryph,  you  deny  me  the 
consciousness  of  the  imagination  ;!  I  am  conscious  of  zero  ;  I  am 
not  conscious  at  all. 


1  '  Aristotle  and  Hobbes  call  imagination  a  dying  sense ;  and  Descartes 
is  equally  explicit.'    '  Imagining  should  not  be  confounded  with  Conceiv- 


174  PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION. 

A  difficulty  may  here  be  started  in  regard  to  two  faculties, — 
Memory  and  Perception. 

Memory  is  defined  by  Reid  '  an  immediate  knowledge  of  the 
past ;'  and  is  thus  distinguished  from  consciousness,  which,  with 
all  philosophers,  he  views  as  '  an  immediate  knowledge  of  the  pres- 
ent? We  may  therefore  be  conscious  of  the  act  of  memory  as 
present,  but  of  its  object  as  past,  consciousness  is  impossible.  And 
certainly,  if  Reid's  definition  of  memory  be  admitted,  this  infer- 
ence cannot  be  disallowed.  But  memory  is  not  an  immediate 
knowledge  of  the  past ;  an  immediate  knowledge  of  the  past  is  a 
contradiction  in  terms.  This  is  manifest,  whether  we  look  from 
the  act  to  the  object,  or  from  the  object  to  the  act. — To  be  known 
immediately,  an  object  must  be  known  in  itself ;  to  be  known  in 
itself,  it  must  be  known  as  actual,  now  existent,  present.  But  the 
object  of  memory  is  past — not  present,  not  now  existent,  not  ac- 
tual ;  it  cannot  therefore  be  known  in  itself.  If  known  at  all,  it 
must  be  known  in  something  different  from  itself — i.  e.  mediate- 
ly ;  and  memory  as  an  'immediate  knowledge  of  .the  past?  is 
thus  impossible. — Again :  memory2  is  an  act  of  knowledge ;  an 


ing,  &c. ;  though  some  philosophers,  as  Gassendi,  have  not  attended  to  the 
distinction.  The  words  Conception,  Concept,  Notion,  should  not  be  limited 
to  the  thought  of  what  cannot  be  represented  in  the  imagination,  as  the 
thought  suggested  by  the  general  term.  The  Leibnitzians  call  this  symbolical, 
in  contrast  to  intuitive  knowledge.  This  is  the  sense  in  which  conception  and 
concfptus  have  been  usually  and  correctly  employed.  Mr.  Stewart,  on  the 
other  hand,  arbitrarily  limits  conception  to  the  reproduction,  in  imagination, 
of  an  object  of  sense  as  actually  perceived.' — Foot-notes  to  Reid,  pp.  227, 
860.—  W. 

1  '  In  memory,  we  cannot  possibly  be  conscious  or  immediately  cognizant 
of  any  object  beyond  the  modifications  of  the  ego  itself.  In  perception  (if 
an  immediate  perception  be  allowed)  we  must  be  conscious,  or  immediately 
cognizant,  of  some  phenomenon  of  the  non-ego."1  '  An  immediate  knowledge 
of  &  past  thing  is  a  contradiction.  For  we  can  only  know  a  thing  immediately, 
if  we  know  it  in  itself,  or  as  existing ;  but  what  is  past  cannot  be  known  in 
itself,  for  it  is  non-existent.'  '  The  datum  of  Memory  does  not  stand  upon 
the  same  ground  as  the  datum  of  simple  Consciousness.  In  so  far  as  mem- 
ory is  consciousness,  it  cannot  be  denied.  We  cannot,  without  contradiction, 
deny  the  fact  of  memory  as  a  present  consciousness  ;  but  we  may,  without 
contradiction,  suppose  that  the  past  given  therein,  is  only  an  illusion  of  the 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  175 

act  exists  only  as  present ;  and  a  present  knowledge  can  be  im- 
mediately cognizant  only  of  a  present  object.  But  the  object 
known  in  memory  is  past ;  consequently,  either  memory  is  not 
an  act  of  knowledge  at  all,  or  the  object  immediately  known  is 
present ;  and  the  past,  if  known,  is  known  only  through  the  me- 
dium of  the  present ;  on  either  alternative  memory  is  not  '  an 
immediate  knowledge  of  the  past?  Thus,  memory,  like  our  other 
faculties,  affords  only  an  immediate  knowledge  of  the  present ;  and, 
like  them,  is  nothing  more  than  consciousness  variously  modi- 
fied* 


present.'  '  Whatever  is  the  immediate  object  of  thought,  of  that  we  are 
necessarily  conscious.  But  of  Alexander,  for  example,  as  existing,  we  are  ne- 
cessarily not  conscious.  Alexander,  as  existing,  cannot,  therefore,  possibly  be 
an  immediate  object  of  thought ;  consequently,  if  we  can  be  said  to  think  of 
Alexander  at  all,  we  can  only  be  said  to  think  of  him  mediately,  in  and 
through  a  representation  of  which  we  are  conscious ;  and  that  representation 
is  the  immediate  object  of  thought.  It  makes  no  difference  whether  this  im- 
mediate object  be  viewed  as  a  terti/um  quid,  distinct  from  the  existing  reality 
and  from  the  conscious  mind ;  or  whether  as  a  mere  modality  of  the  con- 
scious mind  itself— as  the  mere  act  of  thought  considered  in  its  relation  to 
something  beyond  the  sphere  of  consciousness.  In  neither  case  can  we  be 
said  (be  it  in  the  imagination  of  a  possible  or  the  recollection  of  a  past  exist- 
ence) to  know  a  thing  as  existing — that  is,  immediately ;  and,  therefore,  if  in 
these  operations  we  be  said  to  know  aught  out  the  mind  at  all,  we  can  only 
be  said  to  know  it  mediately — in  other  words,  as  a  mediate  object.  The 
whole  perplexity  arises  from  the  ambiguity  of  the  term  object,  that  term 
being  used  both  for  the  external  reality  of  which  we  are  here  not  conscious, 
and  cannot  therefore  know  in  itself,  and  for  the  mental  representation  which 
we  know  in  itself,  but  which  is  known  only  as  relative  to  the  other. 
Reid  chooses  to  abolish  the  former  signification,  on  the  supposition  that  it 
only  applies  to  representative  entity  different  from  the  act  of  thought.  In 
this  supposition,  however,  he  is  wrong ;  nor  does  he  obtain  an  immediate 
knowledge,  even  in  perception,  by  merely  denying  the  crude  hypothesis  of 
representation.' — Foot-notes  to  Eeid,  pp.  329, 339,  444,  279. —  W. 

*  The  only  parallel  we  know  to  this  misconception  of  Reid's  is  the  opin- 
ion on  which  Fromondus  animadverts.  '  In  primis  displicet  nobis  pluri- 
morum  recentiorum  philosophia,  qui  sensuum  interiorum  operationes,  ut 
phantasiationem,  memorationem,  et  reminiscentiam,  circa  imagines,  recen- 
tur  aut  olim  spiritibus  vel  cerebro  impressas,  versari  negant ;  sed  proxlme 
circa  otgecla  quaforis  sunt.  Ut  cum  quis  meminit  se  vidisse  leporem  cur- 
rentcm ;  memoria,  inquiunt,  non  intuetur  et  attingit  imaginem  leporis  in 
cerebro  asservatam,  sed  solum  leporein  ipsum  qui  cursu  trajiciebat  campum, 
&c.,  &c.'  (Pkiks&phia  Christiana  de  Anima.  Lovanii.  1649.  L.  iii.  c.  8. 


176  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

In  regard  to  Perception  :  Reid  allows  an  immediate  knowledge 
of  the  affections  of  the  subject  of  thought,  mind,  or  self,  and  an 
immediate  knowledge  of  the  qualities  of  an  object  really  different 
from  self — matter.  To  the  former,  he  gives  the  name  of  conscious- 
ness, to  the  latter,  that  of  perception.  Is  consciousness,  as  an  im- 
mediate lsno\v\edge,  purely  subjective,  not  to  be  discriminated  from 
perception,  as  an  immediate  knowledge,  really  objective  ? — A  log- 
ical difference  we  admit ;  a  psychological  we  deny. 

Relatives  are  known  only  together :  the  science  of  opposites  is 
one.  Subject  and  object,  mind  and  matter,  are  known  only  in 
correlation  and  contrast, — and  by  the  same  common  act :  while 
knowledge,  as  at  once  a  synthesis  and  an  antithesis  of  both,  may 
be  indifferently  defined  an  antithetic  synthesis,  or  a  synthetic  an- 
tithesis of  its  terms.  Every  conception  '  of  self,  necessarily  in- 
volves a  conception  of  not-self :  every  perception  of  what  is  dif- 
ferent from  me,  implies  a  recognition  of  the  percipient  subject  in 
contradistinction  from  the  object  perceived.  In  one  act  of  knowl- 
edge, indeed,  the  object  is  the  prominent  element,  in  another  the 
subject ;  but  there  is  none  in  which  either  is  known  out  of  rela- 
tion to  the  other.  The  immediate  knowledge  which  Reid  allows 
of  things  different  from  the  mind,  and  the  immediate  knowledge 
of  mind  itself,  cannot  therefore  be  split  into  two  distinct  acts.  In 
perception,  as  in  the  other  faculties,  the  same  indivisible  conscious- 
ness is  conversant  about  both  terms  of  the  relation  of  knowledge. 
Distinguish  the  cognition  of  the  subject  from  the  cognition  of  the 
object  of  perception,  and  you  either  annihilate  the  relation  of 
knowledge  itself,  which  exists  only  in  its  terms  being  comprehend- 
ed together  in  the  unity  of  consciousness  ;  or  you  must  postulate 
a  higher  faculty,  which  shall  again  reduce  to  one,  the  two  cogni- 
tions you  have  distinguished ; — that  is,  you  are  at  last  compelled 


art.  8.)  Who  the  advocates  of  this  opinion  were,  we  are  ignorant ;  but 
more  than  suspect  that,  as  stated,  it  is  only  a  misrepresentation  of  the 
Cartesian  doctrine,  then  on  the  ascendant.  [Lord  Monboddo  has,  how- 
ever, a  doctrine  of  the  sort.] 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  177 

to  admit,  in  an  unphilosophical  complexity,  that  common  con- 
sciousness of  subject  and  object,  which  you  set  out  with  denying 
in  its  philosophical  simplicity.  Consciousness  and  immediate 
knowledge  are  thus  terms  universally  convertible  ;  and  if  there  be 
an  immediate  knowledge  of  things  external,  there  is  consequently 
the  consciousness  of  an  outer  world.* 

Reid's  erroneous  analysis  of  consciousness  is  not  perhaps  of  so 
much  importance  in  itself,  as  from  causing  confusion  in  its  conse- 
quences. Had  he  employed  this  term  as  tantamount  to  imme- 
diate knowledge  in  general,  whether  of  self  or  not,  and  thus  dis- 
tinctly expressed  what  he  certainly  [?]  taught,  that  mind  and 
matter  are  both  equally  known  to  us  as  existent  and  in  them- 
selves ;  Dr.  Brown  could  hardly  have  so  far  misconceived  his  doc- 
trine, as  actually  to  lend  him  the.very  opinion  which  his  whole 
philosophy  was  intended  to  refute,  viz.  that  an  immediate,  and 


*  How  correctly  Aristotle  reasoned  on  this  subject,  may  be  seen  from 
the  following  passage: — 'When  we  perceive  (alaQav&psQa1 — the  Greeks, 
perhaps  fortunately,  had  no  special  term  for  consciousness) — 'when  we 
perceive  that  we  see,  hear,  &c.,  it  is  necessary,  that  by  sight  itself  we  per- 
ceive that  we  see,  or  by  another  sense.  If  by  another  sense,  then  this  also 
must  be  a  sense  of  sight,  conversant  equally  about  the  object  of  sight, 
color.  Consequently,  there  must  either  be  two  senses  of  the  same  object, 
or  every  sense  must  be  percipient  of  itself.  Moreover,  if  the  sense  per- 
cipient of  sight  be  different  from  sight  itself,  it  follows,  either  that  there 
is  a  regress  to  infinity,  or  we  must  admit,  at  last,  some  sense  percipient 
of  itself ;  but  if  so,  it  is  more  reasonable  to  admit  this  in  the  original 
sense  at  once.'  (De  Anima,  L.  iii.  c.  2.  text.  136.)  Here  Aristotle  ought 
not  to  be  supposed  to  mean  that  every  sense  is  an  independent  faculty  of 
perception,  and,  as  such,  conscious  of  itself.  Compare  De  Som.  et  Vlg.  c.  2. 
and  Probl.  (if  indeed  his)  sect.  xi.  §  33.  His  older  commentators — Alexan- 
der, Themistius,  Simplicius — follow  their  master.  Philoponus  and  Michael 
Ephesius  desert  his  doctrine,  and  attribute  this  self-consciousness  to  a  pecu- 
liar faculty  which  they  call  Attention  (rd  irpo<reKTiK6v).  This  is  the  earliest  ex- 
ample we  know  of  this  falae  analysis,  which,  when  carried  to  its  last  absur- 
dity, has  given  us  consciousness,  and  attention,  and  reflection,  as  distinct 
powers.  Of  the  schoolmen,  satins  est  silere,  quam  parum  dicere.  Nemc- 
sius,  and  Plutarchus  of  Athens  preserved  by  Philoponus,  accord  this  rctlex 
consciousness  to  intellect  as  opposed  to  sense.  Plato  varies  in  his  Thea^tetus 
and  Charmides.  Some,  however,  of  the  Greek  commentators  on  Aristotle, 
aa  I  have  elsewhere  observed,  introduced  the  term  ZwaloOrms,  employing  it, 
by  extension,  for  consciousness  in  general. 

8* 


178  PHILOSOPHY  OF   PEECEPTION. 

consequently  a  real,  knowledge  of  external  things  is  impossible. 
But  this  by  anticipation. 

This  leads  us  to  the  second  error, — the  non-distinction  of  repre- 
sentative from  presentative  or  intuitive  knowledge.1  The  reduc- 
tion of  consciousness  to  a  special  faculty,  involved  this  confusion. 
For  had  Reid  perceived  that  all  our  faculties  are  only  conscious- 
ness, and  that  consciousness  as  an  immediate  knowledge  is  only 
of  the  present  and  actual,  he  would  also  have  discovered  that  the 
past  and  possible,  either  could  not  be  known  to  us  at  all,  or  could 
be  known  only  in  and  through  the  present  and  actual,  i.  e.  medi- 
ately. But  a  mediate  knowledge  is  necessarily  a  representative 
knowledge.  For  if  the  present,  or  actual  in  itself,  makes  known 
to  us  the  past  and  possible  through  itself,  this  can  only  be  done 
by  a  vicarious  substitution  or  jepresentation.  And  as  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  past  is  given  in  memory  (using  that  term  in  its  vulgar 
universality),  and  that  of  the  possible  in  imagination,  these  two 
faculties  are  powers  of  representative  knowledge.  Memory  is  an 
immediate  knowledge  of  a  present  thought,  involving  an  absolute 
belief  that  this  thought  represents  another  act  of  knowledge  that 
has  been.  Imagination  (which  we  use  in  its  widest  signification, 
to  include  conception  or  simple  apprehension)  is  an  immediate 
knowledge  of  an  actual  thought,  which,  as  not  subjectively  self- 
contradictory  (i.  e.  logically  possible),  involves  the  hypothetical 
belief  that  it  objectively  may  be  (i.  e.  is  really  possible). 

Nor  is  philosophy  here  at  variance  with  nature.2     The  learned 


1  See  Part  Second,  chapter  ii.  pp.  239-260. —  W. 

*  '  The  term  Nature,11  says  Hamilton  (Reid,  p.  216),  '  is  used  sometimes  in 
a  wider,  sometimes  in  a  narrower  extension.  "When  employed  in  its  most 
extensive  meaning,  it  embraces  the  two  worlds  of  mind  and  matter.  When 
employed  in  its  more  restricted  signification,  it  i«  a  synonym  for  the  latter 
only,  and  is  then  used  in  contradistinction  to  the  former.  In  the  Greek 
philosophy,  the  word  06<r«5  was  general  in  its  meaning ;  and  the  great  branch 
of  philosophy  styled  "physical  or  physiological,"  included  under  it  not  only 
the  sciences  of  matter,  but  also  those  of  mind.  With  us,  the  term  Nature  is 
more  vaguely  extensive  than  the  terms,  physics,  physical,  physiology,  physio- 
logical, or  even  than  the  adjective  natural;  whereas,  in  the  philosophy  of 
Germany,  Natur,  and  its  correlatives,  whether  of  Greek  or  Latin  derivation, 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  179 

and  unlearned  agree,  that  in  memory  and  imagination,  naught  of 
which  we  are  conscious  lies  beyond  the  sphere  of  self,  and  that  in 
these  acts  the  object  known  is  only  relative  to  a  reality  supposed 
to  be.  Nothing  but  Reid's  superstitious  horror  of  the  ideal  theory, 
could  have  blinded  him  so  far  as  not  to  see  that  these  faculties 
are,  of  necessity,  mediate  and  representative.  In  this,  however, 
he  not  only  over-shot  the  truth,  but  almost  frustrated  his  whole 
philosophy.  For,  he  thus  affords  a  ground  (and  the  only  ground* 
though  not  perceived  by  Brown),  on  which  it  could  be  argued 
that  his  doctrine  of  perception  was  not  intuitive — was  not  pre- 
sentative.  For  if  he  reject  the  doctrine  of  ideas  not  less  in  mem- 
ory and  imagination,  which  must  be  representative  faculties,  than 
in  perception,  which  may  be  intuitive,  and  if  he  predicate  imme- 
diate knoioledge  equally  of  all ;  it  can  plausibly  be  contended,  in 
favor  of  Brown's  conclusion,  that  Reid  did  not  really  intend  to 
allow  a  proper  intuitive  or  presentative  perception,  and  that  he 
only  abusively  gave  the  name  of  immediate  knowledge  to  the 
simplest  form  of  the  representative  theory,  in  contradistinction  to 
the  more  complex.  But  this  also  by  anticipation. 

There  exists,  therefore,  a  distinction  of  knowledge, — as  immedi- 
ate, intuitive,  or  presentative,  and  as  mediate  or  representative. — 


are,  in  general,  expressive  of  the  world  of  matter  in  contrast  to  the  world  of 
intelligence.' 

'  Nature,'  says  the  great  Pascal,  '  confounds  the  Tyrrhenians,  and  Kea- 
son  confounds  the  Dogmatists.' 

'Nature,'  says  Hume,  (Inquiry  concerning  Human  Understanding,  §12, 
part  ii.),  '  is  always  too  strong  for  principle ;  and,  though  a  Tyrrhenian 
may  throw  himself  or  others  into  a  momentary  amazement  and  confusion 
by  his  profound  reasonings,  the  first  and  most  trivial  event  in  life  will  put  to 
flight  all  his  doubts  and  scruples,  and  leave  him  the  same  in  every  point  of 
action  and  speculation  with  the  philosophers  of  every  other  sect,  or  with 
those  who  never  concerned  themselves  in  any  philosophical  researches. 
When  he  awakes  from  his  dream,  he  will  lie  the  first  to  join  in  the  laugh 
against  himself,  and  to  confess  that  all  his  objections  are  mere  amusement, 
and  can  have  no  other  tendency  than  to  show  the  whimsical  condition 
of  mankind,  who  must  act,  and  reason,  and  believe,  though  they  are  not 
able,  by  their  most  diligent  inquiry,  to  satisfy  themselves  concerning  the 
foundation  of  the  operations,  or  to  remove  the  objections  which  may  be 
raised  against  them.' —  W. 


180  PHILOSOPHY    OF    PERCEPTION. 

The  former  is  logically  simple,  as  only  contemplative  :  the  latter 
logically  complex,  as  both  representative  and  contemplative  of 
the  representation. — In  the  one,  the  object  is  single,  and  the  word 
univocal :  in  the  other  it  is  double,  and  the  term  aequivocal ;  the 
object  known  and  representing,  being  different  from  the  object 
unknown  and  represented. — The  knowledge  in  an  intuitive  act, 
as  convertible  with  existence,  is  assertory  ;  and  the  reality  of  its 
only  object  is  given  unconditionally,  as  a,  fact :  the  knowledge  in 
a  representative  act,  as  not  convertible  with  existence  is  problem 
atical  ;  and  the  reality  of  its  principal  object  is  given  hypothet- 
ically  as  an  inference. — Representative  knowledge  is  purely  sub 
jective,  for  its  object  known  is  always  ideal ;  presentative  may  be 
either  subjective  or  objective,  for  its  one  object  may  be  either 
ideal  or  material. — Considered  in  themselves :  an  intuitive  cogni- 
tion is  complete,  as  absolute  and  irrespective  of  aught  beyond  the 
compass  of  knowledge ;  a  representative  incomplete,  as  relative 
to  a  transcendent  something,  beyond  the  sphere  of  consciousness. 
— Considered  in  relation  to  their  objects  :  the  former  is  complete, 
its  object  being  known  and  real ;  the  latter  incomplete,  its  object 
known,  being  unreal,  and  its  real  object  unknown. — Considered 
in  relation  to  each  other :  immediate  knowledge  is  complete,  as 
all  sufficient  in  itself;  mediate  incomplete,  as  realized  only 
through  the  other.* 

*  This  distinction  of  intuitive  or  presentative  and  of  representative  knowl- 
edge, overlooked,  or  rather  abolished,  in  the  theories  of  modem  philoso- 
phy, is  correspondent  to  the  division  of  knowledge  by  certain  of  the  school- 
men, into  intuitive  and  abstractive.  By  the  latter  term,  they  also  expressed 
abstract  knowledge  in  its  present  signification. — '^ognitio  intuitiva,1  says 
the  Doctor  Jttsolutissimus,  '  est  ilia  quse  immediate  tendit  ad  rem  sibi  prce- 
sentem  objective,  secundum  ejtts  actualem  existentiam ;  sicut  cum  video  colo- 
rem  existentem  in  pariete,  vel  rosam,  quam  in  manu  teneo.  Akstractiva, 
dicitur  omnis  cognitio,  quse  habetur  de  re  non  sic  realiter  prascnte  in  ra- 
tione  objecti  immediate  cogniti.'  Now,  when  with  a  knowledge  of  this 
distinction  of  which  Reid  was  ignorant,  and  rejecting  equally  with  him  not 
only  species  but  a  representative  perception,  we  say  that  many  of  the  school- 
men have,  in  this  respect,  left  behind  them  all  modern  philosophers ;  we 
assert  a  paradox,  but  one  which  we  are  easily  able  to  prove.  Leibnitz 
spoke  truly,  when  he  said — '  Aurum  latere  in  stercore  illo  scholattico  bar- 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  181 

So  far  there  is  no  difficulty,  or  ought  to  have  been  none.  The 
past  and  possible  can  only  be  known  mediately  by  representa- 
tion. But  a  more  arduous,  at  least  a  more  perplexed  question 
arises,  when  we  ask  : — Is  all  knowledge  of  the  present  or  actual 
intuitive  1  Is  the  knowledge  of  mind  and  matter  equally  imme- 
diate ? 

In  regard  to  the  immediate  knowledge  of  mind,  there  is  now 
at  least  no  difficulty ;  it  is  admitted  not  to  be  representative. 
The  problem,  therefore,  exclusively  regards  the  intuitive  percep- 
tion of  the  qualities  of  matter. 

(To  obviate  misapprehension,  we  may  here  parenthetically 
observe,  that  all  we  do  intuitively  know  of  self, — all  that  we 
may  intuitively  know  of  not-self,  is  only  relative.1  Existence  ab- 
solutely and  in  itself,  is  to  us  as  zero  ;  and  while  nothing  is,  so 
nothing  is  known  to  us,  except  those  phases  of  being  which  stand 
in  analogy  to  our  faculties  of  knowledge.  These  we  call  qualities, 
phenomena,  properties,  &c.  When  we  say,  therefore,  that  a  thing- 
is  known  in  itself,  we  mean  only  that  it  stands  face  to  face,  in 
direct  and  immediate  relation  to  the  conscious  mind  ;  in  other 
words,  that,  as  existing,  its  phenomena  form  part  of  the  circle  of 
our  knowledge, — exist,  since  they  are  known,  and  are  known 
because  they  exist.) 

If  we  interrogate  consciousness  concerning  the  point  in  ques- 
tion, the  response  is  categorical  and  clear.  When  I  concentrate 
my  attention  in  the  simplest  act  of  perception,  I  return  from  my 
observation  with  the  most  irresistible  conviction  of  two  facts,  or 
rather,  two  branches  of  the  same  fact, — that  /  am, — and  that 
something  different  from  me  exists.  In  this  act,  I  am  conscious 
of  myself  as  the  perceiving  subject,  and  of  an  external  reality  as 
the  object  perceived  ;  and  I  am  conscious  of  both  existences  in 
the  same  indivisible  amount  of  intuition.  The  knowledge  of  the 
subject  does  not  precede  or  follow  the  knowledge  of  the  object ; 
— neither  determines,  neither  is  determined  by,  the  other.  The 

1  See  Part  Third,  Philosophy  of  the  Conditioned.—  W. 


182  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

two  terms  of  correlation  stand  in  mutual  counterpoise  and  equal 
independence ;  they  are  given  as  connected  in  the  synthesis  of 
knowledge,  but  as  contrasted  in  the  antithesis  of  existence. 

Such  is  the  fact  of  perception  revealed  in  consciousness,  and  as 
it  determines  mankind  in  general  in  their  equal  assurance  of  the 
reality  of  an  external  world,  and  of  the  existence  of  their  own 
minds.  Consciousness  declares  our  knowledge  of  material  quali- 
ties to  be  intuitive.  Nor  is  the  fact,  as  given,  denied  even  by 
those  who  disallow  its  truth.  So  clear  is  the  deliverance,  that 
even  the  philosophers  (as  we  shall  hereafter  see)  who  reject  an 
intuitive  perception,  find  it  impossible  not  to  admit,  that  their 
doctrine  stands  decidedly  opposed  to  the  voice  of  consciousness 
and  the  natural  conviction  of  mankind.  [This  doctrine  is,  how- 
ever, to  be  asserted  only  in  subordination  to  the  distinction  of  the 
Primary,  Secundo-primary,  and  Secondary  Qualities  of  MoMer?] 

According  as  the  truth  of  the  fact  of  consciousness  in  percep- 
tion is  entirely  accepted,  accepted  in  part,  or  wholly  rejected,  six 
possible  and  actual  systems  of  philosophy  result.  We  say  expli- 
citly— the  truth  of  the  fact.  For  the  fact,  as  a  phenomenon  of 
consciousness  cannot  be  doubted;  since  to  doubt  that  we  are 
conscious  of  this  or  that  is  impossible.  The  doubt,  as  itself  a 
phenomena  of  consciousness,  would  annihilate  itself.* 

1.  If  the  veracity  of  consciousness  be  unconditionally  admitted, 
— if  the  intuitive  knowledge  of  mind  and  matter,  and  the  conse- 
quent reality  of  their  antithesis  be  taken  as  truths,  to  be  ex- 
plained if  possible,  but  in  themselves  are  held  as  paramount  to 
all  doubt,  the  doctrine  is  established  which  we  would  call  the 
scheme  of  Natural  Realism  or  Natural  Dualism. — 2.  If  the 
veracity  of  consciousness  be  allowed  to  the  equipoise  of  the  object 
and  subject  in  the  act,  but  rejected  as  to  the  reality  of  their 
antithesis,the  system  of  Absolute  Identity  emerges,  which  reduces 
both  mind  and  matter  to  phenomenal  modifications  of  the  same 
common  substance. — 3  and  4.  If  the  testimony  of  consciousness 

1  See  Part  Second,  chapter  \.—  W.        *  See  Part  Second,  chapter  iii.—  W. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  183 

be  refused  to  the  co-originality  and  reciprocal  independence  of 
the  subject  and  object,  two  schemes  are  determined,  according  as 
the  one  or  the  other  of  the  terms  is  placed  as  the  original  and 
genetic.  Is  the  object  educed  from  the  subject,  Idealism  ;  is  the 
subject  educed  from  the  object,  Materialism,  is  the  result. — 
5.  Again,  is  the  consciousness  itself  recognized  only  as  a  phe- 
nomenon, and  the  substantial  reality  of  both  subject  and  object 
denied,  the  issue  is  Nihilism. 

6.  These  systems  are  all  conclusions  from  an  original  interpre- 
tation of  the  fact  of  consciousness  in  perception,  carried  intrepidly 
forth  to  its  legitimate  issue.  But  there  is  one  scheme,  which, 
violating  the  integrity  of  this  fact,  and,  with  the  complete  ideal- 
ist, regarding  the  object  of  consciousness  in  perception  as  only  a 
modification  of  the  percipient  subject,  or,  at- least,  a  phenomenon 
numerically  different  from  the  object  it  represents, — endeavors, 
however,  to  stop  short  of  the  negation  of  an  external  world,  the 
reality  of  which  and  the  knowledge  of  whose  reality,  it  seeks  by 
various  hypotheses,  to  establish  and  explain.  This  scheme, 
which  we  would  term  Cosmothetic  Idealism,  Hypothetical  Real- 
ism, or  Hypothetical  Dualism, — although  the  most  inconsequent 
of  all  systems,  has  been  embraced,  under  various  forms,  by  the 
immense  majority  of  philosophers.1 

Of  these  systems,  Dr.  Brown  adheres  to  the  last.  He  holds 
that  the  mind  is  conscious  or  immediately  cognizant  of  nothing 
beyond  its  subjective  states  ;  but  he  assumes  the  existence  of  an 
external  world  beyond  the  sphere  of  consciousness,  exclusively  on 
the  ground  of  our  irresistible  belief  in  its  unknown  reality.  In- 
dependent of  this  belief,  there  is  no  reasoning  on  which  the  exist- 
ence of  matter  can  be  vindicated ;  the  logic  of  the  idealist  he 
admits  to  be  unassailable. 

But  Brown  not  only  embraces  the  scheme  of  hypothetical 
realism  himself,  he  never  suspects  that  Reid  entertained  any  other 
doctrine.  Brown's  transmutation  of  Reid  from  a  natural  to  a 

1  See  page  292,  infra.—  W. 


184  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

hypothetical  realist,  as  a  misconception  of  the  grand  and  dis- 
tinctive tenet  of  a  school,  by  one  even  of  its  disciples,  is  without 
a  parallel  in  the  whole  history  of  philosophy :  and  this  portentous 
error  is  prolific ;  Chimcera  chimceram  parit.  Were  the  evidence 
of  the  mistake  less  unambiguous,  we  should  be  disposed  rather  to 
question  our  own  perspicacity,  than  to  tax  so  subtle  an  intellect 
with  so  gross  a  blunder. 

Before  establishing  against  his  antagonist  the  true  opinion  of 
Reid,  it  will  be  proper  first  to  generalize  the  possible  forms  under 
which  the  hypothesis  of  a  representative  perception  can  be  realized, 
as  a  confusion  of  some  of  these  as  actually  held,  on  the  part  both 
of  Reid  and  Brown,  has  tended  to  introduce  no  small  confusion 
into  the  discussion. 

The  hypothetical  realist  contends,  that  he  is  wholly  ignorant 
of  things  in  themselves,  and  that  these  are  known  to  him,  only 
through  a  vicarious  phenomenon,  of  which  he  is  conscious  in 

perception ; 

'  — 7?«rw7»que  ignarus,  Imayir*  gaudet.' 

In  other  words,  that  the  object  immediately  known  and  repre- 
senting is  numerically  different  from  the  object  really  existing  and 
represented.  Now  this  vicarious  phenomenon,  or  immediate  object, 
must  either  be  numerically  different  from  the  percipient  intellect, 
or  a  modification  of  that  intellect  itself,  If  the  latter,  it  must, 
again,  either  be  a  modification  of  the  thinking  substance,  with  a 
transcendent  existence  beyond  the  act  of  thought,  or  a  modifica- 
tion identical  with  the  act  of  perception  itself. 

All  possible  forms  of  the  representative  hypothesis  are  thus 
reduced  to  three,  and  these  have  all  been  actually  maintained. 

1.  The  representative  object  not  a  modijication  of  mind. 

2.  The  representative  object  a  modification  of  mind,  dependent 
for  its  apprehension,  but  not  for  its  existence,  on  the  act  of  con- 
sciousness. 

3.  The  representative  object  a  modijication  of  mind,  non-exist- 
ent out  of  consciousness  ; — the  idea  and  its  perception  only  dif- 
ferent relations  of  an  act  (state)  really  identical. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  185 

In  the  first,  the  various  opinions  touching  the  nature  and 
•origin  of  the  representative  object ;  whether  material,  immate- 
rial, or  between  both ;  whether  physical  or  hyperphysical ;  wheth- 
er propagated  from  the  external  object  or  generated  in  the  medi- 
um ;  whether  fabricated  by  the  intelligent  soul  or  in  the  animal 
life ;  whether  infused  by  God,  or  angels,  or  identical  with  the 
divine  substance : — these  afford  in  the  history  of  philosophy  so 
many  subordinate  modifications  of  this  form  of  the  hypothesis. 
In  the  two  latter,  the  subaltern  theories  have  been  determined  by 
the  difficulty  to  connect  the  representation  with  the  reality,  in  a 
relation  of  causal  dependence;  and  while  some  philosophers 
have  left  it  altogether  unexplained,  the  others  have  been  com- 
pelled to  resort  to  the  hyperphysical  theories  of  divine  assistance 
and  a  pre-established  harmony.  Under  the  second,  opinions 
have  varied,  whether  the  representative  object  be  innate  or  facti- 
tious4 

The  third  of  these  forms  of  representation  Reid  does  not  seem 
to  have  understood.  The  illusion  which  made  him  view,  in  his 
doctrine,  memory  and  imagination  as  powers  of  immediate  knowl- 
edge, though  only  representative  faculties,  under  the  third  form, 
has,  in  the  history  of  opinions  regarding  perception,  puzzled  him, 
as  we  shall  see,  in  his  exposition  of  the  doctrine  of  Arnauld.  He 
was  not  aware  that  there  was  a  theory,  neither  identical  with  an 
intuitive  perception,  nor  with  the  first  or  second  form  of  the 
representative  hypothesis ;  with  both  of  which  he  was  sufficiently 
acquainted.  Dr.  Brown,  on  the  contrary,  who  adopts  the  third 
and  simplest  modification  of  that  hypothesis,  appears  ignorant  of 
its  discrimination  from  the  second ;  and  accordingly  views  the 
philosophers  who  held  this  latter  form,  as  not  distinguished  in 
opinion  from  himself.  Of  the  doctrine  of  intuition  he  does  not 
seem  almost  to  have  conceived  the  possibility. 

These  being  premised,  we  proceed  to  consider  the  greatest  of 
all  Brown's  errors,  in  itself  and  in  its  consequences, — his  miscon- 

1  See  below,  chapter  iii.  Various  Theories  of  External  Perception. —  W. 


186  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEFITON. 

ceptdon  of  the  cardinal  position  of  Reid's  philosophy,  in  supposing 
that  philosopher  as  a  hypothetical  realist,  to  hold  with  himself  the" 
third  form  of  the  representative  hypothesis,  and  not,  as  a  natural 
realist,  the  doctrine  of  an  intuitive  perception.1 

In  the  first  place,  knowledge  and  existence  are  then  only  con- 
vertible when  the  reality  is  known  in  itself ;  for  then  only  can 
we  say,  that  it  is  known  because  it  exists,  and  exists  since  it  is 
known.  And  this  constitutes  an  immediate,  presentative,  or  intu- 
itive cognition,  rigorously  so  called.  Nor  did  Reid  contemplate 
any  other.  '  It  seems  admitted,'  he  says,  '  as  a  first  principle,  by 
the  learned  and  the  unlearned,  that  what  is  really  perceived  must 
exist,  and  that  to  perceive  ichat  does  not  exist  is  impossible.  So 
far  the  unlearned  man  and  the  philosopher  agree.' — (Essays  on 
the  Intellectual  Powers,  p.  142.) 

In  the  second  place,  philosophers  agree,  that  the  idea  or  repre- 
sentative object  in  their  theory,  is  in  the  strictest  sense  ir&nedi- 
ately  perceived.  And  so  Reid  understands  them.  '  I  perceive 
not,  says  the  Cartesian,  the  external  object  itself  (so  far  he  agrees 
with  the  Peripatetic,  and  differs  from  the  unlearned  man) ;  but 
I  perceive  an  image,  or  form,  or  idea,  in  my  own  mind,  or  in  my 
brain.  /  am  certain  of  the  existence  of  the  idea  ;  because  I  imme- 
diately perceive  it.1  (L.  c.) 

In  the  third  place,  philosophers  concur  in  acknowledging,  that 
mankind  at  large  believe,  that  the  external  reality  itself  consti- 
tutes the  immediate  and  only  object  of  perception — So  also  Reid. 
'On  the  same  principle,  the  unlearned  man  says,  /  perceive  tlie 
external  object,  and  /  perceive  it  to  exist.'1  (L.  c.) — '  The  vulgar 
undoubtedly  believe,  that  it  is  the  external  object  which  we  imme- 
diately perceive,  and  not  a  representative  image  of  it  only.  It  is 
for  this  reason,  that  they  look  upon  it  as  perfect  lunacy  to  call  in 
question  the  existence  of  external  objects'  (L.  c.) — ' The  vulgar 
are  firmly  persuaded,  that  the  very  identical  objects  which  they 
perceive  continue  to  exist  when  they  do  not  perceive  them ;  and 

1  See  Part  Second,  chapter  iii.  §  2.—  W. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF  PERCEPTION.  187 

are  no  less  firmly  persuaded,  that  when  ten  men  look  at  the  sun 
or  the  moon  they  all  see  the  same  individual  object?  (P.  166.) — 
Speaking  of  Berkeley :  '  The  vulgar  opinion  he  reduces  to  this, 
that  the  very  things  which  we  perceive  by  our  senses  do  really 
exist.  This  he  grants?  (P.  165.) — 'It  is  therefore  acknowl- 
edged by  this  philosopher  (Hume)  to  be  a  natural  instinct  or  pre- 
possession, a  universal  and  primary  opinion  of  all  men,  that  the 
objects  which  we  immediately  perceive,  by  our  senses,  are  not 
images  in  our  minds,  but  external  objects,  and  that  their  existence 
is  independent  of  us  and  our  perception.'  (P.  201.  See  also  pp. 
143,  198,  199,  200,  206.) 

In  these  circumstances,  if  Reid:  either  1°, — maintains,  that 
his  immediate  perception  of  external  things  is  convertible  with 
their  reality ;  or  2°, — asserts  that  in  his  doctrine  of  perception, 
the  external  reality  stands  to  the  percipient  mind  face  to  face,  in 
the  same  immediacy  of  relation  which  the  idea  holds  in  the  rep- 
resentative theory  of  the  philosophers ;  or  3°, — declares  the  iden- 
tity of  his  own  opinion  with  the  vulgar  belief,  as  thus  expounded 
by  himself  and  the  philosophers : — he  could  not  more  emphat- 
ically proclaim  himself  a  natural  realist,  and  his  doctrine  of  per- 
ception, as  intended,  at  least,  a  doctrine  of  intuition.  And  he 
does  all  three. 

The  first  and  second. — 'We  have  before  examined  the  rea- 
sons given  by  philosophers  to  prove  that  ideas,  and  not  external 
objects,  are  the  immediate  objects  of  perception.  We  shall  only 
here  observe,  THAT  IF  EXTERNAL  OBJECTS  BE  PERCEIVED  IMMEDI- 
ATELY' [and  he  had  just  before  asserted  for  the  hundredth  time 
that  they  were  so  perceived],  '  WE  HAVE  THE  SAME  REASON  TO 

BELIEVE  THEIR  EXISTENCE,  AS  PHILOSOPHERS  HAVE  TO  BELIEVE 
THE  EXISTENCE  OF  IDEAS,  WHILE  THEY  HOLD  THEM  TO  BE  THE 
IMMEDIATE  OBJECTS  OF  PERCEPTION.'  (P.  589.  See  also  pp.  118, 

138.) 

The  third. — Speaking  of  the  perception  of  the  external  world — 
1  We  have  here  a  remarkable  conflict  between  two  contradictory 
opinions,  wherein  all  mankind  are  engaged.  On  the  one  side 


188  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

stand  all  the  vulgar,  who  are  unpractised  in  philosophical  re- 
searches, and  guided  by  the  uncorrupted  primary  instincts  of 
nature.  On  the  other  side,  stand  all  the  philosophers,  ancient 
and  modern  ;  every  man,  without  exception,  who  reflects.  IN  THIS 

DIVISION,  TO  MY  GREAT  HUMILIATION,  I  FIND  MYSELF  CLASSED 
WITH  THE  VULGAR.'  (P.  207.) 

Various  other  proofs  of  the  same  conclusion,  could  be  adduced  ; 
these,  for  brevity,  we  omit. — Brown's  interpretation  of  the  funda- 
mental tenet  of  Reid's  philosophy  is,  therefore,  not  a  simple  mis- 
conception, but  an  absolute  reversal  of  its  real  and  even  unambig- 
uous import.  [This  is  too  strong.1] 

But  the  ground  on  which  Brown  vindicates  his  interpretation, 
is  not  unworthy  of  the  interpretation  itself.  The  possibility  of  an 
intuition  beyond  the  sphere  of  self,  he  can  hardly  be  said  to  have 
contemplated  ;  but  on  one  occasion,  Reid's  language  seems,  for  a 
moment,  to  have  actually  suggested  to  him  the  question  : — Might 
that  philosopher  not  possibly  regard  the  material  object,  as  iden- 
tical with  the  object  of  consciousness  in  perception  ? — On  what 
ground  does  he  reject  the  affirmative  as  absurd  ?  His  reasoning 
is  to  this  effect  : — To  assert  an  intuitive  perception  of  matter,  is  to 
assert  An  identity  of  matter  and  mind  (for  an  immediacy  of  knowl- 
edge is  convertible  with  a  unity  of  existence)  ;  But  Reid  was  a 
sturdy  dualist :  Therefore  he  could  not  maintain  an  immediate 
perception  of  the  qualities  of  matter.  (Lect.  xxv.  pp.  159,  160.) 
In  this  syllogism,  the  major  is  a  mere  petitio  principii,  which 
Brown  has  not  attempted  to  prove ;  and  which,  as  tried  by  the 
standard  of  all  philosophical  truth,  is  not  only  false,  but  even  the 
converse  of  the  truth  ;  while,  admitting  its  accuracy,  it  cannot  be 
so  connected  with  the  minor,  as  to  legitimate  the  conclusion. 

If  we  appeal  to  consciousness,  consciousness  gives,  even  in  the 
last  analysis, — in  the  unity  of  knowledge,  a  duality  of  existence  ; 
and  peremptorily  falsifies  Brown's  assumption,  that  not-self,  as 
known,  is  identical  with  self  as  Jcnowing.  Reid  therefore,  as  a 


'See  p.  278,  below.—  W. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION.  189 

dualist,  and  on  the  supreme  authority  of  consciousness,  might 
safely  maintain  the  immediacy  of  perception  ; — nay,  as  a  dualist 
Reid  could  not,  consistently,  have  adopted  the  opinion  which 
Brown  argues,  that,  as  a  dualist,  he  must  be  regarded  to  have 
held.  Mind  and  matter  exist  to  us  only  in  their  qualities  ;  and 
these  qualities  exist  to  us  only  as  they  are  known  by  us,  i.  e.,  as 
phenomena.  It  is  thus  merely  from  knowledge  that  we  can  infer 
existence,  and  only  from  the  supposed  repugnance  or  compatibility 
of  phenomena,  within  our  experience,  are  we  able  to  ascend  to  the 
transcendent  difference  or  identity  of  substances.  Now,  on  the 
hypothesis  that  all  we  immediately  know,  is  only  a  state  or 
modification  or  quality  or  phenomenon  of  the  cognitive  subject 
itself, — how  can  we  contend,  that  the  phenomena  of  mind  and 
matter,  known  only  as  modifications  of  the  same  must  be  the 
modifications  of  different  substances  ; — nay,  that  only  on  this  hy- 
pothesis of  their  substantial  unity  in  knowledge,  can  their  substan- 
tial duality  in  existence  be  maintained?*  But  of  this  again. 

Brown's  assumption  has  no  better  foundation  than  the  exagge- 
ration of  a  crotchet  of  philosophers  ;  which,  though  contrary  to 
the  evidence  of  consciousness,  and  consequently  not  only  with- 
out but  against  all  evidence,  has  yet  exerted  a  more  extensive 
and  important  influence,  than  any  principle  in  the  whole  history 
of  philosophy.  This  subject  deserves  a  volume ;  we  can  only 
afford  it  a  few  sentences. — Some  philosophers  (as  Anaxagoras, 
Heraclitus,  Alcmaeon)  maintained  that  knowledge  implied  even  a 
contrariety  of  subject  and  object.  But  since  the  time  of  Em- 
pedocles,  no  opinion  has  been  more  universally  admitted,  than 
that  the  relation  of  knoivledge  inferred  the  analogy  of  existence. 
This  analogy  may  be  supposed  in  two  potences.  What  knows 
and  what  is  known,  are  either  1°,  similar,  or,  2°,  the  same  ;  and 
if  the  general  principle  be  true,  the  latter  is  the  more  philoso- 
phical. This  principle  it  was,  which  immediately  determined  the 
whole  doctrine  of  a  representative  perception.  Its  lower  potence 
is  seen  in  the  intentional  species  of  the  schools,  and  in  the  ideas 
of  Malebranche  and  Berkeley  ;  its  higher  in  the  gnostic  reasons  of 


190  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

the  Platonists,  in  the  pre-existing  species  of  Avicenna  and  the 
Arabians,  in  the  ideas  of  Descartes  and  Leibnitz,  in  the  phenom- 
ena of  Kant,  and  in  the  external  states  of  Dr.  Brown.  It  medi- 
ately determined  the  hierarchical  gradation  of  faculties  or  souls 
of  the  Aristotelians, — the  vehicular  media  of  the  Platonists, — 
the  theories  of  a  common  intellect  of  Alexander,  Themistius, 
Averroes,  Cajetanus,  and  Zabarella, — the  vision  in  the  Deity  of 
Malebranche, — and  the  Cartesian  and  Leibnitian  doctrines  of 
assistance  and  predetermined  harmony.  To  no  other  origin  is  to 
be  ascribed  the  refusal  of  the  fact  of  consciousness  in  its  primitive 
duality  ;  and  the  Unitarian  systems  of  identity,  materialism,  ideal- 
ism, are  the  result. 

But  however  universal  and  omnipotent  this  principle  may  have 
been,  Reid  was  at  once  too  ignorant  of  opinions,  to  be  much  in 
danger  from  authority,  and  too  independent  a  thinker,  to  accept 
so  baseless  a  fancy  as  a  fact.  'Mr.  Norris,'  says  he,  'is  the 
only  author  I  have  met  %ith  who  professedly  puts  the  question, 
Whether  material  things  can  be  perceived  by  us  immediately  ? 
He  has  offered  four  arguments  to  show  that  they  cannot.  First, 
Material  objects  are  without  the  mind,  and  therefore  there  can 
be  no  union  between  the  object  and  the  percipient.  Answer — 
This  argument  is  lame,  until  it  is  shown  to  be  necessary,  that  in 
perception  there  should  be  an  union  between  the  object  and  the 
percipient.  Second,  material  objects  are  disproportioned  to  the 
mind,  and  removed  from  it  by  the  whole  diameter  of  Being. — This 
argument  I  cannot  answer,  because  I  do  not  understand  it.n  (Es- 
says, I.  P.  p.  202.) 


1  'This  confession  would,  of  itself,  prove  how  superficially  Reid  was  versed 
in  the  literature  of  philosophy.  Norris's  second  argument  is  only  the  state- 
ment of  a  principle  generally  assumed  by  philosophers — that  the  relation  of 
knowledge  infers  a  correspondence  of  nature  between  the  subject  knowing, 
and  the  object  known.  This  principle  has  perhaps,  exerted  a  more  exten- 
sive influence  on  speculation  than  any  other  ;  and  yet  it  has  not  been  proved, 
and  is  incapable  of  proof — nay,  is  contradicted  by  the  evidence  of  conscious- 
ness itself.  To  trace  the  influence  of  this  assumption  would  be,  in  fact,  in 
a  certain  sort,  to  write  the  history  of  philosophy ;  for,  though  this  influence 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION.  191 

The  principle,  that  the  relation  of  knowledge  implies  an  anal- 
ogy of  existence,  admitted  without  examination  in  almost  every 
school,  but  which  Reid,  with  an  ignorance  wiser  than  knowledge, 

has  never  yet  been  historically  developed,  it  would  be  easy  to  show  that  the 
belief,  explicit  or  implicit,  that  what  knows  and  what  is  immediately  known 
must  be  of  an  analogous  nature,  lies  at  the  root  of  almost  every  theory  of 
cognition,  from  the  very  earliest  to  the  very  latest  speculations.  In  the  more 
ancient  philosophy  of  Greece,  three  philosophers  (Anaxagoras,  Heraclitus, 
and  Alcmseon)  are  found,  who  professed  the  opposite  doctrine — that  the  con- 
dition of  knowledge  lies  in  the  contrariety,  in  the  natural  antithesis,  of  sub- 
ject and  object.  Aristotle,  likewise,  in  his  treatise  On  the  Soul,  expressly 
condemns  the  prevalent  opinion,  that  the  similar  is  only  cognizable  by  the 
similar ;  but,  in  his  Nwomachiani  Ethics,  he  reverts  to  the  doctrine  which, 
in  the  former  work,  he  had  rejected.  With  these  exceptions,  no  principle, 
since  the  time  of  Empedocles,  by  whom  it  seems  first  to  have  been  explicitly 
announced,  has  been  more  universally  received,  than  this — that  the  relation 
of  knowledge  infers  an  analogy  of  existence.  This  analogy  may  be  of  two  de- 
grees. What  knows,  and  what  is  known,  may  be  either  similar  or  the  same  ; 
and,  if  the  principle  itself  be  admitted,  the  latter  alternative  is  the  more 
philosophical.  Without  entering  on  details,  I  may  here  notice  some  of  the 
more  remarkable  results  of  this  principle,  in  both  its  degrees.  The  general 
principle,  not,  indeed,  exclusively,  but  mainly,  determined  the  admission  of 
a  representative  perception,  by  disallowing  the  possibility  of  any  conscious- 
ness, or  immediate  knowledge  of  matter,  by  a  nature  so  different  from  it  as 
mind ;  and,  in  its  two  degrees,  it  determined  the  various  hypotheses,  by  which 
it  was  attempted  to  explain  the  possibility  of  a  representative  or  mediate 
perception  of  the  external  world.  To  this  principle,  in  its  lower  potence — 
that  what  knows  must  be  similar  in  nature  to  what  is  immediately  known — 
we  owe  the  intentional  species  of  the  Aristotelians,  and  the  ideas  of  Male- 
branche  and  Berkeley.  From  this  principle,  in  its  higher  potence — that  what 
knows  must  be  identical  in  nature  with  what  is  immediately  known — there 
flow  the  gnostic  reasons  of  the  Platonists,  the  pre-existing  forms,  or  species  of 
Theophrastus  and  Themistius,  of  Adelandus  and  Avicenna,  the  (mental) 
ideas  of  Descartes  and  Arnauld,  the  representations,  sensual  ideas,  &c.,  of 
Leibnitz  and  Wolf,  the  phenomena  of  Kant,  the  states  of  Browa,  and 
(shall  we  say  ?)  the  vacillating  doctrine  of  perception  held  by  Eeid  him- 
self. Mediately  this  principle  was  the  origin  of  many  other  famous  the- 
ories : — of  the  hierarchical  gradation  of  souls  or  faculties  of  the  Aristote- 
lians ;  of  the  vehicular  media  of  the  Platonists ;  of  the  hypotheses  of  a 
common  intellect  of  Alexander,  Themistius,  Averroes,  Cajetanus,  and  Za- 
barella ;  of  the  vision  in  the  deity  of  Malcbranche ;  and  of  the  Cartesian 
and  Leibnitzian  doctrines  of  assistance  and  pre-established  harmony.  Fi- 
nally, to  this  principle  is  to  be  ascribed  the  refusal  of  the  evidence  of  con- 
sciousness to  the  primary  fact  the  duality  of  its  perception ;  and  the  uni- 
tarian  schemes  of  Absolute  Identity,  Materialism,  and  Idealism,  are  the  ro- 
Rulta.'  Reid,  p.  300. —  W. 


192  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

confesses  he  does  not  understand ;  is  nothing  more  than  an  irra- 
tional attempt  to  explain,  what  is,  in  itself,  inexplicable.  How 
the  similar  or  the  same  is  conscious  of  itself,  is  not  a  whit  less 
inconceivable,  than  how  one  contrary  is  immediately  percipient 
of  another.  It  at  best  only  removes  our  admitted  ignorance  by 
one  step  back  ;  and  then,  in  place  of  our  knowledge  simply  origi- 
nating from  the  incomprehensible,  it  ostentatiously  departs  from 
the  absurd. 

The  slightest  criticism  is  sufficient  to  manifest  the  futility  of 
that  hypothesis  of  representation,  which  Brown  would  substitute 
for  Reid's  presentative  perception ; — although  this  hypothesis, 
under  various  modifications,  be  almost  coextensive  with  the  his- 
tory of  philosophy.  In  fact,  it  fulfils  none  of  the  conditions  of  a 
legitimate  hypothesis. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  unnecessary. — It  cannot  show,  that  the 
fact  of  an  intuitive  perception,  as  given  in  consciousness,  ought 
not  to  be  accepted  ;  it  is  unable  therefore  to  vindicate  its  own 
necessity,  in  order  to  explain  the  possibility  of  our  knowledge  of 
external  things. — That  we  cannot  show  forth,  how  the  mind  is 
capable  of  knowing  something  different  from  self,  is  no  reason  to 
doubt  that  it  is  so  capable.  Every  how  (&O'TI)  rests  ultimately  on 
a  that  (on)  ;  every  demonstration  is  deduced  from  something 
given  and  indemonstrable  ;  all  that  is  comprehensible,  hangs  from 
some  revealed  fact,  which  we  must  believe  as  actual,  but,  cannot 
construe  to  the  reflective  intellect  in  its  possibility.  In  conscious- 
ness,— in  the  original  spontaneity  of  intelligence  (vws,  locus  prin- 
cipiorum),  are  revealed  the  primordial  facts  of  our  intelligent  na- 
ture. Consciousness  is  the  fountain  of  all  comprehensibility  and 
illustration ;  but  as  such,  cannot  be  itself  illustrated  or  compre- 
hended. To  ask  how  any  fact  of  consciousness  is  possible,  is  to  ask 
how  consciousness  itself  is  possible ;  and  to  ask  how  consciousness 
is  possible,  is  to  ask  how  a  being  intelligent  like  man  is  possible. 
Could  we  answer  this,  the  Serpent  had  not  tempted  Eve  by  an 
hyperbole  : — '  We  should  be  as  Gods.'  But  as  we  did  not  create 
ourselves,  and  are  not  even  in  the  secret  of  our  creation ;  we 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION.  193 

must  take  our  existence,  our  knowledge  upon  trust :  and  that 
philosophy  is  the  only  true,  because  in  it  alone  can  truth  be  real- 
ized, which  does  not  revolt  against  the  authority  of  our  natural 

beliefs. 

'  The  voice  of  Nature  is  the  voice  of  God.' 

To  ask,  therefore,  a  reason  for  the  possibility  of  our  intuition  of 
external  things,  above  the  fact  of  its  reality,  as  given  in  our  per- 
ceptive consciousness,  betrays,  as  Aristotle  has  truly  said,  an 
imbecility  of  the  reasoning  principle  itself : — 'TouTou  Qifrsn  Xo^ov, 
ayevrag  <r»jv  ctitfdrtfi .',  appwrfria  rig  £<f<ri  &avoi'a£.'  The  natural 
realist,  who  accepts  this  intuition,  cannot,  certainly,  explain  it,  be- 
cause, as  ultimate,  it  is  a  fact  inexplicable.  Yet,  with  Hudibras : 

'  He  knows  whqffs  what ;  and  that's  as  high 
As  metaphysic  wit  can  fly.' 

But  the  hypothetical  realist — the  cosmothetic  idealist,  who  rejects 
a  consciousness  of  aught  beyond  the  mind,  cannot  require  of  the 
natural  realist  an  explanation  of  how  such  a  consciousness  is  pos»- 
sible,  until  he  himself  shall  have  explained,  what  is  even  less  con- 
ceivable, the  possibility  of  representing  (i.  e.  of  knowing)  the  un- 
known. Till  then,  each  founds  on  the  incomprehensible  ;  but  the 
former  admits  the  veracity,  the  latter  postulates  the  falsehood  of 
tha*  principle,  which  can  alone  confer  on  this  incomprehensible 
foundation  the  character  of  truth.  The  natural  realist,  whose 
watchword  is — The  facts  of  consciousness,  the  whole  facts,  and 
nothing  but  the  facts,  has  therefore  naught  to  fear  from  his  antag- 
onist, so  long  as  consciousness  cannot  be  explained  nor  redargu- 
ed from  without.  If  his  system  be  to  fall,  it  falls  only  with  phi- 
losophy ;  for  it  can  only  be  disproved,  by  proving  the  mendacity 
of  consciousness — of  that  faculty, 

4  Quo;  nisi  sit  veri,  ratio  quoque  falsa  fit  omnis  ;' 
('  Which  unless  true,  all  reason  turns  a  lie.') 

This  leads  us  to  the  second  violation  of  the  laws  of  a  legitimate 
hypothesis ; — the  doctrine  of  a  representative  perception  annihi- 
lates itself,  in  subverting  the  universal  edifice  of  knowledge. — 
Belying  the  testimony  of  consciousness  to  our  immediate  percep- 

9 


194  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

tion  of  an  outer  world,  it  belies  the  veracity  of  consciousness  alto- 
gether. But  the  truth1  of  consciousness,  is  the  condition  of  the 
possibility  of  all  knowledge.  The  first  act  of  hypothetical  realism, 
is  thus  an  act  of  suicide ;  philosophy,  thereafter,  is  at  best  but  an 
enchanted  corpse,  awaiting  only  the  exorcism  of  the  skeptic,  to 
relapse  into  its  proper  nothingness. — But  of  this  we  shall  have 
occasion  to  treat  at  large,  in  exposing  Brown's  misprision  of  the 
argument  from  common  sense. 

In  the  third  place,  it  is  the  condition  of  a  legitimate  hypothe- 
sis, that  the  fact  or  facts  for  which  it  is  excogitated  to  account, 
be  not  themselves  hypothetical. — But  so  far  is  the  principal  fact, 
which  the  hypothesis  of  a  representative  perception  is  proposed 
to  explain,  from  being  certain  ;  its  reality  is  even  rendered  prob- 
lematical by  the  proposed  explanation  itself.  The  facts,  about 
which  this  hypothesis  is  conversant,  are  two :  the  fact  of  the 
mental  modification,  and  the  fact  of  the  material  reality.  The 
problem  to  be  solved  is  their  connection ;  and  the  hypothesis  of 
representation  is  advanced,  as  the  ratio  of  their  correlation,  in 
supposing  that  the  former  as  known  is  vicarious  of  the  latter  as 
existing.  There  is,  however,  here  a  see-saw  between  the  hypoth- 
esis and  the  fact :  the  fact  is  assumed  as  an  hypothesis ;  and  the 
hypothesis  explained  as  a  fact ;  each  is  established,  each  is  ex- 
pounded, by  the  other.  To  account  for  the  possibility  of  an 
unknown  external  world,  the  hypothesis  of  representation  is  de- 
vised ;  and  to  account  for  the  possibility  of  representation,  we 
imagine  the  hypothesis  of  an  external  world.  Nothing  could  be 
more  easy  than  to  demonstrate,  that  on  this  supposition,  the  fact 
of  the  external  reality  is  not  only  petitory  but  improbable.  This, 
however,  we  are  relieved  from  doing,  by  Dr.  Brown's  own  admis- 
sion, that  '  the  skeptical  argument  for  the  non-existence  of  an  ex- 
ternal world,  as  a  mere  play  of  reasoning,  admits  of  no  reply  ;' 
and  we  shall  afterwards  prove,  that  the  only  ground  on  which  he 
attempts  to  vindicate  this  existence  (the  ground  of  our  natural 

1  See  Part  First,  passim. —  W. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION.  195 

belief  in  its  reality),  is  one,  not  competent  to  the  hypothetical 
realist.  We  shall  see,  that  if  this  belief  be  true,  the  hypothesis 
itself  is  superseded ;  if  false,  that  there  is  no  fact  for  the  hypothe- 
sis to  explain. 

In  the  fourth  place,  a  legitimate  hypothesis  must  account  for 
the  phenomenon,  about  which  it  is  conversant,  adequately  and 
without  violence,  in  all  its  dependencies,  relations,  and  peculiari- 
ties. But  the  hypothesis  in  question,  only  accomplishes  its  end, 
— nay,  only  vindicates  its  utility,  by  a  mutilation,  or,  more  prop- 
erly, by  the  destruction  and  re-creation,  of  the  very  phenomenon 
for  the  nature  of  which  it  would  account.  The  entire  phenome- 
non to  be  explained  by  the  supposition  of  a  representative  percep- 
tion, is  the  fact  given  in  consciousness,  of  the  immediate  knowl- 
edge or  intuition  of  an  existence  different  from  self.  This  simple 
phenomenon  it  hews  down  into  two  fragments ;  into  the  existence 
and  the  intuition.  The  existence  of  external  things,  which  is  given 
only  through  their  intuition,  it  admits ;  the  intuition  itself,  though 
the  ratio  cognoscendi,  and  to  us  therefore  the  ratio  essendi  of  their 
.reality,  it  rejects.  But  to  annihilate  what  is  prior  and  constit- 
utive in  the  phenomenon,  is,  in  truth,  to  annihilate  the  phenom- 
enon altogether.  The  existence  of  an  external  world,  which  the 
hypothesis  proposes  to  explain,  is  no  longer  even  a  truncated  fact 
of  consciousness ;  for  the  existence  given  in  consciousness,  neces- 
sarily fell  with  the  intuition  on  which  it  reposed.  A  representa- 
tive perception,  is  therefore,  an  hypothetical  explanation  of  a 
supposititious  fact :  it  creates  the  nature  it  interprets.  And  in 
this  respect,  of  all  the  varieties  of  the  representative  hypothesis, 
the  third,  or  that  which  views  in  the  object  known  a  modification 
of  thought  itself,  most  violently  outrages  the  phenomenon  of  con- 
sciousness it  would  explain.  And  this  is  Brown's.  The  first,  saves 
the  phenomenon  of  consciousness  in  so  far  as  it  preserves  always 
the  numerical,  if  not  always  the  substantial,  difference  between 
the  object  perceived  and  the  percipient  mind.  The  second  does 
not  violate  at  least  the  anthithesis  of  the  object  perceived  and 
the  percipient  act.  But  in  the  third  or  simplest  form  of  repre- 


196  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

sentation,  not  only  is  the  object  known,  denied  to  be  itself  the 
reality  existing,  as  consciousness  attests ;  this  object  revealed  as 
not-self,  is  identified  with  the  mental  ego;  nay,  even,  though 
given  as  permanent,  with  the  transient  energy  of  thought  itself. 

In  the  fifth  place,  the  fact,  which  a  legitimate  hypothesis  is 
devised  to  explain,  must  be  within  the  sphere  of  experience.  The 
fact,  however,  for  which  that  of  a  representative  perception  ac- 
counts (the  existence  of  external  things),  transcends,  ex  hypothesi, 
all  experience ;  it  is  the  object  of  no  real  knowledge,  but  a  bare 
ens  rationis — a  mere  hyperphysical  chimera. 

In  the  sixth  and  last  place,  an  hypothesis  itself  is  probable  in 
proportion  as  it  works  simply  and  naturally ;  that  is  in  propor- 
tion as  it  is  dependent  on  no  subsidiary  hypothesis,  and  as  it  in- 
volves nothing,  petitory,  occult,  supernatural,  as  an  element  of  its 
explanation.  In  this  respect,  the  doctrine  of  a  representative 
perception  is  not  less  vicious  than  in  others.  To  explain  at  all,  it 
must  not  only  postulate  subsidiary  hypotheses,  but  subsidiary 
miracles.  The  doctrine  in  question  attempts  to  explain  the  knowl- 
edge of  an  unknown  world,  by  the  ratio  of  a  representative  per- 
ception :  but  it  is  impossible  by  any  conceivable  relation,  to  apply 
the  ratio  to  the  facts.  The  mental  modification,  of  which,  on  the 
doctrine  of  representation,  we  are  exclusively  conscious  in  percep- 
tion, either  represents  (i.  e.  affords  a  mediate  knowledge  of)  a  real 
external  world,  or  it  does  not.  (We  say  only  the  reality ;  to 
include  all  systems  from  Kant's,  who  does  not  predicate  even  an 
existence  in  space  and  time  of  things  in  themselves,  to  Locke's, 
who  supposes  the  transcendent  reality  to  resemble  its  idea,  at  least 
in  the  primary  qualities.)  Now,  the  latter  alternative  is  an  affir- 
mation of  absolute  Idealism  ;  we  have,  therefore,  at  present  only 
to  consider  the  former.  And  here,  the  mind  either  knows  the 
reality  of  what  it  represents,  or  it  does  not.  On  the  prior  alter- 
native, the  hypothesis  under  discussion  would  annihilate  itself,  in 
annihilating  the  ground  of  its  utility.  For  as  the  end  of  repre- 
sentation is  knowledge  ;  and  as  the  hypothesis  of  a  representative 
perception  is  only  required  on  the  supposed  impossibility  of  that 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION.  197 

presentative  knowledge  of  external  things,  which  consciousness 
affirms : — if  the  mind  is  admitted  to  be  cognizant  of  the  outer 
reality  in  itself,  previous  to  representation,  the  end  towards  which 
the  hypothesis  was  devised  as  a  mean,  has  been  already  accom- 
plished ;  and  the  possibility  of  an  intuitive  perception,  as  given 
in  consciousness,  is  allowed.  Nor  is  the  hypothesis  only  absurd, 
as  superfluous.  It  is  worse.  For  the  mind  would,  in  this  case, 
be  supposed  to  know  before  it  knew  ;  or,  like  the  crazy  Pentheus, 
to  see  its  objects  double, — 

('  Et  solem  geminum  et  duplices  se  ostendere  Thebas') ; 

and,  if  these  absurdities  be  eschewed,  then  is  the  identity  of  mind 
and  self, — of  consciousness  and  knowledge,  abolished ;  and  my 
intellect  knows,  what  /  am  not  conscious  of  it  knowing  !  The 
other  alternative  remains  : — that  the  mind  is  blindly  determined 
to  represent,  and  truly  to  represent,  the  reality  which  it  does  not 
know.  And  here  the  mind  either  blindly  determines  itself,  or  is 
blindly  determined  by  an  extrinsic  and  intelligent  cause.  The 
former  lemma  is  the  more  philosophical,  in  so  far  as  it  assumes 
nothing  hyperphysical ;  but  it  is  otherwise  utterly  irrational,  in- 
asmuch as  it  would  explain  an  effect,  by  a  cause  wholly  inade- 
quate to  its  production.  On  this  alternative,  knowledge  is  sup- 
posed to  be  the  effect  of  ignorance, — intelligence  of  stupidity, — 
life  of  death.  We  are  necessarily  ignorant,  ultimately  at  least,  of 
the  mode  in  which  causation  operates  ;  but  we  know  at  least,  that 
no  effect  arises  without  a  cause — and  a  cause  proportionate  to  its 
existence.  The  absurdity  of  this  supposition  has  accordingly 
constrained  the  profoundest  cosmothetic  idealists,  notwithstanding 
their  rational  abhorrence  of  a  supernatural  assumption,  to  em- 
brace the  second  alternative.  To  say  nothing  of  less  illustrious 
schemes,  the  systems  of  Divine  Assistance,  of  a  Pre-established 
Harmony,  and  of  the  Vision  of  all  things  in  the  Deity,  are  only 
so  many  subsidiary  hypotheses, — so  many  attempts  to  bridge,  by 
supernatural  machinery,  the  chasm  between  the  representation 
and  the  reality,  which  all  human  ingenuity  had  found,  by  natural 


198  PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION. 

means,  to  be  insuperable.  The  hypothesis  of  a  representative 
perception,  thus  presupposes  a  miracle  to  let  it  work.  Dr.  Brown, 
indeed,  rejects  as  unphilosophical,  those  hyperphysical  subsidies. 
But  he  only  saw  less  clearly  than  their  illustrious  authors,  the 
necessity  which  required  them.  It  is  a  poor  philosophy  that 
eschews  the  Deus  ex  machina,  and  yet  ties  the  knot  which  is  only 
soluble  by  his  interposition.  It  is  not  unphilosophical  to  assume 
a  miracle,  if  a  miracle  be  necessary ;  but  it  is  unphilosophical  to 
originate  the  necessity  itself.  And  here  the  hypothetical  realist 
cannot  pretend,  that  the  difficulty  is  of  nature's,  not  of  his  crea- 
tion. In  fact  it  only  arises,  because  he  has  closed  his  eyes  upon 
the  light  of  nature,  and  refused  the  guidance  of  consciousness : 
but  having  swamped  himself  in  following  the  ignis  fatuus  of  a 
theory,  he  has  no  right  to  refer  its  private  absurdities  to  the  im- 
becility of  human  reason ;  or  to  generalize  his  own  factitious  igno- 
rance, by  a  Quantum  est  quod  nescimus !  The  difficulty  of  the 
problem  Dr.  Brown  has  not  perceived ;  or  perceiving,  has  not 
ventured  to  state, — far  less  attempted  to  remove.  He  has  es- 
sayed, indeed,  to  cut  the  knot,  which  he  was  unable  to  loose ; 
but  we  shall  find,  in  the  sequel,  that  his  summary  postulate  of  the 
reality  of  an  external  world,  on  the  ground  of  our  belief  in  its 
existence,  is,  in  his  hands,  of  all  unfortunate  attempts,  perhaps  the 
most  unsuccessful. 

The  scheme  of  Natural  Realism  (which  it  is  Reid's  honor  to 
have  been  the  first,  among  not  forgotten  philosophers,  virtually 
and  intentionally,  at  least,  to  embrace)  is  thus  the  only  system,  on 
which  the  truth  of  consciousness  and  the  possibility  of  knowledge 
can  be  vindicated ;  whilst  the  Hypothetical  Realist,  in  his  effort 
to  be  '  wise  above  knowledge,'  like  the  dog  in  the  fable,  loses  the 
substance,  in  attempting  to  realize  the  shadow.  '  Lets  hommes'' 
(says  Leibnitz,  with  a  truth  of  which  he  was  not  himself  aware), — 
'  les  hommes  cherchent  ce  qu'ils  savent,  et  ne  savent  pas  ce  quails 
cherchenC 

That  the  doctrine  of  an  intuitive  perception  is  not  without  its 
difficulties,  we  allow ;  but  these  do  not  affect  its  possibility,  and 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  199 

may  in  a  great  measure  be  removed  by  a  more  sedulous  examina- 
tion of  the  phenomena.  The  distinction  of  perception  proper 
from  sensation  proper  ;  in  other  words,  of  the  objective  from  the 
subjective  in  this  act,  Reid,  after  other  philosophers,  has  already 
turned  to  good  account ;  but  his  analysis  would  have  been  still 
more  successful,  had  he  discovered  the  law  which  universally 
governs  their  manifestation : — That  Perception  and  Sensation, 
the  objective  and  subjective,  though  both  always  coexistent,  are 
always  in  the  inverse  ratio  of  each  other.  But  on  this  matter  we 
cannot  at  present  enter.1 

Dr.  Brown  is  not  only  wrong  in  regard  to  Reid's  own  doctrine ; 
he  is  wrong,  even  admitting  his  interpretation  of  that  philosopher 
to  be  true,  in  charging  him  with  a  '  series  of  wonderful  miscon- 
ceptions,' in  regard  to  the  opinions  universally  prevalent  touching 
the  nature  of  ideas.  We  shall  not  argue  the  case  upon  the  higher 
ground,  that  Reid,  as  a  natural  realist,  could  not  be  philosophically 
out,  in  assailing  the  hypothesis  of  a  representative  perception, 
even  though  one  of  its  subordinate  modifications  might  be  mis- 
taken by  him  for  another ;  but  shall  prove  that,  supposing  Reid 
to  have  been,  like  Brown,  a  hypothetical  realist,  under  the  third 
form  of  a  representative  perception,  he  was  not  historically  wrong 
in  attributing  to  philosophers  in  general  (at  least  after  the  decline 
of  the  Scholastic  philosophy),  the  first  or  second  variety  of  the 
hypothesis.  Even  on  this  lower  ground,  Brown  is  fated  to  be 
unsuccessful ;  and  if  Reid  be  not  always  correct,  his  antagonist 
has  failed  in  convicting  him  even  of  a  single  inaccuracy. 
We  shall  consider  Brown's  charge  of  misrepresentation  in 
detail. 

It  is  always  unlucky  to  stumble  on  the  threshold.  The  para- 
graph (Lect.  xxvii.)  in  which  Dr.  Brown  opens  his  attack  on  Reid, 
contains  more  mistakes  than  sentences ;  and  the  etymological  dis- 
cussion it  involves  supposes  as  true,  what  is  not  simply  false,  but 
diametrically  opposite  to  the  truth.  Among  other  errors : — In 

1  See  Part  Second,  chap.  vi. —  W. 


200  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

the  first  place,  the  term  'idea?  was  never  employed  in  any  sys- 
tem, previous  to  the  age  of  Descartes,  to  denote  '  little  images 
derived  from  objects  without.'  In  the  second,  it  was  never  used 
in  any  philosophy,  prior  to  the  same  period,  to  signify  the  imme- 
diate object  of  perception.  In  the  third,  it  was  not  applied  by 
the  '  Peripatetics  or  Schoolmen,'  to  express  an  object  of  human 
thought  at  all.*  In  the  fourth,  ideas  (taking  this  term  for  spe- 


*  The  history  of  the  word  idea  seems  completely  unknown.  Previous  to 
the  age  of  Descartes,  as  a  philosophical  term,  it  was  employed  exclusively 
by  the  Platonists — at  least  exclusively  in  a  Platonic  meaning ;  and  this 
meaning  was  precisely  the  reverse  of  that  attributed  to  the  word  by  Dr. 
Brown; — the  idea  was  not  an  object  of  perception, — the  idea  tea*  not  derived 
from  witfiout.  In  the  schools,  BO  far  from  being  a  current  psychological 
expression,  as  ho  imagines,  it  had  no  other  application  than  a  theological. 
Neither,  after  the  revival  of  letters,  was  the  term  extended  by  the  Aristo- 
telians even  to  the  objects  of  intellect.  Melanchthon,  indeed  (who  was  a 
kind  of  semi-Platonist)  uses  it  on  one  occasion  as  a  synonym  for  notion,  or 
intelligible  species  (De  Anirna,  p.  187,  ed.  1555);  but  it  was  even  to  this 
solitary  instance,  we  presume,  that  Julius  Scaliger  alludes  (De  SubtiKtate, 
vi.  4),  when  he  castigates  such  an  application  of  the  word  as  neoteric  and 
abusive.  "  Melanck."  is  on  the  margin.  Goclenius  also  probably  founded 
his  usage  on  Melanchthon. — We  should  have  distinctly  said,  that  previous 
to  its  employment  by  Descartes  himself,  the  expression  had  never  been  used 
as  a  comprehensive  term  for  the  immediate  objects  of  thought,  had  we  not 
in  remembrance  the  Historia  Animce  Humana  of  our  countryman,  David 
Buchanan.  This  work,  originally  written  in  French,  had,  for  some  years, 
been  privately  circulated  previous  to  its  publication  at  Paris,  in  1636.  Here 
we  find  the  word  idea  familiarly  employed,  in  its  most  extensive  significa- 
tion, to  express  the  objects,  not  only  of  intellect  proper,  but  of  memory, 
imagination,  sense;  and  this  is  the  earliest  example  of  such  an  employment. 
For  the  Discourse  on  Method  in  which  the  term  is  usurped  by  Descartes  in 
an  equal  latitude,  was  at  least  a  year  later  in  its  publication — viz.,  in  June, 
1637.  Adopted  soon  after  also  by  Gassendi,  the  word  under  such  imposing 
patronage  gradually  won  its  way  into  general  use.  In  England,  however, 
Locke  may  be  said  to  have  been  the  first  who  naturalized  the  term  in  it*> 
Cartesian  universality.  Hobbcs  employs  it,  and  that  historically,  only  once 
or  twice ;  Henry  More  and  Cudworth  are  very  chary  of  it,  even  when  treat- 
ing of  the  Cartesian  philosophy ;  "Willis  rarely  uses  it ;  while  Lord  Herbert, 
Reynolds,  and  the  English  philosophers  in  general,  between  Descartes  and 
Locke,  do  not  apply  it  psychologically  at  all.  When  in  common  language, 
employed  by  Milton  and  Dryden,  after  Descartes,  as  before  him  by  Sidney, 
Spenser,  Shakspeare,  Hooker,  &c.,  the  meaning  is  Plutonic.  Our  Lexi- 
vographere  are  ignorant  of  the  difference. 

The  fortune  of  this  word  is  curious.    Employed  by  Plato  to  express  the 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION.  201 

cies)  were  not  '  in  all  the  dark  ages  of  the  scholastic  followers  of 
Aristotle'  regarded  as  '  little  images  derived  from  without ;'  for 
a  numerous  party  of  the  most  illustrious  schoolmen  rejected  spe- 

real  forms  *  of  the  intelligible  world,  in  lofty  contrast  to  the  unreal  images  of 
the  sensible ;  it  was  lowered  by  Descartes,  who  extended  it  to  the  objects  of 
our  consciousness  in  general.  When,  after  Gassendi,  the  school  of  Condillac 
had  analyzed  our  highest  faculties  into  our  lowest,  the  idea  was  still  more 
deeply  degraded  from  its  high  original.  Like  a  fallen  angel,  it  was  relegated 
from  the  sphere  of  Divine  intelligence  to  the  atmosphere  of  human  sense, 
till  at  last  Ideologic  (more  correctly  Idealogu),  a  word  which  could  orAy  prop- 
erly suggest  an  a  priori  scheme,  deducing  our  knowledge  from  the  intellect, 
has  in  France  become  the  name  peculiarly  distinctive  of  that  philosophy  of 
mind  which  exclusively  derives  our  knowledge  from  the  senses.  Word  and 
thing,  ideas  have  been  the  crux  philosopJiorwn,  since  Aristotle  sent  them 
packing  (xatptTiaaav  IStai)  to  the  present  day. 

A  few  notes,  which  we  transfer  from  Hamilton's  Reid,  will  complete  the 
history  and  definition  of  the  word  idea. —  W. 

Whether  Plato  viewed  Ideas  as  existences  independent  of  the  divine 
mind,  is  a  contested  point ;  though,  upon  the  whole,  it  appears  more  proba- 
ble that  he  did  not.  It  is,  however,  admitted  on  all  hands,  to  be  his  doc- 
trine, that  Ideas  were  the  patterns  according  to  which  the  Deity  fashioned 
the  phenomenal  or  ectypal  world. 

It  should  be  carefully  observed  that  the  term  Idea,  previous  to  the  time 
of  Descartes,  was  used  exclusively,  or  all  but  exclusively,  in  its  Plutonic  sig- 
nification. By  Descartes,  and  other  contemporary  philosophers,  it  was  first 
extended  to  denote  our  representations  in  general.  Many  curious  blunders 
have  arisen  in  consequence  of  an  ignorance  of  this.  I  may  notice,  by  the 
way,  that  a  confusion  of  ideas  in  the  Platonic  with  ideas  in  the  Cartesian 
sense  has  led  Reid  into  the  error  of  assimilating  the  hypothesis  of  Plato  and 
the  hypothesis  of  Malebranche  in  regard  to  our  vision  in  the  divine  mind. 
The  Platonic  theory  of  Perception,  in  fact,  bears  a  closer  analogy  to  the  Car 
tesian  and  Leibnitzian  doctrines  than  to  that  of  Malebranche. 

Reid,  in  common  with  our  philosophers  in  general,  had  no  knowledge 
of  the  Platonic  theory  of  sensible  perception;  and  yet  the  gnostic  forms,  the 
cognitive  reasons  of  the  Platonis\p,  held  a  far  more  proximate  relation  to  ideas 
in  the  modern  acceptation  than  the  Platonic  ideas  themselves. 

This  interpretation2  of  the  meaning  of  Plato's  comparison  of  the  cave 
exhibits  a  curious  mistake,  in  which  Reid  is  followed  by  Mr.  Stewart  and 
many  others,3  and  which,  it  is  remarkable,  has  never  yet  been  detected.  In 
the  similitude  in  question  (which  will  be  found  in  the  seventh  book  of  the 
Republic),  Plato  is  supposed  to  intend  an  illustration  of  the  mode  in  which 

1  Whether,  in  the  Platonic  system,  Ideas  are  or  are  not  independent  of  the  Deity,  is,  and 
always  has  been,  a  vexata  quiestio.—$ee  Hamilton's  Reid,  p.  370. —  W. 

1  The  interpretation  given  in  the  text  of  Reid  —  W. 

1  Hamilton  has  shown  in  another  place  that  Bacon  has  also  wrested  Plato's  similitude  of 
the  cave  from  its  genuine  signification  —  /(". 

9* 


202  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

cies,  not  only  in  the  intellect,  but  in  the  sense.  In  the  fifth, 
'phantasm?  in  'the  old  philosophy,'  was  not  the  '•external 
cause  of  perception?  but  the  internal  object  of  imagination.  In 

the  shadows  or  vicarious  images  of  external  things  are  admitted  into  the 
mind — to  typify,  in  short,  an  hypothesis  of  sensitive  perception.  On  his  snji 
position,  the  identity  of  the  Platonic,  Pythagorean,  and  Peripatetic  theories 
of  this  process  is  inferred.  Nothing  can,  however,  ho  more  groundless  than  the 
supposition ;  nothing  more  erroneous  than  the  inference.  By  his  cave,  images, 
and  shadows,  Plato  meant  simply  to  illustrate  the  grand  principle  of  his  philoso- 
phy— that  the  Sensible  or  Ectypal  world  (phenomenal,  transitory,  yiyv6ntvov, 
3v  xal  nit  8c)  stands  to  the  Noetic  or  Archetypal  (substantial,  permanent, 
SVTM  8c)  in  the  same  relation  of  comparative  unreality  in  which  the  shadowx 
of  the  images  of  sensible  existences  themselves,  stand  to  the  things  of  which 
they  are  the  dim  and  distant  adumbrations.  In  the  language  of  an  illus- 
trious poet — 

'  An  nescis,  qutecunque  haec  sunt,  qua)  hac  nocte  teguntur, 
Omnia  res  prorsus  veras  non  esse,  sed  umbras, 
Aut  specula,  undo  ad  nos  aliena  elucet  imago? 
Terra  quidem,  et  maria  alta,  atque  his  circumfluus  aor, 
Et  quse  consistunt  ex  iis,  hac  omnia  tenueis 
Sunt  umbrae,  humanos  quse  tanquam  somnia  qusedam 
Pcrtingunt  animos,  fallaci  et  imagine  ludunt, 
Nunquam  eadem,  fluxu  semper  variata  pcrenni. 
Sol  autem,  Lunseque  glohus,  fulgentiaque  astra 
Csetera,  sint  quamvis  meliori  praedita  vita, 
Et  donata  sevo  immortnli,  hsec  ipsa  tamen  sunt 
uEterni  specula,  in  quae  animus,  qui  est  inde  profectus, 
Inspiciens,  patriss  quodam  quasi  tactus  amore, 
Ardescit.     Verum  quoniam  licic  non  perstat  et  ultra 
Nescio  quid  sequitur  secum,  tacitusquc  rcquirit, 
Nosse  licet  circum  hsec  ipsum  consistere  verum, 
Non  finem:  sed  enim  esse  aliud  quid,  cujus  imago 
Splendet  in  iis,  quod  per  se  ipsum  cst,  et  principinm  esse 
Omnibus  seternum,  ante  omnein  numerumque  diemque ; 
In  quo  alium  Solem  atque  uliam  splendescere  Lunam 
Adspicias,  aliosquc  orbes,  alia  astra  manere, 
Terramquc,  fluviosque  alios,  atque  uora,  et  ignem, 
Et  nemora,  atque  aliis  errare  animalia  silvis.' 

And  as  the  comparison  is  misunderstood,  so  nothing  can  be  conceived 
more  adverse  to  the  doctrine  of  Plato  than  the  theory  it  is  supposed  to  elu- 
cidate. Plotiuus,  indeed,  formally  refutes,  as  contrary  to  the  Platonic,  the 
very  hypothesis  thus  attributed  to  his  master.  (Enn.  IV.,  1.  vi.  cc.  1.  8.) 
The  doctrine  of  the  Platonists  on  this  point  has  been  almost  wholly  neglect- 
ed; and  the  author  among  them  whose  work  contains  its  most  articulate 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  203 

the  sixth,  the  term  '  shadowy  film]  which  here  and  elsewhere  he 
constantly  uses,  shows  that  Dr.  Brown  confounds  the  matterless 


development  has  been  so  completely  overlooked,  both  by  scholars  and  phi- 
losophers, that  his  work  is  of  the  rarest ;  while  even  his  name  is  mentioned  in 
no  history  of  philosophy.  It  is  here  sufficient  to  state,  that  the  t"Sa>\a,  the 
Myoi  YVUS-IKOI,  the  forms  representative  of  external  things,  and  corresponding 
to  the  species  sensiles  expresses  of  the  schoolmen,  were  not  held  by  the  Plato- 
nists  to  be  derived  from  without.  Prior  to  the  act  of  perception,  they  have  a 
latent  but  real  existence  in  the  soul ;  and,  by  the  impassive  energy  of  the 
mind  itself,  are  elicited  into  consciousness,  on  occasion  of  the  impression 
(rivals,  xdBos,  eiKpatris)  made  on  the  external  organ,  and  of  the  vital  form 
((,<aTiK<>v  elSos),  in  consequence  thereof,  sublimated  in  the  animal  life.  The 
verses  of  Boethius,  which  have  been  so  frequently  misunderstood,  contain 
an  accurate  statement  of  the  Platonic  theory  of  perception.  After  refuting 
the  Stoical  doctrine  of  the  passivity  of  mind  in  this  process,  he  proceeds: 

'  Mens  est  efficiens  magis1 
Longe  causa  potentior, 
Quam  quaB  materias  modo 
Impressas  patitur  notas. 
PrcKcedit  tamen  excitans 
Ac  vires  animi  movens 
Vivo  in  corpore  passio, 
Cum  vel  lux  oculos  ferit, 
Vel  vox  auribus  instrepit: 
Turn  mentis  vigor  extitus 
tyuas  intus  species  tenet, 
Ad  motus  similes  vocans, 
Notis  applicat  exteris, 
Introrsumque  reconditis 
Formis  miscet  imagines.' 

I  cannot  now  do  more  than  indicate  the  contrast  of  this  doctrine  to  the 
Peripatetic  (I  do  not  say  Aristotelian)  theory,  and  its  approximation  to  the 
Cartesian  and  Leibnitzian  hypotheses ;  which,  however,  both  attempt  to 
explain,  what  the  Platonic  did  not — how  the  mind,  ex  liypothesi,  above  all 
physical  influence,  is  determined,  on  the  presence  of  the  unknown  reality 
within  the  sphere  of  sense,  to  call  into  consciousness  the  representation 
through  which  that  reality  is  made  known  to  us.  I  may  add,  that  not 
merely  the  Platonists,  but  some  of  the  older  Peripatetics  held  that  the  soul 
virtually  contained  within  itself  representative  forms,  which  were  only 
excited  by  the  external  reality;  a*  Theophrastus  and  Themistius,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  Platonizing  Porphyry,  Simplicius  and  Ammonius  Hermiae ; 
and  the  same  opinion,  adopted,  probably  from  the  latter,  by  his  pupil,  the 
Arabian  Adelandus,  subsequently  became  even  the  common  doctrine  of  the 
Moorish  Aristotelians. 


204  PHILOSOPHY    OF   PKRCEPFION. 

species  of  the  Peripatetics  with  the  corporeal  effluxions  of  Democ- 
ritus  and  Epicurus : 

'  Qua1,  quasi  membrantr,  Miiuino  do  cortice  rerum 
Dcreptas,  volitant  ultro  citroque  per  auras.' 

Dr.  Brown,  in  short,  only  fails  in  victoriously  establishing 
ugainst  Reid  the  various  meanings  in  which  '  the  old  writers' 
employed  the  term  idea,  by  the  petty  fact — that  the  old  writers 
did  not  employ  the  term  idea  at  all. 

Nor  does  the  progress  of  the  attack  belie  the  omen  of  its  out- 
set. We  shall  consider  the  philosophers  quoted  by  Brown  in 
chronological  order.  Of  three  of  these  only  (Descartes,  Arnauld, 
Locke)  were  the  opinions  particularly  noticed  by  Reid ;  the 
others  (Hobbes,  Le  Clerc,  Crousaz)  Brown  adduces  as  examples 
of  Reid's  general  misrepresentation.  Of  the  greater  number  of 
the  philosophers  specially  criticised  by  Reid,  Brown  prudently 
says  nothing. 

Of  these,  the  first  is  DESCARTES  ;  and  in  regard  to  him,  Dr. 
Brown,  not  content  with  accusing  Reid  of  simple  ignorance,  con- 
tends '  that  the  opinions  of  Descartes  are  precisely  opposite  to  the 
representations  which  he  has  given  of  them.'  (Lect.  xxvii.  p. 
172.) — Now  Reid  states,  in  regard  to  Descartes,  that  this  philos- 
opher appears  to  place  the  idea  or  representative  object  in  per- 
ception, sometimes  in  the  mind,  and  sometimes  in  the  brain ; 
and  he  acknowledges  that  while  these  opinions  seem  to  him  con- 
tradictory, he  is  not  prepared  to  pronounce  which  of  them  their 
author  held,  if  he  did  not  indeed  hold  both  together.  'Des- 
cartes,' he  says,  '  seems  to  have  hesitated  between  the  two  opin- 
ions, or  to  have  passed  from  one  to  the  other.'  On  any 
alternative,  however,  Reid  attributes  to  Descartes,  either  the  first 
or  the  second  form  of  representation.  Now  here  we  must  recol- 
lect, that  the  question  is  not  whether  Reid  be  rigorously  right, 
!>ut  whether  he  be  inexcusably  wrong.  Dr.  Brown  accuses  him 
of  the  most  ignorant  misrepresentation, — of  interpreting  an  author, 
whose  perspicuity  he  himself  admits,  in  a  sense  'exactly  the 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  205 

reverse1  of  truth.  To  determine  what  Descartes'  doctrine  of  per- 
ception actually  is,  would  be  difficult,  perhaps  even  impossible ; 
but  in  reference  to  the  question  at  issue,  certainly  superfluous. 
It  here  suffices  to  show,  that  his  opinion  on  this  point  is  one 
mooted  among  his  disciples ;  and  that  Brown,  wholly  unac- 
quainted with  the  difficulties  of  the  question,  dogmatizes  on 
the  basis  of  a  single  passage — nay,  of  a  passage  in  itself  irrele- 
vant. 

Reid  is  justified  against  Brown,  if  the  Cartesian  Idea  be 
proved  either  a  material  image  in  the  brain,  or  an  immaterial 
representation  in  the  mind,  distinct  from  the  precipient  act.  By 
those  not  possessed  of  the  key  to  the  Cartesian  theory,  there  are 
many  passages*  in  the  writings  of  its  author,  which,  taken  by 
themselves,  might  naturally  be  construed  to  import,  that  Des- 
cartes supposed  the  mind  to  be  conscious  of  certain  motions  in 
the  brain,  to  which,  as  well  as  to  the  modifications  of  the  intellect 
itself,  he  applies  the  terms  image  and  idea.  Reid,  who  did  not 
understand  the  Cartesian  philosophy  as  a  system,  was  puzzled  by 
these  superficial  ambiguities.  Not  aware  that  the  cardinal  point 
of  that  system  is — that  mind  and  body,  as  essentially  opposed,  are 
naturally  to  each  other  as  zero,  and  that  their  mutual  intercourse 
can  only  be  supernaturally  maintained  by  the  concourse  of  the 
Deity ;  f  Reid  attributed  to  Descartes  the  possible  opinion,  that 


*  Ex.  gr.  De  Pass.  §  35 — a  passage  stronger  than  any  of  those  noticed  by 
De  la  Forge. 

t  That  the  theory  of  Occasional  Causes  is  necessarily  involved  in  Des- 
cartes' doctrine  of  Assistance,  and  that  his  explanation  of  the  connection  of 
mind  and  body  reposes  on  that  theory,  it  is  impossible  to  doubt.  For  while 
he  rejects  all  physical  influence  in  the  communication  and  conservation  of 
motion  between  bodies,  which  he  refers  exclusively  to  the  ordinary  concourse 
of  God  (Prime.  P.  II.  Art.  36,  etc.} ;  consequently  he  deprives  conflicting 
bodies  of  all  proper  efficiency,  and  reduces  them  to  the  mere  occasional 
causes  of  this  phenomenon.  But  a  fortiori,  he  must  postulate  the  hypothe- 
sis, which  he  found  necessary  in  explaining  the  intercourse  of  things  substan- 
tially the  same,  to  account  for  the  reciprocal  action  of  two  substances,  to  Mm, 
of  so  incompatible  a  nature  as  mind  and  body.  De  la  Forge,  Geulinx,  Male- 
branche,  Cordemoi,  and  other  disciples  of  Descartes,  only  explicitly  evolve 
what  the  writings  of  their  master  implicitly  contain.  We  may  observe, 


206  PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION. 

the  soul  is  immediately  cognizant  of  material  images  in  the  brain, 
But  in  the  Cartesian  theory,  mind  is  only  conscious  of  itself;  the 
affections  of  body  may,  by  the  law  of  union,  be  the  proximate 
occasions,  but  can  never  constitute  the  immediate  objects  of  knowl- 
edge. Reid,  however,  supposing  that  nothing  could  obtain  the 
name  of  image  which  did  not  represent  a  prototype,  or  the  name 
of  idea  which  was  not  an  object  of  thought,  thus  misinterpreted 
Descartes ;  who  applies,  abusively,  indeed,  these  terms  to  the 
occasion  of  perception  (i.  e.  the  motion  in  the  sensorium,  unknown 
in  itself  and  resembling  nothing),  as  well  as  to  the  object  of 
thought  (i.  e.  the  representation  of  which  we  are  conscious  in  the 
mind  itself).  In  the  Leibnitio-Wolfian  system,  two  elements, 
both  also  denominated  ideas,  are  in  like  manner  accurately  to  be 
contradistinguished  in  the  process  of  perception.  The  idea  in 
the  brain,  and  the  idea  in  the  mind,  are,  to  Descartes,  precisely 
what  the  ' material  idea1  and  the  'sensual  idea1  are  to  the 
Wolfians.  In  both  philosophies,  the  two  ideas  are  harmonic  modi- 
fications, correlative  and  coexistent ;  but  in  neither  is  the  organic 
affection  or  material  idea  an  object  of  consciousness.  It  is  merely 
the  unknown  and  arbitrary  condition  of  the  mental  representa- 
tion ;  and  in  the  hypotheses  both  of  Assistance  and  of  Pre-estab- 
lished Harmony,  the  presence  of  the  one  idea  implies  the  con- 
comitance of  the  other,  only  by  virtue  of  the  hyperphysical  deter- 
mination. Had  Reid,  in  fact,  not  limited  his  study  of  the  Car- 
tesian system  to  the  writings  of  its  founder,  the  twofold  applica- 
tion of  the  term  idea,  by  Descartes,  could  never  have  seduced 
him  into  the  belief  that  so  monstrous  a  solecism  had  been  com- 
mitted by  that  illustrious  thinker.  By  De  la  Forge,  the  personal 
friend  of  Descartes,  the  verbal  ambiguity  is,  indeed,  not  only 
noticed,  but  removed ;  and  that  admirable  expositor  applies  the 
term  '  corporeal  species'  to  the  affection  in  the  brain,  and  the 


though  we  cannot  stop  to  prove,  that  Tennemann  is  wrong  in  denying  De  la 
Forge  to  be  even  an  advocate,  far  less  the  first  articulate  expositor  of  the 
doctrine  of  Occasional  Causes. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION.  207 

terms  '  idea]  '  intellectual  notion]  to  the  spiritual  representation 
in  the  conscious  mind. — De  rJSsprit,  c.  10. 

But  if  Reid  be  wrong  in  his  supposition,  that  Descartes  admit- 
ted a  consciousness  of  ideas  in  the  brain  ;*  is  he  on  the  other 
alternative  wrong,  and  inexcusably  wrong,  in  holding  that  Des- 
cartes supposed  ideas  in  the  mind  not  identical  with  their  percep- 
tions? Malebranche,  the  most  illustrious  name  in  the  school 
after  its  founder  (and  who,  not  certainly  with  less  ability,  may 
be  supposed  to  have  studied  the  writings  of  his  master  with  far 
greater  attention  than  either  Reid  or  Brown),  ridicules  as  '  con- 
trary to  common  sense  and  justice'  the  supposition  that  Descartes 
had  rejected  ideas  in  '  the  ordinary  acceptation.''  and  adopted  the 
hypothesis  of  their  being  representations,  not  really  distinct  from 
their  perception.  And  while  '  he  is  as  certain  as  he  possibly  can 
be  in  such  matters,'  that  Descartes  had  not  dissented  from  the 
general  opinion,  he  taunts  Arnauld  with  resting  his  paradoxical 
interpretation  of  that  philosopher's  doctrine, '  not  on  any  passages 
of  his  Metaphysic  contrary  to  the  common  opinion'  but  on  his 
own  arbitrary  limitation  of  '  the  ambiguous  term  perception.' 
(Rep.  au  Livre  des  Idtes,  passim  ;  ARNAULD,  CEuv.  xxxviii.  pp. 
388,  389.)  That  ideas  are  ' found  in  the  mind,  not  formed  by 
it]  and  consequently,  that  in  the  act  of  knowledge  the  represen- 
tation is  really  distinct  from  the  cognition  proper,  is  strenuously 
asserted  as  the  doctrine  of  his  master  by  the  Cartesian  Roell,  in 
the  controversy  he  maintained  with  the  Anti-Cartesian  De  Vries. 
(ROELLI  Dispp. ;  DE  VRIES  De  Ideis  innatis.} — But  it  is  idle  to 
multiply  proofs.  Brown's  charge  of  ignorance  falls  back  upon 
himself;  and  Reid  may  lightly  bear  the  reproach  of  '  exactly 
reversing1  the  notorious  doctrine  of  Descartes,  when  thus  borne, 
along  with  him,  by  the  profoundest  of  that  philosopher's  disciples. 

Had  Brown  been  aware,  that  the  point  at  issue  between  him 


*  Reid's  error  on  this  point  is,  however,  surpassed  by  that  of  M.  Royer- 
Collard,  who  represents  the  idea  in  the  Cartesian  doctrine  of  perception  as 
txdusivfly  situate  in  the  brain. — (CEuvres  de  Jieid,  III.  p.  384.) 


208  PHILOSOPHY   OF    PERCEPTION. 

and  Reid  was  one  agitated  among  the  followers  of  Descartes 
themselves,  he  could  hardly  have  dreamt  of  summarily  determin- 
ing the  question  by  the  production  of  one  vulgar  passage  from 
the  writings  of  that  philosopher.  But  we  are  sorely  puzzled  to 
account  for  his  hallucination  in  considering  this  passage  perti- 
nent. Its  substance  is  fully  given  by  Reid  in  his  exposition  of 
the  Cartesian  doctrine.  Every  iota  it  contains  of  any  relevancy- 
is  adopted  by  Malebranche ; — constitutes,  less  precisely  indeed,  his 
famous  distinction  of  perception  (id€e)  from  sensation  (sentiment) : 
and  Malebranche  is  one  of  the  two  modern  philosophers,  admit- 
ted by  Brown  to  have  held  the  hypothesis  of  representation  in 
its  first,  and,  as  he  says,  its  most '  erroneous''  form.  But  princi- 
ples that  coalesce,  even  with  the  hypothesis  of  ideas  distinct  from 
mind,  are  not,  a  fortiori,  incompatible  with  the  hypothesis  of 
ideas  distinct  only  from  the  perceptive  act.  We  cannot,  however, 
enter  on  an  articulate  exposition  of  its  irrelevancy. 

To  adduce  HOBBES,  as  an  instance  of  Reid's  misrepresentation 
of  the  '  common  doctrine  of  ideas,'  betrays  on  the  part  of  Brown 
a  total  misapprehension  of  the  conditions  of  the  question ; — or  he 
forgets  that  Hobbes  was  a  materialist. — The  doctrine  of  represen- 
tation, under  all  its  modifications,  is  properly  subordinate  to  the 
doctrine  of  a  spiritual  principle  of  thought ;  and  on  the  supposi- 
tion, all  but  universally  admitted  among  philosophers,  that  the 
relation  of  knowledge  implied  the  analogy  of  existence,  it  was 
mainly  devised  to  explain  the  possibility  of  a  knowledge  by  an 
immaterial  subject,  of  an  existence  so  disproportioned  to  its  nature, 
as  the  qualities  of  a  material  object.  Contending,  that  an  imme- 
diate cognition  of  the  accidents  of  matter,  infers  an  essential  iden- 
tity of  matter  and  mind,  Brown  himself  admits,  that  the  hypothe- 
sis of  representation  belongs  exclusively  to  the  doctrine  of  dual- 
ism (Lect.  xxv.  pp.  150,  160)  ;  whilst  Reid,  assailing  the  hypoth- 
esis  of  ideas,  only  as  subverting  the  reality  of  matter,  could  hardly 
regard  it  as  parcel  of  that  scheme,  which  acknowledges  the  real- 
ity of  nothing  else. — But  though  Hobbes  cannot  be  adduced  as 
a  competent  witness  against  Reid,  he  is  however  valid  evidence 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  209 

against  Brown.  Hobbes,  though  a  materialist,  admitted  no 
knowledge  of  an  external  world.  Like  his  friend  Sorbiere,  he 
was  a  kind  of  material  idealist.  According  to  him,  we  know 
nothing  of  the  qualities  or  existence  of  any  outward  reality.  All 
that  we  know  is  the  '  seeming]  the  '  apparition]  the  '  aspect] 
the  '•phenomenon]  the  '•phantasm]  within  ourselves ;  and  this 
subjective  object  of  which  we  are  conscious,  and  which  is  con- 
sciousness itself,  is  nothing  more  than  the  '  agitation1  of  our 
internal  organism,  determined  by  the  unknown  '  motions,'  which 
are  supposed,  in  like  manner,  to  constitute  the  world  without. 
Perception  he  reduces  to  sensation.  Memory  and  imagination 
are  faculties  specifically  identical  with  sense,  differing  from  it 
simply  in  the  degree  of  their  vivacity ;  and  this  difference  of  in- 
tensity, with  Hobbes  as  with  Hume,  is  the  only  discrimination 
between  our  dreaming  and  our  waking  thoughts. — A  doctrine 
of  perception  identical  with  Reid's ! 

In  regard  to  ARNAULD,  the  question  is  not,  as  in  relation  to  the 
others,  whether  Reid  conceived  him  to  maintain  a  form  of  the 
ideal  theory  which  he  rejects,  but  whether  Reid  admits  ArnaulcTs 
opinion  on  perception  and  his  own  to  be  identical. — '  To  these 
authors,'  says  Dr.  Brown,  '  whose  opinions  on  the  subject  of 
perception,  Dr.  Reid  has  misconceived,  I  may  add  one,  whom 
even  he  himself  allows  to  have  shaken  off  the  ideal  system,  and 
to  have  considered  the  idea  and  the  perception  as  not  distinct, 
but  the  same,  a  modification  of  the  mind,  and  nothing  more. 
I  allude  to  the  celebrated  Jansenist  writer,  Arnauld,  who  main- 
tains this  doctrine  as  expressly  as  Dr.  Reid  himself,  and  makes  it 
the  foundation  of  his  argument  in  his  controversy  with  Malo 
branche.'  (Lecture  xxvii.  p.  173.) — If  this  statement  be  not 
untrue,  then  is  Dr.  Brown's  interpretation  of  Reid  himself  correct. 
A  representative  perception,  under  its  third  and  simplest  modifi- 
cation, is  held  by  Arnauld  as  by  Brown  ;  and  his  exposition  it- 
so  clear  and  articulate,  that  all  essential  misconception  of  his 
doctrine  is  precluded.  In  these  circumstances,  if  Reid  avow  the 
identity  of  Arnauld's  opinion  and  his  own,  this  avowal  is  tanta- 


210  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

mount  to  a  declaration  that  his  peculiar  doctrine  of  perception  is 
a  scheme  of  representation  ;  whereas,  on  the  contrary,  if  he  sig- 
nalize the  contrast  of  their  two  opinions,  he  clearly  evinces  the 
radical  antithesis, — and  his  sense  of  the  radical  antithesis, — of 
the  doctrine  of  intuition,  to  every,  even  the  simplest  form  of  the 
hypothesis  of  representation.  And  this  last  lie  does. 

It  cannot  be  maintained  that  Reid  admits  a  philosopher  to 
hold  an  opinion  convertible  with  his,  whom  he  states  'to 
profess  the  doctrine,  universally  received,  that  we  perceive  not 
material  things  immediately, — that  it  is  their  ideas,  which  are 
the  immediate  objects  of  our  thoughts, — and  that  it  is  in  the  idea 
of  every  thing  tliat  we  perceive  its  prvpertie&l  This  fundamental 
contrast  being  established,  we  may  safely  allow,  that  the  radical 
misconception,  which  caused  Reid  to  overlook  the  difference  of 
our  presentative  and  representative  faculties,  caused  him  likewise 
to  believe  that  Arnauld  had  attempted  to  unite  two  contradictory 
theories  of  perception.  Not  aware,  that  it  was  possibly  to  main- 
tain a  doctrine  of  perception,  in  which  the  idea  was  not  really 
distinguished  from  its  cognition,  and  yet  to  hold  that  the  mind 
had  no  immediate  knowledge  of  external  things  :  Reid  supposes, 
in  the  first  place,  that  Arnauld,  in  rejecting  the  hypothesis  of 
ideas,  as  representative  entities,  really  distinct  from  the  contem- 
plative act  of  perception,  coincided  with  himself  in  viewing  the 
material  reality  as  the  immediate  object  of  that  act ;  and  in  the 
second,  that  Arnauld  again  deserted  this  opinion,  when,  with  the 
philosophers,  he  maintained  that  the  idea,  or  act  of  the  mind 
representing  the  external  reality,  and  not  the  external  reality 
itself,  was  the  immediate  object  of  perception.  But  Arnauld's 
theory  is  one  and  indivisible  ;  and,  as  such,  no  part  of  it  is  iden- 
tical with  Reid's.  Reid's  confusion,  here  as  elsewhere,  is  explained 
by  the  circumstance,  that  he  had  never  speculatively  conceived 
the  possibility  of  the  simplest  modification  of  the  representative 
hypothesis.  He  saw  no  medium  between  rejecting  ideas  as 
something  different  from  thought,  and  the  doctrine  of  an  immedi- 
ate knowledge  of  the  material  object.  Neither  does  Arnauld,  as 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  211 

Reid  supposes,  ever  assert  against  Malebranche,  'that  we  per- 
ceive external  things  immediately,'  that  is,  in  themselves.* 
Maintaining  that  all  our  perceptions  are  modifications  essentially 
representative,  Arnauld  everywhere  avows,  that  he  denies  ideas, 
only  as  existences  distinct  from  the  act  itself  of  perception.f 

*  This  is  perfectly  clear  from  Arnauld's  own  uniform  statements ;  and  it 
is  justly  observed  by  Malebrancbe,  in  his  Reply  to  the  Treatise  on  True  and 
False  Ideas,  (p.  123,  orig.  edit.) — that,  'in  reality,  according  to  M.  Arnauld,1 
ice  do  not  perceive  bodies,  -we  perceive  only  ourselves.1 

t  (Euvres,  t.  xxxviii.  pp.  187,  198,  199,  389.  et  passim.  It  is  to  be  recol- 
lected that  Descartes,  Malebranche,  Arrumld,  Locke,  and  philosophers  in 
general  "before  Reid,  employed  the  term  Perception  as  coextensive  with  Con- 
sciousness.— By  Leibnitz,  Wolf,  and  their  followers,  it  was  used  in  a  peculiar 
sense, — as  equivalent  to  Representation  or  Idea  proper,  and  as  contradistin- 
guished from  Apperception,  or  consciousness.  Reid's  limitation  of  the  term, 
though  the  grounds  on  which  it  is  defended  are  not  of  the  strongest,  is  con- 
venient, and  has  been  very  generally  admitted. 


1  On  this  point  may  be  added  the  following  (Reid,  p.  296) :— '  Arnauld  did  not  allow 
that  perception  and  ideas  are  really  or  numerically  distinguished — i.  e.  as  one  thing 
from  another  thing;  not  even  that  they  arc  modally  distinguished — i.  e.  as  a  thing 
from  its  mode.  He  maintained  that  they  are  really  identical,  and  only  rationally  dis- 
criminated as  viewed  in  different  relations ;  the  indivisible  mental  modification  being 
called  A  perception,  by  Reference  to  the  mind  or  thinking  subject — an  idea,  by  refer- 
ence to  the  mediate  object  or  thing  thought  Arnauld  everywhere  avows  that  he  denies 
ideas  only  as  existences  distinct  from  the  act  itself  of  perception.— See  (Euwea,  t. 
xxxviii  pp.  187, 198, 199,  389.' 

'  The  opinion  of  Arnauld  in  regard  to  the  nature  of  ideas  was  by  no  means  over- 
looked by  subsequent  philosophers.  It  is  found  fully  detailed  in  almost  every  systema- 
tic course  or  compend  of  philosophy,  which  appeared  for  a  long  time  after  its  first  pro- 
mulgation, and  in  many  of  these  it  is  the  doctrine  recommended  as  the  true.  Arnauld's 
was  indeed  the  opinion  which  latterly  prevailed  in  the  Cartesian  school.  From  this  it 
passed  into  other  schools.  Leibnitz,  like  Arnanld,  regarded  Ideas,  Notions,  Represen- 
tations, as  mere  modifications  of  the  mind  (what  by  his  disciples  were  called  material 
ideas,  like  the  cerebral  ideas  of  Descartes,  are  out  of  the  question),  and  no  cruder 
opinion  than  this  has  ever  subsequently  found  a  footing  in  any  of  the  German  systems. 

' "  I  don't  know,"  says  Mr.  Stewart,  "  of  any  author  who,  prior  to  Dr.  Reid,  has  ex- 
pressed himself  on  the  subject  with  so  much  justness  and  precision  as  Father  Buffier. 
in  the  following  passage  of  his  Treatise  on  '  First  Truths :' 

'"If  we  confine  ourselves  to  what  is  intelligible  in  our  observations  on  ideas,  we 
will  say  they  are  nothing  but  mere  modifications  of  the  mind  as  a  thinking  being. 
They  are  called  ideas  with  regard  to  the  object  represented;  and  perceptions  with 
regard  to  tire  faculty  representing.  It  is  manifest  that  our  ideas,  considered  in  this 
sense,  are  not  more  distinguished  than  motion  is  from  abody  moved.'— (P.  311,  English 
Translation.)"— Idem.  iii.  Add.  to  vol.  i.  p.  10. 

'  In  this  passage,  Buffier  only  repeats  the  doctrine  of  Arnauld,  in  Arnauld's  own 
words. 

Dr.  Thomas  Brown,  on  the  other  hand,  has  endeavored  to  show  that  this  doctrine 


212  PHILOSOPHY  OF    PERCEPTION. 

Reid  was  therefore  wrong,  and  did  Arimuld  less  than  justice, 
in  viewing  his  theory  'as  a  weak  attempt  to  reconcile  two  incon- 
sistent doctrines:'  he  was  wrong,  and  did  Arnauld  more  than 
justice,  in  supposing  that  one  of  these  doctrines  is  not  incompat- 
ible with  his  own.  The  detection,  however,  of  this  error  only 
tends  to  manifest  more  clearly,  how  just,  even  when  under  its 
influence,  was  Reid's  appreciation  of  the  contrast  subsisting  be- 
tween his  own  and  Arnauld's  opinion,  considered  as  a  whole ; 
and  exposes  more  glaringly  Brown's  general  misconception  of 
Reid's  philosophy,  and  Jiis  present  gross  misrepresentation,  in 
affirming  that  the  doctrines  of  the  two  philosophers  were  identi- 
cal, and  by  Reid  admitted  to  be  the  same. 

Nor  is  Dr.  Brown  more  successful  in  his  defence  of  LOCKE. 

Supposing  always,  that  ideas  were  held  to  be  something 
distinct  from  their  cognition,  Reid  states  it,  as  that  philosopher's 
opinion,  '  that  images  of  external  objects  were  conveyed  to  the 
brain  ;  but  whether  he  thought  with  Descartes  [erratum  for  Dr. 
Clarke  ?]  and  Newton,  that  the  images  in  the  brain  are  perceived 
by  the  mind,  there  present,  or  that  they  are  imprinted  on  the 
mind  itself,  is  not  so  evident.'  This  Dr.  Brown,  nor  is  he  origi- 
nal in  the  assertion,  pronounces  a  flagrant  misrepresentation. 
Not  only  does  he  maintain,  that  Locke  never  conceived  the  idea 
to  be  substantially  different  from  the  mind,  as  a  material  image 
in  the  brain ;  but,  that  he  never  supposed  it  to  have  an  existence 
apart  from  the  mental  energy  of  which  it  is  the  object.  Locke, 
he  asserts,  like  Arnauld,  considered  the  idea  perceived  and  the 
percipient  act,  to  constitute  the  same  indivisible  modification  of 
the  conscious  mind.  We  shall  see. 

In  his  lan.guo.ge,  Locke  is,  of  all  philosophers,  the  most  figura- 
tive, ambiguous,  vascillating,  various,  and  even  contradictory; — 


(which  he  Identifies  with  Reid's)  had  been  long  the  catholic  opinion  ;  nnd  that  Reid,  in 
his  attack  on  the  Ideal  system,  only  refuted  what  had  heen  already  almost  universally 
exploded.  In  this  attempt  he  is.  however,  singularly  unfortunate ;  for,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  Crousaz,  all  the  examples  he  adduces  to  evince  the  prevalence  of  Arnauld's 
doctrine  are  only  so  many  mistakes,  so  many  instances,  in  fact,  which  might  be  alleged 
in  confirmation  of  the  very  opposite  conclusion.1—  W. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION.  213 

as  has  been  noticed  by  Reid,  and  Stewart,  and  Brown  himself, — 
indeed,  we  believe  by  every  author  who  has  had  occasion  to  com- 
ment on  this  philosopher.  The  opinions  of  such  a  writer  are  not, 
therefore,  to  be  assumed  from  isolated  and  casual  expressions, 
which  themselves  require  to  be  interpreted  on  the  general  analo- 
gy of  his  system ;  and  yet  this  is  the  only  ground  on  which  Dr. 
Brown  attempts  to  establish  his  conclusions.  Thus,  on  the  mat- 
ter under  discussion,  though  really  distinguishing,  Locke  verbally 
confounds,  the  objects  of  sense  and  of  intellect, — the  operation 
and  its  object, — the  objects  immediate  and  mediate, — the  object 
and  its  relations, — the  images  of  fancy  and  the  notions  of  the 
understanding.  Consciousness  is  converted  with  Perception, — 
Perception  with  Idea, — Idea  with  Ideatum,  and  with  Notion, 
Conception,  Phantasm,  Representation,  Sense,  Meaning,  &c.  Now, 
his  language  identifying  ideas  and  perceptions,  appears  conform- 
able to  a  disciple  of  Arnauld ;  and  now  it  proclaims  him  a  fol- 
lower of  Digby, — explaining  ideas  by  mechanical  impulse,  and 
the  propagation  of  material  particles  from  the  external  reality  to 
the  brain.  The  idea  would  seem,  in  one  passage,  an  organic 
affection, — the  mere  occasion  of  a  spiritual  representation ;  in 
another,  a  representative  image,  in  the  brain  itself.  In  employ- 
ing thus  indifferently  the  language  of  every  hypothesis,  may  we 
not  suspect,  that  he  was  anxious  to  be  made  responsible  for 
none  ?  One,  however,  he  has  formally  rejected  ;  and  that  is  the 
very  opinion  attributed  to  him  by  Dr.  Brown, — that  the  idea,  or 
object  of  consciousness  in  perception,  is  only  a  modification  of 
the  mind  itself. 

We  do  not  deny,  that  Locke  occasionally  employs  expressions, 
which,  in  a  writer  of  more  considerate  language,  would  imply  the 
identity  of  ideas  with  the  act  of  knowledge ;  and,  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, we  should  have  considered  suspense  more  rational 
than  a  dogmatic  confidence  in  any  conclusion,  did  not  the  follow- 
ing passage,  which  has  never,  we  believe,  been  noticed,  appear  a 
positive  and  explicit  contradiction  of  Dr.  Brown's  interpretation. 
It  is  from  Locke's  Examination  of  Malebranche's  Opinion,  which 


214  PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION. 

as  subsequent  to  the  publication  of  the  Essay,  must  be  held  au- 
thentic, in  relation  to  the  doctrines  of  that  work.  At  the  same 
time,  the  statement  is  articulate  and  precise,  and  possesses  all 
the  authority  of  one  cautiously  made  in  the  course  of  a  polemical 
discussion.  Malebranche  coincided  with  Arnauld,  and  conse- 
quently with  Locke,  as  interpreted  by  Brown,  to  the  extent  of 
supposing,  that  sensation  proper  is  nothing  but  a  state  or  modifi- 
cation of  the  mind  itself ;  and  Locke  had  thus  the  opportunity 
of  expressing,  in  regard  to  this  opinion,  his  agreement  or  dissent. 
An  acquiescence  in  the  doctrine,  that  the  secondary  qualities,  ot 
which  we  are  conscious  in  sensation,  are  merely  mental  states,  by 
no  means  involves  an  admission  that  the  primary  qualities  of 
which  we  are  conscious  in  perception,  are  nothing  more.  Male- 
branche, for  example,  affirms  the  one  and  denies  the  other.  But 
if  Locke  be  found  to  ridicule,  as  he  does,  even  the  opinion  which 
merely  reduces  the  secondary  qualities  to  mental  states,  a  for tiori, 
and  this  on  the  principle  of  his  own  philosophy,  he  nnist  be  held 
to  reject  the  doctrine,  which  would  reduce  not  only  the  non- 
resembling  sensations  of  the  secondary,  but  even  the  resembling, 
and  consequently  extended,  ideas  of  the  primary  qualities  of 
matter,  to  modifications  of  the  immaterial  unextended  mind.  In 
these  circumstances,  the  following  passage  is  superfluously  con- 
clusive against  Brown,  and  equally  so,  whether  we  coincide  or 
not  in  all  the  principles  it  involves  : — '  But  to  examine  their  doc- 
trine of  modification  a  little  further.  Different  sentiments  (sensa- 
tions) are  different  modifications  of  the  mind.  The  mind,  or 
soul,  that  perceives,  is  one  immaterial  indivisible  substance.  Now 
I  see  the  white  and  black  on  this  paper,  I  hear  one  singing  in 
the  next  room,  I  feel  the  warmth  of  the  fire  I  sit  by,  and  I  taste 
an  apple  I  am  eating,  and  all  this  at  the  same  time.  Now,  I  ask, 
take  modification  for  what  you  please,  can  the  same  unextended, 
indivisible  substance  have  different,  nay,  inconsistent  and  opposite 
(as  these  of  white  and  black  must  be)  modifications  at  the  same 
time  ?  Or  must  we  suppose  distinct  parts  in  an  indivisible  sub- 
stance, one  for  black,  another  for  white,  and  another  for  red  ideas, 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  215 

and  so  of  the  rest  of  those  infinite  sensations,  which  we  have  in 
sorts  and  degrees ;  all  which  we  can  distinctly  perceive,  and  so 
are  distinct  ideas,  some  whereof  are  opposite,  as  heat  and  cold,  which 
yet  a  man  may  feel  at  the  same  time  ?  I  was  ignorant  before 
how  sensation  was  performed  in  us  :  this  they  call  an  explanation 
of  it !  Must  I  say  now  I  understand  it  better  ?  If  this  be  to 
cure  one's  ignorance,  it  is  a  very  slight  disease,  and  the  charm  of 
two  or  three  insignificant  words  will  at  any  time  remove  it ;  pro- 
batum  est?  (Sec.  39.) — This  passage,  as  we  shall  see,  is  corre- 
spondent to  the  doctrine  held  on  this  point  by  Locke's  personal 
friend  and  philosophical  follower,  Le  Clerc.  (But,  what  is  curi- 
ous, the  suppositions  which  Locke  here  rejects,  as  incompatible 
with  the  spirituality  of  mind,  are  the  very  facts  on  which  Ammo- 
nius  Hermiae,  Philoponus,  and  Condillac,  among  many  others, 
found  their  proof  of  the  immateriality  of  the  thinking  subject.) 

But  if  it  be  thus  evident  that  Locke  held  neither  the  third 
form  of  representation,  that  lent  to  him  by  Brown,  nor  even  the 
second  ;  it  follows  that  Reid  did  him  any  thing  but  injustice,  in 
supposing  him  to  maintain  that  ideas  are  objects,  either  in  the 
brain,  or  in  the  mind  itself.  Even  the  more  material  of  these 
alternatives  has  been  the  one  generally  attributed  to  him  by  his 
critics,*  and  the  one  adopted  from  him  by  his  disciples.f  Nor  is 
this  to  be  deemed  an  opinion  too  monstrous  to  be  entertained  by 
so  enlightened  a  philosopher.  It  was,  as  we  shall  see,  the  com- 
mon opinion  of  the  age ;  the  opinion,  in  particular,  held  by  the 
most  illustrious  of  his  countrymen  and  contemporaries — by  New- 
ton, Clarke,  Willis,  Hook,  &c.J  The  English  psychologists  have 
indeed  been  generally  very  mechanical. 


*  To  refer  only  to  the  first  and  last  of  his  regular  critics  : — see  Solid  Phi- 
losophy assarted  against  the  Fancies  of  the  Jdelsts,  by  J.  S.  [JonN  SERGEANT.] 
Lond.  1697,  p.  161, — a  very  curious  book,  absolutely,  we  may  say,  unknown; 
and  COUSIN,  Cours  de  Philosophic,  t.  ii.  1829 ;  pp.  330,  357,  325,  365 — the  most 
important  work  on  Locke  since  the  Nouveaux  Essais  of  Leibnitz. 

t  TUCKER'S  Light  of  Nature,  i.  pp.  15,  18,  ed.  2. 

+  On  the  opinion  of  Newton  and  Clarke,  see  Des  Maizcaux's  Eecueil,  i. 
pp.  7,  8,  9,  15,  22,  75,  127,  169,  &e.— Genovesi  notices  the  crudity  of  New- 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION. 

Dr.  Brown  at  length  proceeds  to  consummate  his  imagined 
victory  by  '  that  most  decisive  evidence,  found  not  in  treatises  read 
only  by  a  few,  but  in  the  popular  elementary  works  of  science  of 
the  time,  the  general  text-books  of  schools  and  colleges.'  He 
quotes,  however,  only  two  : — the  Pneumatology  of  Le  Clerc,  and 
the  Logic  of  Crousaz. 

'  LE  CLERC,'  says  Dr.  Brown,  '  in  his  chapter  on  the  nature  of 
ideas,  gives  the  history  of  the  opinions  of  philosophers  on  this 
subject,  and  states  among  them  the  very  doctrine  which  is  most 
forcibly  and  accurately  opposed  to  the  ideal  system  of  perception. 
"  Alii  putant  ideas  et  perccptiones  idearum  easdem  esse,  licet  rela- 
tionibus  differant.  Idea,  uti  censent,  proprie  ad  objectum  refer- 
tur,  quod  mens  considerat; — perceptio,  vere  ad  mentem  ipsam 
quae  percipit :  sed  duplex  ilia  relatio  ad  unam  modificationem 
mentis  pertinet.  Itaque,  secundum  hosce  philosophos,  nullac  sunt, 
proprie,  loquendo,  ideas  a  mente  nostra  distinctae."  What  is  it,  I 
may  ask,  which  Dr.  Reid  considers  himself  as  having  added  to 
this  very  philosophical  view  of  perception  ?  and  if  he  added  noth- 
ing, it  is  surely  too  much  to  ascribe  to  him  the  merit  of  detect- 
ing errors,  the  counter  statement  of  ichich  had  long  formed  a.  part 
of  the  elementary  works  of  the  schools} 

In  the  first  place,  Dr.  Reid  certainly  '  added'  nothing  'to  this 


ton's  doctrine,  '  Mentem  in  certbro  prjesidcrc  atquc  in  eo,  suo  scilicet  senso- 
rio,  rerum  imagines  cemereS — On  Willis,  BOO  his  work  De  Anima  Jjrvtorum, 
p.  64,  alibi,  cd.  1072. — On  Hook,  sec  his  Lect.  on  Light,  §  7. — We  know  not 
whether  it  has  been  remarked  that  Locke's  doctrine  of  particles  and  impulse, 
is  precisely  that  of  Sir  Kenelm  Dighy ;  and  if  Locke  adopts  one  part  of  so 
jfross  an  hypothesis,  what  is  there  improbable  in  his  adoption  of  the  other  f 
—that  the  object  of  perception  is,  a  '  material  participation  of  the  bodies 
that  work  on  the  outward  organs  of  the  senses'  (Digby,  Treatise  of  Bodies, 
c.  82).  As  a  specimen  of  the  mechanical  explanations  of  mental  phenomena 
then  considered  satisfactory,  we  quote  Sir  Kenelm's  theory  of  memory. — 
'  Out  of  which  it  followeth,  that  the  little  similitudes  which  are  in  the  caves 
of  the  brain,  wheeling  and  swimming  about,  almost  in  such  sort  -as  you  see 
in  the  washing  of  currants  or  rice  by  the  winding  about  and  circular  turning 
of  the  cook's  hand,  divers  sorts  of  bodies  do  go  their  course  for  a  pretty 
while ;  so  that  the  most  ordinary  objects  cannot  but  present  themselves 
quickly,'  &c.,  <fcc.  (ibidem). 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  217 

very  philosophical  view  of  perception,'  but  he  exploded  it  alto- 
gether. 

In  the  second,  it  is  false,  either  that  this  doctrine  of  perception 
'  had  long  formed  part  of  the  elementary  works  of  the  schools? 
or  that  Le  Clerc  affords  any  countenance  to  this  assertion.  On 
the  contrary,  it  is  virtually  stated  by  him  to  be  the  novel  paradox 
of  a  single  philosopher  ;  nay,  to  carry  the  blunder  to  hyperbole, 
it  is  already,  as  such  a  singular  opinion,  discussed  and  referred  to 
its  author  by  Reid  himself.  Had  Dr.  Brown  proceeded  from 
the  tenth  paragraph,  which  he  quotes,  to  the  fourteenth,  which 
he  could  not  have  read,  he  would  have  found,  that  the  passage 
extracted,  so  far  from  containing  the  statement  of  an  old  and 
familiar  dogma  in  the  schools,  was  neither  more  nor  less,  than 
a  statement  of  the  contemporary  hypothesis  of — ANTONY  AR- 
NAULD !  and  of  Antony  Arnauld  alone  !  ! 

In  the  third  place,  from  the  mode  in  which  he  cites  Le  Clerc, 
his  silence  to  the  contrary,  and  the  general  tenor  of  his  statement, 
Dr.  Brown  would  lead  us  to  believe  that  Le  Clerc  himself  coin- 
cides in  '  this  very  philosophical  view  of  perception.'  So  far, 
however,  from  coinciding  with  Arnauld,  he  pronounces  his  opin- 
ion to  .be  false ;  controverts  it  on  very  solid  grounds ;  and  in 
delivering  his  own  doctrine  touching  ideas,  though  sufficiently 
cautious  in  telling  us  what  they  are,  he  has  no  hesitation  in 
assuring  us,  among  other  things  which  they  cannot  be,  that  they 
are  not  modifications  or  essential  states  of  mind.  '  Non  est  (idea 
sc.)  modijicatio  aut  essentia  mentis  :  nam  prseterquam  quod  sen- 
timus  ingens  esse  discrimen  inter  ideae  perceptionem  et  sensatio- 
iiem  ;  quid  habet  mens  nostra  simile  monti,  aut  innumeris  ejus- 
modi  ideis  ?' — (Pneumat.,  sect.  i.  c.  5,  §  10.) 

On  all  this  no  observation  of  GUI'S  can  be  either  so  apposite  or 
authoritative,  as  the  edifying  reflections  with  which  Dr.  Brown 
himself  concludes  his  vindication  of  the  philosophers  against 
Reid.  Brown's  precept  is  sound,  but  his  example  is  instructive. 
One  word  we  leave  blank,  which  the  reader  may  himself  supply. 
— '  That  a  mind  so  vigorous  as  that  of  Dr.  —  —  should  have 

10 


218  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PEECEPTION. 

been  capable  of  the  series  of  misconceptions  which  we  have  traced, 
may  seem  wonderful,  and  truly  is  so  ;  and  equally,  or  rather 
still  more  wonderful  is  the  general  admission  of  his  merit  in  this 
respect.  I  trust  it  will  impress  you  with  one  important  lesson — 
to  consult  the  opinions  of  authors  in  their  own  works,  and  not 
in  the  works  of  those  who  profess  to  give  a  faithful  account 
of  them.  From  my  own  experience  I  can  most  truly  assure  you. 
that  there  is  scarcely  an  instance  in  which  /  have  found  the  view 
/  had  received  of  them  to  be  faithful.  There  is  usually  some- 
thing more,  or  something  less,  which  modifies  the  general  result ; 
and  by  the  various  additions  and  subtractions  thus  made,  so  much 
of  the  spirit  of  the  original  doctrine  is  lost,  that  it  may,  in  some 
cases,  be  considered  as  having  made  a  fortunate  escape,  if  it  be 
not  at  last  represented  as  directly  opposite  to  what  it  is.1 — (Lect. 
xxvii.  p.  175.) 

The  cause  must,  therefore,  be  unconditionally  decided  in  favor 
of  Reid,  even  on  that  testimony,  which  Brown  triumphantly  pro- 
duces in  court  as  '  the  most  decisive  evidence1  against  him : — 
here  then  we  might  close  our  case.  To  signalize,  however,  more 
completely  the  whole  character  of  the  accusation,  we  shall  call  a 
few  witnesses  ;  to  prove,  in  fact,  nothing  more  than  that  Brown's 
own  '  most  decisive  evidence'  is  not  less  favorable  to  himself, 
than  any  other  that  might  be  cited  from  the  great  majority  of  the 
learned. 

MALEBRANCHE,  in  his  controversy  with  Arnauld,  everywhere 
assumes  the  doctrine  of  ideas,  really  distinct  from  their  percep- 
tion, to  be  the  one  '  commonly  received  ;'  nor  does  his  adversary 
venture  to  dispute  the  assumption.  (Rep.  au  Livre  des  Idees. — 
ARNAULD,  CEuv.  t.  xxxviii.  p.  388.) 

LEIBNITZ,  on  the  other  hand,  in  answer  to  Clarke,  admits,  that 
the  crude  theory  of  ideas  held  by  this  philosopher,  was  the  com- 
mon. 'Je  ne  demeure  point  d'accord  des  notions  vulgaires. 
comme  si  les  Images  des  chosen  ttoient  transporters,  par  les 
organes,  jusqu'a  Vame.  Cette  notion  de  la  Philosophic  Vulgaire 
n'est  point  intelligible,  comme  les  nouveaux  Cartesiens  1'ont  assez 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  219 

montre.  L'on  ne  sauroit  expliquer  comment  la  substance  imma- 
terielle  est  affectee  par  la  matidre :  et  soutenir  une  chose  non 
intelligible  la-dessus,  c'est  recourir  a  la  notion  scholastique  chime- 
rique  de  je  ne  sai  quelles  esp&es  intentionelles  inexpliquable,  qui 
passent  des  organes  dans  1'ame.'  (Opera,  II.  p.  161.)  Nor  does 
Clarke,  in  reply,  disown  this  doctrine  for  himself  and  others. — 
(Ibid.  p.  182). 

BRUCKER,  in  his  Historia  PhilosopMca  Doctrince  de  Ideis 
(1723),  speaks  of  Arnauld's  hypothesis  as  a  'peculiar  opinion, 
rejected  by  'philosophers  in  general  (plerisque  eruditis),'  and 
as  not  less  untenable  than  the  paradox  of  Malebranche. — (P. 
248.) 

Dr.  Brown  is  fond  of  text-books.  Did  we  condescend  to  those 
of  ordinary  authors,  we  could  adduce  a  cloud  of  witnesses  against 
him.  As  a  sample,  we  shall  quote  only  three,  but  these  of  the 
very  highest  authority. 

CHRISTIAN  THOMASIUS,  though  a  reformer  of  the  Peripatetic 
and  Cartesian  systems,  adopted  a  grosser  theory  of  ideas  than 
either.  In  his  Introductio  ad  Philosophiam  aulicam  (1*702),  he 
defines  thought  in  general,  a  mental  discourse  '  about  images,  by 
the  motion  of  external  bodies,  and  through  the  organs  of  sense, 
stamped  in  the  substance  of  the  brain.1  (c.  3.  §  29.  See  also 
his  Inst.  Jurispr.  Div.,  L.  i.  c.  1,  and  Introd.  in  Phil,  ration., 
c.  3.) 

S'GRAVESANDE,  in  his  Introductio  ad  Philosophiam  (1736), 
though  professing  to  leave  undetermined,  the  positive  question 
concerning  the  origin  of  ideas,  and  admitting  that  sensations  are 
'  nothing  more  than  modifications  of  the  mind  itself;'  makes  no 
scruple,  in  determining  the  negative,  to  dismiss,  as  absurd,  the 
hypothesis,  which  would  reduce  sensible  ideas  to  an  equal  sub- 
jectivity. '  Mcntem  iftsam  has  Ideas  efficere,  et  sibi  ipsi  repre- 
sentare  res,  quarum  his  solis  Ideis  cognitionem  acquirit,  nullo 
modo  conc'pi  potcst.  Nulla  inter  causam  et  effectum  relatio  dare- 
tur.'  (§§  279,  282.) 

GENOVESI,  in  his  Elementa  Mctaphysicce  (1748),  lays  it  down 


220  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

as  a  fundamental  position  of  philosophy,  that  ideas  and  the  act 
cognitive  of  ideas  are  distinct  ('  Prop.  xxx.  Idece  et  Perceptio- 
nes  non  videntur  esse  posse  una  eademque  res1)]  and  he  ably 
refutes  the  hypothesis  of  Arnauld,  which  he  reprobates  as  a 
paradox,  unworthy  of  that  illustrious  reasoner.  (Pars  II.  p. 
140.) 

VOLTAIRE'S  Dictionaire  Philosophique  may  be  adduced  as  rep- 
resenting the  intelligence  of  the  age  of  Reid  himself.  '  Qu'est 
ce  qu'une  Idee  ? — C'est  une  Image  qui  se  peint  dans  mon  cerveau. 
— Toutes  vos  penstes  sont  done  des  images  ? — Assurement?  <fec. 
(voce  Idee.) 

What,  in  fine,  is  the  doctrine  of  the  two  most  numerous  schools 
of  modern  philosophy — the  LEIBNITIAN  and  KANTIAN  ?*  Both 
maintain  that  the  mind  involves  representations  of  which  it  is 
not,  and  never  may  be,  conscious ;  that  is,  both  maintain  the 
second  form  of  the  hypothesis,  and  one  of  the  two  that  Reid 
understood  and  professedly  assailed.  [This  statement  requires 
qualification.] 

In  Crousaz,  Dr.  Brown  has  actually  succeeded  in  finding  one 
example  (he  might  have  found  twenty),  of  a  philosopher,  before 
Reid,  holding  the  same  theory  of  ideas  with  Arnauld  and  him- 
self.f 

*  LEIBNITZ; — Opera,  Dutensii,  torn.  ii.  pp.  21,  23,  33,  214,  pars  ii.  pp. 
187,  145,  148.  (Enures  Philos.  par  Raspe,  pp.  66,  67,  74,  96,  ets.  WOLF; 
—PsycM.  Rat.  §  10,  et-s.  Psychol.  Emp.  §  48.  KANT—  Crttik  d.  r.  V.  p. 
376,  ed.  2.  Anthropologie,  §  5.  With  one  restriction,  Leibnitz's  doctrine 
is  that  of  the  lower  Platonists,  who  maintained  that  the  soul  actually  con- 
tains representations  of  every  possible  substance  and  event  in  the  world 
during  the  revolution  of  the  great  year  ;  although  these  cognitive  reason* 
are  not  elicited  into  consciousness,  unless  the  reality,  thus  represented, 
be  itself  brought  within  the  sphere  of  the  sensual  organs.  (Plotinus, 
Enn.  V.  lib.  vii.  cc.  1,  2,  3.) 

t  In  speaking  of  this  author,  Dr.  Brown,  who  never  loses  an  opportunity 
to  depreciate  Reid,  goes  out  of  his  way  to  remark,  '  that  precisely  the  same 
distinction  of  sensations  and  perceptions,  on  which  Dr.  Reid  founds  so  much, 
is  stated  and  enforced  in  the  different  works  of  this  ingenious  writer,'  and 
expatiates  on  this  conformity  of  the  two  philosophers,  as  if  he  deemed  its  de- 
tection to  be  something  new  and  curious.  Mr.  Stewart  had  already  noticed 
it  in  his  Essays.  But  neither  he  nor  Brown  seem  to  recollect,  that  Crousaz 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    PERCEPTION.  221 

The  reader  is  now  in  a  condition  to  judge  of  the  correctness 
of  Brown's  statement,  'that  with  the  exception  of  Malebranche 
and  Berkeley,  who  had  peculiar  and  very  erroneous  notions  on 
the  subject,  ALL  the  philosophers  whom  Dr.  Reid  considered  him- 
self as  opposing'  (what !  Newton,  Clarke,  Hook,  Norris,  Porter- 
field,  <fec.  ? — these,  be  it  remembered,  ALL  severally  attacked  by 
Reid,  Brown  has  neither  ventured  to  defend,  nor  to  acknowledge 
that  he  could  not),  '  would,  if  they  had  been  questioned  by  him, 
have  admitted,  before  they  heard  a  single  argument  on  his  part, 
that  their  opinions  with  respect  to  ideas  were  precisely  the  same  as 
his  own?  (Lect.  xxvii.  p.  174.) 

We  have  thus  vindicated  our  original  assertion  : — BROWN  HAS 

NOT  SUCCEEDED  IN  CONVICTING  REID,  EVEN  OF  A  SINGLE  ERROR. 

Brown's  mistakes  regarding  the  opinions  on  perception,  enter- 
tained by  Reid  and  the  philosophers,  are  perhaps,  however,  even 
less  astonishing,  than  his  total  misconception  of  the  purport  of 
Hume's  reasoning  against  the  existence  of  matter,  and  of  the 
argument  by  which  Reid  invalidates  Hume's  skeptical  conclusion. 
We  shall  endeavor  to  reduce  the  problem  to  its  simplicity. 

Our  knowledge  rests  ultimately  on  certain  facts  of  conscious- 
ness,1 which  as  primitive,  and  consequently  incomprehensible,  are 


only  copies  Malebranche,  re  et  verbis,  and  that  Reid  had  himself  expressly 
assigned^  to  that  philosopher  the  merit  of  first  recognizing  the  distinction. 
This  is  incorrect.  But  M.  Koyer-Collard  (Reid,  (Euvres,  t.  iii.  p.  329)  is  still 
more  inaccurate  in  thinking  that  Malebranche  and  Leibnitz  (Leibnitz  \) 
were  perhaps  the  only  philosophers  before  Eeid,  who  had  discriminated  per- 
ception from  sensation.  The  distinction  was  established  by  Descartes  ;  and 
after  Malebranche,  but  long  before  Eeid,  it  had  become  even  common  ;  and 
so  far  is  Leibnitz  from  having  any  merit  in  the  matter,  his  criticism  of  Male- 
branche shows,  that  with  all  his  learning  he  was  strangely  ignorant  of  a  dis- 
crimination then  familiar  to  philosophers  in  general,  which  may  indeed  be 
traced  under  various  appellations  to  the  most  ancient  times.  [A  contribu- 
tion1 towards  this  history,  and  a  reduction  of  the  qualities  of  matter  to  three 
classes,  under  the  names  of  Primary,  Secundo-primary,  and  Secondary,  ia 
given  in  the  Supplementary  Dissertations  appended  to  Eeid's  Works  (p. 
825-875.)] 

1  See  Part  First,  Philosophy  of  Common  Sense. —  \V. 


It  forms  the  fifth  chapter  of  the  second  part  of  this  voL—  W. 


222  PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION. 

given  less  in  the  form  of  cognitions  than  of  beliefs.  But  if  con- 
sciousness in  its  last  analysis  —  in  other  words,  if  our  primary 
experience,  be  a  faith  ;  the  reality  of  our  knowledge  turns  on  the 
veracity  of  our  constitutive  beliefs.  As  ultimate,  the  quality  of 
these  beliefs  cannot  be  inferred  ;  their  truth,  however,  is  in  the 
first  instance  to  be  presumed.  As  given  and  possessed,  they 
must  stand  good  until  refuted;  '•neganti  incumbit  probatio?  It 
is  toot  to  be  presumed,  that  intelligence  gratuitously  annihilates 
itself;  —  that  Nature  operates  in  vain  ;  —  that  the  Author  of  na- 
ture creates  only  to  deceive. 


5'  SVITOTI  Trdfixav  dirdAXuraj,  fivnva  irdvrtf 
Aaot  $;;(ii'£ou(j('     Qcou  tv  n  IOTI  xai  dvrr/.' 


But  though  the  truth  of  our  instinctive  faiths  must  in  the  first 
instance  be  admitted,  their  falsehood  may  subsequently  be  estab- 
lished :  this,  however,  only  through  themselves  —  only  on  the 
ground  of  their  reciprocal  contradiction.  Is  this  contradiction 
proved,  the  edifice  of  our  knowledge  is  undermined  ;  for  '  no  lie 
is  of  the  truth.1  Consciousness  is  to  the  philosopher,  what  the 
Bible  is  to  the  theologian.  Both  are  professedly  revelations  of 
divine  truth  ;  both  exclusively  supply  the  constitutive  principles 
of  knowledge,  and  the  regulative  principles  of  its  construction. 
To  both  we  must  resort  for  elements  and  for  laws.  Each  may  be 
disproved,  but  disproved  only  by  itself.  If  one  or  othfr  reveal 
facts,  which,  as  mutually  repugnant,  cannot  but  be  false,  the 
authenticity  of  that  revelation  is  invalidated  ;  and  the  criticism 
which  signalizes  this  self-refutation,  has,  in  either  case,  been  able 
to  convert  assurance  into  skepticism,  —  '  to  turn  the  truth  of  God 
into  a  lie,' 

'  Et  \io\KTQficLem  primam,  et  convcllere  tola 
Fundamenta  quibus  nixatur  vita  taluzque.'1  —  LUCB. 

As  psychology  is  only  a  developed  consciousness,  that  is,  a 
scientific  evolution  of  the  facts  of  which  consciousness  is  the  guar- 
antee and  revelation  ;  the  positive  philosopher  has  thus  a  primary 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION.  223 

presumption  in  favor  of  the  elements  out  of  which  his  system  is 
constructed ;  whilst  the  skeptic,  or  negative  philosopher,  must  be 
content  to  argue  back  to  the  falsehood  of  these  elements,  from  the 
impossibility  which  the  dogmatist  may  experience,  in  combining 
them  into  the  harmony  of  truth.  For  truth  is  one  ;  and  the  end 
of  philosophy  is  the  intuition  of  unity.  Skepticism  is  not  an  ori- 
ginal or  independent  method  ;  it  is  the  correlative  and  consequent 
of  dogmatism ;  and  so  far  from  being  an  enemy  to  truth,  it  arises 
only  from  a  false  philosophy,  as  its  indication  and  its  cure.  '  Alte 
dubitat,  qui  altius  credit?  The  skeptic  must  not  himself  estab- 
lish, but  from  the  dogmatist  accept,  his  principles  ;  and  his  con- 
clusion is  only  a  reduction  of  philosophy  to  zero,  on  the  hypothe- 
sis of  the  doctrine  from  which  his  premises  are  borrowed. — Are 
the  principles  which  a  particular  system  involves,  convicted  of 
contradiction  ;  or,  are  these  principles  proved  repugnant  to  others, 
which,  as  facts  of  consciousness,  every  positive  philosophy  must 
admit ;  there  is  established  a  relative  skepticism,  or  the  conclusion, 
that  philosophy,  in  so  far  as  realized  in  this  system,  is  groundless. 
Again,  are  the  principles,  which,  as  facts  of  consciousness,  philos- 
ophy in  general  must  comprehend,  found  exclusive  of  each  other ; 
there  is  established  an  absolute  skepticism; — the  impossibility  of 
all  philosophy  is  involved  in  the  negation  of  the  one  criterion  of 
truth.  Our  statement  may  be  reduced  to  a  dilemma.  Either  the 
facts  of  consciousness  can  be  reconciled,  or  they  cannot.  If  they 
cannot,  knowledge  absolutely  is  impossible,  and  every  system  of 
philosophy  therefore  false.  If  they  can,  no  system  which  supposes 
their  inconsistency  can  pretend  to  truth. 

As  a  legitimate  skeptic,  Hume  could  not  assail  the  foundations 
of  knowledge  in  themselves.  His  reasoning  is  from  their  subse- 
quent contradiction  to  their  original  falsehood  ;  and  his  premises, 
not  established  by  himself,  are  accepted  only  as  principles  univer- 
sally conceded  in  the  previous  schools  of  philosophy.  On  the 
assumption,  that  what  was  thus  unanimously  admitted  by  phi- 
losophers, must  be  admitted  of  philosophy  itself,  his  argument 
against  the  certainty  of  knowledge  was  triumphant. — Philosophers 


224  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

agreed  in  rejecting  certain  primitive  beliefs  of  consciousness  as 
false,  and  in  usurping  others  as  true.  If  consciousness,  however, 
were  confessed  to  yield  a  lying  evidence  in  one  particular,  it  could 
not  be  adduced  as  a  credible  witness  at  all : — '  Falsus  in  uno. 
falsus  in  omnibus.''  But  as  the  reality  of  our  knowledge  necessa- 
rily rests  on  the  assumed  veracity  of  consciousness,  it  thus  rests 
on  an  assumption  implicitly  admitted  by  all  systems  of  philosophy 
to  be  illegitimate. 

'  Faciunt,  nee,  intelligendo,  vt  nihil  inteUigant  P 

Reid  (like  Kant)  did  not  dispute  Hume's  inference,  as  deduced 
from  its  antecedents.  He  allowed  his  skepticisms,  as  relative,  to 
be  irrefragable ;  and  that  philosophy  could  not  be  saved  from 
absolute  skepticism,  unless  his  conceded  premises  could  be  dis- 
allowed, by  refuting  the  principles  universally  acknowledged  by 
modern  philosophers.  This  he  applied  himself  to  do.  He  sub- 
jected these  principles  to  a  new  and  rigorous  criticism.  If  his 
analysis  be  correct  (and  it  was  so,  at  least,  in  spirit  and  intention), 
it  proved  them  to  be  hypotheses,  on  which  the  credulous  sequa- 
city  of  philosophers, — '  philosophorum  credula  natio  ' — had 
bestowed  the  prescriptive  authority  of  self-evident  truths  ;  and 
showed,  that  where  a  genuine  fact  of  consciousness  had  been  sur- 
rendered, it  had  been  surrendered  in  deference  to  some  groundless 
assumption,  which,  in  reason,  it  ought  to  have  exploded.  Philos- 
ophy was  thus  again  reconciled  with  Nature ;  consciousness  was 
not  a  bundle  of  antilogies ;  certainty  and  knowledge  were  not 
evicted  from  man. 

All  this  Dr.  Brown  completely  misunderstands.  He  compre- 
hends neither  the  reasoning  of  skepticism,  in  the  hands  of  Hume, 
nor  the  argument  from  common  sense,  in  those  of  Reid.  Retro- 
grading himself  to  the  tenets  of  that  philosophy,  whose  contra- 
dictions Hume  had  fairly  developed  into  skepticism,  he  appeals 
against  this  conclusion  to  the  argument  of  common  sense ;  albeit 
that  argument,  if  true,  belies  his  hypothesis,  and  if  his  hypothesis 
be  true,  is  belied  by  it.  Hume  and  Reid  he  actually  represents 
as  maintaining  precisely  the  same  doctrine,  on  precisely  the  same 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    PERCEPTION.  225 

grounds ;  and  finds  both  concurring  with  himself,  in  advocating 
that  very  opinion,  which  the  one  had  resolved  into  a  negation  of 
all  knowledge,  and  the  other  exploded  as  a  baseless  hypothesis. 

Our  discussion,  at  present,  is  limited  to  a  single  question, — to 
the  truth  or  falsehood  of  consciousness  in  assuring  us  of  the  reality 
of  a  material  world.  In  perception,  consciousness  gives,  as  an 
ultimate  fact,  a  belief  of  the  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  something 
different  from  self.  As  ultimate,  this  belief  cannot  be  reduced 
to  a  higher  principle ;  neither  can  it  be  truly  analyzed  into  a 
double  element.  We  only  believe  that  this  something  exists,  be- 
cause we  believe  that  we  know  (are  conscious  of)  this  something 
as  existing ;  the  belief  of  the  existence  is  necessarily  involved  in 
the  belief  of  the  knowledge  of  the  existence.  Both  are  original,  or 
neither.  Does  consciousness  deceive  us  in  the  latter,  it  neces- 
sarily deludes  us  in  the  former ;  and  if  the  former,  though  a  fact 
of  consciousness,  be  false ;  the  latter,  because  a  fact  of  conscious- 
ness, is  not  true.  The  beliefs  contained  in  the  two  propositions  : 

1°,  /  believe  that  a  material  world  exists  ; 

2°,  /  believe  that  I  immediately  know  a  material  world  existing, 
(in  other  words,  /  believe  that  the  external  reality  itself  »'*• 
the  object  of  which  I  am  conscious  in  perception  )  : 
though  distinguished  by  philosophers,  are  thus  virtually  iden- 
tical. 

The  belief  of  an  external  world,  was  too  powerful,  not  to  com- 
pel an  acquiescence  in  its  truth.  But  the  philosophers  yielded  to 
nature,  only  in  so  far  as  to  coincide  in  the  dominant  result.  They 
falsely  discriminated  the  belief  in  the  existence,  from  the  belief  in 
the  knowledge.  With  a  few  exceptions,  they  held  fast  by  the 
truth  of  the  first ;  but,  on  grounds  to  which  it  is  not  here  neces- 
sary to  advert,  they  concurred,  with  singular  unanimity,  in  ab- 
juring the  second.  The  object  of  which  we  are  conscious  in  per- 
ception, could  only,  they  explicitly  avowed,  be  a  representative 
image  present  to  the  mind ; — an  image  which,  they  implicitly- 
confessed,  we  are  necessitated  to  regard  as  identical  with  the  un- 
known reality  itself.  Man,  in  short,  upon  the  common  doctrine 

10* 


226  PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION. 

of  philosophy,  was  doomed  by  a  perfidious  nature  to  realize  the 
fable  of  Narcissus ;  he  mistakes  self  for  not-self, 

'corptu  putat  esse  quod  umbra  eat.' 

To  carry  these  principles  to  their  issue  was  easy ;  and  skepti- 
cism in  the  hands  of  Hume  was  the  result.  The  absolute  veracity 
of  consciousness  was  invalidated  by  the  falsehood  of  one  of  its 
facts ;  and  the  belief  of  the  knowledge,  assumed  to  be  delusive, 
was  even  supposed  in  the  belief  of  the  existence,  admitted  to  be 
true.  The  uncertainty  of  knowledge  in  general,  and  in  particu- 
lar, the  problematical  existence  of  a  material  world,  were  thus 
legitimately  established.  To  confute  this  reduction  on  the  con- 
ventional ground  of  the  philosophers,  Reid  saw  to  be  impossible; 
and  the  argument  which  he  opposed,  was,  in  fact,  immediately 
subversive  of  the  dogmatic  principle,  and  only  mediately  of  the 
skeptical  conclusion.  This  reasoning  was  of  very  ancient  appli- 
cation, and  had  been  even  long  familiarly  known  by  the  name  of 
the  argument  from  Common  Sense. 

To  argue  from  common  sense  is  nothing  more  than  to  render 
available  the  presumption  in  favor  of  the  original  facts  of  con- 
sciousness,— that  what  is  by  nature  necessarily  BELIEVED  to  be, 
truly  is.  Aristotle,  in  whose  philosophy  this  presumption  ob- 
tained the  authority  of  a  principle,  thus  enounces  the  argument : — 
'  What  appears  to  all,  that  we  affirm  to  be ;  and  he  who  rejects 
this  belief,  will,  assuredly,  advance  nothing  better  worthy  of  cred- 
it.' (JEth.  Nic.  L.  x.  c.  2.)  As  this  argument  rests  entirely  on 
a  presumption ;'  the  fundamental  condition  of  its  validity  is,  that 
this  presumption  be  not  disproved.  The  presumption  iu  favor  of 
the  veracity  of  consciousness,  as  we  have  already  shown,  is  redar- 
gued by  the  repugnance  of  the  facts  themselves,  of  which  con- 
sciousness is  the  complement;  as  the  truth  of  all  can  only  be 
vindicated  on  the  truth  of  each.  The  argument  from  common 

1  '  There  is,'  says  Hamilton  (Reid  p.  447),  '  a  presumption  in  favor  of  the 
veracity  of  the  primary  data  of  consciousness.  This  can  only  be  rebutted  by 
showing  that  these  facts  arc  contradictory.  Skepticism  attempts  to  show 
this  011  the  principles  which  the  dogmatism  postulates.' —  W. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    PERCEPTION.  227 

sense,  therefore  postulates,   and   founds  on   the   assumption  — 

*HAT    OUR    ORIGINAL   BELIEFS    BE    NOT    PROVED    SELF-CONTRADIC- 
TORY. 

The  harmony  of  our  primary  convictions  being  supposed,  and 
not  redargued,  the  argument  from  common  sense  is  decisive 
against  every  deductive  inference  not  in  unison  with  them.  For 
as  every  conclusion  is  involved  in  its  premises,  and  as  these  again 
must  ultimately  be  resolved  into  some  original  belief;  the  conclu- 
sion, if  inconsistent  with  the  primary  phenomena  of  consciousness, 
must,  ex  hypothesi^  be  inconsistent  with  its  premises,  i.  e.  be  logi- 
cally false.  On  this  ground,  our  convictions  at  first  hand,  per- 
emptorily derogate  from  our  convictions  at  second.  '  If  we  know 
and  believe,'  says  Aristotle,  '  through  certain  original  principles, 
we  must  know  and  believe  these  with  paramount  certainty,  for  the 
very  reason  that  we  know  and  believe  all  else  through  them  ;' 
and  he  eJseAvhere  observes,  that  our  approbation  is  often  rather 
to  be  accorded  to  what  is  revealed  by  nature  as  actual,  than  to 
what  can  be  demonstrated  by  philosophy  as  possible  :  —  '  n^otfe'^siv 
ou  SsT  ifaLvTct.  <roi£  Sia,  TWV  Xoywv,  clXXd  tfoXXaxit:  juuxXXov  ToTg  <pai- 


'  Novimus  certissima  scientia,  et  clamante  conscientia1  (to  apply 
the  language  of  Augustine,  in  our  acceptation),  is  thus  a  proposi- 
tion, either  absolutely  true  or  absolutely  false.  The  argument 
from  common  sense,  if  not  omnipotent,  is  powerless  :  and  in  the 
hands  of  a  philosopher  by  whom  its  postulate  cannot  be  allowed, 
its  employment,  if  not  suicidal,  is  absurd.  This  condition  of  non- 
contradiction '  is  unexpressed  by  Reid.  It  might  seem  to  him  too 
evidently  included  in  the  very  conception  of  the  argument  to  re- 
quire enouncement.  Dr.  Brown  has  proved  that  he  was  wrong. 

*  Jacob!  (  Werke,  II.  Vorr.  p.  11,  ets.)  following  Fries,  places  Aristotle  at 
the  head  of  that  absurd  majority  of  philosophers,  who  attempt  to  demonstrate 
every  thing.  This  would  not  have  been  more  sublimely  false,  had  it  been 
said  of  the  German  Plato  himself. 

1  The  two  maxims,  —  wliatever  is,  is  ;  and  it  is  impossible  for  the  same  thing 
to  be,  and  not  to  le,  are  called  the  principle  of  Identity,  and  the  principle  of 
Contradiction,  or,  more  properly,  Non-  Contradiction.  —  W. 


228  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

Yet  Reid  could  hardly  have  anticipated,  that  his  whole  philoso- 
phy, in  relation  to  the  argument  of  common  sense,  and  that  argu* 
ment  itself,  were  so  to  be  mistaken,  as  to  be  actually  interpreted 
by  contraries. — These  principles  established,  we  proceed  to  their 
application. 

Dr.  Brown's  error,  in  regard  to  Reid's  doctrine  of  perception, 
involves  the  other,  touching  the  relation  of  that  doctrine  to 
Hume's  skeptical  idealism.  On  the  supposition,  that  Reid  views 
in  the  immediate  object  of  perception  a  mental  modification,  and 
not  a  material  quality,  Dr.  Brown  is  fully  warranted  in  asserting, 
that  he  left  the  foundations  of  idealism,  precisely  as  he  found 
them.  Let  it  once  be  granted,  that  the  object  known  in  percep- 
tion, is  not  convertible  with  the  reality  existing;  idealism  re- 
poses in  equal  security  on  the  hypothesis  of  a  representative  per- 
ception,— whether  the  representative  image  be  a  modification  of 
consciousness  itself, — or  whether  it  have  an  existence  independ- 
ent either  of  mind  or  of  the  act  of  thought.  The  former  indeed 
as  the  simpler  basis,  would  be  the  more  secure ;  and,  in  point  of 
fact,  the  egoistical  idealism  of  Fichte,  resting  on  the  third  form 
of  representation,  is  less  exposed  to  criticism  than  the  theologi- 
cal idealism  of  Berkeley,  which  reposes  on  the  first.  Did  Brown 
not  mistake  Reid's  doctrine,  Reid  was  certainly  absurd  in  thinking 
a  refutation  of  idealism  to  be  involved  in  his  refutation  of  the 
common  theory  of  perception.  So  far  from  blaming  Brown,  on 
this  supposition,  for  denying  to  Reid  the  single  merit  which  that 
philosopher  thought  peculiarly  his  own ;  we  only  reproach  him 
for  leaving,  to  Reid  and  to  himself,  any  possible  mode  of  resist- 
ing the  idealist  at  all.  It  was  a  monstrous  error  to  reverse  Reid's 
doctrine  of  perception ;  but  a  greater  still  not  to  see  that  this 
reversal  stultifies  the  argument  from  common  sense ;  and  that 
so  far  from  'proceeding  an  safe  ground1  in  an  appeal  to  our 
original  beliefs,  Reid  would  have  employed,  as  Brown  has 
actually  done,  a  weapon,  harmless  to  the  skeptic,  but  mortal  to 
himself. 

The  belief,  says   Dr.  Brown,  in  the  existence  of  an  external 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    PERCEPTION.  229 

world  is  irresistible,  therefore  it  is  true.  On  his  doctrine  of 
perception,  which  he  attributes  also  to  Reid,  this  inference  is 
however  incompetent,  because  on  that  doctrine  he  cannot  fulfil 
the  condition  which  the  argument  implies.  /  cannot  but  be- 
lieve that  material  things  exist : — /  cannot  but  believe  that  the 
material  reality  is  the  object  immediately  known  in  perception. 
The  former  of  these  beliefs,  explicitly  argues  Dr.  Brown,  in 
defending  his  system  against  the  skeptic,  because  irresistible,  is 
true.  The  latter  of  these  beliefs,  implicitly  argues  Dr.  Brown,  in 
establishing  his  system  itself,  though  irresistible,  is  false.  And 
here  not  only  are  two  primitive  beliefs,  supposed  to  be 
repugnant,  and  consciousness  therefore  delusive;  the  very 
belief  which  is  assumed  as  true,  exists  in  fact  only  through 
the  other,  which,  ex  hypothesi,  is  false.  Both  in  reality  are 
one.*  Kant,  in  whose  doctrine  as  in  Brown's  the  immediate 

*  This  reasoning  can  only  be  invalidated  either,  1°,  By  disproving  the 
belief  itself  of  the  knowledge,  as  a  fact ;  or — 2°,  By  disproving  its  attribute 
of  originality.  The  latter  is  impossible ;  and  if  possible,  would  also  anni- 
hilate the  originality  of  the  belief  of  the  existence,  which  is  supposed.  The 
former  alternative  is  ridiculous.  That  we  are  naturally  determined  to  be- 
lieve the  object  known  in  perception,  to  be  the  external  existence  itself, 
and  that  it  is  only  in  consequence  of  a  supposed  philosophical  necessity,  we 
subsequently  endeavor  by  an  artificial  abstraction  to  discriminate  these, 
is  admitted  even  by  those  psychologists  whose  doctrine  is  thereby  placed 
in  overt  contradiction  to  our  original  beliefs.  Though  perhaps  superfluous 
to  allege  authorities  in  support  of  such  a  point,  we  refer,  however,  to  the 
following,  which  happen  to  occur  to  our  recollection. — DESCARTES,  De  Pa#s. 
art.  26. — MALEBRANCHE,  Reck.  I.  iii.  c.  1. — BERKELEY,  Works,  i.  p.  216, 
and  quoted  by  Keid,  Es.  I.  P.  p.  165.— HUME,  Treat.  H.  N.  i.  pp.  330, 
338,  353,  358,  361,  369,  orig.  ed.— Essays,  ii.  pp.  154,  157,  ed.  1788.— As 
not  generally  accessible,  we  translate  the  following  extracts. — SCHELLINU 
(Ideen  zu  einer  Philosophic  der  Natw.  Einl.  p.  xix.  1st  ed.) — '  When  (in 
perception)  I  represent  an  object,  object  and  representation  are  one  and  tht 
same.  And  simply  in  this  our  mobility  to  discriminate  the  object  from  tht 
representation  during  the  act,  lies  the  conviction  which  the  common  sense 
of  mankind  (gemeine  Verstand)  has  of  the  reality  of  external  things,  although 
these  become  known  to  it,  only  through  representations.'  (See  also  p. 
xxvi.) — We  cannot  recover,  at  the  moment,  a  passage,  to  the  same  effect. 
in  Kant;  but  the  ensuing  is  the  testimony  of  an  eminent  disciple. — TEN- 
NEMANN  (Ge*ch.  d.  Phil.  II.  p,  294),  speaking  of  Plato:  '  The  illusion  thai 
tilings  in  tlum&elue*  are  cognvzalh,  is  so  natural,  that  we  need  not  marvel  if 


230  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

object  of  perception  constitutes  only  a  subjective  phenomenon, 
was  too  acute,  not  to  discern  that,  on  this  hypothesis,  philos- 
ophy could  not,  without  contradiction,  appeal  to  the  evidence 
of  our  elementary  faiths. — '  Allowing  idealism,'  he  says,  '  to  be 
as  dangerous  as  it  truly  is,  it  would  still  remain  a  scandal  to 
philosophy  and  human  reason  in  general,  to  be  compelled  to 
accept  the  existence  of  external  things  on  the  testimony  of  mere 
belief.'* 


even  philosophers  have  not  been  able  to  emancipate  themselves  from  the 
prejudice.  The  common  sense  of  mankind  (gemeine  Menschenverstand) 
which  remains  steadfast  within  the  sphere  of  experience,  recognizes  no  distinc- 
tion between  things  in  themselves  [unknown  reality  existing]  and  phenomena 
[representation,  object  known] ;  and  the  philosophizing  reason,  commences 
therewith  its  attempt  to  investigate  the  foundations  of  this  knowledge,  and 
to  recall  itself  into  system.' — See  also  JACOBI'S  David  Hume,  passim  (  Werlce, 
ii.)  and  Aw  Allwills  Britfsammlung  (  Wcrke,  \.  p.  119,  eh.)  Ueid  has  been 
already  quoted. 

*  Or.  d.  r.  V. —  Vorr.  p.  xxxix.  Kant's  marvellous  acuteness  did  not  how- 
ever enable  him  to  bestow  on  his  'Only  possible  demonstration  of  the  reality 
of  an  external  world?  (ibid.  p.  275,  fts.),  even  a  logical  necessity  ;  nor  prevent 
his  transcendental,  from  being  apodeictically  resolved  (by  Jacobi  and  Fichte1) 
into  absolute,  idealism.  In  this  argument,  indeed,  he  collects  more  in  the 
conclusion,  than  was  contained  in  the  antecedent ;  and  reaches  it  by  a  double 
naltus,  overleaping  the  foundations  both  of  the  egoistical  and  mystical 
idealists. — Though  Kant,  in  the  passage  quoted  above  and  in  other  places, 
apparently  derides  the  common  sense  of  mankind,  and  altogether  rejects  it 
as  a  metaphysical  principle  of  truth  ;  he  at  last,  however,  found  it  necessary 
(in  order  to  save  philosophy  from  the  annihilating  energy  of  his  Speculative 
Reason)  to  rest  on  that  very  principle  of  un  ulimate  belief  (which  he  had  orig- 
inally spurned  as  a  basis  even  of  a  material  reality),  the  reality  of  all  the  sub- 
limest  objects  of  our  interest — God,  Free  Will,  Immortality,  &c.  His  Prac- 
tical Season,  as  far  as  it  extends,  is,  in  truth,  only  another  (and  not  even  a 


1  '  The  doctrine  of  Kant  has  been  rigorously  proved  by  Jacobi  and  Fichte  to  be,  in  ita 
legitimate  issue,  a  doctrine  of  absolute  Idealism  ;  and  the  demonstrations  which  the  phi- 
losopher of  Koenigsberg  has  given  of  the  existence  of  an  external  world,  have  been 
long  admitted,  even  by  his  disciples  themselves,  to  be  inconclusive.  But  our  Scottish 
philosophers  appeal  to  an  argument  which  the  German  philosopher  overtly  rejected— the 
argument,  as  it  is  called,  from  common  sense.  In  their  hands,  however,  this  argument 
is  unavailing;  for,  if  it  be  good  against  the  conclusions  of  the  Idealist,  it  is  good  against 
the  premises  which  they  afford  him.  The  common  sense  of  mankind  only  assures  us 
of  the  existence  of  an  external  and  extended  world,  in  assuring  us  that  we  are  conscious, 
not  merely  of  the  phenomena  of  mind  in  relation  to  matter,  but  of  the  phenomena  of 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  231 

But  Reid  is  not  like  Brown,  felo  de  se  in  his  reasoning  from 
our  natural  beliefs ;  and  on  his  genuine  doctrine  of  perception, 
the  argument  has  a  very  different  tendency.  Reid  asserts  that 
his  doctrine  of  perception  is  itself  a  confutation  of  the  ideal  sys- 
tem ;  and  so,  when  its  imperfections  are  supplied,  it  truly  is.  For 
it  at  once  denies  to  the  skeptic  and  idealist  the  premises  of  their 
conclusion  ;  and  restores  to  the  realist,  in  its  omnipotence,  the  ar- 
gument of  common  sense.  The  skeptic  and  idealist  can  only  found 
on  the  admission,  that  the  object  known  is  not  convertible  with 
the  reality  existing ;  and,  at  the  same  time,  this  admission,  by 
placing  the  facts  of  consciousness  in  mutual  contradiction,  denies 
its  postulate  to  the  argument  from  our  beliefs.  Reid's  analysis 
therefore  in  its  result, — THAT  WE  HAVE,  AS  WE  BELIEVE  WE 

HAVE,  AN    IMMEDIATE   KNOWLEDGE    OF   THE  MATERIAL  REALITY, 

accomplished  every  thing  at  once.* 

Dr.  Brown  is  not,  however,  more  erroneous  in  thinking  that 
the  argument  from  common  sense  could  be  employed  by  him. 
than  in  supposing  that  its  legitimacy,  as  so  employed,  was  admit- 


better)  term  for  Common  Sense.1 — Fichte,  too,  escaped  the  admitted  nihilism 
of  his  speculative  philosophy,  only  by  a  similar  inconsequence  in  his  practical. 
— (See  his  Bestimmung  des  Mensclien.)  iNaturam  expeUasfwrcaJ  &c. 

*  [This  is  spoken  too  absolutely.  Eeid  I  think  was  correct  in  the  aim  of 
his  philosophy ;  but  in  the  execution  of  his  purpose  he  is  often  at  fault, 
often  confused,  and  sometimes  even  contradictory.  I  have  endeavored  to 
point  out  and  to  correct  these  imperfections  in  the  edition  which  I  have  not 
yet  finished  of  his  works.] 


matter  in  relation  to  mind—'  in  other  words  that  we  arc  immediately  percipient  of  ex- 
tended things. 

•  Reid  himself  seems  to  have  become  obscurely  aware  of  this  condition ;  and,  though 
he  never  retracted  his  doctrine  concerning  the  mere  suggestion  of  extension-,  we  find. 
in  his  "Essays  on  the  Intellectual  Powers,"  assertions  in  regard  to  the  immediate  per- 
ception of  external  things,  which  would  tend  to  show  that  his  later  views  were  more  in 
unison  with  the  necessary  conviction  of  mankind.'  Reid,  p.  129. —  If! 

i  'This  philosopher,  in  one  of  his  controversial  treatises,  imprecates  eternal  damna- 
tion on  himself  not  only  should  he  retract,  but  should  he  even  waver  in  regard  to 
any  one  principle  of  his  doctrine;  a  doctrine,  the  speculative  result  of  which  left  him. 
ns  he  confesses,  without  even  a  certainty  of  his  own  existence.  It  is  Varro  who  speaks 
of  the  credulo  philosophorwn  natio ;  hut  this  is  to  be  credulous  even  in  credulity.' — 
Reid,  p.  281.—  W. 


232  PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION. 

ted  by  Hume.  So  little  did  he  suspect  the  futility,  in  his  own 
hands,  of  this  proof,  he  only  regards  it  as  superfluous,  if  opposed 
to  that  philosopher,  who,  he  thinks,  in  allowing  the  belief  in  the 
existence  of  matter  to  be  irresistible,  allows  it  to  be  true.  (Lect. 
xxviii.  p.  176.)  Dr.  Brown  has  committed,  perhaps,  more  impor- 
tant mistakes  than  this,  in  regard  to  skepticism  and  to  Hume ; — 
none  certainly  more  fundamental.  Hume  is  converted  into  a 
dogmatist ;  the  essence  of  skepticism  is  misconceived. 

On  the  hypothesis  that  our  natural  beliefs  are  fallacious,  it  is 
not  for  the  Pyrrhonist  to  reject,  but  to  establish  their  authenti- 
city ;  and  so  far  from  the  admission  of  their  strength  being  a  sur- 
render of  his  doubt,  the  very  triumph  of  skepticism  consists  in 
proving  them  to  be  irresistible.  By  what  demonstration  is  the 
foundation  of  all  certainty  and  knowledge  so  effectually  subverted, 
as  by  showing  that  the  principles,  which  reason  constrains  us 
speculatively  to  admit,  are  contradictory  of  the  facts,  which  our 
instincts  compel  us  practically  to  believe  ?  Our  intellectual  na- 
ture is  thus  seen  to  be  divided  against  itself;  consciousness  stands 
self-convictsd  of  delusion.  '  Surely  we  have  eaten  the  fruit  of 
lies!' 

This  is  the  scope  of  the  '  Essay  on  the  Academical  or  Skeptical 
Philosophy,'1  from  which  Dr.  Brown  quotes.  In  that  essay,  pre- 
vious to  the  quotation,  Hume  shows,  on  the  admission  of  philos- 
ophers, that  our  belief  in  t/ie  knowledge  of  material  things,  a*  im- 
possible is  false ;  and  on  this  admission,  he  had  irresistibly  estal>- 
lished  the  speculative  absurdity  of  our  belief  in  the  existence  of 
an  external  world.  In  the  passage,  on  the  contrary,  which  Dr. 
Brown  partially  extracts,  he  is  showing  that  this  idealism,  which 
in  theory  must  be  admitted,  is  in  application  impossible.  Specu- 
lation and  practice,  nature  and  philosophy,  sense  and  reason,  be- 
lief and  knowledge,  thus  placed  in  mutual  antithesis,  give,  as  their 
result,  the  uncertainty  of  every  principle ;  and  the  assertion  of 
this  uncertainty  is — Skepticism.  This  result  is  declared  even  in 
the  sentence,  with  the  preliminary  clause  of  which,  Dr.  Brown 
abruptly  terminates  his  quotation. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF    PERCEPTION.  233 

But  allowing  Dr.  Brown  to  be  correct  in  transmuting  the  skep- 
tical nihilist  into  a  dogmatic  realist ;  he  would  still  be  wrong  (on 
the  supposition  that  Hume  admitted  the  truth  of  a  belief  to  be 
convertible  with  its  invincibility)  in  conceiving,  on  the  one  hand, 
that  Hume  could  ever  acquiesce  in  the  same  inconsequent  con- 
clusion with  himself;  or,  on  the  other,  that  he  himself  could, 
without  an  abandonment  of  his  system,  acquiesce  in  the  legitimate 
conclusion.  On  this  supposition,  Hume  could  only  have  arrived 
at  a  similar  result  with  Reid ;  there  is  no  tenable  medium  between 
the  natural  realism  of  the  one  and  the  skeptical  nihilism  of  the 
other. — '  Do  you  follow,'  says  Hume  in  the  same  essay,  '  the  in- 
stincts and  propensities  of  nature  in  assenting  to  the  veracity  of 
sense?' — I  do,  says  Dr.  Brown.  (Lect.  xxviii.  p.  176,  alibi.) — 
'  But  these,'  continues  Hume, '  lead  you  to  believe  that  the  very 
perception  or  sensible  image  is  the  external  object.  Do  you  dis- 
claim this  principle  in  order  to  embrace  a  more  rational  opinion, 
that  the  perceptions  are  only  representations  of  something  exter- 
nal ? — It  is  the  vital  principle  of  my  system,  says  Brown,  that 
the  mind  knows  nothing  beyond  its  own  states  (Lect.  passim) ; 
philosophical  suicide  is  not  my  choice ;  I  must  recall  my  admis- 
sion, and  give  the  lie  to  this  natural  belief. — 'You  here,'  pro- 
ceeds Hume,  '  depart  from  your  natural  propensities  and  more 
obvious  sentiments  ;  and  yet  are  not  able  to  satisfy  your  reason, 
which  can  never  find  any  convincing  argument  from  experience 
to  prove,  that  the  perceptions  are  connected  with  any  external 
objects.' — I  allow,  says  Brown,  that  the  existence  of  an  external 
world  cannot  be  proved  by  reasoning,  and  that  the  skeptical  argu- 
ment admits  of  no  logical  reply.  (Lect.  xxviii.  p.  175.) — 'But' 
(we  may  suppose  Hume  to  conclude)  '  as  you  truly  maintain  that 
the  confutation  of  skepticism  can  be  attempted  only  in  two  ways 
(ibid.), — either  by  showing  that  its  arguments  are  inconclusive, 
or  by  opposing  to  them,  as  paramount,  the  evidence  of  our  nat- 
ural beliefs, — and  as  you  now,  voluntarily  or  by  compulsion,  aban- 
don both  ;  you  are  confessedly  reduced  to  the  dilemma,  either  of 
acquiescing  in  the  conclusion  of  the  skeptic,  or  of  refusing  your 


234  PHILOSOPHY   OF    PERCEPTION. 

assent  upon  no  ground  whatever.  Pyrrhonism  or  absurdity? — 
choose  your  horn.' 

Were  the  skepticism  into  which  Dr.  Brown's  philosophy  is  thus 
analyzed,  confined  to  the  negation  of  matter,  the  result  would  be 
comparatively  unimportant  The  transcendent  reality  of  an 
outer  world,  considered  absolutely,  is  to  us  a  matter  of  supreme 
indifference.  It  is  not  the  idealism  itself  that  we  must  deplore ; 
but  the  mendacity  of  consciousness  which  it  involves.  Conscious- 
ness, once  convicted  of  falsehood,  an  unconditional  skepticism,  in 
regard  to  the  character  of  our  intellectual  being,  is  the  melan- 
choly, but  only  rational,  result.  Any  conclusion  may  now  with 
impunity  be  drawn  against  the  hopes  and  dignity  of  human  na- 
ture. Our  Personality,  our  Immateriality,  our  Moral  Liberty, 
have  no  longer  an  argument  for  their  defence.  'Man  is  the 
dream  of  a  shadow ;'  God  is  the  dream  of  that  dream. 

Dr.  Brown,  after  the  best  philosophers,  rests  the  proof  of  our 
personal  identity,  and  of  our  mental  individuality,  on  the  ground 
of  beliefs,  which,  as  '  intuitive,  universal,  immediate,  and  irresisti- 
ble,' he  not  unjustly  regards  as  '  the  internal  and  never-ceasing 
voice  of  our  Creator, — revelations  from  on  high,  omnipotent  [and 
veracious]  as  their  author.'  To  him  this  argument  is  however 
incompetent,  as  contradictory. 

What  we  know  of  self  or  person,  we  know,  only  as  given  in 
consciousness.  In  our  perceptive  consciousness  there  is  revealed 
asan  ultimate  fact  a  self  and  a  not -self ;  each  given  as  independ- 
ent— each  known  only  in  antithesis  to  the  other.  No  belief  is 
more  '  intuitive,  universal,  immediate,  or  irresistible,'  than  that 
this  antithesis  is  real  and  known  to  be  real ;  no  belief  is  therefore 
more  true.  If  the  antithesis  be  illusive,  self  and  not-self,  subject 
and  object,  I  and  Thou  are  distinctions  without  a  difference ;  and 
consciousness,  so  far  from  being  '  the  internal  voice  of  our  Crea- 
tor,' is  shown  to  be,  like  Satan, '  a  liar  from  the  beginning.'  The 
reality  of  this  antithesis,  in  different  2*irts  of  his  philosophy  Dr. 
Brown  affirms  and  denies. — In  establishing  his  theory  of  percep- 
tion, he  articulately  denies,  that  mind  is  conscious  of  aught  be- 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  235 

yond  itself;  virtually  asserts  that  what  is  there  given  in  con- 
sciousness as  not-self,  is  only  a  phenomenal  illusion, — a  modifica- 
tion of  self,  which  our  consciousness  determines  us  to  believe  the 
quality  of  something  numerically  and  substantially  different. 
Like  Narcissus  again,  he  must  lament, — 

'  Me  ego  sum  sensi,  sed  me  mea  fallit  imago.'1 

After  this  implication  in  one  part  of  his  system  that  our  belief 
in  the  distinction  of  self  and  not-self  is  nothing  more  than  the 
deception  of  a  lying  consciousness ;  it  is  startling  to  find  him,  in 
others,  appealing  to  the  beliefs  of  this  same  consciousness  as  to 
'  revelations  from  on  high  ;' — nay,  in  an  especial  manner  alleg- 
ing '  as  the  voice  of  our  Creator,'  this  very  faith  in  the  distinction 
of  self  and  not-self,  through  the  fallacy  of  which,  and  of  which 
alone,  he  had  elsewhere  argued  consciousness  of  falsehood. 

On  the  veracity  of  this  mendacious  belief,  Dr.  Brown  establishes 
his  proof  of  our  PERSONAL  IDENTITY.  (Lect.  xii.-xv.)  Touching 
the  object  of  perception,  when  its  evidence  is  inconvenient,  this 
belief  is  quietly  passed  over  as  incompetent  to  distinguish  not-self 
from  self ;  in  the  question  regarding  our  personal  identity,  where 
its  testimony  is  convenient,  it  is  clamorously  cited  as  an  inspired 
witness,  exclusively  competent  to  distinguish  self  from  not-self. 
Yet,  why,  if  in  the  one  case,  it  mistook  self  for  not-self,  it 
may  not,  in  the  other,  mistake  not-self  for  self,  would  appear  a 
problem  not  of  the  easiest  solution. 

The  same  belief,  with  the  same  inconsistency,  is  again  called  in 
to  prove  the  INDIVIDUALITY  OF  MIND.  (Lect.  xcvi.)  But  if  we 
are  fallaciously  determined,  in  perception,  to  believe  what  is  sup- 
posed indivisible,  identical,  and  one,  to  be  plural  and  different 
and  incompatible  (self  —  self  +  not-self)  ;  how,  on  the  authority 
of  the  same  treacherous  conviction,  dare  we  maintain,  that  the 
phenomenal  unity  of  consciousness  affords  a  guarantee  of  the  real 
simplicity  of  the  thinking  principle  ?  The  materialist  may  now 
contend,  without  fear  of  contradiction,  that  self  is  only  an  illusive 
phenomenon  ;  that  our  consecutive  identity  is  that  of  the  Delphic 


236  PHILOSOPHY    OF    1'KRCEPTION. 

ship,  and  our  present  unity  merely  that  of  a  system  of  co-ordinate 
activities.  To  explain  the  phenomenon,  he  has  only  to  suppose, 
as  certain  theorists  have  lately  done,  an  organ  to  tell  the  lie  of 
our  personality ;  and  to  quote  as  authority  for  the  lie  itself,  the 
I*erfidy  of  consciousness,  on  which  the  theory  of  a  representative 
perception  is  founded. 

On  the  hypothesis  of  a  representative  perception,  there  is,  in 
fact,  no  salvation  from  materialism,  on  the  one  side,  short  of 
idealism — skepticism — nihilism,  on  the  other.  Our  knowledge  of 
mind  and  matter,  as  substances,  is  merely  relative ;  they  'are 
known  to  us  only  in  their  qualities  ;  and  we  can  justify  the  pos- 
tulation  of  two  different  substances,  exclusively  on  the  supposition 
of  the  incompatibility  of  the  double  series  of  phenomena  to  coin- 
here  in  one.  Is  this  supposition  disproved  ?— the  presumption 
against  dualism  is  again  decisive.  '  Entities  are  not  to  be  multi- 
plied without  necessity* — '  A  plurality  of  principles  is  not  to  be 
assumed  where  the  phenomena  can  be  explained  by  one.'1  In  Brown's 
theory  of  perception  he  abolishes  the  incompatibility  of  the  two 
series  ;  and  yet  his  argument,  as  a  dualist,  for  an  immaterial  prin- 
ciple of  thought,  proceeds  on  the  ground,  that  this  incompatibility 
subsists.  (Lect.  xcvi.  pp.  646,  647.)  This  philosopher  denies  us 
an  immediate  knowledge  of  aught  beyond  the  accidents  of  mind. 
The  accidents  which  we  refer  to  body,  as  known  to  us,  are  only 
states  or  modifications  of  the  percipient  subject  itself ;  in  other 
words,  the  qualities  we  call  material,  are  known  by  us  to  exist, 
only  as  they  are  known  by  us  to  inhere  in  the  same  substance  an 
t}te  qualities  we  denominate  mental.  There  is  an  apparent  anti- 
thesis, but  a  real  identity.  On  this  doctrine,  the  hypothesis  of  a 
double  principle  losing  its  necessity,  becomes  philosophically  ab- 
surd ;  and  on  the  law  of  parsimony,  a  psychological  unitarianism, 
at  best,  is  established.  To  the  argument,  that  the  qualities 
of  the  object  are  so  repugnant  to  the  qualities  of  the  sub- 
ject of  perception,  that  they  cannot  be  supposed  the  accidents 
of  the  same  substance ;  the  Unitarian — whether  materialist,  ideal- 
ist, or  absolutist — has  only  to  reply  :  that  so  far  from  the  attri- 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  237 

butes  of  the  object  being  exclusive  of  the  attributes  of  the  subject 
in  this  act ;  the  hypothetical  dualist  himself  establishes,  as  the 
fundamental  axiom  of  his  philosophy  of  mind,  that  the  object 
known  is  universally  identical  with  the  subject  knowing.  The  ma- 
terialist may  now  derive  the  subject  from  the  object,  the  idealist 
derive  the  object  from  the  subject,  the  absolutist  sublimate  both 
into  indifference,  nay,  the  nihilist  subvert  the  substantial  reality 
of  either  ; — the  hypothetical  realist  so  far  from  being  able  to  re- 
sist the  conclusion  of  any,  in  fact  accords  their  assumptive  premi- 
ses to  all. 

The  same  contradiction  would,  in  like  manner,  invalidate  every 
presumption  in  favor  of  our  LIBERTY  OF  WILL.  But  as  Dr. 
Brown  throughout  his  scheme  of  Ethics  advances  no  argument 
in  support  of  this  condition  of  our  moral  being,  which  his  philos- 
ophy otherwise  tends  to  render  impossible,  we  shall  say  nothing 
of  this  consequence  of  hypothetical  realism. 

So  much  for  the  system,  which  its  author  fondly  imagines, '  al- 
lows to  the  skeptic  no  resting-place  for  his  foot, — no  fulcrum  for 
the  instrument  he  uses  ;'  so  much  for  the  doctrine  which  Brown 
would  substitute  for  Reid's ; — nay,  which  he  even  supposes  Reid 
himself  to  have  maintained. 

'  SCILICET,  HOC  TOTUM  FALSA  RATIONS  RECEPTUM  EST  !'* 


*  [In  this  criticism  I  have  spoken  only  of  Dr.  Brown's  mistakes,  and  of 
those  only  with  reference  to  his  attack  on  Keid.  On  his  appropriating  to 
himself  the  observations  of  others,  and  in  particular  those  of  Destutt 
Tracy,  I  have  said  nothing,  though  an  enumeration  of  these  would  be 
necessary  to  place  Brown  upon  his  proper  level.  That,  however,  would 
require  a  separate  discussion.] 


CHAPTER    II. 

EEPRESENTATIVE  AND  PRESENTATIVE   KNOWLEDGE.1 

§  I. — THE  DISTINCTION  OP  PRESENTATIVE,  INTUITIVE  OR  IMME- 
DIATE, AND  OF  REPRESENTATIVE  OR  MEDIATE  COGNITION  ; 
WITH  THE  VARIOUS  SIGNIFICATIONS  OF  THE  TERM  OBJECT, 
ITS  CONJUGATES  AND  CORRELATIVES. 

THE  correlative  terms,  Immediate  and  Mediate,  as  attributes  of 
knowledge  and  its  modifications,  are  employed  in  more  than  a  sin- 
gle relation.  In  order,  therefore,  to  obviate  misapprehension,  it  is 
necessary,  in  the  first  place,  to  determine  in  what  signification  it 
is,  that  we  are  at  present  to  employ  them. 

In  apprehending  an  individual  thing,  either  itself  through 
sense,  or  its  representation  in  the  phantasy,  we  have,  in  a  certain 
sort,  an  absolute  or  irrespective  cognition,  which  is  justly  denom- 
inated immediate,  by  constrast  to  the  more  relative  and  mediate 
knowledge,  which,  subsequently,  we  compass  of  the  same  object, 
when,  by  a  comparative  act  of  the  understanding  we  refer  it  to  a 
class,  that  is,  think  or  recognize  it,  by  relation  to  other  things 
under  a  certain  notion  or  general  term.  With  this  distinction  we 
have  nothing  now  to  do.  The  discrimination  of  immediate  and 
mediate  knowledge,  with  which  we  are  at  present  concerned,  lies 
within  and  subdivides  what  constitutes,  in  the  foregoing  division, 
the  branch  of  immediate  cognition ;  for  we  are  only  here  to  deal 
with  the  knowledge  of  individual  objects  absolutely  considered, 
and  not  viewed  in  relation  to  aught  beyond  themselves. 

This  distinction  of  immediate  and  mediate  cognition  it  is  of  the 

1  Hamilton's  second  Supplementary  Dissertation  on  Reid  constitutes  this 
chapter. —  W. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION.  239 

highest  importance  to  establish  ;  for  it  is  one  without  which  the 
whole  philosophy  of  knowledge  must  remain  involved  in  ambi- 
guities. What,  for  example,  can  be  more  various,  vacillating, 
and  contradictory,  than  the  employment  of  the  all-important  terms 
object  and  objective,  in  contrast  to  subject  and  subjective,  in  the 
writings  of  Kant  ? — though  the  same  is  true  of  those  of  other  re- 
cent philosophers.  This  arose  from  the  want  of  a  preliminary 
determination  of  the  various,  and  even  opposite  meanings,  of 
which  these  terms  are  susceptible, — a  selection  of  the  one  proper 
meaning, — ;and  a  rigorous  adherence  to  the  meaning  thus  pre- 
ferred. But,  in  particular,  the  doctrine  of  Natural  Realism  can- 
not, without  this  distinction,  be  adequately  understood,  developed, 
and  discriminated.  Reid,  accordingly,  in  consequence  of  the  want 
of  it,  has  not  only  failed  in  giving  to  his  philosophy  its  precise 
and  appropriate  expression,  he  has  failed  even  in  withdrawing  it 
from  equivocation  and  confusion, — insomuch,  that  it  even  re- 
mains a  question,  whether  his  Doctrine  be  one  of  Natural  Realism 
at  all. — The  following  is  a  more  articulate  development  of  this 
important  distinction  than  that  which  I  gave  some  ten  years  ago  ;' 
and  since,  by  more  than  one  philosopher  adopted. 

For  the  sake  of  distinctness,  I  shall  state  the  different  momenta 
of  the  distinction  in  separate  Propositions ;  and  these  for  more 
convenient  reference  I  shall  number. 

1. — A  thing  is  known  immediately  or  proximately,  when  we 
cognize  it  in  itself ;  mediately  or  remotely,  when  we  cognize  it 
in  or  through  something  numerically  different  from  itself.  Imme- 
diate cognition,  thus  the  knowledge  of  a  thing  in  itself,  involves 
the/acf  of  its  existence  ;  mediate  cognition,  thus  the  knowledge 
of  a  thing  in  or  through  something  not  itself,  involves  only  the 
possibility  of  its  existence. 

2. — An  immediate  cognition,  inasmuch  as  the  thing  known 
is  itself  presented  to  observation,  may  be  called  a  presentative  ; 
and  inasmuch  as  the  thing  presented  is,  as  it  were,  viewed  by 

1  See  previous  chapter,  p.  178. —  W. 


240  PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION. 

the  mind  face  to  face,  may  be  called  an  intuitive*  cognition. — A 
mediate  cognition,  inasmuch  as  the  thing  known  is  held  up  or 
mirrored  to  the  mind  in  a  vicarious  representation,  may  be  called 
a  representative  f  cognition. 

3. — A  thing  known  is  called  an  object  of  knowledge. 

4. — In  a  presentative  or  immediate  cognition  there  is  one  sole 
object ;  the  thing  (immediately)  known  and  the  thing  existing 
being  one  and  the  same. — In  a  representative  or  mediate  cogni- 
tion there  may  be  discriminated  two  objects  ;  the  thing  (imme- 
diately) known,  and  the  thing  existing  being  numerically  different. 

5. — A  thing  known  in  itself  is  the  (sole)  presentative  or  intui- 
tive object  of  knowledge,  or  the  (sole)  object  of  a  presentative  or 
intuitive  knowledge. — A  thing  known  in  and  through  something 
else  is  the  primary,  mediate,  remote,^  real,§  existent,  or  represent- 


*  On  the  application  of  the  term  Litutiive,  in  this  sense,  see  in  the  sequel 
of  this  Excursus,  p.  256,  a.  b. 

t  The  term  Representation  I  employ  always  strictly,  as  in  contrast  to  Pre- 
sentation, and,  therefore,  with  exclusive  reference  to  individual  objects,  and 
not  in  the  vague  generality  of  Eepresentatlo  or  Vorstettung  in  the  Leibnitz- 
ian  and  subsequent  philosophies  of  Germany,  where  it  is  used  for  any  cogni- 
tive act,  considered,  not  in  relation  to  what  knows,  but  to  what  is  known ; 
that  is,  as  the  genus  including  under  it  Intuitions,  Perceptions,  Sensations, 
Conceptions,  Notions,  Thoughts  proper,  &c.,  as  species. 

\  The  distinction  of  proximate  and  remote  object  is  sometimes  applied  to 
perception  in  a  different  manner.  Thus  Color  (the  White  of  the  "Wall  for 
instance),  is  said  to  be  the  proximate,  object  of  vision,  because  it  is  seen  im- 
mediately ;  the  colored  thing  (the  Wall  itself  for  instance)  is  said  to  be  the 
remote  object  of  vision,  because  it  is  seen  only  through  the  mediation  of 
the  color.  This  however  is  inaccurate.  For  the  Wall,  that  in  which  the 
color  inheres,  however  mediately  known,  is  never  mediately  seen.  It  is  not 
indeed  an  object  of  perception  at  all ;  it  is  only  the  subject  of  such  an  otyect. 
and  is  reached  by  a  cognitive  process,  different  from  the  merely  percep- 
tive. 

§  On  the  term  Heal. — The  term  Real  (realis),  though  always  importing 
the  existent,  is  used  in  various  significations  and  oppositions.  The  following 
occur  to  me : 

1.  As  denoting  existence,  in  contrast  to  the  nomenclature  of  existence, — 
the  thing,  as  contradistinguished  from  its  name.    Thus  we  have  definitions 
and  divisions  real,  and  definitions  and  divisions  nominal  or  verbal. 

2.  As  expressing  the  existent  opposed  to  the  non-existent, — a  something  iu 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION.  24:1 

cd,  object  of  (mediate)  knowledge, — objectum  quod  ;    and  a  thing 
tnrough  which  something  else  is  known  is  the  secondary,  imme- 


contrast  to  a  nothing.    In  this  sense  the  diminutions  of  existence,  to  which 
reality,  in  the   allowing  significations,  is  counterposed,  are  all  real. 

8.  As  denoting  material  or  external,  in  contrast  to  mental,  spiritual,  or  inter- 
nal, existence.  This  meaning  is  improper;  so, therefore,  is  the  term  Realism, 
as  equivalent  to  Materialism,  in  the  nomenclature  of  sorne  recent  philoso- 
phers. 

4.  As  synonymous  with  actual  /  and  this  (a.  as  opposed  to  potential,  b.)  as 
opposed  to  possible  existence. 

5.  As  denoting  absolute  or  irrespective,  in  opposition  to  phenomenal  or  rela- 
tive, existence ;  in  other  words,  as  denoting  things  in  themselves  and  out  of 
relation  to  all  else,  in  contrast  to  things  in  relation  to,  and  as  known  by,  in- 
telligences, like  men,  who  know  only  under  the  conditions  of  plurality  and 
difference.     In  this  sense,  which  is  rarely  employed  and  may  be  neglected, 
the  Keal  is  only  another  term  for  the  Unconditioned  or  Absolute, — T&  Syria;  tv. 

6.  As  indicating  existence  considered  as  a  subsistence  in  nature  (ens  extra 
unimam,  ens  natures'),  it  stands  counter  to  an  existence  considered  as  a 
representation  in  thought.     In  this  sense,  reale,  in  the  language  of  the  older 
philosophy  (Scholastic,  Cartesian,  Gassendian),  as  applied  to  esse  or  ens,  is 
opposed  to  intentionale,  notionale,  conceptibile,  imaginarvum,  rationis,cognitionis, . 
in  anima,  in  intellectu,  prout  cognitum,  ideale,  &c. ;  and  corresponds  with  a 
parte  rei,  as  opposed  to  aparte  intellect/us,  with  subjectivum,  as  opposed  to  oojec- 
tivum  (see  p.  240  b.  sq.  note),  with  proprium,  priiicipale,  and  fundamentale, 
as  opposed  to  vkarium,  with  materiale,  as  opposed  to  formale,  and  with/or- 
male  in  seipso,  and  entitativum,  as  opposed  to  representativum,  &c.    Under 
this  head,  in  the  vascillating  language   of  our  more  recent  philosophy,  real 
approximates  to,  but  is  hardly  convertible  with  objective,  in  contrast  to  sub- 
jective in  the  signification  there  prevalent. 

7.  In  close  connection  with  the  sixth  meaning,  real,  in  the  last  place,  de- 
dotes  an  identity  or  difference  founded  on  the  conditions  of  the  existence  of 
a  thing  in  itself,  in  contrast  to  an  identity  or  difference  founded  only  on  the 
relation  or  point  of  view  in  which  the  thing  may  be  regarded  by  the  think- 
ing subject.    In  this  sense  it  is  opposed  to  logical  or  rational,  the  terms  being 
here  employed  in  a  peculiar  meaning.     Tims  a  thing  which  really  (re)  or  in 
itself  is  one  and  indivisible  may  logically  (ratione)  by  the  mind  be  considered 
as  diverse  and  plural,  and  vice  versa,  what  are  really  diverse  and  plural  may 
logically  be  viewed,  as  one  and  indivisible.   As  an  example  of  the  former ; — 
the  sides  and  angles  of  a  triangle  (or  trilateral),  as  mutually  correlative — as 
together  making  up  the  same  simple  figure — and  as,  without  destruction  of 
that  figure,  actually  inseparable  from  it,  and  from  each  other,  are  really  one ; 
but  inasmuch  as  they  have  peculiar  relations  which  may,  in  thought  be  con- 
sidered severally  and  for  themselves,  they  are  logically  twofold.   In  like  man- 
ner take  apprehension  and  judgment.     These  are  really  one,  as  each  involves 
the  other  (for  we  apprehend  only  as  we  judge  something  to  be,  and  we  judge 
only,  as  we  apprehend  the  existence  of  the  terms  compared),  and  as  together 

11 


242  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

(Hate,  proximate,  ideal,*  vicarious  or  representative,  object  of 
(mediate)  knowledge, — objectum  quo,  or  per  quod.  The  former 
may  likewise  be  styled  objectum  entitativum. 

6. — The  Ego  as  the  subject  of  thought  and  knowledge  is  now 
commonly  styled  by  philosophers  simply  The  Subject ;  and  Sub- 
jective is  a  familiar  expression  for  what  pertains  to  the  mind  or 
thinking  principle.  In  contrast  and  correlation  to  these,  the  terms 
Object  and  Objective  are,  in  like  manner  now  in  general  use  to 
denote  the  Non-ego,  its  affections  and  properties, — and  in  general 
the  Really  existent  as  opposed  to  the  Ideally  known.  These 
expressions,  more  especially  Object  and  Objective,  are  ambiguous ; 
for  though  the  Non-ego  may  be  the  more  frequent  and  obtrusive 
object  of  cognition,  still  a  mode  of  mind  constitutes  an  object  of 
thought  and  knowledge,  no  less  than  a  mode  of  matter.  Without, 
therefore,  disturbing  the  preceding  nomenclature,  which  is  not 
only  ratified  but  convenient,  I  would  propose  that,  when  we  wish 
to  be  precise,  or  where  any  ambiguity  is  to  be  dreaded,  we  should 
employ  on  the  one  hand,  either  the  terms  subject-object  or  subject- 
ive object  (and  this  we  could  again  distinguish  as  absolute  or  as 
relative) — on  the  other,  either  object-object,  or  objective  object.\ 


they  constitute  a  single  indivisible  act  of  cognition ;  but  they  are  logically 
double,  inasmuch  as,  by  mental  abstraction,  they  may  be  viewed  each  for 
itself,  and  as  a  distinguishable  element  of  thought.  As  an  example  of  the 
latter;  individual  things,  as  John,  James,  Richard,  &c.,  are  really  (numer- 
ically) different,  as  coexisting  in  nature  only  under  the  condition  of  plu- 
rality ;  but,  as  resembling  objects  constituting  a  single  class  or  notion 
(man)  they  are  logically  considered  (generically  or  specifically)  identical 
and  one. 

*  I  eschew,  in  general,  the  employment  of  the  words  Idea  and  Ideal — they 
are  BO  vague  and  various  in  meaning.  But  they  cannot  always  be  avoided, 
as  the  conjugates  of  the  indispensable  term  Idealism.  Nor  is  there,  as  I  use 
them,  any  danger  from  tlieir  ambiguity ;  for  I  always  manifestly  employ 
them  simply  for  subjective — (what  is  in  or  of  the  mind),  in  contrast  to  objec- 
tive— (what  is  out  of,  or  external  to,  the  mind). 

t  The  terms  Subject  and  Subjective,  Object  and  Objective. — I  have  already  had 
occasion  to  show,  that,  in  the  hands  of  recent  philosophers,  the  principal 
terms  of  philosophy  have  not  only  been  frequently  changed  from  their  orig- 
inal meanings  and  correlations,  but  those  meanings  and  correlations  some- 
times even  simply  reversed.  I  have  again  to  do  this  in  reference  to  the  cor- 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  243 

7.— If  the  representative  object  be  supposed  (according  to  one 
theory)  a  mode  of  the  conscious  mind  or  self,  it  may  be  distin- 

relatives  subjective  and  objective,  as  employed  to  denote  what  Aristotle  vaguely 
expressed  by  the  terifis  ra  fiplv  and  rd  <p6<ret — the  things  in  us,  and  the  things  in 
nature. 

The  terms  subject  and  olyect  were,  for  a  long  time,  not  sufficiently  discrim- 
inated from  each  other. — Even  in  the  writings  of  Aristotle  rb  {nroneiiicvov  is 
used  ambiguously  for  id  in  quo,  the  subject  proper,  and  id  circa  quod,  the  object 
proper  ; — and  this  latter  meaning  is  unknown  to  Pluto.  The  Greek  language 
never,  in  fact,  possessed  any  one  term  of  equal  universality,  and  of  the  same 
definite  signification,  as  object.  For  the  term  di-riitti/uvov,  which  comes  the 
nearest,  Aristotle  uses,  like  Plato,  in  the  plural,  to  designate,  in  general,  the 
various  kinds  ofopposites  ;  and  there  is,  I  believe,  only  a  single  passage  to  be 
found  in  his  writings  (De  An.  ii.  c.  4),  in  which  this  word  can  be  adequately 
translated  by  object.  The  reason  of  this,  at  first* sight,  apparent  deficiency 
may  have  been  that  as  no  language,  except  the  Greek,  conld  express,  not  by 
a  periphrasis,  but  by  a  special  word,  the  object  of  every  several  faculty  or 
application  of  mind  (as  aia9r)T6v,  <j>avTaoT6v,vorjT6v,  •yviacrrov,  firioT^nSv,  SoiAi/rdy, 
ipcKrdv,  6ov\evrdv,  TUOT&V,  &c.,  &c.),  so  the  Greek  philosophers  alone  found 
little  want  of  a  term  precisely  to  express  the  abstract  notion  of  objectivity  in 
its  indeterminate  universality,  which  they  could  apply,  as  they  required  it, 
in  any  determinate  relation.  The  schoolmen  distinguished  the  subjectum 
occupationis,  from  the  subjectum  inhcKsionis,  pr&dicationis,  &c.,  limiting  the 
term  objectum  (which  in  classical  Latinity  had  never  been  naturalized  as  an 
absolute  term,  even  by  the  philosophers)  to  the  former  ;  and  it  would  have 
been  well  had  the  term  subjectum,  in  that  sense,  been,  at  the  same  time, 
wholly  renounced.  This  was  not,  however,  done.  Even  to  the  present  day, 
the  word  subject  is  employed,  in  most  of  the  vernacular  languages,  for  the 
materia  circa  quam,  in  which  signification  the  term  object  ought  to  be  exclu- 
sively applied.  But  a  still  more  intolerable  abuse  has  recently  crept  in ;  ob- 
ject has,  in  French  and  English,  been  for  above  a  century  vulgarly  employed 
for  end,  motive,  final  cause.  But  to  speak  of  these  terms  more  in  detail. 

The  term  object  (objectum,  id  quod  objicitur  cognitioni,  &c.)  involves  a 
two-fold  element  of  meaning.  1°,  it  expresses  something  absolute,  some- 
thing in  itself  that  is  ;  for  before  a  thing  can  be  presented  to  cognition,  it 
must  be  supposed  to  exist.  2°,  It  expresses  something  relative ;  for  in  so 
far  as  it  is  presented  to  cognition,  it  is  supposed  to  be  only  as  it  is  known  to 
exist.  Now  if  the  equipoise  be  not  preserved,  if  either  of  these  elements  be 
allowed  Jo  preponderate,  the  word  will  assume  a  meaning  precisely  opposite 
to  that  which  it  would  obtain  from  the  preponderance  of  the  other.  If  the 
first  element  prevail,  object  and  objective  will  denote  that  which  exists  of  its 
own  nature,  in  contrast  to  that  which  exists  only  under  the  conditions  of  our 
faculties  ; — the  real  in  opposition  to  the  ideal.  If  the  second  element  prevail, 
object  and  objective  will  denote  what  exists  only  as  it  exists  in  thought ; — the 
ideal  in  contrast  to  the  real. 

Now  both  of  these  counter  meanings  of  the  terms  object  and  objective  have 
obtained  in  the  nomenclature  of  different  times  and  different  philosophies, — 


244  PHILOSOPHY   OF    PERCEPTION. 

guished  as  Egoistical ;  if  it  be  supposed  (according  to  another) 
something  numerically  different  from  the  conscious  mind  or  self, 


uay  in  the  nomenclature  of  the  same  time  und  even  t^ie  same  philosophy. 
Hence  great  confusion  and  ambiguity. 

In  the  scholastic  philosophy  in  which,  us  already  said,  object  and  objective, 
subject  and  subjective,  were  first  employed  in  their  high  abstraction,  and  as 
absolute  terms,  and,  among  the  systems  immediately  subsequent,  in  the  Car- 
tesian and  Gassendian  schools,  the  latter  meaning  was  the  one  exclusively 
prevalent.  In  these  older  philosophies,  objectivum,  as  applied  to  ens  or  ease, 
was  opposed  loformale  and  subjectivum  ;  and  corresponded  with  intentionale, 
vicarium,  representativum,  rationale  or  rations,  intellectuale  or  in  inteUectu, 
proitt  cognitum,  ideale,  &c.,  as  opposed  to  reale,  proprium,  principale,  funda- 
mental?, prout  in  seipso,  &c. 

In  these  schools  the  esse  •subjecticum,  in  contrast  to  the  ease  objectivum,  de- 
noted a  thing  considered  as  inhering  in  its  subject,  whether  that  subject  were 
mind  or  matter,  as  contradistinguished  from  a  thing  considered  an  present  to 
the  mind  only  as  an  accidental  object  of  thought.  Thus  the  faculty  of  im- 
agination, for  example,  and  its  acts,  were  said  to  have  a  suJijective  existence 
in  the  mind ;  while  its  several  images  or  representations  had,  qua  images  or 
objects  of  consciousness,  only  an  objective.  Again,  a  material  thing,  say  a 
horse,  qua  existing,  was  said  to  have  a  subjective  being  out  of  the  mind ;  qua 
conceived  or  known,  it  was  said  to  have  an  objective  being  in  the  mind. 
Every  thought  has  thus  a  subjective  and  an  objective  phasis ; — of  which  more 
particularly  as  follows : 

1.  The  esse  subjectivum,  formaU,  or  proprium  of  a  notion,  concept,  species, 
idea,  <&c.,  denoted  it  as  considered  absolutely  for  itself,  and  as  distinguished 
from  the  thing,  the  real  object,  of  which  it  is  the  notion,  species,  &c. ;  that  is, 
simply  as  a  mode  inherent  in  the  mind  as  a  subject,  or  as  an  operation  exert- 
ed by  the  mind  as  a  cause.    In  this  relation,  the  esse  rtale  of  a  notion,  species, 
&c.,  was  opposed  to  the  following. 

2.  The  esse  objectivum,  vicarium,  intentionale,  ideale,  representativum  of  a 
notion,  concept,  specits,  idea,  &c.,  denoted  it,  not  as  considered  absolutely  for 
itself,  and  as  distinguished  from  its  object,  but  simply  as  vicarious  or  repre- 
sentative of  the  thing  thought.    In  this  relation  the  esse  reale  of  a  notion, 
&c.,  was  opposed  to  the  mere  negation  of  existence — only  distinguished 
it  from  a  simple  nothing. 

Hitherto  we  have  seen  the  application  of  the  term  objective  determined  by 
the  preponderance  of  the  second  of  the  two  counter  elements  of  meaning ; 
we  have  now  to  regard  it  in  its  subsequent  change  of  sense  as  determined  by 
the  first. 

The  cause  of  this  change  I  trace  to  the  more  modern  Schoolmen,  in  the 
distinction  they  took  of  conceptus  (as  also  of  notio  and  intentio)  into  formalis 
and  objectivus, — a  distinction  both  in  itself  and  in  its  nomenclature,  incoiisist- 
ent  and  untenable. — A.  formal  concept  or  notion  they  defined — '  the  immedi- 
ate and  actual  representation  of  the  thing  thought ;'  an  objective  concept  or 
notion  they  defined—'  the  thing  itself  which  is  represented  or  thought.'— 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  245 

it  may  be  distinguished  as  Non-Egoistical.1    The  former  theory 
supposes  two  things  numerically  different :    1°,  the  object  repre- 


Now,  in  the  first  place,  the  second  of  these,  is,  either  not  a  concept  or  notion 
at  all,  or  it  is  indistinguishable  from  the  first.  (A  similar  absurdity  is  commit- 
ted by  Locke  in  his  employment  of  Idea  for  its  object — the  reality  represent- 
ed by  it — the  Ideatum.) — In  the  second  place,  the  terms  formal  and  objective 
are  here  used  in  senses  precisely  opposite  to  what  they  were  when  the  same 
philosophers  spoke  of  the  esse  formale  and  esse  dbjectivum  of  a  notion. 

This  distinction  and  the  terms  in  which  it  was  expressed  came  however 
to  be  universally  admitted.  Hence,  though  proceeding  from  an  error,  I 
would  account  in  part,  but  in  part  only,  for  the  general  commutation  latterly 
effected  in  the  application  of  the  term  objective.  This  change  began,  I  am 
inclined  to  think,  about  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  century — and  in  the 
German  schools.  Thus  Calovius — 'Quicquid  objective  fundamentaliter  in 
natura  existit,'  &c.  (ScriptaPhilosophica,  1651,  p.  72.)  In  the  same  sense  it  is 
used  by  Leibnitz;  e.g.  N.  Essais,  p.  187  ;  and  subsequently  to  him  by  the 
Leibnitio-Wolfians  and  other  German  philosophers  in  general.  This  appli- 
cation of  the  term,  it  is  therefore  seen,  became  prevalent  among  his  country- 
men long  before  the  time  of  Kant ;  in  the  '  Logica '  of  whose  master  Knutzen, 
I  may  notice,  objective  and  subjective,  in  their  modern  meaning  are  em- 
ployed in  almost  every  page.  The  English  philosophers,  at  the  commence- 
ment of  the  last  century,  are  found  sometimes  using  the  term  objective  in  the 
old  sense, — as  Berkeley  in  his  '  Siris,'  §  292  ;  sometimes  in  the  new, — as  Nor- 
risinhis  'Keason  and  Faith'  (ch.  1),  and  Oldfield  in  his  'Essay  towards  the 
improvement  of  Eeason'  (Part  ii.  c.  19),  who  both  likewise  oppose  it  to  sub- 
jective, taken  also  in  its  present  acceptation. 

But  the  cause,  why  the  general  terms  subject  and  subjective,  object  and  ob- 
jective, came,  in  philosophy,  to  be  simply  applied  to  a  certain  special  distinc- 
tion ;  and  why,  in  that  distinction,  they  came  to  be  opposed  as  contraries — 
this  is  not  to  be  traced  alone  to  the  inconsistencies  which  I  have  noticed  ;  for 
that  inconsistency  itself  must  be  accounted  for.  It  lies  deeper.  It  is  to  be 
found  in  the  constituent  elements  of  all  knowledge  itself;  and  the  nomen- 
clature in  question  is  only  an  elliptical  abbreviation,  and  restricted  applica- 
tion of  the  scholastic  expressions  by  which  these  elements  have  for  many 
ages  been  expressed. 

All  knowledge  is  a  relation — a  relation  between  that  which  knows  (in  scho- 
lastic language,  the  subject  in  which  knowledge  inheres),  and  that  which  is 
known  (in  scholastic  language,  the  object  about  which  knowledge  is  conver- 
sant) ;  and  the  contents  of  every  act  of  knowledge  are  made  up  of  elements, 
and  regulated  by  laws,  proceeding  partly  from  its  object  and  partly  from  its 
subject.  Now  philosophy  proper  is  principally  and  primarily  the  science  of 
knowledge ;  its  first  and  most  important  problem  being  to  determine —  What 
can,  we  know  ?  that  is,  what  are  the  conditions  of  our  knowing,  whether 


1  See  the  next  chapter.—  W. 


246  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

sented, — 2°,  the  representing  and  cognizant  mind  : — the  latter, 
three;  1°, the  object  represented, — 2°,  the  object  representing, — 
3°,  the  cognizant  mind.  Compared  merely  with  each  other,  the 
former,  as  simpler,  may,  by  contrast  to  the  latter,  be  considered, 

these  lie  in  the  nature  of  the  object,  or  in  the  nature  of  the  subject,  of  knowl- 
edge? 

But  Philosophy  being  the  Science  of  Knowledge  ;  and  the  science  of  knowl- 
edge supposing,  in  its  most  fundamental  and  thorough-going  analysis,  the 
distinction  of  the  subject  and  object  of  knowledge;  it  is  evident,  that,  to  philos- 
ophy the  subject  of  knowledge  would  be,  by  pre-eminence,  The  Subject,  and 
the  object  of  knowledge  by  pre-eminence,  The  Object.  It  was  therefore  natu- 
ral that  the  object  and  the  objective,  the  subject  and  the  subjective  should  be 
employed  by  philosophers  as  simple  terms,  compendiously  to  denote  the 
grand  discrimination,  about  which  philosophy  was  constantly  employed,  and 
which  no  others  could  be  found  so  precisely  and  promptly  to  express.  In 
fact,  had  it  not  been  for  the  special  meaning  given  to  objective  in  the  Schools, 
their  employment  in  this  their  natural  relation  would  probably  have  been  of 
'a  much  earlier  date ;  not  however  that  they  are  void  of  ambiguity,  and  have 
not  been  often  abusively  employed.  This  arises  from  the  following  circum- 
stance : — The  subject  of  knowledge  is  exclusively  the  Ego  or  conscious  mind. 
Subject  and  subjective,  considered  in  themselves,  are  therefore  little  liable  to 
equis-ocation.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  object  of  knowledge  is  not  neces- 
sarily a  phenomenon  of  the  Non-ego  ;  for  the  phenomena  of  the  Ego  itself 
constitute  as  veritable,  though  not  so  various  and  prominent,  objects  of  cog- 
nition, as  the  phenomena  of  the  Non-ego. 

Subjective  and  objective  do  not,  therefore,  thoroughly  and  adequately  dis- 
criminate that  which  belongs  to  mind,  and  even  that  which  belongs  to  matter; 
they  do  not  even  competently  distinguish  what  is  dependent,  from  what  is 
independent,  on  the  conditions  of  the  mental  self.  But  in  these  significations 
they  are  and  must  be  frequently  employed.  Without  therefore  discarding 
this  nomenclature,  which,  as  fur  as  it  goes,  expresses,  in  general,  a  distinction 
of  the  highest  importance,  in  the  most  apposite  terms ;  these  terms  may  by 
qualification  easily  be  rendered  adequate  to  those  subordinate  discrimina- 
tions, which  it  is  often  requisite  to  signalize,  but  which  they  cannot  simply 
and  of  themselves  denote. 

Subject  and  subjective,  without  any  qualifying  attribute,  I  would  therefore 
employ,  as  has  hitherto  been  done,  to  mark  out  what  inheres  in,  pertains 
to,  or  depends  on,  the  knowing  mind  whether  of  man  in  general,  or  of  this 
or  that  individual  man  in  particular;  and  this  in  contrast  to  object  and  ob- 
jective, as  expressing  what  does  not  so  inhere,  pertain,  and  depend.  Thus, 
for  example,  an  art  or  science  is  said  to  be  objective,  when  considered  simply 
as  a  system  of  speculative  truths  or  practical  rules,  but  without  respect  of 
any  actual  possessor ;  subjective  when  considered  as  a  habit  of  knowledge  or 
a  dexterity,  inherent  in  the  mind,  either  vaguely  of  any,  or  precisely  of  this 
or  that,  possessor. 

But,  as  has  been  stated,  an  object  of  knowledge  imiy  be  a  mode  ofmind,  or 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    PERCEPTION.  247 

but  still  inaccurately,  as  an  immediate  cognition.1  The  latter  of 
these  as  limited  in  its  application  to  certain  faculties,  and  now  in 
fact  wholly  exploded,  may  be  thrown  out  of  account. 

8. — External  Perception  or  Perception  simply,  is  the  faculty 
presentative  or  intuitive  of  the  phenomena  of  the  Non-Ego  or 
Matter — if  there  be  any  intuitive  apprehension  allowed  of  the  Non- 
Ego  at  all.  Internal  Perception  or  Self -Consciousness  is  the  fac- 
ulty presentative  or  intuitive  of  the  phenomena  of  the  Ego  or  mind. 

9. — Imagination  or  Phantasy?  in  its  most  extensive  meaning, 
is  the  faculty  representative  of  the  phenomena  both  of  the  exter- 
nal and  internal  worlds. 

10. — A  representation  considered  as  an  object  is  logically,  not 
really,  different  from  a  representation  considered  as  an  act.  Here 
object  and  act  are  merely  the  same  indivisible  mode  of  mind 
viewed  in  two  different  relations.  Considered  by  reference  to  a 
(mediate)  object  represented,  it  is  a  representative  object ;  con- 


it  may  be  something  different  from  mind  ;  and  it  is  frequently  of  import- 
ance to  indicate  precisely  iinder  which  of  these  classes  that  object  comes. 
In  this  case  by  an  internal  development  of  the  nomenclature  itself,  we  might 
employ,  on  the  former  alternative,  the  term  subject-object  ;  on  the  latter,  the 
term  object-object. 

But  the  subject-object  may  be  either  a  mode  of  mind,  of  which  we  are  con- 
scious as  absolute  and  for  itself  alone, — as,  for  example,  a  pain  or  pleasure  ; 
or  a  mode  of  mind,  of  which  we  are  conscious,  as  relative  to,  and  represen- 
tative of  something  else, — as,  for  instance,  the  imagination  of  something; 
past  or  possible.  Of  these  we  might  distinguish,  when  necessary,  the  one, 
as  the  absolute  or  the  real  subject-object,  the  other,  as  the  relative  or  the  ideal 
or  the  representative  subject-object. 

Finally,  it  may  be  required  to  mark  whether  the  object-object  and  the  svl- 
ject-object  be  immediately  known  as  present,  or  only  as  represented.  In 
this  case  we  must  resort,  on  the  former  alternative,  to  the  epithet prefsentatin? 
or  intuitine;  on  the  latter,  to  those  of  represented,  mediate,  remote,  primary, 
principal,  &c. 

'This  observation  has  reference  to  Eeid.  See  sequel  of  this  chapter,  §  ii. 
and  the  following  chapter,  §  ii.  A,  4. —  W. 

2  '  The  Latin  Imayinatio,  witli  its  modifications  in  the  vulgar  languages, 
was  employed  both  in  ancient  and  modern  times  to  express  what  the  Greeks 
denominated  ^avraola.  Phantasy,  of  which  Phansy  or  Fancy  is  a  corruption, 
and  now  employed  in  a  more  limited  sense,  was  a  common  name  for  Imagi- 
nation with  the  old  English  writers.' — Reid,  p.  379. —  II'. 


248  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

sidered  by  reference  to  the  mind  representing  and  contemplating 
the  representation,  it  is  a  representative  act.  A  representative 
object  being  viewed  as  posterior  in  the  order  of  nature,  but  not  of 
time,  to  the  representative  act,  is  viewed  as  a  product ;  and  the 
representative  act  being  viewed  as  prior  in  the  order  of  nature, 
though  not  of  time,  to  the  representative  object,  is  viewed  as  a 
producing  process.  The  same  may  be  said  of  Image  and  Imagi- 
nation. (Prop.  21,  and  p.  259,  a  b,  and  note.) 

1 1 . — A  thing  to  be  known  in  itself  must  be  known  as  actually 
existing  (Pr.  1),  and  it  cannot  be  known  as  actually  existing 
unless  it  be  known  as  existing  in  its  When  and  its  Where.  But 
the  When  and  Where  of  an  object  are  immediately  cognizable 
by  the  subject,  only  if  the  When  be  now  (i.  e.  at  the  same 
moment1  with  the  cognitive  act),  and  the  Where  be  here  (i.  e. 
within  the  sphere  of  the  cognitive  faculty) ;  therefore  a  presenta- 
tive  or  intuitive  knowledge  is  only  competent  of  an  object  present 
to  the  mind,  both  in  time  and  in  space. 

12. — E  converse — whatever  is  known,  but  not  as  actually 
existing  now  and  here,  is  known  not  in  itself,  as  the  presentative 


1  Time  is  cognizable  and  conceivable  only  as  an  indefinite  past,  present,  or 
future.  An  absolute  minimum  we  cannot  fix — an  infinite  division  we  can- 
not carry  out.  We  can  conceive  Time  only  as  a  relative.  The  Present,  so 
far  as  construable  to  thought,  has  no  reality.  (See  p.  488.)  Will  Sir  William 
then  explain  to  us  what  he  means  by  the  phrase — at  tht,  same  moment  with? 
In  Extensive  Quantity  he  wisely  docs  not  demand  an  absolute  '  present,'  for 
in  that  case  the  Eleatic  Zeno's  demonstration  would  hold  him  motionless. 
He  does  seem  to  demand  an  absolute  present  in  Extensive  Quantity.  Abso- 
lute present,  has  no  place  in  thought.  Perception  must  take  place  in  time, 
/. «.  in  an  indefinite  present.  Add  that  Memory,  as  Hobbcs,  Descartes,  and 
Aristotle  call  Imagination,  is  a  dying  sense ;  and  what  hinders  us  from  say- 
ing, with  Reid,  that  Memory  is  an  immediate  (=non-mediate)  knowledge  of 
the  past?  It  seems  to  us  that  Hamilton  is  here  crossing  a  shadow  of  the 
Absolute,  and  that  the  question  may  in  part  be  redargued  from  his  own 
ground  of  Relativity.  We  do  not  mean  that  Sir  William  is  wrong  in  making 
a  distinction  between  Presentative  and  Representative  knowledge,  but  that 
the  line  of  demarkation  might  be  shifted.  We  here  speak  briefly,  and  only 
to  the  initiated  ;  and  regret  that  these  sheets  are  passing  so  rapidly  through 
the  press  that  we  cannot  discuss  the  question  at  some  length,  for  it  is  one  of 
the  most  important  in  philosophy. —  W. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  249 

object  of  an  intuitive,  but  only  as  the  remote  object  of  a  repre- 
sentative cognition. 

13. — A  representative  object,  considered  irrespectively  of  what 
it  represents,  and  simply  as  a  mode  of  the  conscious  subject,  is 
an  intuitive  or  presentative  object.  For  it  is  known  in  itself,  as 
a  mental  mode,  actually  existing  now  and  here.* 


*  Propositions  10-13  may  illustrate  a  passage  in  Aristotle's  treatise  on 
Memory  and  Reminiscence  (c.  1),  which  has  been  often  curiously  misunder- 
stood by  his  expositors ;  and  as  it,  in  return,  serves  to  illustrate  the  doctrin* 
here  stated,  I  translate  it : 

'  Of  what  part  of  the  soul  memory  is  a  function,  is  manifest ; — of  that,  to 
wit,  of  which  imagination  or  phantasy  is  a  function.  [And  imagination  had 
been  already  shown  to  be  a  function  of  the  common  sense.] 

'  And  here  a  doubt  may  be  started — Whether  the  affection  [or  mental 
modification]  being  present,  the  reality  absent,  that  what  is  not  present  can 
be  remembered  [or,  in  general,  known].  For  it  is  manifest  that  we  must 
conceive  the  aifection,  determined  in  the  soul  or  its  proximate  bodily  organ, 
through  sense,  to  be,  as  it  were,  a  sort  of  portrait,  of  which  we  say  that 
memory  is  the  habit  [or  retention].  For  the  movement  excited  [to  employ 
the  simile  of  Plato]  stamps,  as  it  were,  a  kind  of  impression  of  the  total  pro- 
cess of  perception!  [on  the  soul  or  its  organ],  after  the  manner  of  one  who 
applies  a  signet  to  wax.  .  .  . 

'  But  if  such  be  the  circumstances  of  memory — Is  remembrance  [a  cogni- 
tion] of  this  affection,  or  of  that  from  which  it  is  produced?  For,  if  of  the 
latter,  we  can  have  no  remembrance  [or  cognition]  of  things  absent ;  if  of  the 
former,  how,  as  percipient  [or  conscious  of  this  present  affection],  can  we 
have  a  remembrance  [or  cognition]  of  that  of  which  we  are  not  percipient 
[or  conscious] — the  absent  [reality]  ?  Again,!  supposing  there  to  be  a  resem- 
bling something,  such  as  an  impression  or  picture,  in  the  mind ;  the  percep- 
tion [or  consciousness]  of  this — Why  should  it  be  the  remembrance  [or  cog- 
nition] of  another  thing,  and  not  of  this  something  itself? — for  in  the  act  of 
remembrance  we  contemplate  this  mental  affection,  and  of  this  [alone]  are 
we  percipient  [or  conscious].  In  these  circumstances,  how  is  a  remembrance 
[or  cognition]  possible  of  what  is  not  present  ?  For  if  so,  it  would  seem  that 
what  is  not  present  might,  in  like  manner,  be  seen  and  heard. 

'  Or  is  this  possible,  and  what  actually  occurs  ?  And  thus : — As  in  a  por- 
trait the  thing  painted  is  an  animal,  and  a  representation  (tMv)  [of  an  ani- 
mal], one  and  the  same  being,  at  once,  both  (for,  though  in  reality  both  are 
not  the  same,  in  thought  we  can  view  the  painting,  either  [absolutely]  as 
animal,  or  [relatively]  as  representation  [of  an  animal]) ;  in  like  manner,  the 
phantasm  in  us,  we  must  consider,  both  absolutely,  as  a  phenomenon  (Oeu- 


t  AitrOtipaTos : — this  comprehends  both  the  objective  presentation — atVOi/rdv,  <md 
the  subjective  energy — utodnatf. 
I  I  read  CTI  rf  re.    Themistius  has  crt  tivt. 

11* 


250  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

14. — Consciousness  is  a  knowledge  solely  of  what  is  now  and 
here  present  to  the  mind.  It  is  therefore  only  intuitive,  and 
its  objects  exclusively  presentative.  Again,  Consciousness  is  a 
knowledge  of  all  that  is  now  and  here  present  to  the  mind : 
every  immediate  object  of  cognition  is  thus  an  object  of  conscious- 
ness, and  every  intuitive  cognition  itself,  simply  a  special  form 
of  consciousness. 

15. —  Consciousness  comprehends  every  cognitive  act ;  in  other 
words,  whatever  we  are  not  conscious  of,  that  we  do  not  know. 
But  consciousness  is  an  immediate  cognition.  Therefore  all  our 
mediate  cognitions  are  contained  in  our  immediate. 

16. — The  actual  modifications — the  present  acts  and  affections 
of  the  Ego,  are  objects  of  immediate  cognition,  as  themselves 
objects  of  consciousness.  (Pr.  14.)  The  past  and  possible  modi- 
fications of  the  Ego  are  objects  of  mediate  cognition,  as  repre- 
sented to  consciousness  in  a  present  or  actual  modification. 

17. — The  Primary  Qualities*  of  matter  or  body,  now  and  here, 
that  is  in  proximate  relation  to  our  organs,  are  objects  of  imme- 
diate cognition  to  the  Natural  Realists,2  of  mediate,  to  the  Cos- 
mothetic  Idealists  :*  the  former,  on  the  testimony  of  consciousness, 
asserting  to  mind  the  capability  of  intuitively  perceiving  what  is 
not  itself;  the  latter  denying  this  capability,  but  asserting  to  the 


pwa)  in  itself,  and  relatively,  as  a  phantasm  [or  representation]  of  something 
different  from  itself.  Considered  absolutely,  it  is  a  [mere]  phenomenon  or 
[irrespecti%re]  phantasm  ;  considered  relatively,  it  is  a  representation  or  recol- 
lective  image.  So  that  when  a  movement  [or  mental  modification]  is  in 
present  act; — if  the  soul  perceive  [or  apprehend]  it  as  absolute  and  for  itself, 
a  kind  of  [irrespective]  concept  or  phantasm  seems  the  result;  whereas,  if 
as  relative  to  what  is  different  from  itself,  it  views  it  (as  in  the  picture)  for  a 
representation,  and  a  representation  of  Coriscus,  even  although  Coriscus  has 
not  himself  been  seen.  And  here  we  are  differently  affected  in  this  mode  of 
viewing  [the  movement,  as  painted  representation],  from  what  we  arc  when 
'  viewing  it,  as  painted  animal ;  the  mental  phenomenon,  in  the  one  case  is, 
so  to  say,  a  mere  [irrelative]  concept;  while  in  the  other,  what  is  remem- 
bered is  here  [in  the  mind],  as  there  [in  the  picture],  a  representation.' 

1  On  the  distinction  of  the  Primary  and  Secondary  Qualities  of  Matter — 
its  history  and  completion,  sec  below,  chap.  v. —  W. 

*  On  these  Designations,  see  above,  Part  I.  and  the  chapter  following  this. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION.  251 

mind  the  power  of  representing,  and  truly  representing,  what  it 
does  not  know.  To  the  Absolute  Idealists1  matter  has  no  exist- 
ence as  an  object  of  cognition,  either  immediate  or  mediate. 

18. — The  Secondary  Qualities*  of  body  now  and  here,  as  only 
present  affections  of  the  conscious  subject,  determined  by  an 
unknown  external  cause,  are,  on  every  theory,  now  allowed  to  be 
objects  of  immediate  cognition.  (Pr.  16.) 

19. — As  not  now  present  in  time,3  an  immediate  knowledge  of 
the  past  is  impossible.  The  past  is  only  mediately  cognizable  in 
and  through  a  present  modification  relative  to,  and  representative 
of  it  as  having  been.  To  speak  of  an  immediate  knowledge  of 
the  past  involves  a  contradiction  in  adjecto.  For  to  know  the 
past  immediately,  it  must  be  known  in  itself; — and  to  be  known 
in  itself  it  must  be  known  as  now  existing.  But  the  past  is  just 
a  negation  of  the  now  existent :  its  very  notion,  therefore,  excludes 
the  possibility  of  its  being  immediately  known.  So  much  for 
Memory,  or  Recollective  Imagination. 

20. — In  like  manner,  supposing  that  a  knowledge  of  the  future 
were  competent,  this  can  only  be  conceived  possible,  in  and 
through  a  now  present  representation ;  that  is,  only  as  a  mediate 
cognition.  For,  as  not  yet  existent,  the  future  cannot  be  known 
in  itself,  or  as  actually  existent.  As  not  here  present,  an  imme- 
diate knowledge  of  an  object  distant  in  space  is  likewise  impossi- 
ble.3 For,  as  beyond  the  sphere  of  our  organs  and  faculties,  it 
cannot  be  known  by  them  in  itself;  it  can  only,  therefore,  if 
known  at  all,  be  known  through  something  different  from  itself, 
that  is  mediately,  in  a  reproductive  or  a  constructive  act  of  imagi- 
nation. 

21. — A  possible  object — an  ens  rationis — is  a  mere  fabrication 
of  the  mind  itself;  it  exists  only  ideally  in  and  through  an  act  of 

1  On  these  Designations  see  above,  Part  I.  and  the  chapter  following  this. 
—  W. 

2  On  the  assertions  of  Reid,  Stewart,  &c.,  that  the  mind  is  immediately 
percipient  of  distant  objects,  see  §  ii.  of  this  chapter,  and  §  ii.  of  the  next 
chapter. —  W. 

*  See  note  1,  p.  248.—  W. 


252  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

imagination,  and  has  only  a  logical  existence,  apart  from  that  act 
with  which  it  is  really  identical.  (Pr.  10.  and  p.  259,  a  b,  with 
note.)  It  is  therefore  an  intuitive  object  in  itself;  but  in  so  far, 
as  not  involving  a  contradiction,  it  is  conceived  as  prefiguring 
something  which  may  possibly  exist  some-where  and  some-when — 
this  something,  too,  being  constructed  out  of  elements  which  had 
been  previously  given  in  Presentation — it  is  Representative.' 


Compared  together,  these  two  cognitions  afford  the  following 
similarities  and  differences. 

A.  Compared  by  reference  to  their  simplicity  or  complexity,  as 
Acts. 

22. — Though  both  as  really  considered  (re,  non  ratione),  are 
equally  one  and  indivisible ;  still  as  logically  considered  (ratione, 
non  re),  an  Intuitive  cognition  is  simple,  being  merely  intuitive ; 
a  Representative,  complex,  as  both  representative  and  intuitive  of 
the  representation. 

B.  Compared  by  reference  to  the  number  of  their  Objects. 

23. — In  a  Presentative  knowledge  there  can  only  be  a  single 
object,  and  the  term  object  is  here  therefore  univocal.  In  a  Rep- 
resentative knowledge  two  different  things  are  viewed  as  objects, 
and  the  term  object,  therefore,  becomes  equivocal ;  the  secondary 
object  within,  being  numerically  different  from  the  primary  ob- 
ject without,  the  sphere  of  consciousness,  which  it  represents. 

C.  Compared  by  reference  to  the  relativity  of  their  Ofyects, 
known  in  consciousness. 

24. — In  a  presentative  cognition,  the  object  known  in  con- 
sciousness, being  relative  only  to  the  conscious  subject,  may,  by 
contrast,  be  considered  as  absolute  or  irrespective.  In  a  repre- 
sentative cognition,  the  object  known  in  consciousness,  being,  be- 
sides the  necessary  reference  to  the  subject,  relative  to,  as  vicari- 
ous of,  an  object  unknown  to  consciousness,  must,  in  every  point 


See  the  next  chapter,  §  i. —  W. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION.  253 

of  view,  be  viewed  as  relative  or  respective.  Thus,  it  is  on  all 
hands  admitted,  that  in  Self-consciousness  the  object  is  subjective 
and  absolute ;  and,  that  in  Imagination,  under  every  form,  it  is 
subjective  and  relative.  In  regard  to  external  Perception,  opin- 
ions differ.  For  on  the  doctrine  of  the  Natural  Realists,  it  is 
objective  and  absolute ;  on  the  doctrine  of  the  Absolute  Idealists 
subjective  and  absolute ;  on  the  doctrine  of  the  Cosmothetic  Ideal- 
ists, subjective  and  relative.1 

D.  Compared  by  reference  to  the  character  of  the  existential 
Judgments  they  involve. 

25. — The  judgment  involved  in  an  Intuitive  apprehension  is  as- 
sertory  ;  for  the  fact  of  the  intuition  being  dependent  on  the  fact 
of  the  present  existence  of  the  object,  the  existence  of  the  object 
is  unconditionally  enounced  as  actual.  The  judgment  involved  in 
a  Representative  apprehension  is  problematic  ;  for  here  the  fact 
of  the  representation  not  being  dependent  on  the  present  exist- 
ence of  the  object  represented,  the  existence  of  that  object  can  be 
only  modally  affirmed  as  possible. 

E.  Compared  by  reference  to  their  character  as  Cognitions. 
26. — Representative  knowledge  is  admitted  on  all  hands  to  be 

exclusively  subjective  or  ideal ;  for  its  proximate  object  is,  on 
every  theory,  in  or  of  the  mind,  while  its  remote  object,  in  itself, 
and  except  in  and  through  the  proximate  object,  is  unknown. — 
Presentative  knowledge  is,  on  the  doctrine  of  the  Natural  Realists, 
partly  subjective  and  ideal,  partly  objective  and  real ;  inasmuch 
as  its  sole  object  may  be  a  phenomenon  either  of  self  or  of  not- 
self ':  while,  on  the  doctrine  of  the  Idealists  (whether  Absolute 
or  Cosmothetic)  it  is  always  subjective  or  ideal ;  consciousness, 
on  their  hypothesis,  being  cognizant  only  of  mind  and  its  con- 
tents. 

F.  Compared  in  respect  of  their  Self-sufficiency  or  Dependence. 
2Y. — a. — In  one  respect,  Representative  knowledge  is  not  sclf- 

sufficient,  inasmuch  as  every  representative  cognition  of  an  object 

1  See  the  next  chapter,  §  i. —  W. 


254  PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION. 

supposes  «i  previous  presentative  apprehension  of  that  same  ob- 
ject. This  is  even  true  of  the  representation  of  an  imaginary  or 
merely  possible  object ;  for  though  the  object,  of  which  we  are 
conscious  in  such  an  act,  be  a  mere  figment  of  the  phantasy,  and, 
as  a  now  represented  whole,  was  never  previously  presented  to 
our  observation ;  still  that  whole  is  nothing  but  an  assemblage  of 
parts,  of  which,  in  different  combinations,  we  have  had  an  intui- 
tive cognition.  Presentative  knowledge,  on  the  contrary,  is,  in 
this  respect,  self-sufficient,  being  wholly  independent  on  Repre- 
sentative for  its  objects. 

28. — b. — Representative  knowledge,  in  another  respect,  is  not 
self-sufficient.  For  inasmuch  as  all  representation  is  only  the 
repetition,  simple  or  modified,  of  what  was  once  intuitively  appre- 
hended ;  Representative  is  dependent  on  Presentative  knowledge, 
as  (with  the  mind)  the  concause  and  condition  of  its  possibility. 
Presentative  knowledge,  on  the  contrary,  is  in  this  respect  inde- 
pendent of  Representative ;  for  with  our  intuitive  cognitions  com- 
mences all  our  knowledge. 

29. — c. — In  a  third  respect  Representative  knowledge  is  not 
self-sufficient ;  for  it  is  only  deserving  of  the  name  of  knowledge 
in  so  far  as  it  is  conformable  with  the  intuitions  which  it  repre- 
sents.— Presentative  knowledge,  on  the  contrary,  is,  in  this  re- 
spect, all-sufficient ;  for  in  the  last  resort  it  is  the  sole  vehicle,  the 
exclusive  criterion  and  guarantee  of  truth. 

30. — d. — In  a  fourth  respect,  Representative  knowledge  is  not 
self-sufficient,  being  wholly  dependent  upon  Intuitive ;  for  the 
object  represented  is  only  known  through  an  intuition  of  the  sub- 
ject representing.  Representative  knowledge  always,  therefore,  in- 
volves presentative,  as  its  condition. — Intuitive  knowledge,  on  the 
contrary,  is,  in  this  respect,  all-sufficient,  being  wholly  independ- 
ent of  representative,  which  it,  consequently,  excludes.  Thus  in 
different  points  of  view  Representative  knowledge  contains  and 
is  contained  in,  Presentative  (Pr.  15). 

G. — Compared  in  reference  to  their  intrinsic  Completeness  and 
Perfection. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION.  255 

31. — a. — In  one  respect  Intuitive  knowledge  is  complete  and 
perfect,  as  irrespective  of  aught  beyond  the  sphere  of  conscious- 
ness ;  while  Representative  knowledge  is  incomplete  and  imperfect, 
as  relative  to  what  transcends  that  sphere. 

32. — b. — In  another  respect,  Intuitive  knowledge  is  complete 
and  perfect,  as  affording  the  highest  certainty  of  the  highest  de- 
termination of  existence — the  Actual — the  Here  and  Now  exist- 
ent ; — Representative,  incomplete  and  imperfect,  as  affording  only 
an  inferior  assurance  of  certain  inferior  determinations  of  exist- 
ence— the  Past,  the  Future,  the  Possible — the  not  Here  and  not 
Now  existent. 

33. — c. — In  a  third  respect,  Intuitive  knowledge  is  complete 
and  perfect,  its  object  known  being  at  once  real,  and  known  as 
real; — Representative  knowledge,  incomplete  and  imperfect,  its 
known  object  being  unreal,  its  real  object  unknown. 


The  precise  distinction  between  Presentative  and  Representative 
knowledge,  and  the  different  meanings  of  the  term  Object, — the 
want  of  which  has  involved  our  modern  philosophy  in  great  con- 
fusion,— I  had  long  ago  evolved  from  my  own  reflection,  and  be- 
fore I  was  aware  that  a  parallel  distinction  had  been  taken  by  the 
Schoolmen,  under  the  name  Intuitive  and  Abstract  knowledge 
(cognitio  Intuitiva  et  Abstractiva,  or  Visionis  et  Simplicis  Intel- 
ligentice).  Of  these,  the  former  they  defined — the  knowledge  of 
a  thing  present  as  it  is  present  (cognitio  rei  prcesentis  ut  prcesens 
esf) ;  the  latter — the  knowledge  of  a  thing  not  as  it  is  present 
(cognitio  rei  non  ut  prwsens  est).  This  distinction  remounts, 
among  the  Latin  Schoolmen,  to  at  least  the  middle  of  the  eleventh 
century ;  for  I  find  that  both  St.  Anselm  and  Hugo  a  Sancto 
Victore  notice  it.  It  was  certainly  not  borrowed  from  the  Ara- 
bians ;  for  Averroes,  at  the  end  of  the  following  century,  seems 
unaware  of  it.  In  fact,  it  bears  upon  its  front  the  indication  of  a 
Christian  origin ;  for,  as  Scotus  and  Ariminensis  notice,  the  term 


256  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PEBCEPTION. 

Intuitive  was  probably  suggested  by  St.  Paul's  expression,  ' facie 
adfaciemj  as  the  Vulgate  has  it  (1  Corinth,  xiii.  12).  For  intu- 
itive, in  this  sense,  the  Lower  Greeks  sometimes  employed  the 
terms  !#OTTIXO£,  and  au<roir<nxo£ — a  sense  unknown  to  the  Lexi- 
cographers ; — but  they  do  not  appear  to  have  taken  the  counter 
distinction.  The  term  abstract  or  abstractive  was  less  fortunately 
chosen  than  its  correlative;  for  besides  the  signification  in  ques- 
tion, as  opposed  to  intuitive,  in  which  case  we  look  away  from 
the  existence  of  a  concrete  object ;  it  was  likewise  employed  in 
opposition  to  concrete,  and,  though  improperly,  as  a  synonym  of 
universal,  in  which  case  we  look  away  from  each  and  every  indi- 
vidual subject  of  inhesion.  As  this  last  is  the  meaning  in  which 
abstract  as  it  was  originally,  is  now  exclusively,  employed,  and  as 
representative  is,  otherwise,  a  far  preferable  expression,  it  would 
manifestly  be  worse  than  idle  to  attempt  its  resuscitation  in  the 
former  sense. 

The  propriety  and  importance  of  the  distinction  is  unquestion- 
able ;  but  the  Schoolmen — at  least  the  great  majority  who  held 
the  doctrine  of  intentional  species — wholly  spoiled  it  in  applica- 
tion ;  by  calling  the  representative  perception  they  allowed  of  ex- 
ternal things,  by  the  name  of  an  intuitive  cognition,  to  say  noth- 
ing of  the  idle  thesis  which  many  of  them  defended — that  by  a 
miracle  we  could  have  an  intuitive  apprehension  of  a  distant,  nay 
even  of  a  non-existent,  object.  This  error,  I  may  notice,  is  the 
corollary  of  another  of  which  I  am  soon  to  speak — the  holding 
that  external  things,  though  known  only  through  species,  are  im- 
mediately known  in  themselves. 

§  II. — THE  ERRORS  OF  REID  AND  OTHER  PHILOSOPHERS,  IN  REF- 
ERENCE TO  THE  DISTINCTION  OF  PRESENTATIVE  OR  IMMEDI- 
ATE AND  REPRESENTATIVE  OR  MEDIATE  KNOWLEDGE,  AND 
OF  OBJECT  PROXIMATE  AND  REMOTE. 

The  preceding  distinction  is  one  which,  for  the  Natural  Real- 
ist, it  is  necessary  to  establish,  in  order  to  discriminate  his  own 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION.  257 

peculiar  doctrine  of  perception  from  those  of  the  Idealists,  Coa- 
mothetic  and  Absolute,  in  their  various  modifications.  This, 
however,  Reid  unfortunately  did  not  do ;  and  the  consequence 
has  been  the  following  imperfections,  inaccuracies,  and  errors. 

A.  In  the  first  place,  he  has,  at  least  in  words,  abolished  the 
distinction  of  presentative  and  representative  cognition. 

1°,  He  asserts,  in  general,  that  every  object  of  thought  must 
be  an  immediate  object  (I.  P.  427  b). 

2°,  He  affirms,  in  particular,  not  only  of  the  faculties  whose  ob- 
jects are,  but  of  those  whose  objects  are  not,  actually  present  to 
the  mind, — that  they  are  all  and  each  of  them  immediate  knowl- 
edges. Thus  he  frequently  defines  memory  (in  the  sense  of  rec- 
ollective  imagination)  '  an  immediate  knowledge  of  things  past' 
(I.  P.  339  a,  351  b.  357  a);  he  speaks  of  an  immediate  knowl- 
edge of  things  future  (I.  P.  340  b) ;  and  maintains  that  the 
immediate  object  in  our  conception  (imagination)  of  a  distant 
reality,  is  that  reality  itself  (I.  P.  374  b).  See  above,  Propp.  10,. 
11,  12,  19,  20,  21. 

Now  the  cause  why  Reid  not  only  did  not  establish,  but  even 
thought  to  abolish,  the  distinction  of  mediate  cognition  with  its 
objects  proximate  and  remote,  was,  1°,  his  error,  which  we  are 
elsewhere  to  consider,1  in  supposing  that  philosophers  in  the  prox- 
imate object  of  knowledge,  had  in  view,  always,  a  tertium  quid 
different  both  from  the  reality  represented  and  the  conscious  mind 
(Inq.  106  a,  I.  P.  226  b,  369  ab)  ;  and  2°,  his  failing  to  observe 
that  the  rejection  of  this  complex  hypothesis  of  non-egoistical  rep- 
resentation, by  no  means  involved  either  the  subversion  of  repre- 
sentative knowledge  in  general,  or  the  establishment  of  presenta- 
tive perception  in  particular.  (See  Prop.  7.") 

But  Reid's  doctrine  in  this  respect  is  perhaps  imperfectly  de- 
veloped, rather  than  deliberately  wrong  ;  and  I  am  confident  that 
had  it  been  proposed  to  him,  he  would  at  once  have  acquiesced  in 
the  distinction  of  presentative  and  representative  knowledge,  above 
stated,  not  only  as  true  in  itself,  but  as  necessary  to  lay  a  solid 

1  See  next  chapter,  §  ii.—  W.  a  See  next  clmpter,  §  i.—  W. 


258  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

foundation  for  a  theory  of  intuitive  perception,  in  conformity  with 
the  common  sense  of  mankind. 

B.  In  the  second  place,  Reid  maintains  that  in  our  cognitions 
there  must  be  an  object  (real  or  imaginary)  distinct  from  the  op- 
eration of  the  mind  conversant  about  it ;  for  the  act  is  one  thing 
and  the  object  of  the  act  another.  (I.  P.  292  b,  305  a,  also  298 
b,  373  a,  374  b.) 

This  is  erroneous — at  least  it  is  erroneously  expressed.  Take 
an  imaginary  object,  and  Reid's  own  instance — a  centaur.  Here 
he  says,  '  The  sole  object  of  conception  (imagination)  is  an  ani- 
mal which  I  believe  never  existed.'  It '  never  existed ;'  that  is 
never  really,  never  in  nature,  never  externally,  existed.  But  it  is 
4  an  object  of  imagination.'  It  is  not  therefore  a  mere  non-exist- 
ence ;  for  if  it  had  no  kind  of  existence,  it  could  not  possibly  be 
the  positive  object  of  any  kind  of  thought.  For  were  it  an  abso- 
lute nothing,  it  could  have  no  qualities  (non-entis  nulla  sunt  attri- 
buta)  ;  but  the  object  we  are  conscious  of,  as  a  Centaur,  has  qual- 
ities,— qualities  which  constitute  it  a  determinate  something,  and 
distinguish  it  from  every  other  entity  whatsoever.  We  must, 
therefore,  per  force,  allow  it  some  sort  of  imaginary,  ideal,  repre- 
sentative, or  (in  the  older  meaning  of  the  term)  objective,  existence 
in  the  mind.  Now  this  existence  can  only  be  one  or  other  of  two 
sorts  ;  for  such  object  in  the  mind,  either  is,  or  is  not,  a  mode  of 
mind.  Of  these  alternatives  the  latter  cannot  be  supposed  ;  for 
this  would  be  an  affirmation  of  the  crudest  kind  of  non-egoistical 
representation- — the  very  hypothesis  against  which  Reid  so  strenu- 
ously contends.  The  former  alternative  remains — that  it  is  a 
mode  of  the  imagining  mind, — that  it  is  in  fact  the  plastic  act  c* 
imagination1  considered  as  representing  to  itself  a  certain  possible 
form — a  Centaur.  But  then  Reid's  assertion — that  there  is 
always  an  object  distinct  from  the  operation  of  the  mind  convers- 


1  The  elements,  thus  to  speak,  of  the  possible  form  which  the  imagination 
in  its  plastic  act,  represents  to  itself,  have  an  objective  existence.  The  form 
itself,  is  only  a  combination  of  real  forms ;  the  combining  of  these  is  the  only 
purely  subjective  act. —  W. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION.  259 

ant  about  it,  the  act  being  one  thing,  the  object  of  the  act  ano- 
ther— must  be  surrendered.  For  the  object  and  the  act  are  here 
only  one  and  the  same  thing  in  two  several  relations. — (Prop.  21.) 
Reid's  error  consists  in  mistaking  a  logical  for  a  metaphysical 
difference — a  distinction  of  relation  for  a  distinction  of  entity. 
Or  is  the  error  only  from  the  vagueness  and  ambiguity  of  ex- 
pression ?* 

C.  In  the  third  place,  to  this  head  we  may  refer  Reid's  inac- 
curacy in  regard  to  the  precise  object  of  perception.  This  object  is 
not,  as  he  seems  frequently  to  assert,  any  distant  reality  (Inq. 
104  b,  158  b,  159  ab,  160  a,  186  b.— I.  P.  299  a,  302  a,  303  a, 
304  a,  et  alibi)  ;  for  we  are  percipient  of  nothing  but  what  is  in 


*  In  what  manner  many  of  the  acutest  of  the  later  Schoolmen  puzzled 
themselves  likewise,  with  this,  apparently,  very  simple  matter,  may  be  seen 
in  their  discussions  touching  the  nature  of  Entia  Ratlonis.  I  may  mention  in 
general,  Fonseca,  Suarez,  Mendoza,  Euvius,  Murcia,  Oviedo,  Arriaga,  Carle- 
ton,  &c.,  on  the  one  hand;  and  Biel,  Mirandulanus,  Jandunus,  Valesius, 
Erice,  &c.,  on  the  other.  I  may  here  insert,  though  only  at  present,  for  the 
latter  paragraph  in  which  Reid's  difficulty  is  solved,  the  following  passage 
from  Biel.  It  contains  important  observations  to  which  I  must  subsequently 
refer : 

'Ad  secundum  de  figmentis  dicitur,  quod  (intelligendo  illam  similitudinem 
quaui  anima  fingit,  i.  e.  abstrahit  a  rebus)  sic  figmenta  sunt  actus  intelligen- 
di,  qui  habent  esse  vernm  et  subjectivum  (v.  p.  243  a  b,  note)  in  anima. 
Sunt  enim  qualitates  animse  inhaerentes;  et  hi  actus  sunt  naturales  similitu- 
dines  rerum  a  quibus  formantur,  quaj  sunt  objecta  eorum  ;  nee  oportet  po- 
nere  aliquod  objectum  medium  inter  cognitionem  intellectivam  actus,  etrealc 
ejus  objectum. 

'Dicuntur  autem  hujusmodi  actus  figmenta,  quia  tales  sunt  in  reprcesen- 
tdndo  rem,  quales  sunt  res  repraesentatos.  Non  autem  talia  in  existendo,  i.  e. 
in.  qualitatibus  realibus ;  quia  sunt  qualitates  spirituales,  objeeta  vero  frequen- 
ter res  materiales  ;  sunt  autem  naturaliter  similes  in  reprtesentando,  qnia  rc- 
praesentant  res  distincte  cum  suis  habitudinibus  sicut  sunt  realiter ;  non  au- 
tem sunt  similes  in  essendo,  i.  e.  quod  actus  [actu]  haberent  csse  reale  ejusdom 
specie!  cum  suis  objectis. 

'  Quod  additur  de  Chimscra;  patet  quod  aliter  chimsora  dicitur  figmentum, 
et  aliler  cognitio  ret  possibilis.  Vcrum  conceptus  chima?rae,  id  est  actus 
cognoscendi  correspondens  huic  voci  "ChinKera;,"  estveraqualitas  inmente; 
tamcn  illnd  quod  significat  nihil  est.'  In  i.  Sent.  Dist.  ii.  Qu.  8. 

The  author  of  the  preceding  passage,  it  must  be  remembered,  allowed  no 
intentional  species,  that  is,  no  representative  entities  different  from  the  oper- 
ations of  the  mind  itself. 


260  PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION. 

proximate  contact,  in  immediate  relation,  with  our  organs  of 
sense.  Distant  realities  we  reach,  not  by  perception,  but  by  a 
subsequent  process  of  inference  founded  thereon  :  and  so  far,  as  he 
somewhere  says  (I.  P.  284  b),  from  all  men  who  look  upon  the 
sun  perceiving  the  same  object,  in  reality,  every  individual,  in  this 
instance,  perceives  a  different  object,  nay,  a  different  object  in  each 
several  eye.  The  doctrine  of  Natural  Realism  requires  no  such 
untenable  assumption  for  its  basis.  It  is  sufficient  to  establish  the 
simple  fact,  that  we  are  competent,  as  consciousness  assures  us, 
immediately  to  apprehend  through  sense  the  non-ego  in  certain 
limited  relations  ;  and  it  is  of  no  consequence  whatever,  either  to 
our  certainty  of  the  reality  of  a  material  world,  or  to  our  ultimate 
knowledge  of  its  properties,  whether  by  this  primary  apprehen- 
sion we  lay  hold,  in  the  first  instance,  on  a  larger  or  a  lesser  por- 
tion of  its  contents. 

Mr.  Stewart  also  (Elem.  vol.  i.  ch.  i.  sect.  2,  p.  79  sq.  6  ed.),  in 
arguing  against  the  counter  doctrine  in  one  of  its  accidental  forms, 
maintains,  in  general,  that  we  may  be  percipient  of  distant  objects. 
But  his  observations  do  not  contemplate,  therefore  do  not  meet 
the  cardinal  questions  ; — Is  perception  a  presentative  cognition  of 
the  non-ego,  or  only  a  representative  cognition  of  it,  in  and 
through  the  ego? — and  if  the  former, — Can  we  apprehend  a 
thing  immediately  and  not  know  it  in  itself? — Can  we  appre- 
hend it  as  actually  existing  ? — and,  Can  we  apprehend  it  as  ac- 
tually existing,  and  not  apprehend  it  in  the  When  and  Where  of 
its  existence,  that  is,  only  as  present  ? 

A  misapprehension  analogous  to  that  of  Reid  and  Stewart,  and 
of  a  still  more  obtrusive  character,  was  made  by  a  majority  of 
those  schoolmen,  who,  as  non-egoistical  representationists,  main- 
tained the  hypothesis  of  intentional  species,  as  media  of  sensitive 
perception,  imagination,  &c.  They,  in  general,  held,  that  the  spe- 
cies is  not  itself  perceived,  but  the  reality  through  the  species, — 
and  on  the  following  as  the  principal  grounds  : — The  present  ob- 
jects we  perceive  by  sense,  or  the  absent  objects  we  imagine,  are 
extended,  figured,  colored,  <fec. ;  but  the  species  are  not  themselves 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  261 

extended,  figured,  colored,  &c.,  they  are  only  representative  of 
these  qualities  in  external  objects  ;  the  species  are  not,  therefore, 
themselves  objects  of  knowledge,  or,  as  they  otherwise  expressed 
it,  do  not  themselves  terminate  the  cognition.*  See,  instar  om- 
nium, De  Raconis,  Physica,  Disp.  iii.  de  An.  Sens.  A  pp.  sect.  ii. 
qu.  4,  art.  3. — Irenaeus,  De  Anima,  c.  2,  sect.  3,  §  3. 

The  error  of  this  doctrine  did  not,  however,  escape  the  observa- 
tion of  the  acuter  even  of  those  who  supported  the  theory  of  inten- 
tional species.  It  is  exposed  by  Scaliger  the  father ;  and  his  ex- 
position is  advanced  as  a  '  very  subtle '  speculation.  Addressing 
Cardan,  whose  work  '  De  Subtilitate '  he  is  controverting,  he 


'  Cum  tarn  praeclare  de  visu  sentires,  maximam  omisisti  subti- 
litatem.  Doce  me  prius  sodes  —  Quid  est  id  quod  video  ?  Dices, 
"  Pnerilem  esse  interrogationem  —  Rent  enim  esse,  quae  videatur." 
At  doce  quaeso  nos  pueros  per  salebras  hasce  Naturae  perreptantes. 
Si  sensio  est  receptio  ;  nee  recipitur  Res  ;  demonstrabitur  certis- 
sima  demonstration  sic  ;  —  ergo  non  sentitur  Res.  Aiunt  —  "  Rem 
videri  per  Speciem."  Intelligo  ;  et  conclude  :  —  Species  ergo  senti- 
tur. Rem  ipsam  haud  percipit  sensus.  Species  ipsa  non  est  ea 
res,  cujus  est  species.  Isti  vero  ausi  sunt  ita  dicere  ;  —  "  Non  vide- 
ri speciem,  sed  Rem  per  Speciem.  Speciem  vero  esse  videndi  ra- 
tionem."  Audio  verba  ;  rem  haud  intelligo.  Non  enim  est  spe- 
cies ratio  videndi,  ut  Lux.  Quid  igitur  ?  —  "  Per  speciem  (inquiunt) 
vides  rem  ;  non  potes  autem  videre  speciem,  quia  necesse  esset  ut, 
per  speciem,  videres."  Quse  sententia  est  omnium  absurdissima. 
Dico  enim  jam  ;  —  Rem  non  videri,  sed  Speciem.  Sensus  ergo, 
recipit  speciem  ;  quam  rei  similem  judicat  Intellectus,  atque  sic 
rem  cognoscit  per  reflexionem.'  (De  Subtilitate,  Ex.  ccxcviii. 


*  This  doctrine,  his  recent  and  very  able  biographer  (M.  Huet)  finds 
maintained  by  the  great  Henry  of  Ghent,  and  he  adduces  it  as  both  an  ori- 
ginal opinion  of  the  Doctor  Solennis,  and  an  anticipation  of  one  of  the  truths 
established  by  the  Scottish  sohool.  There  was,  however,  nothing  new  in  the 
opinion  ;  and  if  an  anticipation,  it  was  only  the  anticipation  of  an  error.  — 
Recherches,  &c.,  pp.  130,  119. 


262  PHILOSOPHY  OF   PERCEPTION. 

But  in  correcting  one  inconsistency  Scaliger  here  falls  into 
another.  For  how  can  the  reflective  intellect  judge  the  species 
to  resemble,  that  is,  correctly  to  represent  the  external  reality, 
when,  ex  hypothesi,  the  reality  itself  is  unknown  ;  unknown  in 
its  qualities,  unknown  even  in  its  existence  ?  This  consideration 
ought  to  have  led  '  the  Master  of  Subtilties'  to  doubt  concerning 
the  doctrine  of  perception  by  species  altogether. 

But  long  before  Scaliger,  the  error  in  question  had  been  refu- 
ted by  certain  of  those  Schoolmen  who  rejected  the  whole  doc- 
trine of  intentional  species.  I  was  surprised  to  find  the  distinc- 
tion between  an  immediate  and  a  mediate  object,  in  our  acts 
cognitive  of  things  not  actually  present  to  apprehension,  advanced 
by  Gregory  of  Rimini,  in  a  disputation  maintained  by  him 
against  a  certain  '  Joannes  Scotus' — not  the  Subtle  Doctor,  who 
was  already  gone,  but — a  Scotchman,  who  appears  to  have  been 
a  fellow  Regent  with  Gregory  in  the  University  of  Paris.  This 
doctrine  did  not,  however,  obtain  the  acceptation  which  it  merited ; 
and  when  noticed  at  all,  it  was  in  general  noticed  only  to  be  re- 
dargued— even  by  his  brother  Nominalists.  Biel  rejects  the  par- 
adox, without  naming  its  author.  But  John  Major,  the  last  of 
the  regular  Schoolmen,  openly  maintains  on  this  point,  against 
the  Authentic  Doctor,  the  thesis  of  his  earlier  countryman,  Joan- 
nes— a  thesis  also  identical  with  the  doctrine  of  his  later  coun- 
tryman, Reid.  '  Dico  (he  says,  writing  in  Paris),  quod  notitiam 
abstractivam  quam  habeo  pinnaculi  Sanctae  Genovefes  in  Scotia, 
in  Sancto  Andrea,  ad  pinnaculum  immediate  terminatur  ;  verum, 
ob  notitiae  imperfectionem  et  naturam,  nescio  certitudinaliter  an 
sit  dirutum  exustumve,  sicut  olim  tonitruo  conflagravit.'  *  In 
Sent.  L.  i.  dist.  3,  qu.  2. 

I  have  omitted  however  to  notice,  that  the  vulgar  doctrine  of 

*  The  existence  of  a  Pinnacle  of  St.  Gonevieve  in  St.  Andrew's  is  now 
unknown  to  our  Scottish  Antiquaries ;  and  this,  I  may  notice,  is  one  of  a 
thousand  curious  anecdotes  relative  to  this  country,  scattered  throughout 
Major's  writings,  and  upon  matters  to  which  allusions  from  a  Doctor  of  the 
Sorbonne,  in  a  Commentary  on  the  Sentences,  were  least  to  be  expected. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION.  263 

the  Schools  in  regard  to  the  immediate  cognition  of  real  objects, 
through  their  species  or  representations,  was  refuted,  in  anticipa- 
tion, by  Plotinus,  who  observes — 'That  if  we  receive  the  im- 
pressed forms  (rJirous)  of  objects  perceived,  it  cannot  be  that  we 
really  perceive  the  things  which  we  are  said  to  perceive,  but  only 
their  images  or  shadows ;  so  that  the  things  existing  are  one  dis- 
tinct order  of  beings,  the  objects  perceived  by  us,  another. 
(Ennead.  v.  L.  vi.  c.  1.)  His  own  doctrine  of  perception  is 
however  equally  subjective  as  that  which  he  assails ;  it  is 
substantially  the  same  with  the  Cartesian  and  Leibnitzian 
hypotheses. 

Representationiste  are  not  however  always  so  reluctant  to 
see  and  to  confess,  that  their  doctrine  involves  a  surrender  of 
all  immediate  and  real  knowledge  of  an  external  world.  This 
too  is  admitted  by  even  those  who,  equally  with  Reid,  had 
renounced  ideas  as  representative  entities,  different  either  from 
the  substance  of  mind,  or  from  the  act  of  cognition  itself.  Ar- 
nauld  frankly  acknowledges  this  of  his  own  theory  of  perception ; 
which  he  justly  contends  to  be  identical  with  that  of  Descartes.1 
Other  Cartesians,  and  of  a  doctrine  equally  pure,  have"  been  no 
less  explicit.  '  Nota  vero  (says  Flender,  whose  verbosity  I  some- 
what abridge),  mentem  nostram  percipere  vel  cognoscere  imme- 
diate tantum  seipsam  suasque  facultates,  per  intirnam  sui  consci- 
entiam  ;  sed  alias  res  a  se  distinctas,  non  nisi  mediate,  scilicet  per 
ideas.  .  .  Nota  porro,  quod  perceptio  sen  idea  rei  spectari  dupli- 
citur  :  vel  in  se  ipsa,  prout  est  modus  cogitandi  cujus  mens  est 
conscia, — quo  modo  a  mente  ut  causa  efficiente  fluit ;  vel  relata 


1  '  I  am  convinced  that  in  this  interpretation  of  Descartes'  doctrine,  Ar- 
nauld  is  right ;  for  Descartes  defines  mental  ideas — those,  to  wit,  of  which 
we  are  conscious — to  be  "  Cogitationes  prout  sunt  tanquam  imagines — that  is, 
thoughts  considered  in  their  representative  capacity ;  nor  is  there  any  pas- 
page  to  be  found  in  the  writings  of  this  philosopher,  which  if  properly  un- 
derstood, warrants  the  conclusion,  that,  by  ideas  in  the  mind,  he  meant  aught 
distinct  from  the  cognitive  act.  The  double  use  of  the  term  idea  by  Des- 
cartes has,  however,  led  Keid  and  others  into  a  misconception  on  this  point* 
Reid;  p.  296.—  W. 


264  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

ad  objectum  quod  per  cam  representatur,  prout  est  cogitatio  intel- 
lectus  hanc  vel  illam  rem  representans, — quo  modo  forma  seu 
essentia  ideae  consistit  »»  representatione  rei,  sive  in  eo  quod  sit 
representamen  vel  imago  ejus  rei  quam  concipimus.'  (Phosph. 
Philos.  §  5.) 


CHAPTER  III. 

VAEIOUS  THEORIES  OF  EXTERNAL  PERCEPTION.1 

§  1. — SYSTEMATIC  SCHEMES,  FROM  DIFFERENT  POINTS  OF  VIEW, 
OF  THE  VARIOUS  THEORIES  OF  THE  RELATION  OF  EXTERNAL 
PERCEPTION  TO  ITS  OBJECT,  AND  OF  THE  VARIOUS  SYS- 
TEMS OF  PHILOSOPHY  FOUNDED  THEREON.* 

SCHEME  I. — Table  of  distribution,  General  and  Special. — In 
the  perception  of  the  external  world,  the  object  of  which  we  are 
conscious  may  be  considered — either,  (I.)  as  absolute  and  total — 
or,  (II.)  as  relative  and  partial,  i.  e.,  vicarious  or  representative 
of  another  and  principal  object,  beyond  the  sphere  of  conscious- 
ness. Those  who  hold  the  former  of  these  doctrines  may  be 
called  Presentationists  or  Intuitionists  :  those  who  hold  the  lat- 
ter, Representationists.\  Of  these  in  their  order. 

I. — The  Presentationists  or  Intuitionists  constitute  the  object, 
of  which  we  are  conscious,  in  perception,  into  a  sole,  absolute,  or 
total,  object ;  in  other  words,  reduce  perception  to  an  act  of  im- 
mediate or  intuitive  cognition  ;  and  this — either  (A)  by  abolish- 
ing any  immediate,  ideal,  subjective  object,  representing ; — or, 
(B)  by  abolishing  any  mediate,  real,  objective  object,  represented. 

A. — The  former  of  these,  viewing  the  one  total  object  of  per- 
ceptive consciousness  as  real,  as  existing,  and  therefore,  in  this 
case,  as  material,  extended,  external,  are  Realists,  and  may  dia- 


1  This  chapter  is  Hamilton's  third  Supplementary  Dissertation  on  Reid. 
—  W. 

*  Compare  the  more  comprehensive  evolution  of  Philosophical  System* 
from  the  total  fact  of  Consciousness  in  perception,  given  above,  p.  28  a,  sq. 
An  acquaintance  with  that  distribution  is  here  supposed. 

t  On  the  terms  Intuition  and  Representation,  and  on  the  distinction  of 
immediate  and  mediate,  of  ideal  and  real,  object,  see  previous  chapter,  §  1. 

12 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION. 

tinctively  be  called  Intuitional  or  Presentative  Realists,  and  Rea. 
Presentationists  or  Intuitionists ;  while,  as  founding  their  doc- 
trine on  the  datum  of  the  natural  consciousness,  or  common  sense, 
of  mankind,  they  deserve  the  names  of  Natural  Realists  or  Nat- 
ural Dualists.  Of  this  scheme  there  are  no  subordinate  varie- 
ties ;  except  in  so  far  as  a  difference  of  opinion  may  arise,  in 
regard  to — what  qualities  are  to  be  referred  to  the  object  per- 
ceived, or  non-ego, — what  qualities  to  the  percipient  subject,  or 
ego.  Presentative  Realism  is  thus  divided  (i.)  into  a  philosophi- 
cal or  developed  form — that,  to  wit,  in  which  the  Primary  Qual- 
ities of  body,  the  Common  Sensibles,1  constitute  the  objective 
object  of  perception  ;  and  (ii.)  into  a  vulgar  or  undeveloped  form 
— that,  to  wit,  in  which  not  only  the  primary  qualities  (as  Ex- 
tension and  Figure),  but  also  the  secondary  (as  Color,  Savor, 
&c.),  are,  as  known  to  us,  regarded  equally  to  appertain  to  the 
non-ego. 

B. — The  latter  of  these,  viewing  the  object  of  consciousness  in 
perception  as  ideal  (as  a  phenomenon  in  or  of  mind),  are  Ideal- 
ists ;  and  as  denying  that  this  ideal  object  has  any  external  pro- 
totype, they  may  be  styled  Absolute  Idealists,  or  Idealist  Unita- 
rians.— They  are  to  be  again  divided  into  two  subaltern  classes, 
as  the  Idea — (i.)  is, — or  (ii.)  is  not,  considered  a  modification  of 
the  percipient  mind. 

i. — If  the  Idea  be  regarded  as  a  mode  of  the  human  mind 
itself,  we  have  a  scheme  of  Egoistical  Idealism  ;  and  this  again 
admits  of  a  twofold  distinction,  according  as  the  idea  is  viewed — 
(a)  as  having  no  existence  out  of  the  momentary  act  of  presenta- 
tive  consciousness,  with  which  it  is,  in  fact,  identical  ; — or  (b)  as 
having  an  (unknown)  existence,  independent  of  the  present  act 
of  consciousness  by  which  it  is  called  up,  contemplated,  but  not 
created.  Finally,  as  in  each  of  these  the  mind  may  be  deter- 
mined to  present  the  object  either — (1.)  by  its  own  natural  laws, 
— or  (2.)  by  supernatural  agencies,  each  may  be  subdivided  into 
a  Natural  and  Supernatural  variety. 

1  See  chapter  v. —  W. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  267 

ii. — If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Idea  be  viewed  not  as  a  mode 
of  the  human  mind,  there  is  given  the  scheme  of  Non-Egoistical 
Idealism,  which,  in  all  its  forms,  is  necessarily  hyperphysical.  It 
admits,  in  the  first  place,  of  a  twofold  distinction,  according  as 
the  ideal  object  is  supposed — (a)  to  be, — or  (b)  not  to  be,  in  the 
perceiving  mind  itself. 

a. — Of  these  the  former  may  again  be  subdivided  according 
as  the  ideas  are  supposed — (1.)  to  be  connate  with  the  mind  and 
existent  in  it  out  of  consciousness  ; — or  (2.)  infused  into  it  at  the 
moment  of  consciousness, — (a)  immediately  by  God, — (§)  by 
some  lower  supernatural  agency. 

b. — The  latter  supposes  that  the  human  mind  is  conscious  of 
the  idea,  in  some  higher  intelligence,  to  which  it  is  intimately 
present;  and  this  higher  mind  may  either  be — (1.)  that  of  the 
Deity,  or  (2.)  that  of  some  inferior  supernatural  existence. 

All  these  modifications  of  Non-Egoistical  Idealism  admit,  how- 
ever, in  common^  of  certain  subordinate  divisions,  according  as 
the  qualities  (primary  and  secondary)  and  the  phenomena  of  the 
several  senses  may  be  variously  considered  either  as  objective  and 
ideal  or  as  subjective  and  sensational.* 

II. — The  JRepresentationists,  as  denying  to  consciousness  the 
cognizance  of  aught  beyond  a  merely  subjective  phenomenon, 


*  The  general  approximation  of  thorough-going  Kealism  and  thorough- 
going Idealism,  here  given,  may,  at  first  sight,  be  startling.  On  reflection,  how- 
ever, their  radical  affinity  will  prove  well  grounded.  Both  build  upon  the 
same  fundamental  fact — that  the  extended  object  immediately  perceived  is 
identical  with  the  extended  object  actually  existing ; — for  the  truth  of  this  fact, 
both  can  appeal  to  the  common  sense  of  mankind ; — and  to  the  common 
sense  of  mankind  Berkeley  did  appeal  not  less  confidently,  and  perhaps 
more  logically,  than  Keid.  Natural  Eealism  and  Absolute  Idealism  are  the 
only  systems  worthy  of  a  philosopher;  for,  as  they  alone  have  any  founda- 
tion in  consciousness,  so  they  alone  have  any  consistency  in  themselves.  The 
scheme  of  Hypothetical  Eealism  or  Cosmothetic  Idealism,  which  supposes 
that  behind  the  non-existent  world  perceived,  there  lurks  a  correspondent 
but  unknown  world  existing,  is  not  only  repugnant  to  our  natural  beliefs, 
but  in  manifold  contradiction  with  itself.  The  scheme  of  Natural  Kealism 
may  be  ultimately  difficult — for,  like  all  other  truths,  it  ends  in  the  incon- 
ceivable ;  but  Hypothetical  Realism — in  its  origin — -in  its  development — iu 
its  result,  although  the  favorite  scheme  of  philosophers,  is  philosophically 
absurd. 


268  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

are  likewise  Idealists ;  yet  as  positing  the  reality  of  an  external 
world,  they  must  be  distinguished  as  Cosmothetic  Idealists.  But, 
as  affirming  an  external  world,  they  are  also  Realists,  or  Dualist*. 
Since,  however,  they  do  not,  like  the  Natural  Realists,  accept  the 
existence  of  an  external  world  directly  on  the  natural  testimony 
of  consciousness,  as  something  known,  but  endeavor  to  establish 
its  unknown  existence  by  a  principal  and  sundry  subsidiary  hy- 
potheses ;  they  must,  under  that  character,  be  discriminated  as 
Hypothetical  Realists  or  Hypothetical  Dualists.  This  Hypoth- 
esis of  a  Representative  perception  has  been  maintained  under 
one  or  other  of  two  principal  forms, — a  finer  and  a  cruder, — ac- 
cording as  the  representation — either  (A)  is, — or  (B)  is  not,  sup- 
posed to  be  a  mode  of  the  percipient  subject  itself.  (And,  be  it 
observed,  this  distinction,  in  reference  to  Reid's  philosophy,  ought 
to  be  carefully  borne  in  mind.) 

A. — If  the  immediate,  known,  or  representative,  object  be  re- 
garded as  a  modification  of  the  mind  or  self,  we  have  one  va- 
riety of  representationism  (the  simpler  and  more  refined),  which 
may  be  characterized  as  the  Egoistical  Representationism.  This 
finer  form  is,  however,  itself  again  subdivided  into  a  finer  and  a 
cruder;  according  as  the  subjective  object — (i.)  is — or  (ii.)  is  not, 
identified  with  the  percipient  act. 

i. — In  the  former  case,  the  immediate  or  ideal  object  is  re- 
garded as  only  logically  distinguished  from  the  perceptive  act ; 
being  simply  the  perceptive  act  itself,  considered  in  one  of  its  re- 
lations,— its  relation,  to  wit  (not  to  the  subject  perceiving,  in 
which  case  it  is  properly  called  a  perception,  but)  to  the  mediate 
object,  the  reality  represented,  and  which,  in  and  through  that 
representation  alone,  is  objectified  to  consciousness  and  per- 
ceived. 

ii. — In  the  latter  case,  the  immediate  object  is  regarded,  as  a 
mode  of  mind,  existent  out  of  the  act  of  perceptive  conscious- 
ness, and,  though  contemplated  in,  not  really  identical  with,  that 
act.  This  cruder  form  of  egoistical  representationism  substan- 
tially coincides  with  that  finer  form  of  the  non-egoistical,  which 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION. 

views  the  vicarious  object  as  spiritual  (II.  B,  i.  b.)  I  have  there- 
fore found  it  requisite  to  consider  these  as  identical ;  and  accord- 
ingly, in  speaking  of  the  finer  form  of  representation,  be  it  ob- 
served, I  exclusively  have  in  view  the  form  of  which  I  have  last 
spoken  (II.  A,  i.) 

This  form,  in  both  its  degrees,  is  divided  into  certain  subaltern 
genera  and  species,  according  as  the  mind  is  supposed  to  be  de- 
termined to  represent  by  causes — either  (a)  natural,  physical, — 
or  (b)  supernatural,  hyperphysical. 

a. — Of  these,  the  natural  determination  to  represent,  is — 
either  (1.)  one  foreign  and  external  (by  the  action  of  the  mate- 
rial reality  on  the  passive  mind,  through  sense) ; — or  (2.)  one 
native  and  internal  (a  self-determination  of  the  impassive  mind, 
on  occasion  of  the  presentation  of  the  material  object  to  sense) ; 
— or  finally  (3.)  one  partly  both  (the  mind  being  at  once  acted 
on,  and  itself  reacting). 

b. — The  hyperphysical  determination,  again,  may  be  main- 
tained— either  to  be  (1.)  immediate  and  special ;  whether  this 
be  realized — (a)  by  the  direct  operation  or  concourse  of  God  (as 
in  a  scheme  of  Occasional  Causes) — or  (§)  by  the  influence  of  in- 
ferior supernatural  agencies : — or  (2.)  mediate  and  general  (as 
by  the  predetermined  ordination  of  God,  in  a  theory  of  Pre- 
established  Harmony). 

B. — If  the  representative  object  be  viewed  as  something  in 
but  not  a  mere  mode  of,  mind  ; — in  other  words,  if  it  be  viewed 
as  a  tertium  quid  numerically  different  both  from  the  subject 
knowing  and  the  object  represented ;  we  have  a  second  form  of 
Representationism  (the  more  complex  and  cruder)  which  may  be 
distinguished  as  the  Non-egoistical.  This  also  falls  into  certain 
inferior  species :  for  the  ideal  or  vicarious  object  has  been  held 
(i.)  by  some  to  be  spiritual ; — (ii.)  by  others  to  be  corporeal ; — 
while  (iii.)  others,  to  carry  hypothesis  to  absurdity,  have  regarded 
it,  as  neither  spiritual  nor  corporeal,  but  of  an  inconceivable  na- 
ture, intermediate  between,  or  different  from,  both. 

i. — Spiritual.     Here  the  vicarious  object  may  be  supposed — 


270  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

either  (a)  to  be  some  supernatural  intelligence,  to  which  the  hu- 
man mind  is  present;  and  this — either  (1.)  the  divine, — or  (2.) 
not  the  divine  : — or  (b)  in  the  human  mind ;  and  if  so — either 
(1.)  connate  and  inexistent,  being  elicited  into  consciousness,  on 
occasion  of  the  impression  of  the  external  object  on  the  sensual 
organ  ; — or  (2.)  infused  on  such  occasions,  and  this — either  (a) 
by  God, — or  (€)  by  other  supernatural  intelligences, — and  of 
these  different  theorists  have  supposed  different  kinds. 

ii. — Corporeal,  in  the  common  sensory  (whether  brain  or  heart). 
This — either  (a)  as  a  propagation  from  the  external  reality — 
(1.)  of  a  grosser  ; — (2.)  of  a  more  attenuated  nature  : — or  (b)  a 
modification  determined  in  the  sensory  itself — (1.)  as  a  configu- 
ration ; — (2.)  as  a  motion  (and  this  last — either  (a)  as  a  flow  of 
spirits — or  (?)  as  a  vibration  of  fibres — or  (y)  as  both  a  flow  and 
a  vibration)  ; — or  (3.)  as  both  a  configuration  and  a  motion. 

iii. — Neither  spiritual  nor  corjtoreal.  This  might  admit,  in 
part,  of  similar  modifications  with  B,  i.  and  B,  ii. 

All  these  species  of  Representationism  may  be,  and  almost  all 
of  them  have  been,  actually  held.  Under  certain  varying  restric- 
tions, however,  inasmuch  as  a  representative  object  may  be  pos- 
tulated in  perception  for  all,  or  only  for  some  of  the  senses,  for 
all  or  only  for  some  of  the  qualities  made  known  to  us  in  the 
perceptive  act.  And  this  latter  alternative,  which  has  been  most 
generally  adopted,  again  admits  of  various  subdivisions,  accord- 
ing to  the  particular  senses  in  which,  and  the  particular  qualities 
of  which,  a  vicarious  object  is  allowed. 

SCHEME  II. — Table  of  General  Distribution  ;  with  references 
for  details  to  Scheme  I. 

The  object  of  Consciousness  in  Perception  is  a  quality,  mode, 
or  phenomenon — either  (I.)  of  an  external  reality,  in  immediate 
relation  to  our  organs  ; — or  (II.)  not  of  an  external  reality,  but 
either  of  the  mind  itself,  or  of  something  in  the  mind,  which  in- 
ternal object,  let  us  on  either  alternative,  here  call  Idea. 

I.  The  former  opinion  is  the  doctrine  of  real  presentative  per- 
ception. (I.  A.) 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION.  271 

II.  The  latter  is  the  doctrine  of  ideal  perception ;  which  either — 

A — supposes  that  the  Idea  is  an  original  and  absolute  present- 
ment, and  thus  constitutes  the  doctrine  of  ideal  presentative  per- 
ception (I.  B) ;  or 

B — supposes  that  the  Idea  only  represents  the  quality  of  a  real 
object ;  and  thus  constitutes  the  doctrine  of  ideal  representative 
perception  (II.) 

SCHEME  III. — Merely  General  Table. 

In  relation  to  our  perception  of  an  external  world,  philosophers 
are  (I.)  Realists ;  (II.)  Idealists. 

I.  The  Realists  are  (A)  Natural ;  (B)  Hypothetical  (=  Cos- 
mothetic  Idealists). 

II.  The  Idealists  are  (A)  Absolute  or  Presentative ;  (B)  Cos- 
mothetic  or  Representative  (=  Hypothetical  Realists).    See  above, 
p.  266,  b,  and  30  a. 


Such  is  a  conspectus  in  different  points  of  view  of  all  the  the- 
ories touching  perception  and  its  object ;  and  of  the  different  sys- 
tems of  philosophy  founded  thereon,  which,  as  far  as  they  occur  to 
me,  have  been  promulgated  during  the  progress  of  philosophy. 
But  it  is  at  present  only  requisite  for  the  student  of  philosophy  to 
bear  in  mind  the  more  general  principles  and  heads  of  distribution. 
To  enumerate  the  individual  philosophers  by  whom  these  several 
theories  were  originated  or  maintained,  would  require  a  far 
greater  amplitude  of  detail  than  can  .be  now  afforded;  and, 
though  of  some  historical  interest,  this  is  not  required  for  the 
purposes  which  I  am  here  exclusively  desirous  of  accomplishing. 
Similar  tables  might  be  also  given  of  the  opinions  of  philoso- 
phers, touching  the  object  of  Imagination  and  of  Intellect.  But 
the  relation  of  these  faculties  to  their  object  does  not,  in  like 
manner,  afford  the  fundamental  principles  of  difference,  and  there- 
tore  a  common  starting  point,  to  the  great  philosophical  systems  ; 
while  a  scheme  of  the  hypotheses  in  regard  to  them,  would,  at 


272  PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION. 

least  in  the  details,  be  little  more  than  an  uninteresting  repetition 
of  the  foregoing  distribution.  There  is  therefore  little  induce- 
ment to  annex  such  tables ;  were  they  not,  in  other  respects,  here 
completely  out  of  place.  I  have  only,  at  present,  two  ends  in 
view.  Of  these  the  primary,  is  to  display,  to  discriminate,  and 
to  lay  down  a  nomenclature  of,  the  various  theories  of  Perception, 
actual  and  possible.  This  is  accomplished.  The  secondary,  is  to 
determine  under  which  of  these  theories  the  doctrine  of  Reid  is 
to  be  classed.  And  to  this  inquiry  I  now  address  myself. 

§    II. OF    WHAT    CHARACTER,    IN    THE    PRECEDING    RESPECT,    IK 

REID'S  DOCTRINE  OF  PERCEPTION  ? 

As  in  this  part  of  his  philosophy,  in  particular,  Mr.  Stewart 
closely  follows  the  footsteps  of  his  predecessor,  and  seems  even  to 
have  deemed  all  further  speculation  on  the  subject  superfluous ; 
the  question  here  propounded  must  be  viewed  as  common  to  both 
philosophers. 

Now,  there  are  only  two  of  the  preceding  theories  of  percep- 
tion, with  one  or  other  of  which  Reid's  doctrine  can  possibly  be 
identified.  He  is  a  Dualist ; — and  the  only  doubt  is — whether  he 
be  Natural  Realist  (I.  A),  or  a  Hypothetical  JRealist,  under  the 
finer  form  of  Egoistical  Representationism  (II.  A,  i.) 

The  cause  why  Reid  left  the  character  of  his  doctrine  ambigu- 
ous on  this  the  very  cardinal  point  of  his  philosophy,  is  to  be 
found  in  the  following  circumstances. 

1°,  That,  in  general  (although  the  same  maybe  said  of  all 
other  philosophers),  he  never  discriminated  either  speculatively  or 
historically  the  three  theories  of  Real  Presentationism,  of  Egois- 
tical, and  of  Non-Egoistical,  Representationism. 

2°,  That,  in  particular,  he  never  clearly  distinguished  the  first 
and  second  of  these,  as  not  only  different,  but  contrasted,  theo- 
ries; though  on  one  occasion  (I.  P.  p.  297  a  b)  he  does  seem  to 
have  been  obscurely  aware  that  they  were  not  identical. 

3°,  That,  while  right  in  regarding  philosophers,  in  general,  as 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  273 

Cosmothetic  Idealists,  he  erroneously  supposed  that  they  were  all, 
or  nearly  all,  Non-Egoistical  Representationists.  And — 

4°,  That  he  viewed  the  theory  of  Non-Egoistical  Representa- 
tionism  as  that  form  alone  of  Cosmothetic  Idealism  which  when 
carried  to  its  legitimate  issue  ended  in  Absolute  Idealism  ;  whereas 
the  other  form  of  Cosmothetic  Idealism,  the  theory  of  Egoistical 
Representationism,  whether  speculatively  or  historically  considered, 
is,  with  at  least  equal  rigor,  to  be  developed  into  the  same  result. 

Dr.  Thomas  Brown  considers  Reid  to  be,  like  himself,  a  Cos- 
mothetic Idealist,  under  the  finer  form  of  egoistical  representa- 
tionism ;  but  without  assigning  any  reason  for  this  belief,  except 
one  which,  as  I  have  elsewhere  shown,  is  altogether  nugatory.* 
For  my  own  part,  I  am  decidedly  of  opinion,  that,  as  the  great 
end — the  governing  principle  of  Reid's  doctrine  was  to  reconcile 
philosophy  with  the  necessary  convictions  of  mankind,  that  he 
intended  a  doctrine  of  natural,  consequently  a  doctrine  of  present- 
ative,  realism ;  and  that  he  would  have  at  once  surrendered,  as 
erroneous,  every  statement  which  was  found  at  variance  with  such 
a  doctrine.  But  that  the  reader  should  be  enabled  to  form  his 
own  opinion  on  the  point,  which  I  admit  not  to  be  without  diffi- 
culty ;  and  that  the  ambiguities  and  inconsistencies  of  Reid,  on 
this  the  most  important  part  of  his  philosophy,  should,  by  an  artic- 
ulate exposition,  be  deprived  of  their  evil  influence :  I  shall  now 
enumerate — (A)  the  statements,  which  may,  on  the  one  hand,  be 
adduced  to  prove  that  his  doctrine  of  perception  is  one  of  medi- 
ate cognition  under  the  form  of  egoistical  representationism ; — 


•  *  Edinb.  Eev.,1  vol.  iii.  p.  173-175 ; — also  in  Cross  and  Peisse.  In  saying. 
however,  on  that  occasion,  that  Dr.  Brown  was  guilty  of  '  a  reversal  of  the 
real  and  even  unambiguous  import'  of  Keid's  doctrine  of  perception,  I  feel 
called  upon  to  admit,  that  the  latter  epithet  is  too  strong; — for  on  grounds,, 
totally  different  from  the  untenable  one  of  Brown,  I  am  now  about  to  show, . 
that  Reid's  doctrine,  on  this  point,  is  doubtful.  This  admission  docs  not, 
however,  imply  that  Brown  is  not,  from  first  to  last, — is  not  in  one  and  all  of 
his  strictures  on  Reid's  doctrine  of  perception,  as  there  shown,  wholly  in 
error.  _^ 

i  See  above,  p.  138.—  W. 
12* 


274  PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION. 

and  (B)  those  which  may,  on  the  other  hand,  be  alleged  to  show, 
that  it  is  one  of  immediate  cognition,  under  the  form  of  real  pre- 
sentationism.  But  as  these  counter  statements  are  only  of  import, 
inasmuch  as  they  severally  imply  the  conditions  of  mediate  or  of 
immediate  cognition ;  it  is  necessary  that  the  reader  should  bear 
in  mind  the  exposition  which  has  been  given  of  these  conditions.1 

A. — Statements  conformable  to  the  doctrine  of  a  mediate  per- 
ception, under  the  form  of  an  egoistical  representation,  and  incon- 
sistent with  that  of  immediate  perception,  under  the  form  of  a  real 
presentation,  of  material  objects. 

1.  On  the  testimony  of  consciousness,  and  in  the  doctrine  of 
an  intuitive  perception,  the  mind,  when  a  material  existence  is 
brought  into  relation  with  its  organ  of  sense,  obtains  two  con- 
comitant, and  immediate,  cognitions.  Of  these,  the  one  is  the 
consciousness  (sensation)  of  certain  subjective  modifications  in  us, 
which  we  refer,  as  effects,  to  certain  unknown  powers,  as  causes, 
in  the  external  reality ;  the  secondary  qualities  of  body :  the  other 
is  the  consciousness  (perception)  of  certain  objective  attributes  in 
the  external  reality  itself,  as,  or  as  in  relation  to  our  sensible  organ- 
ism ; — the  primary  qualities  of  body.  Of  these  cognitions,  the 
former  is  admitted,  on  all  hands,  to  be  subjective  and  ideal :  the 
latter,  the  Natural  Realist  maintains,  against  the  Cosmothetic 
Idealist,  to  be  objective  and  real.  But  it  is  only  objective  and 
real,  in  so  far  as  it  is  immediate ;  and  immediate  it  cannot  be, 
if— either,  1°,  dependent  on  the  former,  as  its  cause  or  its  occa- 
sion— or,  2°,  consequent  on  it,  as  on  a  necessary  antecedent.  But 
both  these  conditions  of  a  presentative  perception  Reid  and  Stew- 
art are  seen  to  violate ;  and  therefore  they  may  be  held,  virtually, 
to  confess,  that  their  doctrine  is  one  only  of  representative  per- 
ception.2 

Touching  the  former  condition :  Reid  states,  that  the  primary 
qualities  of  material  existences,  Extension,  Figure,  &c.,  are  sug- 
gested to  us  through  the  secondary ;  which,  though  not  the  sufficient 

1  See  previous  chapter,  §  1. —  W. 

1  See  below,  chapter  v.  §  \.  No.  23.—  W. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION.  275 

causes  of  our  conception,  are  the  signs*  on  occasion  of  which, 
we  are  made  to  'conceive'  the  primary.  (Inq.  188  a,  122  a, 
123  b,  128  b  note.)  The  secondary  qualities,  as  mere  sensations, 
mere  consciousness  of  certain  subjective  affections,  afford  us  no 
immediate  knowledge  of  aught  different  from  self.  If,  therefore, 
the  primary  qualities  be  only  '  suggestions]  only  '  conceptions' 
(Inq.  183  a,  I.  P.  318  a  b),  which  are,  as  it  were,  'conjured  up 
by  a  kind  of  natural  magic'  (Inq.  122  a),  or  '  inspired  by  means 
unknown'  (Inq.  188  a);  these  conceptions  are  only  representa- 
tions, which  the  mind  is,  in  some  inconceivable  manner,  blindly 
determined  to  form  of  what  it  does  not  know ;  and  as  percep- 
tion is  only  a  consciousness  of  these  conceptions,  perception  is, 
like  sensation,  only  an  immediate  cognition  of  certain  modes 
of  self.  Our  knowledge  of  the  external  world,  on  this  footing,  is 
wholly  subjective  or  ideal ;  and  if  such  be  Reid's  doctrine,  it  is 
wholly  conformable  to  that  enounced  in  the  following  statement 
of  the  Cartesian  representationism  by  Silvain  Regis : — '  We  may 
thus,  he  says,  affirm,  that  the  cognition  we  have  of  any  individ- 
ual body  which  strikes  the  sense  is  composed  of  two  parts, — of  a 
sensation  (sentiment),  and  of  an  imagination;  an  imagination, 
which  represents  the  extension  of  this  body  under  a  determinate 
size ;  and  a  sensation  of  color  and  light,  which  renders  this  exten- 
sion visible.'  (Metaph.  L.  ii.  P.  i.  ch.  5.  Cours,  t.  i.  p.  162,  ed. 
1691.)  The  statement  may  stand  equally  for  an  enoun cement  of 
the  Kantian  doctrine  of  perception ;  and  it  is,  perhaps,  worth  no- 
ticing, that  Regis  anticipated  Kant,  in  holding  the  imagination 
of  space  to  be  the  a  priori  form  or  subjective  condition  of  per- 
ception. '  L'idee  de  1'Entendus  (he  says)  est  nee  avec  1'ame,'  &c. 
(ibid.  c.  9,  p.  171  et  alibi). — This  theory  of  Suggestion,  so  ex- 
explicitly  maintained  in  the  'Inquiry,'  is  not  repeated  in  the  'Es- 


*  This  application  of  the  term  sign  suits  the  Cosmothetic  Idealist,  as  tho 
Cartesian  Bossuet  (Connaissance  de  Dieu,  &c.,  ch.  8,  §  8),  or  the  Absolute 
Idealist,  as  Berkeley  (passim),  but  not  the  Natural  Realist.  In  this  doctrine 
of  natural  signs,  I  see  Reid  was,  in  a  manner,  also  preceded  by  Hutcheson 
•  Syn.  Met.,  P.  ii.  c.  1— Syst.  of  Mor.,  B.  i.  ch.  1,  p.  5). 


276  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

says  on  the  Intellectual  Powers.'  Reid,  therefore,  as  I  have 
already  observed,  may  seem  to  have  become  doubtful  of  the  ten- 
dency of  the  doctrine  advanced  in  his  earlier  work ;  and  we  ought 
not,  at  all  events,  to  hold  him  rigorously  accountable  for  the  con- 
sequences of  what,  if  he  did  not  formally  retract  in  his  later  writ- 
ings, he  did  not  continue  to  profess. 

Touching  the  latter  condition  : — Reid  in  stating,  that  '  if  sen- 
sation be  produced,  the  corresponding  perception  follows  even 
when  there  is  no  object'  (I.  P.  320  b.) — and  Stewart  in  stating, 
that '  sensations  are  the  constant  antecedents  of  our  perceptions' 
(L.  i.  c.  1,  p.  93,  ed.  6),  manifestly  advance  a  doctrine,  which 
if  rigidly  interpreted,  is  incompatible  with  the  requisites  of  an 
intuitive  perception. 

2.  It  is  the  condition  of  an  intuitive  perception,  that  a  sensa- 
tion is  actually  felt  there,  where  it  is  felt  to  be.     To  suppose  that 
a  pain,  for  instance,  in  the  toe,  is  felt  really  in  the  brain,  is  con  - 
formable  only  to  a  theory  of  representationism.     For  if  the  mind 
cannot  be  conscious  of  the  secondary  qualities,  except  at  the  cen- 
tre of  the  nervous  organism,  it  cannot  be  conscious  of  the  prima- 
ry, in  their  relation  to  its  periphery  ;  and  this  involves  the  admis- 
sion that  it  is  incompetent  to  more  than  a  subjective  or  ideal  or 
representative  cognition  of  external  things.     But  such  is  the  doc- 
trine which  Reid  manifestly  holds.     (1.  P.  319  b,  320  a  b.) 

3.  On  the  doctrine  of  Natural  Realism,  that  the  ego  has  an 
intuitive  perception  of  the  non-ego  in  proximate  relation  to  its 
organs,  a  knowledge  and  a  belief  of  the  existence  of  the  external 
world,  is  clearly  given  in  the  fact  of  such  intuitive  perception.    In 
this  case,  therefore,  we  are  not  called  upon  to  explain  such  knowl- 
edge and  belief  by  the  hypothesis,  or,  at  least,  the  analogy,  of  an 
inspired  notion  and  infused  faith.     On  the  doctrine  of  Cosmo- 
thetic  Idealism,  on  the  contrary,  which  supposes  that  the  mind  is 
determined  to  represent  to  itself  the  external  world,  which,  ex 
hypothesi,  it  does  not  know ;  the  fact  of  such  representation  can 
only  be  conceived  possible,  through  some  hyperphysical  agency  ; 
and  therefore  Reid',s  rationale  of  perception,  by  an  inspiration  or 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PEKCEPTTON.  277 

kind  of  magical  conjuration,  as  given  in  the  Inquiry  (122  a,  188 
a ;  Stewart,  El.  i.  64,  93),  may  seem  to  favor  the  construction, 
that  his  doctrine  is  a  representationism.  In  the  Essays  on  the 
Intellectual  Powers  he  is,  however,  more  cautious  ;  and  the  note1 
I  have  appended  in  that  work  at  p.  257  a,  is  to  be  viewed  in 
more  especial  reference  to  the  doctrine  of  the  Inquiry ;  though 
in  the  relative  passage  '  the  will  of  God'  may,  certainly,  seem 
called  as  a  Deus  ex  machina,  to  solve  a  knot  which  the  doctrine 
of  intuitive  perception  does  not  tie. 

4.  The  terms  notion  and  conception  are,  in   propriety,  only 
applicable  to  our  mediate  and  representative  cognitions. — When 


1  The  following  is  the  note  referred  to : 

'  The  doctrine  of  Keid  and  Stewart,  in  regard  to  our  perception  of  external 
things,  bears  a  close  analogy  to  the  Cartesian  scheme  of  divine  assistance,  or  of 
occasional  causes.  It  seems,  however,  to  coincide  most  completely  with  the 
opinion  of  Ruardus  Andala,  a  Dutch  Cartesian,  who  attempted  to  reconcile 
the  theory  of  assistance  with  that  of  physical  influence.  "Statuo,"  he  says, 
"  nos  clarissimam  et  distinctissimam  hujus  operation-is  et  tuiionis  posse  habere 
ideanij  si  modo,  quod  omnino  facere  oportet,  ad  Deum,  caussam  ejus  pri- 
mam  et  liberam  ascendamus,  et  ab  ejus  beneplacito  admirandum  hunc  effec- 
tum  derivemus.  Nos  possumus  huic  vel  illi  motui  e.  gr.  campanse,  sic  et, 
hederae  suspense  literis  scriptis,  verbis  quibuscunque  pronunciatis,  aliisque 
signis,  varias  ideas  alligare,  ita,  ut  per  visum,  vel  auditum  in  mente  exciten- 
tur  variae  ideaa,  perceptiones  et  sensatioues :  annon  hinc  clare  et  facile  intel- 
ligimus,  Deum  creatorem  mentis  et  corporis  potuisse  instituere  et  ordinare. 
ut  per  varies  in  corpore  motus  varise  in  mente  excitentur  ideaa  et  perceptiones ; 
et  vicissim,  ut  per  varias  mentis  volitiones,  varii  in  corpore  excitentur  et  pro- 
ducantur  motus  ?  Hinc  et  pro  varia  alterutrius  partis  dispositione  altera 
pars  variis  modis  affici  potest.  Hoc  autem  a  Deo  ita  ordinatum  et  effectum 
esse,  a  posteriori,  continua,  certissima  et  clarissima  experientia  docet.  Testes 
irrefragabiles  onmique  exceptione  majores  reciproci  hujus  commercii,  opera- 
tionis  mentis  in  corpus,  et  corporis  in  mentem,  nee  non  communionis  status, 
sunt  sensii*  omnes  turn  externi,  turn  interni  ;  ut  et  omnes  et  singular  et  con- 
tinufB  actiones  mentis  in  corpus,  de  quibus  modo  fuit  actum.  Si  quis 
vero  a  proprietatibus  mentis  ad  proprietates  corporis  progredi  velit,  aut  ex 
natura  diversissimarum  harum  substantiarum  deducere  motum  in  corpore, 
&  perceptiones  in  mente,  aut  hos  effectus  ut  necessario  connexos  spectare ; 
nos  is  frustra  erit,  nihil  intelliget,  perversissime  philosophabitur  nullamque 
hujns  rei  ideam  habere  poterit.  Si  vero  ad  Deum  Creatorem  adscendamus, 
eumque  vere  agnoscamus,  nihil  hie  erit  obscuri,  hunc  effectum  clarissime 
intelligemus,  et  quidem  per  caussam  ejus  primam ;  quse  perfectissima  de- 
mum  est  scientia.' — W. 


278  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

Reid,  therefore,  says  that  '  the  perception  of  an  object  consists  of, 
or  implies,  a  conception  or  notion  of  it'  (Inq.  183  a,  188  a,  I.  P. 
258  a,  b,  318  b,  319  a,  et  alibi)  ;  there  is  here,  either  an  impro- 
priety of  language,  or  perception  is,  in  his  view,  a  mediate  and 
representative  knowledge.  The  former  alternative  is,  however, 
at  least  equally  probable  as  the  latter ;  for  Consciousness,  which 
on  all  hands,  is  admitted  to  be  a  knowledge  immediate  and  intui- 
tive, he  defines  (I.  P.  327  a)  'an  immediate  conception  of  the 
operation  of  our  own  minds,'  <fec.  Conception  and  Notion,  Reid 
seems,  therefore,  to  employ,  at  least  sometimes,  for  cognition  in 
general. 

5.  In  calling  imagination  of  the  past,  the  distant,  <kc.,  an  im- 
mediate knowledge,  Reid,  it  may  be  said,  could  only  mean  by 
immediate,  a  knowledge  effected  not  through  the  supposed  inter- 
mediation of  a  vicarious  object,  numerically  different  from  the 
object  existing  and  the  mind  knowing,  but  through  a  representa- 
tion of  the  past,  or  real,  object,  in  and  by  the  mind  itself;  in 
other  words,  that  by  mediate  knowledge  he  denoted  a  non-egois- 
tical, by  immediate  knowledge  an  egoistical,  representation.1   This 
being  established,  it  may  be  further  argued — 1°,  that  in  calling 
Perception  an  immediate  knowledge,  he,  on  the  same  analogy, 
must  be  supposed  to  deny,  in  reference  to  this  faculty,  only  the 
doctrine  of  non-egoistical  representation.    This  is  confirmed — 2°, 
by  his  not  taking  the  distinction  between  perception  as  a  pre- 
sentative,  and  Memory,  for  instance   (i.  e.  recollective  imagina- 
tion), as  a  representative,  cognition ;   which  he  ought  to  have 
done,  had  he  contemplated,  in  the  former,  more  than  a  faculty, 
through  which  the  ego  represents  to  itself  the  non-ego,  of  which 
it  has  no  consciousness — no  true  objective  and  immediate  appre- 
hension.    This,  however,  only  proves  that  Reid's  Perception  may 
be  representative,  not  that  it  actually  is  so. 

6.  The  doctrine  maintained  by  Reid  (I.  P.  199  a,  298  b,  299 
a,  302  e,  305  b)  and  by  Stewart  (Elem.  vol.  i.  c.  I.  sect  2)  that 

1  See  previous  chapter,  §  1,  Pr.  7,  p.  241. —  W. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION.  279 

perception  is  possible  of  distant  objects,  is,  when  sifted,  found 
necessarily  to  imply  that  perception  is  not,  in  that  case,  an  ap- 
prehension of  the  object  in  its  place  in  space — in  its  Where ; 
and  this  again  necessarily  implies,  that  it  is  not  an  apprehen- 
sion of  the  object,  as  existing,  or  in  itself.  But  if  not  known 
as  existing,  or  in  itself,  a  thing  is,  either  not  known  at  all,  or 
known  only  in  and  through  something  different  from  itself. 
Perception,  therefore,  is,  on  this  doctrine,  at  best  a  mediate  or 
representative  cognition ;  of  the  simpler  form  of  representation, 
the  egoistical,  it  may  be,  but  still  only  vicarious  and  subjective.1 

7.  In  some  places  our  author  would  seem  to  hold  that  Percep- 
tion is  the  result  of  an  inference,  and  that  what  is  said  to  be  per- 
ceived is  the  remote  cause,  and  therefore  not  the  immediate  object 
of  Perception.     If  this  be  so,  Perception  is  not  a  presentative 
knowledge.     (Inq.  125  a,  I.  P.  310  a  b,  319  a.)     In  other  pas- 
sages, that  perception  is  the  result  of  inference  or  reasoning,  is 
expressly  denied.      (I.  P.  259  b,  260  a  b,  309  b,  326  a,  328  b, 
&c.) 

8.  On  the  supposition,  that  we  have  an  immediate  cognition  or 
consciousness  of  the  non-ego,  we  must  have,  at  the  same  time, 
involved  as  part  and  parcel  of  that  cognition,  a  belief  of  its  exist- 
ence.    To  view,  therefore,  our  belief  of  the  existence  of  the  exter- 
nal world,  as  any  thing  apart  from  our  knowledge  of  that  world, 
— to  refer  it  to  instinct — to  view  jt  as  unaccountable — to  consid- 
er it  as  an  ultimate  law  of  our  constitution,  &c.,  as  Reid  does 
(Inq.  188  a  b,  I.  P.  258  b,  309  b,  326  a,  327  a,  et  alibi),  is,  to 
say  the  least  of  it,  suspicious  ;  appearing  to  imply,  that  our  cog- 
nition of  the  material  world,  as  only  mediate  and  subjective, 
does  not  at  once  and  of  itself,  necessitate  a  belief  of  the  existence 
of  external  things. 

B.  Counter  statements,  conformable  to  the  doctrine  of  a  real 
presentation  of  material  objects,  and  inconsistent  with  that  of  a 
representative  perception. 

1  See  the  previous  chapter. —  W. 


280  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

1.  Knowledge  and   existence   only  infer  each  other  when  a 
reality  is  known  in  itself  or  as  existing ;  for  only  in  that  case  can 
we  say  of  it, — on  the  one  hand,  it  is  known,  because  it  exists, — 
on  the  other,  it  exists,  since  it  is  known.     In  propriety  of  lan- 
guage, this  constitutes,  exclusively,  an  immediate,  intuitive,  or 
real,  cognition.     This  is  at  once  the  doctrine  of  philosophers  in 
general,  and  of  Reid  in  particular.     '  It  seems,'  he  says, '  admit- 
ted as  a  first  principle,  by  the  learned  and  the  unlearned,  that 
what  is  really  perceived  must  exist,  and  that  to  perceive  what 
does  not  exist  is  impossible.     So  far  the  unlearned  man  and  the 
philosopher  agree.'     (I.  P.  p.  274  b.)      This  principle  will  find 
an  articulate  illustration  in  the  three  proximately  following  state- 
ments, in  all  of  which  it  is  implied. 

2.  The  idea  or  representative  object,  all  philosophers,  of  what- 
ever doctrine,  concur  in  holding  to  be  in  the  strictest  sense  of  the 
expression,  itself  immediately  apprehended;  and  that,  as  thus 
apprehended,  it  necessarily  exists.     That  Reid  fully  understands 
their  doctrine,  is  shown  by  his  introducing  a  Cosmothetic  Ideal- 
ist thus  speaking: — 'I  perceive  an  image,  or  form,  or  idea,  in  my 
own  mind,  or  in  my  brain.     I  am  certain  of  the  existence  of  the 
idea ;  because  I  immediately  perceive  it.'  (Ibid.)     Now  then,  if 
Reid  be  found  to  assert — that,  on  his  doctrine,  we  perceive  mate- 
rial objects  not  less  immediately,  than,  on  the  common  doctrine 
of  philosophers,  we  perceive  ideal  objects ;  and  that  therefore  his 
theory  of  perception  affords  an  equal  certainty  of  the  existence 
of  the  external  reality,  as  that  of  the  Cosmothetic  Idealist  does  of 
the   existence  of  its  internal  representation ;  if  Reid,  I  say,  do 
this,  he  unambiguously  enounces  a  doctrine  of  presentative,  and 
not  of  representative,  perception.     And  this  he  does.     Having 
repeated,  for  the  hundredth  time,  the  deliverance  of  common 
sense,  that  we  perceive  material  things  immediately,  and  not 
their  ideal   representations,  he  proceeds: — 'I   shall   only  here 
observe  that  if  external  objects  be  perceived  immediately,  we 
have  the  same  reason  to  believe  their  existence  as  philosophers 
have  to  believe  the  existence  of  ideas,  while  they  hold  them  to 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  281 

be  the  immediate  objects  of  perception.'  (I.  P.  446  a  b.  See 
also  263  b,  272  b.) 

3.  Philosophers — even  Skeptics  and  Idealists — concur  in  ac- 
knowledging that  mankind  at  large  believe  that  the  external 
reality  is  itself  the  immediate  and  only  object  in  perception. 
Reid  is  of  course  no  exception.  After  stating  the  principle  pre- 
viously quoted  (B,  st.  1 ),  '  that  what  is  really  perceived  must 
exist,'  he  adds ; — '  the  unlearned  man  says,  I  perceive  the  external 
object,  and  I  perceive  it  to  exist.  Nothing  can  be  more  absurd 
than  to  doubt  it.'  (I.  P.  274  b.)  Again :— '  The  vulgar  un- 
doubtedly believe,  that  it  is  the  external  object  which  we  imme- 
diately perceive,  and  not  a  representative  image  of  it  only.  It  is 
for  this  reason,  that  they  look  upon  it  as  perfect  lunacy  to  call  in 
question  the  existence  of  external  objects.'  (Ibid.)  Again: — 
'  The  vulgar  are  firmly  persuaded  that  the  very  identical  objects 
which  they  perceive  continue  to  exist  when  they  do  not  perceive 
them  ;  and  are  no  less  firmly  persuaded  that  when  ten  men  look 
at  the  sun  or  the  moon  they  all  see  the  same  individual  object.'* 
(I.  P.  284  b.)  Again,  speaking  of  Berkeley : — '  The  vulgar 
opinion  he  reduces  to  this — that  the  very  things  which  we  per- 
ceive by  our  senses  do  really  exist.  This  he  grants.'  (I.  P.  284 
a.)  Finally,  speaking  of  Hume : — '  It  is  therefore  acknowledged 
by  this  philosopher  to  be  a  natural  instinct  or  prepossession,  an 
universal  and  primary  opinion  of  all  men,  that  the  objects  which 
we  immediately  perceive  by  our  senses,  are  not  images  in  our 
minds,  but  external  objects,  and  that  their  existence  is  independent 
of  us  and  our  perception.'  (I.  P.  299  b;  see  also  275  a,  298  b, 
299  a  b,  302  a  b.) 

It  is  thus  evinced  that  Reid,  like  other  philosophers,  attributes 
to  men  in  general  the  belief  of  an  intuitive  perception.  If,  then, 
he  declare  that  his  own  opinion  coincides  with  that  of  the  vulgar, 
he  will,  consequently,  declare  himself  a  Presentative  Realist. 

*  The  inaccuracy  of  this  statement*  does  not  affect  the  argument. 
>8eep.m—  W. 


282  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

And  he  does  this,  emphatically  too.  Speaking  of  the  Perception 
of  the  external  world:  'We  have  here  a  remarkable  conflict 
between  two  contradictory  opinions,  wherein  all  mankind  are 
engaged.  On  the  one  side  stand  all  the  vulgar,  who  are  unprac- 
tised in  philosophical  researches,  and  guided  by  the  uncorrupted 
primary  instincts  of  nature.  On  the  other  side,  stand  all  the 
philosophers,  ancient  and  modern ;  every  man,  without  excep- 
tion, who  reflects.  In  this  division,  to  my  great  humiliation,  I 
find  myself  classed  with  the  vulgar?  (I.  P.  302  b.) 

4.  All  philosophers  agree  that  self-consciousness  is  an  imme- 
diate knowledge,  and  therefore  affords  an  absolute  and  direct  cer- 
tainty of  the  existence  of  its  objects.     Reid  (with  whom  conscious- 
ness is  equivalent  to  self-consciousness)  of  course  maintains  this ; 
but  he  also  maintains,  not  only  that  perception  affords  a  sufficient 
proof,  but  as  valid  an  assurance  of  the  reality  of  material  phe- 
nomena, as  consciousness  does  of  the  reality  of  mental.     (I.  P. 
263  b,  269  a,  373,  et  alibi.)     In  this  last  assertion  I  have  shown 
that  Reid  (and  Stewart  along  with  him)  is  wrong ;  for  the  phe- 
nomena of  self-consciousness   cannot   possibly   be  doubted   or 
denied ;'  but  the  statement  at  least  tends  to  prove  that  his  per- 
ception is  truly  immediate — is,  under  a  different  name,  a  con- 
sciousness of  the  non-ego. 

5.  Arnauld's  doctrine  of  external  perception  is  a  purely  ego- 
istical representationism ;  and  he  has  stated  its  conditions  and 
consequences  with  the  utmost  accuracy  and  precision.     (I.   P. 
295-298.)     Reid  expresses  both  his  content  and  discontent  with 
Arnauld's  theory  of  perception,  which  he  erroneously  views  as 
inconsistent  with  itself  (297  a  b).     This  plainly  shows  that  he 
had  not  realized  to  himself  a  clear  conception  of  the  two  doctrines 
of  Presentationism  and  Egoistical  Representationism,  in  them- 
seives  and  in  their  contrasts.     But  it  also  proves  that  when  the 
conditions  and  consequences  of  the  latter  scheme,  even  in  its 
purest  form,  were  explicitly  enounced,  that  he  was  then  suffi- 

1  See  Part  First.—  W. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION.  283 

ciently  aware  of  their  incompatibility  with  the  doctrine  which  he 
himself  maintained — a  doctrine,  therefore,  it  may  be  fairly  con- 
tended (though  not  in  his  hands  clearly  understood,  far  less 
articulately  developed),  substantially  one  of  Natural  Realism.* 


To  Reid's  inadequate  discrimination— common  to  him  with 
other  philosophers — of  the  different  theories  of  Perception,  either 
as  possible  in  theory,  or  as  actually  held,  is,  as  I  have  already 
noticed,  to  be  ascribed  the  ambiguities  and  virtual  contradictions 
which  we  have  now  been  considering. 

In  the  first  place  (what  was  of  little  importance  to  the  Hypo- 
thetical, but  indispensably  necessary  for  the  Natural  Realist),  he 
did  not  establish  the  fact  of  the  two  cognitions,  the  presentative 
and  representative ; — signalize  their  contents ;  evolve  their  sev- 
eral conditions ; — consider  what  faculties  in  general  were  to  be 
referred  to  each ; — and,  in  particular,  which  of  these  was  the 
kind  of  condition  competent,  in  our  Perception  of  the  external 
world. 

In  the  second  place,  he  did  not  take  note,  that  representation 
is  possible  under  two  forms — the  egoistical  and  non-egoistical ; 
each,  if  Perception  be  reduced  to  a  representative  faculty,  afford- 
ing premises  of  equal  cogency  to  the  absolute  idealist  and  skep- 
tic. On  the  contrary,  he  seems  to  have  overlooked  the  egoistical 
form  of  representationism  altogether  (compare  Inq.  106  a,  128  a 
b,  130  b,  210  a,  I.  P.  226  a  b,  256  a  b,  257  a  b,  269  a,  274  a, 


*  It  will  be  observed  that  I  do  not  found  any  argument  on  Reid's  frequent 
assertion,  that  perception  affords  an  immediate  knowledge  and  immediate  belief 
of  external  things  (e.  g.  I.  P.  259  b,  260  a  b,  267  a,  809  b,  326  b).  For  if  h'c 
call  memory  an  immediate  knowledge  of  the  past — meaning  thereby,  in  ref- 
erence to  it,  only  a  negation  of  the  doctrine  of  non-egoistical  representation, 
he  may  also  call  Perception  an  immediate  knowledge  of  the  outward  reality, 
and  still  not  deny  that  it  is  representative  cognition,  in  and  by  the  mind 
itself. 


284  PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION. 

277  b,  278  a  b,  293  b,  299  a,  318  b,  427  a  b)  ;  and  confounded 
it  either  with  the  non-egoistical  form,  or  with  the  counter  doc- 
trine of  real  presentatiomsm.  In  consequence  of  this,  he  has 
been  betrayed  into  sundry  errors,  of  less  or  greater  account.  On 
the  one  hand ; — to  the  confusion  of  Presentationism  and  Non-ego- 
istical representationism,  we  must  attribute  the  inconsistencies  we 
have  just  signalized,  in  the  exposition  of  his  own  doctrine.  These 
are  of  principal  account.  On  the  other  hand ;  to  the  confusion  of 
Egoistical  and  Non-egoistical  representationism,  we  must  refer 
the  less  important  errors; — 1°,  of  viewing  many  philosophers 
who  held  the  former  doctrine,  as  holding  the  latter ;  and  2°,  of 
considering  the  refutation  of  the  non-egoistical  form  of  represen- 
tation, as  a  subversion  of  the  only  ground  on  which  the  skeptic 
and  absolute  idealist  established,  or  could  establish  their  conclu- 
sions. 


CHAPTER  IV.1 

DOCTRINE  OF  PERCEPTION  MAINTAINED  BY  THE  ABSOLUTE 
IDEALISTS.— DISCUSSION  ON  THE  SCHEME  OF  ARTHUR  COL- 
LIER. 

WE  deem  it  our  duty  to  call  attention  to  these  publications  :s 
for  in  themselves  they  are  eminently  deserving  of  the  notice  of 
the  few  who  in  this  country  take  an  interest  in  those  higher  spec- 
ulations to  which,  in  other  countries,  the  name  of  Philosophy  is 
exclusively  conceded ;  and,  at  the  same  time,  they  have  not  been 
ushered  into  the  world  with  those  adventitious  recommendations 
which  might  secure  their  intrinsic  merit  against  neglect. 

The  fortune  of  the  first  is  curious. — It  is  known  to  those  who 
have  made  an  active  study  of  philosophy  and  its  histoiy,  that 
there  are  many  philosophical  treatises  written  by  English  authors 
— in  whole  or  in  part  of  great  value,  but,  at  the  same  time,  of 
extreme  rarity.  Of  these,  the  rarest  are,  in  fact,  frequently  the 
most  original :  for  precisely  in  proportion  as  an  author  is  in  ad- 
vance of  his  age,  is  it  likely  that  his  works  will  be  neglected  ;  and 
the  neglect  of  contemporaries  in  general  consigns  a  book, — espe- 
cially a  small  book; — if  not  protected  by  accidental  concomitants, 

1  This  was  first  published  in  the  Edinburgh  Review,  for  April,  1839,  and 
has  recently  been  published  in  the  '  Discussions,'  under  the  title  of  Idealism. 
That  portion  of  it  which  shows  that  Catholicism  is  inconsistent  with  Ideal- 
ism is  a  new,  and  very  important,  contribution  to  the  history  of  philosophy. 
It  also  does  justice  to  the  name  of  an  almost  forgotten  idealist,  who  was 
scarcely  inferior  to  Berkeley  himself. —  W. 

a  The  following  are  the  titles  of  the  books  reviewed : 

1.  Metaphysical  Tracts  by  English  Philosophers  of  the  Eighteenth  Century. 
Prepared  for  the  Press  by  the  late  Rev.  Sam.  Parr,  D.  D.  8vo.  London.  1837. 

2.  Memoirs  of  the  Life  and   Writings  of  the  Rev.  Arthur  Collier,  M.  A., 
Rector  of  Langford  MagrM,  in  the  County  of  Wilts.    From  A.  D.  1704  to  A.  D. 
1732.     With  some  Account  of  his  Family.    By  Robert  Benson,  M.  A.  8vo. 
London.  1887.—  W. 


286  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

at  once  to  the  tobacconist  or  tallow-chandler.  This  is  more  par- 
ticularly the  case  with  pamphlets,  philosophical,  and  at  the  same 
time  polemical.  Of  these  we  are  acquainted  with  some,  extant 
perhaps  only  in  one  or  two  copies,  which  display  a  metaphysical 
talent  unappreciated  in  a  former  age,  but  which  would  command 
the  admiration  of  the  present.  Nay,  even  of  English  philoso- 
phers of  the  very  highest  note  (strange  to  say  !)  there  are  now 
actually  lying  unknown  to  their  editors,  biographers,  and  fellow- 
metaphysicians,  published  treatises,  of  the  highest  interest  and 
importance :  [as  of  Cudworth,  Berkeley,  Collins,  <fcc.] 

We  have  often,  therefore,  thought  that,  were  there  with  us  a 
public  disposed  to  indemnify  the  cost  of  such  a  publication,  a 
collection,  partly  of  treatises,  partly  of  extracts  from  treatises,  by 
English  metaphysical  writers,  of  rarity  and  merit,  would  be  one 
of  no  inconsiderable  importance.  In  any  other  country  than 
Britain,  such  a  publication  would  be  of  no  risk  or  difficulty.  Al- 
most every  nation  of  Europe,  except  our  own,  has,  in  fact,  at 
present  similar  collections  in  progress — only  incomparably  more 
ambitious.  Among  others,  there  are  in  Germany  the  Corpus 
Philosophorum,  by  Gfroerer ;  in  France,  the  Bibliotheque  Philo- 
sophique  des  Temps  Modemes,  by  Bouillet  and  Gamier ;  and  in 
Italy,  the  Collezione  de*  Classici  Metafisici,  <kc.  Nay,  in  this 
country  itself,  we  have  publishing  societies  for  every  department 
of  forgotten  literature — except  Philosophy. 

But  in  Britain,  which  does  not  even  possess  an  annotated  edi- 
tion of  Locke, — in  England,1  where  the  universities  teach  the 
little  philosophy  they  still  nominally  attempt,  like  the  catechism, 
by  rote,  what  encouragement  could  such  an  enterprise  obtain  ? 
It  did  not,  therefore,  surprise  us,  when  wo  learnt  that  the  pub- 
lisher of  the  two  works  under  review, — when  he  essayed  what, 
in  the  language  of  '  the  trade?  is  called  '  to  subscribe1  The  Meta- 
physical Tracts,  found  his  brother  booksellers  indisposed  to  ven- 
ture even  on  a  single  copy. — Now,  what  was  the  work  which 

1  As  much  might  be  said  of  philosophy  in  America.—  W. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  287 

our  literary  purveyors  thus  eschewed  as  wormwood  to  British 
taste? 

The  late  Dr.  Parr,  whose  erudition  was  as  unexclusive  as  pro- 
found, had,  many  years  previous  to  his  death,  formed  the  plan  of 
reprinting  a  series  of  the  rarer  metaphysical  treatises,  of  English 
authorship,  which  his  remarkable  library  contained.  With  this 
view,  he  had  actually  thrown  off  a  small  impression  of  five  such 
tracts,  with  an  abridgment  of  a  sixth ;  but  as  these  probably 
formed  only  a  part  of  his  intended  collection,  which,  at  the  same 
time,  it  is  known  he  meant  to  have  prefaced  by  an  introduction, 
containing,  among  other  matters,  an  historical  disquisition  on 
Idealism,  with  special  reference  to  the  philosophy  of  Collier,  the 
publication  was  from  time  to  time  delayed,  until  its  completion 
was  finally  frustrated  by  his  death.  When  his  library  was  subse- 
quently sold,  the  impression  of  the  six  treatises  was  purchased  by 
Mr.  Lumley,  a  respectable  London  bookseller ;  and  by  him  has 
recently  been  published  under  the  title  which  stands  as  Number 
First  at  the  head  of  this  article. 

The  treatises  reprinted  in  this  collection  are  the  following : 


'  1.  Clams  Universalis  ;  or  a  new  Inquiry  after  Truth :  being  a  demonstra- 
ion  of  the  non-existence  or  impossibility  of  an  external  world.  By  Arthur  Col- 
lier, Rector  of  Langford  Magna,  near  Sarum.  London :  1718. 

'  2.  A  specimen  of  True  Philosophy  /  in  a  discourse  on  Genesis,  the  first 
chapter  and  the  first  verse.  By  Arthur  Collier,  Eector  of  Langford  Magna, 
near  Sarum,  Wilts.  Not  improper  to  be  bound  up  with  his  Clavis  Universa- 
lis. Sarum:  1730. 

'  3.  (An  Abridgment,  by  Dr.  Parr,  of  the  doctrines  maintained  by  Collier 
in  his)  Loyology,  or  Treatise  on  the  Logos,  in  seven  sermons  on  John  i.  verses 
1,  2,  3, 14,  together  with  an  Appendix  on  the  same  subject.  1732. 

'  4.  Conjectural  qucedam  de  Sensu,  Motu,  et  Idearum  generatione.  (This  was 
first  published  by  David  Hartley  as  an  appendix  to  his  Epistolary  Disserta- 
tion, De  Lithontriptico  a  J.  Stephens  nuper  invento  (Leyden,  1741,  Bath, 
1746) ;  and  contains  the  principles  of  that  psychological  theory  which  he  af- 
terwards so  fully  developed  in  his  observations  on  Man.) 

'  5.  An  Inquiry  into  the  Origin  of  the  Human  Appetites  and- Affections,  show- 
ing how  each  arises  from  Association,  with  an  account  of  the  entrance  of  Moral 
£oil  into  the  world.  To  which  are  added  some  remarks  on  the  independent 
scheme  which  deduces  all  obligation  on  God's  part  and  man's  from  certain 
abstract  relations,  truth,  etc.  Written  for  the  use  of  the  young  gentlemen 
at  the  universities.  Lincoln :  1747.  (The  author  is  yet  unknown.) 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

'  6.  Man  in  quest  of  himself  ;  or  a  defence  of  the  Individuality  of  the  Human 
Mind,  or  Self.  Occasioned  by  some  remarks  in  the  Monthly  Review  for 
July,  1768,  on  a  note  in  Search's  Freewill.  By  Cuthbcrt  Comment,  Gent. 
London  :  1788.  (The  author  of  this  is  Search  himself,  that  is,  Mr.  Abraham 
Tucker.)' 

These  tracts  are  undoubtedly  well  worthy  of  notice ;  but  to  the 
first — the  Clavis  Universalis  of  Collier — as  by  far  the  most  in- 
teresting and  important,  we  shall  at  present  confine  the  few  ob- 
servations which  we  can  afford  space  to  make.* 

This  treatise  is  in  fact  one  not  a  little  remarkable  in  the  his- 
tory of  philosophy ;  for  to  Collier  along  with  Berkeley  is  due 
the  honor  of  having  first  explicitly  maintained  a  theory  of  Abso- 
lute Idealism  ;  and  the  Clavis  is  the  work  in  which  that  theory 
is  developed.  The  fortune  of  this  treatise,  especially  in  its  own 
country,  has  been  very  different  from  its  deserts.  Though  the 
negation  of  an  external  world  had  been  incidentally  advanced  by 
Berkeley  in  his  Principles  of  Human  Knoioledge  some  three 
years  prior  to  the  appearance  of  the  Clavis  Universalis,  with 
which  the  publication  of  his  Dialogues  between  Hylas  and  Philo- 
nous  was  simultaneous ;  it  is  certain  that  Collier  was  not  only 
wholly  unacquainted  with  Berkeley's  speculations,  but  had  de- 
layed promulgating  his  opinion  till  after  a  ten,  years'  meditation. 
Both  philosophers  are  thus  equally  original.  They  are  also  nearly 
on  a  level  in  scientific  talent ;  for,  comparing  the  treatise  of 
Collier  with  the  writings  of  Berkeley,  we  find  it  little  inferior  in 
metaphysical  acuteness  or  force  of  reasoning,  however  deficient  it 
may  be  in  the  graces  of  composition,  and  the  variety  of  illustra- 
tion, by  which  the  works  of  his  more  accomplished  rival  are  dis- 
tinguished. But  how  disproportioned  to  their  relative  merits  has 
been  the  reputation  of  the  two  philosophers  !  While  Berkeley's 
became  a  name  memorable  throughout  Europe,  that  of  Collier 
was  utterly  forgotten, — it  appears  in  no  British  biography ;  and  is 
not  found  even  on  the  list  of  local  authors  in  the  elaborate  historv 


*  [It  never  rains  but  it  pours.  Collier's  Clavis  was  subsequently  reprinted, 
in  a  very  handsome  form,  by  a  literary  association  in  Edinburgh.  Would 
that  the  books  wanting  reimpression  were  first  dealt  with !] 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  289 

of  the  county  where  he  was  born,  and  of  the  parish  where  he  was 
hereditary  Rector  !  Indeed,  but  for  the  notice  of  the  Clavis  by 
Dr.  Reid  (who  appears  to  have  stumbled  on  it  in  the  College 
Library  of  Glasgow),  it  is  probable  that  the  name  of  Collier  would 
have  remained  in  his  own  country  absolutely  unknown — until, 
perhaps,  our  attention  might  have  been  called  to  his  remarkable 
writings,  by  the  consideration  they  had  by  accident  obtained  from 
the  philosophers  of  other  countries.  In  England  the  Clavis  Uni- 
versalis  was  printed,  but  there  it  can  hardly  be  said  to  have  been 
published ;  for  it  there  never  attracted  the  slightest  observa- 
tion ;  and  of  the  copies  now  known  to  be  extant  of  the  original 
edition, 

inumerus  mx  est  totidem,  quot 


TTiebarvm  portce  vel  dimtis  ostla  Nili? 

The  public  libraries  of  Oxford  and  Cambridge,  as  Mr.  Benson 
observes,  do  not  possess  a  single  copy.  There  are,  however, 
two  in  Edinburgh  ;  and  in  Glasgow,  as  we  have  noticed,  there  is 
another. 

The  only  country  in  which  the  Clavis  can  truly  be  said  to  have 
been  hitherto  published,  is  Germany. 

In  the  sixth  supplemental  volume  of  the  Ada.  JEruditorum 
(17 17)  there  is  a  copious  and  able  abstract  of  its  contents. 
Through  this  abridgment  the  speculations  of  Collier  became 
known — particularly  to  the  German  philosophers ;  and  we  rec- 
ollect to  have  seen  them  quoted,  among  others,  by  Wolf  and 
Bilfinger. 

In  1750,  the  work  was,  however,  translated,  without  retrench- 
ment, into  German,  by  Professor  Eschenbach  of  Rostock,  along 
with  Berkeley's  Dialogues  between  Hylas  and  Philonous.  These 
two  treatises  constitute  his  '  Collection  of  the  most  distinguished 
Writers  who  deny  the  reality  of  their  own  body  and  of  the  whole 
corporeal  world,' — treatises  which  he  accompanied  with  '  Counter 
observations,  and  an  Appendix,  in  which  the  existence  of  matter 
is  demonstrated :'  These  are  of  considerable  value.  [I  have 
spoken  of  them,  in  Stewart's  Dissertation,  Note  SS.]  Speaking 

13 


290  PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION. 

of  Collier's  treatise,  the  translator  tells  us  : — '  If  any  book  ever 
cost  me  trouble  to  obtain  it,  the  Clavis  is  that  book.  Every  ex- 
ertion was  fruitless.  At  length,  an  esteemed  friend,  Mr.  J.  Selk, 
candidate  of  theology  in  Dantzic,  sent  me  the  work,  after  I  had 

abandoned  all  hope  of  ever  being  able  to  procure  it 

The  preface  is  wanting  in  the  copy  thus  obtained — a  proof  that  it 
was  rummaged,  with  difficulty,  out  of  some  old  book  magazine. 
It  has  not,  therefore,  been  in  my  power  to  present  it  to  the  curi- 
ous reader,  but  I  trust  the  loss  may  not  be  of  any  great  import- 
ance.'— In  regard  to  the  preface,  Dr.  Eschenbach  is,  however, 
mistaken ;  the  original  has  none. 

By  this  translation,  which  has  now  itself  become  rare,  the  work 
was  rendered  fully  accessible  in  Germany ;  and  the  philosophers 
of  that  country  did  not  fail  to  accord  to  its  author  the  honor  due 
to  his  metaphysical  talent  and  originality.  The  best  comparative 
view  of  the  kindred  doctrines  of  Collier  and  Berkeley  is  indeed 
given  by  Tennemann  (xi.  399,  sq.)  ;  whose  meritorious  History 
of  Philosophy,  we  may  observe,  does  justice  to  more  than  one 
English  thinker,  whose  works,  and  even  whose  name,  are  in  his 
own  country  as  if  they  had  never  been  ! 

Dr.  Reid's  notice  of  the  Clavis  attracted  the  attention  of  Mr. 
Dugald  Stewart  and  of  Dr.  Parr  to  the  work ;  and  to  the  nom- 
inal celebrity  which,  through  them,  its  author  has  thus  tardily 
attained,  even  in  Britain,  are  we  indebted  for  Mr.  Benson's  inter- 
esting Memoirs  of  the  Life  and  Writings  of  Arthur  Collier : 
forming  the  second  of  the  two  publications  prefixed  to  this  article. 
What  was  his  inducement,  and  what  his  means  for  the  execution 
of  this  task,  the  biographer  thus  informs  us. 

****** 

Arthur  Collier  was  born  in  1680.  He  was  the  son  of  Arthur 
Collier,  Rector  of  Langford-Magna,  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Salisbury — a  living,  the  advowson  of  which  had  for  about  a  cen- 
tury been  in  possession  of  the  family,  and  of  which  his  great- 
grandfather, grandfather,  father,  and  himself,  were  successively 
incumbents.  With  his  younger  brother,  William,  who  was  also 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  291 

destined  for  the  Church,  and  who  obtained  an  adjoining  benefice, 
he  received  his  earlier  education  in  the  grammar-school  of  Salis- 
bury. In  1697  he  was  entered  of  Pembroke  College,  Oxford ; 
but  in  the  following  year,  when  his  brother  joined  him  at  the 
University,  they  both  became  members  of  Balliol.  His  father 
having  died  in  1697,  the  family  living  was  held  by  a  substitute 
until  17 04,  when  Arthur  having  taken  priest's  orders,  was  induct- 
ed into  the  Rectory,  on  the  presentation  of  his  mother.  In  1707 
he  married  a  niece  of  Sir  Stephen  Fox  ;  and  died  in  1732,  leav- 
ing his  wife,  with  two  sons  and  two  daughters,  in  embarrassed 
circumstances.  Of  the  sons  : — Arthur  became  a  civilian  of  some 
note  at  the  Commons ;  and  Charles  rose  in  the  army  to  the  rank 
of  Colonel.  Of  the  daughters  : — Jane  was  the  clever  authoress 
of  The  Art  of  Ingeniously  Tormenting  ;  and  Mary  obtained 
some  celebrity  from  having  accompanied  Fielding,  as  his  wife's 
friend,  in  the  voyage  which  he  made  in  quest  of  health  to  Lis- 
bon. Collier's  family  is  now  believed  to  be  extinct. 

Besides  the  Clavis  Universalis  (1713),  The  Specimen  of  True 
Philosophy  (1730),  and  the  Logology  (1732),  Collier  was  the 
author  of  two  published  Sermons  on  controversial  points,  which 
have  not  been  recovered.  Of  his  manuscript  works  the  remains 
are  still  considerable,  but  it  is  probable  that  the  greater  propor- 
tion has  perished.  Our  author  was  hardly  less  independent  in 
his  religious,  than  in  his  philosophical,  speculations.  In  the  lat- 
ter he  was  an  Idealist;  in  the  former,  an  Arian.(like  Clarke), — 
an  Apollinarian, — and  a  High  Churchman,  on  grounds  which 
high  churchmen  could  not  understand.  Of  Collier  as  a  parish 
priest  and  a  theologian,  Mr.  Benson  supplies  us  with  much  inter- 
esting information.  But  it  is  only  as  a  metaphysician  that  we  at 
present  consider  him ;  and  in  this  respect  the  Memoirs  form  a 
valuable  supplement  to  the  Clavis.  Besides  a  series  of  letters  in 
exposition  of  his  philosophical  system,  they  afford  us,  what  is 
even  more  important,  an  insight  into  the  course  of  study  by 
which  Collier  was  led  to  his  conclusion.  With  philosophical  lite- 
rature he  does  not  appear  to  have  been  at  all  extensively  conver- 


292  PHILOSOPHY   OF    PERCEPTION. 

saut.  His  writings  betray  no  intimate  acquaintance  with  the 
works  of  the  great  thinkers  of  antiquity  ;  and  the  compends  of 
the  German  Scheiblerus  and  of  the  Scottish  Baronius,  apparently 
supplied  him  with  all  that  he  knew  of  the  Metaphysic  of  the 
Schools.  Locke  is  never  once  alluded  to.  Descartes  and  Male- 
branche,  and  his  neighbor  Mr.  Norris,  were  the  philosophers 
whom  he  seems  principally  to  have  studied ;  and  their  works, 
taken  by  themselves,  were  precisely  those  best  adapted  to  conduct 
an  untrammelled  mind  of  originality  and  boldness  to  the  result 
at  which  he  actually  arrived. 

Without  entering  on  any  general  consideration  of  the  doctrine 
of  Idealism,  or  attempting  a  regular  analysis  of  the  argument  of 
Collier,  we  hazard  a  few  remarks  on  that  theory, — simply  with 
the  view  of  calling  attention  to  some  of  the  peculiar  merits  of 
our  author. 

Mankind  in  general  believe  that  an  external  world  exists,  only 
because  they  believe  that  they  immediately  know  it  as  existent. 
As  they  believe  that  they  themselves  exist  because  conscious  of  a 
self  or  ego  ;  so  they  believe  that  something  different  from  them- 
selves exists,  because  they  believe  that  they  are  also  conscious  of 
this  not-self,  or  non-ego. 

In  the  first  place,  then,  it  is  self-evident,  that  the  existence  of 
the  external  world  cannot  be  doubted,  if  we  admit  that  we  do, 
as  we  naturally  believe  we  do, — know  it  immediately  as  ex- 
istent. If  the  fact  of  the  knowledge  be  allowed,  the  fact  of  the 
existence  cannot  be  gainsaid.  The  former  involves  the  latter. 

But,  in  the  second  place,  it  is  hardly  less  manifest,  that  if  our 
natural  belief  in  the  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  an  external 
world  be  disallowed  as  false,  that  our  natural  belief  in  the  exist- 
ence of  such  a  world  can  no  longer  be  founded  on  as  true.  Yet, 
marvellous  to  say,  this  has  been  very  generally  done. 

For  reasons  to  which  we  cannot  at  present  advert,  it  has  been 
almost  universally  denied  by  philosophers,  that  in  sensitive  per- 
ception we  are  conscious  of  any  external  reality.  On  the  con- 
trary, they  have  maintained,  with  singular  unanimity,  that  what 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  293 

we  are  immediately  cognitive  of  in  that  act,  is  only  an  ideal  object 
in  the  mind  itself.  In  so  far  as  they  agree  in  holding  this  opinion, 
philosophers  may  be  called  Idealists  in  contrast  to  mankind  in 
general,  and  a  few  stray  speculators  who  may  be  called  Real- 
ists— Natural  Realists. 

In  regard  to  the  relation  or  import  of  this  ideal  object,  philos- 
ophers are  divided ;  and  this  division  constitutes  two  great  and 
opposing  opinions  in  philosophy.  On  the  one  hand,  the  major- 
ity have  maintained  that  the  ideal  object  of  which  the  mind  is 
conscious,  is  vicarious  or  representative  of  a  real  object,  unknown 
immediately  or  as  existing,  and  known  only  mediately  through 
this  its  ideal  substitute.  These  philosophers,  thus  holding  the 
existence  of  an  external  world — a  world,  however,  unknown  in 
itself,  and  therefore  asserted  only  as  an  hypothesis,  may  be  ap- 
propriately styled  Cosmothetic  Idealists — Hypothetical  or  As- 
sumptive Realists.  On  the  other  hand,  a  minority  maintain, 
that  the  ideal  object  has  no  external  prototype  ;  and  they  accord- 
dingly  deny  the  existence  of  any  external  world.  These  may  be 
denominated  the  Absolute  Idealists. 

Each  of  these  great  genera  of  Idealists  is,  however,  divided  and 
subdivided  into  various  subordinate  species. 

The  Cosmothetic  Idealists  fall  primarily  into  two  classes,  inas- 
much as  some  view  the  ideal  or  representative  object  to  be  a 
tertium  quid  different  from  the  percipient  mind  as  from  the  rep- 
resented object ;  while  others  regard  it  as  only  a  modification  of 
the  mind  itself, — as  only  the  percipient  act  considered  as  repre- 
sentative of,  or  relative  to,  the  supposed  external  reality.  The 
former  of  these  classes  is  again  variously  subdivided,  according 
as  theories  may  differ  in  regard  to  the  nature  and  origin  of  the 
vicarious  object ;  as  whether  it  be  material  or  immaterial, — 
whether  it  come  from  without  or  rise  from  within, — whether  it 
emanate  from  the  external  reality  or  from  a  higher  source, — 
whether  it  be  infused  by  God  or  other  hyperphysical  intelligences, 
or  whether  it  be  a  representation  in  the  Deity  himself, — whether 
it  be  innate,  or  whether  it  be  produced  by  the  mind,  on  occasion 


294:  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

of  the  presence  of  the  material  object  within  the  sphere  of  sense. 
<fec.,  <fec. 

Of  Absolute  Idealism  '  only  two  principal  species  are  possible ; 

1  'If  idealism  supposed  the  existence  of  ideas  as  tertia  quaedam,  distinct  at 
once  from  the  material  object  and  the  immaterial  subject,  these  intermediate 
entities  being  likewise  held  to  originate  immediately  or  mediately  in  sense — 
if  this  hypothesis,  I  say,  were  requisite  to  Idealism,  then  would  Reid's  criti- 
cism of  that  doctrine  be  a  complete  and  final  confutation.  But  as  this  criti- 
cism did  not  contemplate,  so  it  does  not  confute  that  simpler  and  more 
refined  Idealism  which  views  in  ideas  only  modifications  of  the  mind  itself; 
and  which,  in  place  of  sensualizing  intellect,  intellectualizes  sense.  On  the 
contrary,  Reid  (and  herein  ho  is  followed  by  Mr.  Stewart),  in  the  doctrine 
now  maintained,  asserts  the  very  positions  on  which  this  scheme  of  Ideal- 
ism establishes  its  conclusions.  An  Egoistical  Idealism  is  established,  on 
the  doctrine  that  all  our  knowledge  is  merely  subjective,  or  of  the  mind 
itself;  that  the  Ego  has  no  immediate  cognizance  of  a  Non-Ego  as  exist- 
ing, but  that  the  Non-Ego  is  only  represented  to  us  in  a  modification  of  the 
self-conscious  Ego.  This  doctrine  being  admitted,  the  Idealist  has  only  to 
show  that  the  supposition  of  a  Non-Ego,  or  external  world  really  existent,  is 
a  groundless  and  unnecessary  assumption ;  for,  while  the  law  of  parcimo- 
ny  prohibits  the  multiplication  of  substances  or  causes  beyond  what  the 
phenomena  require,  we  have  manifestly  no  right  to  postulate  for  the  Non- 
Ego  the  dignity  of  an  independent  substance  beyond  the  Ego,  seeing  that 
this  Non-Ego  is,  ex  hypotheti,  known  to  us,  consequently  exists  for  us  only  as 
a  phenomenon  of  the  Ego. — Now,  the  doctrine  of  our  Scottish  philosophers 
is,  in  fact,  the  very  groundwork  on  which  the  Egoistical  Idealism  reposes. 
That  doctrine  not  only  maintains  our  sensations  of  the  secondary  qualities  to 
be  the  mere  effects  of  certain  unknown  causes,  of  which  we  are  consequently 
entitled  to  affirm  nothing,  but  that  we  have  no  direct  and  immediate  percep- 
tion of  extension  and  the  other  primary  qualities  of  matter.  To  limit  our- 
selves to  extension  (or  space),  which  figure  and  motion  (the  two  other  quali- 
ties proposed  by  Reid  for  the  experiment)  suppose,  it  is  evident  that  if  ex- 
tension be  not  immediately  perceived  as  externally  existing,  extended  objects 
cannot  be  immediately  perceived  as  realities  out,  and  independent  of,  the 
percipient  subject ;  for,  if  we  were  capable  of  such  a  perception  of  such 
objects,  we  should  necessarily  be  also  capable  of  a  perception  of  this,  the  one 
essential  attribute  of  their  existence.  But,  on  the  doctrine  of  our  Scottish 
philosophers,  Extension  is  a  notion  suggested  on  occasion  of  sensations  sup- 
posed to  be  determined  by  certain  unknown  causes ;  which  unknown  causes 
are  again  supposed  to  be  existences  independent  of  the  mind,  and  extended 
— their  complement,  in  fact,  constituting  the  external  world.  All  our  knowl- 
edge of  the  Non-Ego  is  thus  merely  ideal  and  mediate;  we  have  no  knowl- 
edge of  any  really  objective  reality,  except  through  a  subjective  representa- 
tion or  notion ;  in  other  words,  we  are  only  immediately  cognizant  of  cer- 
tain modes  of  our  own  minds,  and,  in  and  through  them,  mediately  warned 
of  the  phenomena  of  the  material  universe.  In  all  essential  respects,  this 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION.  295 

at  least,  only  two  have  been  actually  manifested  in  the  history 
of  philosophy ; — the  Theistic  and  the  Egoistic.  The  former  sup- 
poses that  the  Deity  presents  to  the  mind  the  appearances  which 
we  are  determined  to  mistake  for  an  external  world ;  the  latter 
supposes  that  these  appearances  are  manifested  to  consciousness, 
in  conformity  to  certain  unknown  laws  by  the  mind  itself.  The 
Theistic  Idealism  is  again  subdivided  into  three ;  according  as 
God  is  supposed  to  exhibit  the  phenomena  in  question  in  his 
own  substance, — to  infuse  into  the  percipient  mind  representative 
entities  different  from  its  own  modification, — or  to  determine  the 
ego  itself  to  an  illusive  representation  of  the  non-ego} 

Now  it  is  easily  shown,  that  if  the  doctrine  of  Natural  Realism 
be  abandoned, — if  it  be  admitted,  or  proved,  that  we  are  deceived 
in  our  belief  of  an  immediate  knowledge  of  aught  beyond  the 
mind ;  then  Absolute  Idealism  is  a  conclusion  philosophically 
inevitable,  the  assumption  of  an  external  world  being  now  an 
assumption  which  no  necessity  legitimates,  and  which  is  therefore 
philosophically  inadmissible.  On  the  law  of  parsimony  it  must 
be  presumed  null. 

It  is,  however,  historically  true,  that  Natural  Realism  had  been 
long  abandoned  by  philosophers  for  Cosmothetic  Idealism,  before 
the  grounds  on  which  this  latter  doctrine  rests  were  shown  to  be 
unsound.  These  grounds  are  principally  the  following : 

1.) — In  fas,  first  place,  the  natural  belief  in  the  existence  of  an 
external  world  was  allowed  to  operate  even  when  the  natural 
belief  of  our  immediate  knowledge  of  such  a  world  was  argued  to 
be  false.  It  might  be  thought  that  philosophers,  when  they 
maintained  that  one  original  belief  was  illusive,  would  not  con- 
tend that  another  was  veracious, — still  less  that  they  would 
assume,  as  true,  a  belief  which  existed  only  as  the  result  of  a 

doctrine  of  Keid  and  Stewart  is  identical  with  Kant's  ;  except  that  the  Ger- 
man philosopher,  in  holding  space  to  be  a  necessary  form  of  our  conceptions 
of  external  things,  prudently  declined  asserting  that  these  unknown  things 
are  in  themselves  extended.' — Reid,  p.  128. —  W. 

1  For  a  more  detailed  view  of  these  distinctions,  see  the  previous  chapter. 
—  W. 


296  PHILOSOPHY    OF   PEBCEFTION. 

belief  which  they  assumed  to  be  false.  But  this  they  did.  The 
Uosmothetic  Idealists  all  deny  the  validity  of  our  natural  belief 
in  our  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  external  things ;  but  we 
rind  the  majority  of  them,  at  the  same  time,  maintaining  that 
such  existence  must  be  admitted  on  the  authority  of  our  natural 
belief  of  its  reality.  And  yet  the  latter  belief  exists  only  in  and 
through  the  former ;  and  if  the  former  be  held  false,  it  is  there- 
fore, of  all  absurdities  the  greatest  to  view  the  latter  as  true. 
Thus  Descartes,  after  arguing  that  mankind  are  universally  de- 
luded in  their  conviction  that  they  have  any  immediate  knowl- 
edge of  aught  beyond  the  modifications  of  their  own  minds ; 
again  argues  that  the  existence  of  an  external  world  must  be 
admitted, — because  if  it  do  not  exist,  God  deceives,  in  impressing 
on  us  a  belief  in  its  reality  ;  but  God  is  no  deceiver  ;  therefore, 
<fec.  This  reasoning  is  either  good  for  nothing,  or  good  for  more 
than  Descartes  intended.  For,  on  the  one  hand,  if  God  be  no 
deceiver,  he  did  not  deceive  us  in  our  natural  belief  that  we 
know  something  more  than  the  mere  modes  of  self ;  but  then 
the  fundamental  position  of  the  Cartesian  philosophy  is  disproved : 
and  if,  on  the  other  hand,  this  position  be  admitted,  God  is  there- 
by confessed  to  be  a  deceiver,  who,  having  deluded  us  in  the 
belief  on  which  our  belief  of  an  external  world  is  founded,  cannot 
be  consistently  supposed  not  to  delude  us  in  this  belief  itself. 
Such  melancholy  reasoning  is,  however,  from  Descartes  to  Dr. 
Brown,  the  favorite  logic  by  which  the  Cosmothetic  Idealists  in 
general  attempt  to  resist  the  conclusion  of  the  Absolute  Idealists. 
But  on  this  ground  there  is  no  tenable  medium  between  Natural 
Realism  and  Absolute  Idealism. 

It  is  curious  to  notice  the  different  views  which  Berkeley  and 
Collier,  our  two  Absolute  Idealists,  and  which  Dr.  Samuel 
Clarke,  the  acutest  of  the  Hypothetical  Realists  with  whom  they 
both  came  in  contact,  took  of  this  principle. 

Clarke  was,  apparently,  too  sagacious  a  metaphysician  not  to 
see  that  the  proof  of  the  reality  of  an  external  world  reposed 
mainly  on  our  natural  belief  of  its  reality ;  and  at  the  same  time 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  297 

that  this  natural  belief  could  not  be  pleaded  in  favor  of  his 
hypothesis  by  the  Cosraothetic  Idealist.  He  was  himself  con- 
scious, that  his  philosophy  afforded  him  no  arms  against  the 
reasoning  of  the  Absolute  Idealists ;  whose  inference  he  was, 
however,  inclined  neither  to  admit,  nor  able  to  show  why  it 
should  not.  Whiston,  in  his  Memoirs,  speaking  of  Berkeley  and 
his  Idealism,  says  : — '  He  was  pleased  to  send  Dr.  Clarke  and 
myself,  each  of  us  a  book.  After  we  had  both  perused  it,  I  went 
to  Dr.  Clarke  and  discoursed  with  him  about  it  to  this  effect : — 
That  I,  being  not  a  metaphysician,  was  not  able  to  answer  Mr. 
Berkeley's  subtile  premises,  though  I  did  not  at  all  believe  his 
absurd  conclusion.  I,  therefore,  desired  that  he,  who  was  deep 
in  such  subtilties,  but  did  not  appear  to  believe  Mr.  Berkeley's 
conclusions,  would  answer  him  ;  which  task  he  declined.1  Many 
years  after  this,  as  we  are  told  in  the  Life  of  Bishop  Berkeley, 
prefixed  to  his  works  : — '  There  was,  at  Mr.  Addison's  instance,  a 
meeting  of  Drs.  Clarke  and  Berkeley  to  discuss  this  speculative 
point ;  and  great  hopes  were  entertained  from  the  conference. 
The  parties,  however,  separated  without  being  able  to  come  to 
any  agreement.  Dr.  Berkeley  declared  himself  not  well  satisfied 
with  the  conduct  of  his  antagonist  on  the  occasion,  icho,  though 
he  could  not  answer,  had  not  candor  enough  to  own  himself  con- 
vinced? 

Mr.  Benson  affords  us  a  curious  anecdote  to  the  same  effect  in 
a  letter  of  Collier  to  Clarke.  From  it  we  learn, — that  when 
Collier  originally  presented  his  Claris  to  the  Doctor,  through  a 
friend,  on  reading  the  title,  Clarke  good-humoredly  said  : — '  Poor 
gentleman  !  I  pity  him.  lie  would  be  a  philosopher,  but  has 
chosen  a  strange  task ;  for  he  can  neither  prove  his  point  him- 
self, nor  can  the  contrary  be  proved  against  him.' 

In  regard  f*o  the  two  Idealists  themselves,  each  dealt  with  this 
ground  of  argument  in  a  very  different  way ;  and  it  must  be 
confessed  that  in  this  respect  Collier  is  favorably  contrasted  with 
Berkeley. — Berkeley  attempts  to  enlist  the  natural  belief  of  man- 
kind in  his  favor  against  the  Hypothetical  Realism  of  the  philos- 

13* 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

ophers.  It  is  true,  that  natural  belief  is  opposed  to  scientific 
opinion.  Mankind  are  not,  however,  as  Berkeley  reports,  Ideal- 
ists. In  this  he  even  contradicts  himself;  for,  if  they  be,  in 
truth,  of  his  opinion,  why  does  he  dispute  so  anxiously,  so  learn- 
edly against  them  ? — Collier,  on  the  contrary,  consistently  rejects 
all  appeal  to  the  common  sense  of  mankind.  The  motto  of  his 
work,  from  Malebranche,  is  the  watchword  of  his  philosophy  : — 
'  Vulgi  assensus  et  approbatio  circa,  materiam  difficilem,  est  cer- 
ium argumentum  falsitatis  istius  opinionis  cut  assentitur?  And 
in  his  answer  to  the  Cartesian  argument  for  the  reality  of  matter, 
from  '  that  strong  and  natural  inclination  which  all  men  have  to 
believe  in  an  external  world  ;'  he  shrewdly  remarks  on  the.  incon- 
sistency of  such  a  reasoning  at  such  hands  : — '  Strange !  That 
a  person  of  Mr.  Descartes'  sagacity  should  be  found  in  so  plain 
and  palpable  an  oversight ;  and  that  the  late  ingenious  Mr.  Nor- 
ris  should  be  found  treading  in  the  same  track,  and  that  too  upon 
a  solemn  and  particular  disquisition  of  this  matter.  That  whilst 
on  the  one  hand,  they  contend  against  the  common  inclination 
or  prejudice  of  mankind,  that  the  visible  world  is  not  external, 
they  should  yet  appeal  to  the  same  common  inclination  for  the 
truth  or  being  of  an  external  world,  which  on  their  principles 
must  be  said  to  be  invisible ;  and  for  which,  therefore  (they  must 
needs  have  known  if  they  had  considered  it),  there  neither  is,  nor 
can  be,  any  kind  of  inclination.'  (P.  81.) 

2.) — In  the  second  place  it  was  very  generally  assumed  in 
antiquity,  and  during  the  middle  ages,  that  an  external  world 
was  a  supposition  necessary  to  render  possible  the  fact  of  our 
sensitive  cognition.  The  philosophers  who  held,  that  the  imme- 
diate object  of  perception  was  an  emanation  from  an  outer  real- 
ity, and  that  the  hypothesis  of  the  latter  was  requisite  to  account 
for  the  phenomenon  of  the  former, — their  theory  involved  the 
existence  of  an  external  world  as  its  condition.  But  from  the 
moment  that  the  necessity  of  this  condition  was  abandoned,  and 
this  was  done  by  many  even  of  the  scholastic  philosophers  ; — from 
the  moment  that  sensible  species  or  the  vicarious  objects  in  per- 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION.  299 

ception  were  admitted  to  be  derivable  from  other  sources  than 
the  external  objects  themselves,  as  from  God,  or  from  the  mind 
itself ;  from  that  moment  we  must  look  for  other  reasons  than 
the  preceding,  to  account  for  the  remarkable  fact,  that  it  was  not 
until  after  the  commencement  of  the  eighteenth  century  that  a 
doctrine  of  Absolute  Idealism  was,  without  communication,  con- 
temporaneously promulgated  by  Berkeley  and  Collier. 

3.) — In  explanation  of  this  fact,  we  must  refer  to  a  third 
ground,  which  has  been  wholly  overlooked  by  the  historians  of 
philosophy ;  but  which  it  is  necessary  to  take  into  account, 
would  we  explain  how  so  obvious  a  conclusion  as  the  negation  of 
the  existence  of  an  outer  world,  on  the  negation  of  our  immediate 
knowledge  of  its  existence,  should  not  have  been  drawn  by  so 
acute  a  race  of  speculators  as  the  philosophers  of  the  middle 
ages,  to  say  nothing  of  the  great  philosophers  of  a  more  recent 
epoch.  This  ground  is  : — That  the  doctrine  of  Idealism  is  in- 
compatible with  the  Catholic  doctrine  of  the  Eucharist.  It  is  a 
very  erroneous  statement  of  Reid,  in  which,  however  he  errs 
only  in  common  with  other  philosophers,  that  '  during  the 
reign  of  the  Peripatetic  doctrine,  we  find  no  appearance  of  skepti- 
cism about  the  existence  of  matter.'  On  the  contrary,  during  the 
dominance  of  the  scholastic  philosophy,  we  find  that  the  possibil- 
ity of  the  non-existence  of  matter  was  contemplated  ;  nay,  that 
the  reasons  in  support  of  this  supposition  were  expounded,  in  all 
their  cogency.  We  do  not,  however,  find  the  conclusion  founded 
on  these  reasons  formally  professed.  And  why  ?  Because  this 
conclusion,  though  philosophically  proved,  was  theologically  dis- 
proved ;  and  such  disproof  was  during  the  middle  ages  sufficient 
to  prevent  the  overt  recognition  of  any  speculative  doctrine  ;  foi 
with  all  its  ingenuity  and  boldness,  philosophy  during  these  ages 
was  confessedly  in  the  service  of  the  church, — it  was  always  Phi- 
losophia  ancillans  Theologian.  And  this  because  the  service  was 
voluntary  ; — a  thraldom  indeed  of  love.  Now,  if  the  reality  of 
matter  were  denied,  there  would,  in  genera!,  be  denied  the  reality 
of  Christ's  incarnation  ;  and  in  particular  the  tmnsubstantiatirm 


300  PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION. 

into  his  body  of  the  elements  of  bread  and  wine.  There  were  other 
theological  reasons  indeed,  and  these  not  without  their  weight ; 
but  this  was,  perhaps,  the  only  one  insuperable  to  a  Catholic. 

We  find  the  influence  of  this  reason  at  work  in  very  ancient 
times.  It  was  employed  by  the  earlier  Fathers,  and  more  espe- 
cially in  opposition  to  Marcion's  doctrine  of  the  merely  phenome- 
nal incarnation  of  our  Saviour. — '  Non  licet'  (says  Tertullian  in 
his  book  De  Anima,  speaking  of  the  evidence  of  sense) — '  non 
licet  nobis  in  dubium  sensus  istus  revocare,  ne  et  in  Christo  de 
fide  eorum  deliberetur :  ne  forte  dicatur,  quod  falso  Satanam 
prospectarit  de  caelo  praecipitatum  ;  aut  falso  vocem  Patris  audi- 
erit  de  ipso  testificatam  ;  aut  deceptus  sit  cum  Petri  socrum 

tetegit Sic  et  Marcion  phantasma  eum  maluit  credere, 

totius  corporis  in  illo  dedignatus  veritatem.'  (Cap.  xvii.)  And 
in  his  book,  Adversus  Marcionem : — '  Ideo  Christus  non  erat 
quod  videbatur,  et  quod  erat  mentiebatur  ;  caro,  nee  caro ;  homo, 
nee  homo :  proinde  Deus  Christus,  nee  Deus ;  cur  enim  non 
etiam  Dei  phantasma  portaverit  ?  An  credam  ei  de  interiore 
substantia,  qui  sit  de  exteriore  frustratus  ?  Quomodo  verax  habe- 
bitur  in  occulto,  tarn  fallax  repertus  in  aperto?  .  .  .  Jam  nunc 
quum  mendacium  deprehenditur  Christus  caro  ;  sequitur  ut  om- 
nia  quae  per  carnem  Christi  gesta  sunt,  mendacio  gesta  sint, — 
congressus,  contactus,  convictus,  ipsas  quoque  virtutes.  Si  enim 
tangendo  aliquem,  liberavit  a  vitio,  non  potest  vere  actum  credi, 
sine  corporis  ipsius  veritate.  Nihil  solid um  ab  inani,  nihil  ple- 
num a  vacuo  perfici  licet.  Putativus  habitus,  putativus  actus ; 
imaginarius  operator,  imaginariae  operas.'  (Lib.  iii.  c.  8.) — In 
like  manner,  St.  Augustin,  among  many  other  passages  : — '  Si 
phantasma  fuit  corpus  Christi,  fefellit  Christus ;  et  si  fefellit,  veri- 
tas  non  est.  Est  autem  veritas  Christus  ;  non  igitur  phantasma 
fuit  corpus  ejus.'  (lAber  De  Ixxxiii.  Quoestionibus,  qu.  14.) — 
And  so  many  others. 

The  repugnancy  of  the  Catholic  dogma  of  transubstantiation 
with  the  surrender  of  a  substantial  prototype  of  the  species  pre- 
sented to  our  sensible  perceptions,  was,  however,  more  fully  and 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    PERCEPTION.  301 

precisely  signalized  by  the  Schoolmen  ;  as  may  be  seen  in  the 
polemic  waged  principally  on  the  great  arena  of  scholastic  sub- 
tilty — the  commentaries  on  the  four  books  of  the  Sentences  of 
Peter  Lombard.  In  their  commentaries  on  the  first  book,  espe- 
cially, will  be  found  abundant  speculation  of  an  idealistic  tend- 
ency. The  question  is  almost  regularly  mooted : — May  not 
God  preserve  the  species  (the  ideas  of  a  more  modern  philosophy) 
before  the  mind,  the  external  reality  represented  being  destroyed  ? 
— May  not  God,  in  fact,  object  to  the  sense  the  species  represent- 
ing an  external  world,  that  ivorld,  in  reality,  not  existing  ?  To 
these  questions  the  answer  is,  always  in  the  first  instance,  affirm- 
ative. Why  then,  the  possibility,  the  probability  even,  being  ad- 
mitted, was  the  fact  denied  ?  Philosophically  orthodox,  it  was 
theologically  heretical ;  and  their  principal  argument  for  the 
rejection  is,  that  on  such  hypothesis,  the  doctrine  of  a  transub- 
stantiated eucharist  becomes  untenable.  A  change  is  not, — can- 
not be, — (spiritually)  real. 

Such  was  the  special  reason,  why  many  of  the  acuter  School- 
men did  not  follow  out  their  general  argument,  to  the  express 
negation  of  matter  ;  and  such  also  was  the  only  reason,  to  say 
nothing  of  other  Cartesians,  why  Malebranche  deformed  the  sim- 
plicity of  his  peculiar  theory  with  such  an  assumptive  hors  d'oeuvre, 
as  an  unknown  and  otiose  universe  of  matter.  It  is,  indeed,  but 
justice  to  that  great  philosopher  to  say, — that  if  the  incumbrance 
with  which,  as  a  Catholic,  he  was  obliged  to  burden  it,  be  thrown 
off  his  theory,  that  theory  becomes  one  of  Absolute  Idealism  ; 
and  that,  in  fact,  all  the  principal  arguments  in  support  of  such 
a  scheme  are  found  fully  developed  in  his  immortal  Inquiry  after 
Truth.  This  Malebranche  well  knew ;  and  knowing  it,  we  can 
easily  understand,  how  Berkeley's  interview  with  him  ended  as 
it  did.* 

*  [I  cannot,  however,  concur  in  the  praise  of  novelty  and  invention,  which 
has  always  been  conceded  to  the  central  theory  of  Malebranche.  His '  Vision 
of  all  things  in  the  Deity,'1  is,  as  it  appears  to  me,  simply  a  transference  to 
man  in  the  flesh,  to  the  Viator,  of  that  mode  of  cognition,  maintained  by 


302  PHILOSOPHY    OF   PEBCEPTION. 

Malebranche  thus  left  little  for  his  Protestant  successors  to  do. 
They  had  only  to  omit  the  Catholic1  excrescence ;  the  reasons 
vindicating  this  omission  they  found  collected  and  marshalled  to 
their  hand.  That  Idealism  was  the  legitimate  issue  of  the  Male- 
branchian  doctrine,  was  at  once  seen  by  those  competent  to  meta- 
physical reasoning.  This  was  signalized,  in  general,  by  Bayle, 
and,  what  has  not  been  hitherto  noticed,  by  Locke.*  It  was, 

many  of  the  older  Catholic  divines,an  explanation  of  how  the  saints,  as  dis- 
embodied spirits,  can  be  aware  of  human  invocations,  and,  in  general,  of 
what  passes  upon  earth.  'They  perceive?  it  is  said,  'all  things  in  God.1 
So  that,  in  truth,  the  philosophical  theory  of  Malebranche  is  nothing  but  the 
extension  of  a  theological  hypothesis,  long  common  in  the  schools ;  and  with 
scholastic  speculations,  Malobranche  was  even  intimately  acquainted.  This 
Hypothesis  I  liad  once  occasion  to  express : 

1  Quidquid,  in  his  tenelris  rite,  carne  latebat, 
Nunc  leg'u  in  magno  cuncto,  beate,  DeoS] 

1 '  They  (the  Catholics)  admit  that  physically  the  bread  and  wine  are  bread 
and  wine ;  and  only  contend  that  hypervhyticaUy  in  a  spiritual,  mysterious, 
and  inconceivable  sense,  they  are  really  flesh  and  blood.  Those,  therefore, 
who  think  of  disproving  the  doctrine  of  transubstantiation,  by  proving  that 
in  the  eucharist  bread  and  wine  remain  physically  bread  and  wine,  are  guilty 
of  the  idle  sophism  called  mutatio  elenchi."1 — Reid,  p.  518. —  W. 

*  Compare  Locke's  Examination  of  P.  MalebranchJs  Opinion  (§  20). 

When  on  this  subject,  we  may  clear  up  a  point  connected  therewith,  of 
some  interest,  in  relation  to  Locke  and  fiewton,  and  which  has  engaged  the 
attention  of  Dr.  Reid  and  Mr.  Dugald  Stewart. 

Jteid,  who  has  overlooked  the  passage  of  Locke  just  referred  to,  says,  in 
deducing  the  history  of  the  Berkeleian  Idealism,  and  after  speaking  of  Male- 
branche's  opinion : — '  It  may  seem  strange  that  Locke,  who  wrote  so  much 
about  ideas,  should  not  see  those  consequences  which  Berkeley  thought  so 
obviously  deducible  from  that  doctrine.  .  .  .  There  is,  indeed  a  single 
passage  in  Locke's  essay,  which  may  lead  one  to  conjecture  that  he  had  a 
glimpse  of  that  system  which  Berkeley  afterwards  advanced,  but  thought 
proper  to  suppress  it  within  his  own  breast.  The  passage  is  in  Book  IV.  c. 
10,  where,  having  proved  the  existence  of  an  eternal,  intelligent  mind,  he 
comes  to  answer  those  who  conceive  that  matter  also  must  be  eternal, 
because  we  cannot  conceive  how  it  could  be  made  out  of  nothing ;  and, 
having  observed  that  the  creation  of  mind  requires  no  less  power  than  the 
creation  of  matter,  he  adds  what  follows : — "  Nay,  possibly,  if  we  could 
emancipate  ourselves  from  vulgar  notions,  and  raise  our  thoughts,  as  far  as 
they  would  reach,  to  a  closer  contemplation  of  things,  we  might  be  able  to 
aim  at  some  dim  and  seeming  conception,  how  matter  might  at  first  be  made 
and  begin  to  exist,  by  the  power  of  that  eternal  first  Being ;  but  to  give 
beginning  and  being  to  a  spirit,  would  be  found  a  more  inconceivable  effect 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  303 

therefore,  but  little  creditable  to  the  acuteness  of  Norris,  that  he, 
a  Protestant,  should  have  adopted  the  Malebranchian  hypothe- 
sis, without  rejecting  its  Catholic  incumbrance.  The  honor  of 


of  omnipotent  power.  But  this  being  what  would,  perhaps,  lead  us  too  far 
from  the  notions  on  which  the  philosophy  now  in  the  world  is  built,  it  would 
not  be  pardonable  to  deviate  so  far  from  them,  or  to  inquire,  so  far  as  gram- 
mar itself  would  authorize,  if  the  common  settled  opinion  oppose  it ;  espe- 
cially in  this  place,  where  the  received  doctrine  serves  well  enough  to  our 
present  purpose." '  Reid  then  goes  on  at  considerable  length  to  show  that 
'  every  particular  Mr.  Locke  has  hinted  with  regard  to  that  system  which  he 
had  in  his  mind,  but  thought  it  prudent  to  suppress,  tallies  exactly  with  the 
system  of  Berkeley.'  (Intellectual  Powers,  Ess.  II.  ch.  10.) 

Stewart  does  not  coincide  with  Reid.  In  quoting  the  same  passage  of 
Locke,  he  says  of  it,  that  '  when  considered  in  connection  with  some  others 
in  his  writings,  it  would  almost  tempt  one  to  think  that  a  theory  concerning 
matter,  somewhat  analogous  to  that  of  Boscovich,  had  occasionally  passed 
through  his  mind ;'  and  then  adduces  various  reasons  in  support  of  this 
opinion,  and  in  opposition  to  Reid's.  (Philosophical  Essays,  Ess.  II.  ch.  1, 
p.  63.) 

The  whole  arcanum  in  the  passage  in  question  is,  however,  revealed  by 
M.  Coste,  the  French  translator  of  the  Essay,  and  of  several  other  of  the 
works  of  Locke,  with  whom,  the  philosopher  lined  in  the  same  family,  and  on 
the  most  intimate  terms,  for  the  last  seven  years  of  his  life  ;  and  who,  though 
lie  has  never  been  consulted,  affords  often  the  most  important  information  in 
regard  to  Locke's  opinions.  To  this  passage  there  is  in  the  fourth  edition  of 
Coste's  translation,  a  very  curious  note  appended,  of  which  the  following  is 
an  abstract.  '  Ilere  Mr.  Locke  excites  our  curiosity  without  being  inclined 
to  satisfy  it.  Many  persons  having  imagined  that  he  had  communicated  to 
me  this  mode  of  explaining  the  creation  of  matter,  requested,  when  my  trans- 
lation first  appeared,  that  I  would  inform  them  what  it  was ;  but  I  was 
obliged  to  confess,  that  Mr.  Locke  had  not  made  even  me  a  partner  in  the 
secret.  At  length,  long  after  his  death,  Sir  Isaac  Newton,  to  whom  I  was 
accidentally  speaking  of  this  part  of  Mr.  Locke's  book,  discovered  to  me  the 
whole  mystery.  He  told  me,  smiling,  that  it  was  he  himself  who  had  imagined 
this  manner  of  explaining  the  creation  of  matter,  and  that  the  thought  had 
struck  him,  one  day,  when  this  question  chanced  to  turn  up  in  a  conversa- 
tion between  himself,  Mr.  Locke,  and  the  late  Earl  of  Pembroke.  The  fol- 
lowing is  the  way  in  which  he  explained  to  them  his  thought: — "  We  may  be 
enabled1'1  (he  said)  "to  form  some  rude  conception  of  the  creation  of  matter,  if 
we  suppose  that  God  by  his  power  had  prevented  the  entrance  of  any  thing  into 
a  certain  portion  of  pure  space,  which  is  of  its  nature  penetrable,  eternal,  neces- 
sary, infinite  ;  for  henceforward  this  portwn  of  space  would  be  endowed  with 
impenetrability  ;  one  of  the  essential  qualities  of  matter  ;  and  as  pure  space  i-s 
absolutely  uniform,  we  have  only  again  to  suppose  that  God  communicated  the 
same  impenetrability  to  another  portion  of  space,  and  we  should  then  obtain  in 
a  certain  sort  the  notion  of  the  mobility  of  matter,  another  quality  which  i-s  also 


304  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

first  promulgating  an  articulate  scheme  of  absolute  idealism  was 
thus  left  Co  Berkeley  and  Collier  ;  and  though  both  are  indebted 
to  Malebranche  for  the  principal  arguments  they  adduce,  each  is 
also  entitled  to  the  credit  of  having  applied  them  with  an  inge- 
nuity peculiar  to  himself. 

It  is  likewise  to  the  credit  of  Collier's  sagacity,  that  he  has 
noticed  (and  he  is  the  only  modern  philosopher,  we  have  found, 
to  have  anticipated  our  observation)  the  incompatibility  of  the 
Catholic  doctrine  of  the  Eucharist  with  the  non-existence  of  mat- 
ter. In  the  concluding  chapter  of  his  work,  in  which  he  speaks 
'  of  the  use  and  consequences  of  the  foregoing  treatise,'  he  enu- 
merates as  one  '  particular  usefulness  with  respect  to  religion,'  the 
refutation  it  affords  of  '  the  real  presence  of  Christ's  body  in  the 
Eucharist  in  which  the  Papists  have  grafted  the  doctrine  of  tran- 
substantiation.'  He  says : 

'  Now  nothing  can  bo  more  evident,  than  that  both  the  sound  and  ex- 
plication of  this  important  doctrine  are  founded  altogether  on  the  suppo- 
sition of  external  matter ;  so  that,  if  this  be  removed,  there  is  not  any 
thing  left  whereon  to  build  so  much  as  the  appearance  of  a  question. — 
For  if,  after  this,  it  bo  inquired  whether  the  substance  of  the  bread  in  this  sac- 
rament, be  not  changed  into  the  substance  of  the  "body  of  Christ,  the  accidents 
or  sensible  appearances  remaining  as  before ;  or  suppose  this  should  be 
affirmed  to  be  the  fact,  or  at  least  possible,  it  may  indeed  be  shown  to 
be  untrue  or  impossible,  on  the  supposition  of  an  external  world,  from 
certain  consequential  absurdities  which  attend  it ;  but  to  remove  an  external 
world,  is  to  prick- it  in  its  punctum  saliens,  or  quench  its  very  -vital  flame.  For 
if  there  is  no  external  matter,  the  very  distinction  is  lost  between  the 
substance  and  accidents,  or  sensible  species  of  bodies,  and  these  last  will 
become  the  sole  essence  of  material  objects.  So  that,  if  these  arc  supposed 
to  remain  as  before,  there  is  no  possible  room  for  the  supposal  of  any 
change,  in  that  the  thing  supposed  to  be  changed,  is  here  shown  to  be  nothing 
at  all.'  (P.  95.) 


very  essential  to  it."  Thus,  then,  we  are  relieved  of  the  embarrassment  of 
endeavoring  to  discover  what  it  was  that  Mr.  Locke  had  deemed  it  advisable 
to  conceal  from  his  readers  :  for  the  above  is  all  that  gave  him  occasion  to 
tell  us — "  if  we  would  raise  our  thoughts  as  far  as  they  could  reach,  we  might 
be  able  to  aim  at  some  dim  and  seeming  conception  how  matter  might  at 
first  be  made," '  &c. — This  suffices  to  show  what  was  the  general  purport  of 
Locke's  expressions,  and  that  Mr.  Stewart's  conjecture  is  at  least  nearer  to 
the  truth  than  Dr.  Reid's. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    PERCEPTION.  305 

But  we  must  conclude. — What  has  now  been  said  in  reference 
to  a  part  of  its  contents,  may  perhaps  contribute  to  attract  the 
attention  of  those  interested  in  the  higher  philosophy,  to  this  very 
curious  volume.  We  need  hardly  add,  that  Mr  Benson's  Memoirs 
of  Collier  should  be  bound  up  along  with  it. 


CHAPTER  V. 

DISTINCTION  OF  THE  PRIMARY  AND  SECONDARY  QUALITIES 
OF  BODY.1 

THE  developed  doctrine  of  Real  Presentationism,  the  basis  of 
Natural  Realism,  asserts  the  consciousness  or  immediate  perception 
of  certain  essential  attributes  of  matter  objectively  existing ;  while 
it  admits  that  other  properties  of  body  are  unknown  in  them- 
selves, and  only  inferred  as  causes  to  account  for  certain  subject- 
ive affections  of  which  we  are  cognizant  in  ourselves.  This  dis- 
crimination, which  to  other  systems  is  contingent,  superficial,  ex- 
traneous, but  to  Natural  Realism  necessary,  radical,  intrinsic,  co- 
incides with  what,  since  the  time  of  Locke,  has  been  generally 
known  as  the  distinction  of  the  Qualities  of  Matter  or  Body,  using 
these  terms  as  convertible  into  Primary  and  Secondary. 

Of  this  celebrated  analysis,  I  shall  here,  in  the  first  place,  at- 
tempt an  historical  survey  ;  and  in  the  second,  endeavor  to  place 
it  on  its  proper  footing  by  a  critical  analysis  ;  without  however 
in  either  respect  proposing  more  than  a  contribution  towards  a 
more  full  and  regular  discussion  of  it  in  both. 

§  I. — DISTINCTION  OF  THE  PRIMARY    AND    SECONDARY  QUALI- 
TIES   OF   BODY    CONSIDERED    HISTORICALLY. 

In  regard  to  its  History1 — this,  as  hitherto  attempted,  is  at 
once  extremely  erroneous,  if  History  may  be  called  the  incidental 


1  This  is  the  fourth  supplementary  Dissertation  in  Hamilton's  Reid. —  W. 

*  Sir  William  ia  exploring  a  new  tract  in  the  history  of  philosophy.  No 
one  has  preceded  him  in  this  research,  and  if  he  has  not  completed  the  his- 
tory of  the  distinction  of  the  Primary  and  Secondary  Qualities  of  Body,  he 
has  given  us,  with  accurate  criticism,  the  opinions  of  those  most  worthy  of 
being  consulted.  No  one,  from  Brucker  to  the  present  time,  lias  traced  the 
history  of  particular  opinions  with  such  affluent  and  unerring  erudition,  as 
that  of  Hamilton.  In  this  respect,  he  stands  unrivalled  and  alone.  We 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION.  307 

notices  in  regard  to  it  of  an  historical  import,  which  are  occasion- 
ally to  be  met  with  in  philosophical  treatises. — Among  the  most 
important  of  those,  are  those  furnished  by  Reid  himself,  and  by 
M.  Royer-Collard. 

The  distinction  of  the  real  and  the  apparent,  of  the  absolute 
and  the  relative,  or  of  the  objective  and  the  subjective  qualities  of 
perceived  bodies  is  of  so  obtrusive  a  character,  that  it  was  taken 
almost  at  the  origin  of  speculation,  and  can  be  shown  to  have 
commanded  the  assent  even  of  those  philosophers  by  whom  it  is 
now  commonly  believed  to  have  been  again  formally  rejected. 
For  in  this,  as  in  many  other  cases,  it  will  be  found  that  while 
philosophers  appear  to  differ,  they  are,  in  reality,  at  one. 

1. — LEUCIPPUS  and  DEMOCRITUS  are  the  first  on  record  by 
whom  the  observation  was  enounced,  that  the  Sweet,  the  Bitter, 
the  Cold,  the  Hot,  the  Colored,  &c.,  are  wholly  different,  in  their 
absolute  nature,  from  the  character  in  which  they  come  manifested 
to  us.  In  the  latter  case,  these  qualities  have  no  real  or  inde- 
pendent existence  (ou  xcc<rct  dX^siav).  The  only  existence  they 
can  pretend  to,  is  merely  one  phenomenal  in  us  ;  and  this  in  vir- 
tue of  a  law  or  relation  (vofxw),  established  between  the  existing 
body  and  the  percipient  mind ;  while  all  that  can  be  denomina- 
ted Quality  in  the  external  reality,  is  only  some  modification  of 
Quantity,  some  particular  configuration,  position,  or  co-arrange- 
ment of  Atoms,  in  conjunction  with  the  Inane.  (Aristoteles,  Me- 
taph.,  L.  i.  c.  4 — Phys.  Ausc.,  L.  i.  c.  5 — De  Anima,  L.  iii.  c.  1 — 
De  Sensu  et  Sensili,  c.  4 — De  Gen.  et  Corr.,  L.  i.  cc.  2,  7,  8  ; — 
Theophrastus,  De  Sensu,  §§  63,  65,  67,  69,  73,  ed.  Schneid.  ;-- 
Sextus  Empiricus,  adv.  Math.,  vii.  §  135 — Hypot.  i.  §  213  ; — 
Galenus,  De  Elem.,  L.  i.  c.  2, ; — Laertius,  L.  ix.  seg.  44  ; — Plu- 
tarchus,  adv.  Colot,,  p.  1110,  ed.  Xyl. ; — Simplicius,  in  Phys. 


hope  that  many  will  follow  his  example,  who,  each  working  in  a  separate 
field,  will  at  length  complete  the  history — not  of  philosophers,  hot  of  men, 
not  of  systems  even,  but  of  the  human  mind  itself,  in  the  various  forms  of 
its  manifestation. —  W. 


308  PHILOSOPHY    OF    I'KUCKITION. 

Ausc,,  if.  7,  10,  106,  119,  ed.  Aid.; — Pkiloponus,  De  Gen.  et 
Oorr.,  f.  32,  ed  Aid.) 

2,  3. — This  observation  was  not  lost  on  PROTAGORAS  or  on 
PLATO.  The  former  on  this  ground  endeavored  to  establish  the 
absolute  relativity  of  all  human  knowledge ;  the  latter  the  abso- 
lute relativity  of  our  sensible  perceptions.  (Theaetetus,  passim.) 

4. — By  the  CYREN^AN  philosophers  the  distinction  was 
likewise  adopted  and  applied.  (Cic.  Qu.  Acad.,  iv.  c.  24.) 

5. — With  other  doctrines  of  the  older  Atomists  it  was  trans- 
planted into  his  system  by  EPICURUS.  (Epist.  ad  Herod,  apud 
Laert.,  L.  x.  seg.  54  ;  Lucret.,  L.  ii.  v.  729 — 1021.) 

6. — In  regard  to  ARISTOTLE,  it  is  requisite  to  be  somewhat 
more  explicit.  This  philosopher  might  seem,  at  first  sight,  to 
have  rejected  the  distinction  (De  Anima,  L.  iii.  c.  i.) ;  and  among 
many  others,  Reid  has  asserted  that  Aristotle  again  ignored  the 
discrimination,  which  had  been  thus  recognized  by  his  predeces- 
sors. (Inq.,  123  a,  I.  P.  313  b.)  Nothing,  however,  can  be  more 
erroneous  than  the  accredited  doctrine  upon  this  point.  Aris- 
totle does  not  abolish  the  distinction ; — nay,  I  am  confident  of 
showing,  that  to  whatever  merit  modem  philosophers  may  pre- 
tend in  this  analysis,  all  and  each  of  their  observations  are  to  t»e 
found,  clearly  stated,  in  the  writings  of  the  Stagirite. 

In  the  first  place,  no  philosopher  has  discriminated  with 
greater,  perhaps  none  with  equal,  precision,  the  difference  of  cor- 
poreal qualities  considered  objectively  and  subjectively.  These  re- 
lations he  has  not  only  contrasted,  but  has  assigned  to  them  dis- 
tinctive appellations.  In  his  Categories  (c.  viii.  §  10,  Pachian 
division,  by  which,  as  that  usually  adopted,  I  uniformly  quote), 
speaking  of  Quality,  he  says  : — '  A  third  kind  of  Quality  [Such- 
ness]  is  made  up  of  the  Affective  Qualities  and  Affections  (•jrotdrjTi- 
xeu  tfoioTTjTes,  -jra^rj).  Of  this  class  are  Sweetness,  Bitterness, 
Sourness,  and  the  like,  also  Heat  and  Cold,  Whiteness  and  Black- 
ness, <fec.  That  these  are  qualities  [suchnesses]  is  manifest.  For 
the  subjects  in  which  they  are  received,  are  said  to  be  such  and 
such  by  relation  to  them.  Thus  honey  is  called  sweet,  as  recipi- 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    PERCEPTION.  309 

ent  of  sweetness,  body,  white,  as  recipient  of  whiteness,  and  so  of 
the  rest.  They  are  called  affective  [i.  e.  causing  passion  or  affec- 
tion*] not  because  the  things  to  which  these  qualities  belong, 
have  been  themselves  affected  in  any  way  (for  it  is  not  because 
honey,  or  the  like,  has  been  somehow  affected  that  it  is  called 
sweet,  and  in  like  manner  heat  and  cold  are  not  called  affective 
qualities  because  the  bodies  in  which  they  inhere  have  undergone 
any  affection) ;  but  they  are  called  affective,  because  each  of  the 


*  The  active-potential  term  7ra0i7r«r<5j,  primarily  and  properly  denotes  that 
which  can  in  itself  suffer  or  be  affected ;  it  is  here  employed  in  a  secondary 
and  abusive  sense  (for  -ndex**  is  intransitive),  but  which  subsequently  became 
the  more  prevalent — to  signify  that  which  can  cause  suffering  or  affection  in 
something  else.  The  counter  passive-potential  form,  jra0/?T<5j,  is  not,  I  venture 
to  assert,  ever  used  by  Aristotle,  though  quoted  from  him,  and  from  this 
very  treatise,  by  all  the  principal  lexicographers  for  the  last  three  centuries ; 
nay,  I  make  further  bold  to  say,  there  is  no  authority  for  it  (Menander's  is 
naught),  until  long  subsequently  to  the  age  of  the  Stagirite.  [The  error,  I 
suspect,  originated  thus: — Tusanus,  in  his  Lexicon  (1552),  says,  under  the 
word — '  Vide  Fabrum  Stapulensem  apud  Aristotelem  in  Prsedicamentis ;' 
meaning,  it  is  probable  (for  I  have  not  the  book  at  hand),  to  send  us  to 
Faber's  Introduction  to  the  Categories,  for  some  observations  on  the  term. 
The  Lexicon  Septemvirale  (1563),  copying  Tusanus,  omits  Faber,  and  simply 
refers  '  Aristoteli,  in  Prsedicamentis,'  as  to  an  authority  for  the  word ;  and 
this  error,  propagated  through  Stephanus,  Constantino,  Scapula,  and  subse- 
quent compilers,  stands  unconnected  to  the  present  day.]  But  this  term, 
even  were  it  of  Aristotelic  usage,  could  not,  without  violence,  have  been 
twisted  to  denote,  in  conjunction  with  noidrris ,  what  the  philosopher  less 
equivocally,  if  less  symmetrically,  expresses  by  rrdQos,  affection.  Patibilis, 
like  most  Latin  verbals  of  its  class,  indiscriminately  renders  the  two  poten- 
tials, active  and  passive,  which  the  Greek  tongue  alone  so  admirably  contra- 
distinguishes. But,  in  any  way,  the  word  is  incompetent  to  Aristotle's 
meaning,  in  the  sense  of  affective.  For  it  only  signifies  either  that  which 
can  suffer,  or  that  which  can  be  suffered ;  and  there  is  not,  I  am  confident,  a 
single  ancient  authority  to  be  found  for  it,,  in  the  sense  of  that  which  can 
came  to  suffer,— the  sense  to  which  it  is  contorted  by  the  modern  Latin  Aris- 
totelians. But  they  had  their  excuse — necessity;  for  the  terms  passivus, 
used  in  the  '  Categorise  Decem'  attributed  to  St.  Augustine,  and  passibiUs, 
employed  by  Boethius  in  his  version  of  the  present  passage,  are  even  worse. 
The  words  affective  and  affection,  render  the  Greek  adjective  and  substantive 
tolerably  well. 

This  distinction  by  Aristotle  is  very  commonly  misunderstood.  It  is  even 
reversed  by  Gassendi ;  but  with  him,  of  course,  only  from  inadvertence. 
Phys.  Sect.  i.  Lib.  vi.  c.  1. 


310  PHILOSOPHY    OF    PERCEPTION. 

foresaid  qualities  has  the  power  of  causing  an  affection  in  the 
sense.  For  sweetness  determines  a  certain  affection  in  tasting, 
heat  in  touching,  and  in  like  manner  the  others.' 

Nothing  can  be  juster  than  this  distinction,  and  it  is  only  to  be 
regretted  that  he  should  have  detracted  from  the  precision  of  the 
language  in  which  it  is  expressed  by  not  restricting  the  correlative 
terms,  Affective  Qualities  and  Affections,  to  the  discrimination  in 
question  alone.  In  this  particular  observation,  it  is  proper  to 
notice,  Aristotle  had  in  view  the  secondary  qualities  of  our  mod- 
ern philosophy  exclusively.  It  suffices,  however,  to  show  that  no 
philosopher  had  a  clearer  insight  into  the  contrast  of  such  quali- 
ties, as  they  are,  and  as  they  are  perceived  ;  and,  were  other  proof 
awanting,  it  might  also  of  itself  exonerate  him  from  any  share  in 
the  perversion  made  by  the  later  Peripatetics  of  his  philosophy, 
in  their  doctrine  of  Substantial  Forms ; — a  doctrine  which,  as 
Reid  (I.  P.  316)  rightly  observes,  is  inconsistent  with  the  distinc- 
tion in  question  as  taken  by  the  Atomic  philosophers,  but  which 
in  truth  is  not  less  inconsistent  with  that  here  established  by  Aris- 
totle himself.*  It  may  be  here  likewise  observed  that  Andronicus, 


*  The  theory  of  what  are  called  Substantial  Forms,  that  is,  qualities 
viewed  as  entities  conjoined  with,  and  not  as  mere  dispositions  or  modifica- 
tions of  matter,  was  devised  by  the  perverse  ingenuity  of  the  Arabian  phi- 
losophers and  physicians.  Adopted  from  them,  it  was  long  a  prevalent  doc- 
trine in  the  Western  schools,  among  the  followers  of  Aristotle  and  Galen  ; 
to  either  of  whom  it  is  a  gross  injustice  to  attribute  this  opinion.  It  was  the 
ambiguity  of  the  word  oiiaia,  by  which  the  Greeks  express  what  is  denoted 
(to  say  nothing  of  Arabic)  by  both  the  Latin  terms  essentia  and  substantia, 
that  allowed  of,  and  principally  occasioned  the  misinterpretation. 

I  may  likewise  notice,  by  the  way,  that  Aristotle's  doctrine  of  the  assimi- 
lation, in  the  sensitive  process,  of  that  which  perceives  with  that  which  is 
perceived,  may  reasonably  be  explained  to  mean,  that  the  object  and  subject 
are  then  so  brought  into  mutual  relation,  as,  by  their  coefficient  energy,  to 
constitute  an  act  of  cognition  one  and  indivisible,  and  in  which  the  reality  is 
to  us  as  we  perceive  it  to  be.  This  is  a  far  easier,  and  a  far  more  consistent 
interpretation  of  his  words  than  the  monstrous  doctrine  of  intentional  forms 
or  species; — a  doctrine  founded  on  one  or  two  vague  or  metaphorical  expres- 
sions, and  for  which  the  general  analogy  of  his  philosophy  required  a  very 
different  meaning.  For  example,  when  Aristotle  (Do  Anima,  iii.  1),  in 
showing  that  an  objection  was  incompetent,  even  on  ite  own  hypothesis, 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION.  311 

as  quoted  by  Simplicius  (Categ.  f.  55  ed.  Velsii),  explicitly  states, 
that  the  Affective  Qualities  are,  in  strict  propriety,  not  qualities 
but  powers  (Q-J  ifoia,  dXXex,  croi^Tixa).  Aristotle  himself,  indeed, 
accords  to  these  apart  from  perception,  only  a  potential  existence ; 
and  the  Peripatetics  in  general  held  them  to  be,  in  their  language 
not  #a0/]<nx<2£,  formally,  subjectively,  but  JvS£yijrixw£,  virtually, 
eminently,  in  the  external  object.  Locke  has  thus  no  title  what- 
ever to  the  honor  generally  accorded  to  him  of  first  promulgating 
the  observation,  that  the  secondary  qualities,  as  in  the  object,  are 
not  so  much  qualities  as  poioers.  This  observation  was,  however, 
only  borrowed  by  Locke  from  the  Cartesians.  But  of  this  here- 
after. 

In  the  second  place,  Aristotle  likewise  notices  the  ambiguity 
which  arises  from  languages  not  always  affording  different  terms 
by  which  to  distinguish  the  potential  from  the  actual,  and  the 
objective  from  the  subjective  phases,  in  our  perception  by  the  dif- 
ferent senses.  Thus,  he  observes  (De  Anima,  L.  iii.  c.  1)  that, 
'  Though  the  actuality  or  energy  of  the  object  of  sense  and  of  the 
sense  itself  be  one  and  indivisible,  the  nature,  the  essence,  of  the 
energy  is,  however,  not  the  same  in  each  ;  as,  for  example,  sound 
in  energy,  and  hearing  in  energy.  For  it  may  happen,  that  what 
has  the  power  of  hearing  does  not  now  hear,  and  that  what  has 
the  power  of  sounding  does  not  always  sound.  But  when  what 
has  the  faculty  of  hearing,  on  the  one  hand,  operates,  and  what 


dialectically  admits — '  that  what  sees  color  is,  in  a  certain  sort,  itself  colored ;' 
— is  this  more  than  a  qualified  statement  of  what  modern  philosophers  have 
so  often,  far  less  guardedly,  asserted — that  color  is  not  to  be  considered 
merely  as  an  attribute  of  body,  since,  in  a  certain  respect,  it  is  an  affection  of 
mind  ?  And  when  he  immediately  subjoins  the  reason — '  for  each  organ  of 
sense  is  receptive  of  its  appropriate  object,'  or,  as  he  elsewhere  expresses  it, 
'  receptive  of  the  form  without  the  matter ;'  what  is  this  but  to  say — that  our 
organs  of  sense  stand  in  relation  to  certain  qualities  of  body,  and  that  each 
organ  is  susceptible  of  an  affection  from  its  appropriate  quality ;  such  qual- 
ity, however,  not  being  received  by  the  sense  in  a  material  efflux  from  the 
object,  as  was  held  by  Deraocritus  and  many  previous  philosophers  ?  Yet 
this  is  the  principal  text  on  which  the  common  doctrine  of  Intentional  Spe- 
cies is  attributed  to  Aristotle. 


312  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

has  the  faculty  of  sounding,  on  the  other,  sounds,  then  the  actual 
hearing  and  the  actual  sounding  take  place  conjunctly  ;  and  of 
these  the  one  may  be  called  Audition,  the  other  Sonation  ; — the 
subjective  term,  hearing,  and  the  objective  term,  sound,  as  he 
afterwards  states,  being  twofold  in  meaning,  each  denoting  ambig- 
uously both  the  actual  and  the  potential. — '  The  same  analogy,' 
he  adds,  '  holds  good  in  regard  to  the  other  senses  and  their  re- 
spective objects.  For  as  affection  and  passion  are  realized  in  the 
patient,  and  not  in  the  efficient,  so  the  energy  of  the  object  of 
sense  (aiV^rov),  and  the  energy  of  t\\n  faculty  of  sense  (aiV0»j<nx6v) 
are  both  in  the  latter ; — but  whilst  in  certain  of  the  senses  they 
have  obtained  distinct  names,  (as  Sonation  and  Audition),  in  thf 
rest,  the  one  or  the  other  is  left  anonymous.  For  Vision  denotes 
the  energy  of  the  visual  faculty,  whereas  the  energy  of  color,  it* 
object,  is  without  a  name  ;  and  while  Gustation  expresses  the  act 
of  what  is  able  to  taste,  the  act*  of  that  capable  of  being  tasted 
is  nameless.  But  seeing  that  of  the  object,  and  of  the  faculty,  of 
sense  the  energy  is  one  and  the  same,  though  their  nature  be  dif- 
ferent, it  is  necessary,  that  hearing  and  sound,  as  actual  (and  the 
same  is  the  case  in  the  other  senses),  should  subsist  and  perish 
together ;  whereas  this  is  not  necessary,  in  so  far  as  these  are  con- 
sidered as  potentially  existing.' 

He  then  goes  on  to  rectify,  in  its  statement,  the  doctrine  of  the 
older  physical  philosophers  ;  in  whom  Philoponus  (or  Ammonius) 
contemplates  Protagoras  and  hft  followers,  but  Simplicius,  on  bet- 
ter grounds,  the  Democriteans.  '  But  the  earlier  speculators  on 
nature  were  not  correct  in  saying,  that  there  is  nothing  white  or 


*  In  English,  and  in  most  other  languages,  there  are  not  distinct  words 
to  express  as  well  the  objective  as  the  subjective,  coefficient  in  the  senses, 
more  particularly  of  Tasting  and  Smelling ;  and  we  are  therefore  obliged 
ambiguously  to  apply  the  terms  taste  and  smell  (which  are  rather  subjective 
in  signification)  in  an  objective  sense,  and  the  terms  savor,  flavor,  &c.  (which 
have  perhaps  now  more  of  an  objective  meaning),  in  a  subjective  significa- 
tion. In  reference  to  the  sense  of  touch,  the  same  word  is  often  equivocally 
used  to  denote,  objectively,  a  primary  quality,  and  subjectively,  a  secondary. 
Aa  Tiardneti,  roughness,  &c. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION.  313 

black,  apart  from  sight,  and  nothing  sapid  apart  from  taste.  This 
doctrine  is,  in  certain  respects,  right,  in  certain  respects,  wrong. 
For  sense  and  the  object  of  sense  having  each  a  two-fold  significa- 
tion, inasmuch  as  they  may  severally  mean  either  what  is  poten- 
tially, or  what  is  actually,  existent ;  in  the  latter  case,  what  is 
here  asserted,  takes  place,  but  not  so  in  the  former.  These  spec- 
ulators were  therefore  at  fault,  in  stating  absolutely  what  is  only 
true  under  conditions.'  (De  Anima,  iii.  c.  1.) 

This  criticism,  it  is  evident,  so  far  from  involving  a  rejection  of 
the  distinction  taken  by  Leucippus  and  Democritus,  is  only  an 
accommodation  of  it  to  the  form  of  his  own  philosophy ;  in 
which  the  distinction  of  the  Potential  and  Actual  obtain  as 
great,  perhaps  an  exaggerated  importance.  And  it  is  sufficiently 
manifest  that  the  older  philosophers  exclusively  contemplated  the 
latter. 

But,  in  the  third  place,  not  only  did  Aristotle  clearly  establish 
the  difference  between  qualities  considered  absolutely,  as  in  the 
existing  object,  and  qualities  considered  relatively,  as  in  the  sen- 
tient subject ;  and  not  only  did  he  signalize  the  ambiguity  which 
arises  from  the  poverty  of  language,  employing  only  a  single 
word  to  denote  these  indifferently  : — he  likewise  anticipated  Des- 
cartes, Locke,  and  other  modern  philosophers,  in  establishing,  and 
marking  out  by  appropriate  terms,  a  distinction  precisely  analo- 
gous with  that  taken  by  them  of  the  Primary  and  Secondary 
Qualities  of  Matter.  The  Aristotelic  distinction  which,  in  its  re- 
lation to  the  other,  has  been  wholly  overlooked,  is  found  in  the 
discrimination  of  the  Common  and  Proper  Percepts,  Sensibles.  or 
objects  of  Sense  (aiV^ro,  xoiva  xai  J'&a).  It  is  given  in  the  two 
principal  psychological  treatises  of  the  philosopher ;  and  to  the 
following  purport. 

Aristotle  (De  Anima,  L.  ii.  c.  2,  L.  iii.  c.  1,  and  De  Sensu  et 
Sensili,  c.  1)  enumerates  five  percepts  common  to  all  or  to  a  plu- 
rality of  the  senses, — viz,  Magnitude  (Extension),  Figure,  Motion, 
Rest,  Number.  To  these  in  one  place  (De  Anima,  iii.  1)  he  adds 
Unity ;  and  in  another  (De  Sensu  et  Sensili,  c.  4),  he  states,  as 

14 


314  PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION. 

common,  at  least  to  sight  and  touch,  besides  Magnitude  and 
Figure,  the  Rough  and  the  Smooth,  the  Acute  and  the  Obtuse. 
Unity  however  he  comprises  under  Number ;  and  the  Rough  and 
Smooth,  the  Acute  and  Obtuse,  under  Figure.  Nay,  of  the  five 
common  sensibles  or  percepts,  he  gives  us  (De  Anima,  iii.  l)a 
further  reduction,  resolving  Figure  into  Magnitude ;  while  both 
of  these,  he  says,  as  well  as  Rest  and  Number,  are  known  through 
Motion  ;  which  last,  as  he  frequently  repeats,  necessarily  involves 
the  notion  of  Time ;  for  motion  exists  only  as  in  Time.  (Com- 
pare Phys.  Ausc.  L.  iv.  passim.)  His  words  are — '  All  these  we 
perceive  by  Motion.*  Thus  Magnitude  (Extension)  is  apprehended 
by  motion,  wherefore  also  Figure,  for  figure  is  a  kind  of  magni- 
tude ;  what  is  at  Rest  by  not  being  moved ;  Number,  by  a  nega- 
tion of  the  continuous,!  even  in  the  sensations  proper  to  the  sev- 


*  This  doctrine  of  Aristotle  is  rejected  by  Thcophrastus,  as  wo  learn  from 
the  fragments  concerning  Sense  preserved  in  the  rare  and  neglected  treatise 
of  Priscianus  Lydus,  p.  285.  Many  modern  philosophers  when  they 
attempted  to  explain  the  origin  of  our  notion  of  extension  from  motion,  and, 
in  particular,  the  motion  of  the  hand,  were  not  aware  that  they  had  the 
Stagirite  at  their  head.  It  is  to  be  remembered,  however,  that  Aristotle 
does  not  attempt,  like  them,  to  explain  by  motion  our  necessary  concept  of 
space,  but  merely  our  contingent  perception  of  the  relative  extension  of  this 
or  that  particular  object. 

This,  however,  takes  it  for  granted,  that  by  motion  (tclvrjan},  Aristotle 
intends  local  motion.  But  motion  is  with  him  a  generic  term,  comprising 
four,  or  six  species ;  and,  in  point  of  fact,  by  motion  Aristotle  may  here,  us 
in  many,  if  not  most,  other  places  of  his  psychological  writings,  mean  a  sub- 
jective mutation  (dAAotatnj)  or  modification  of  the  percipient.  This,  too,  is 
the  interpretation  given  to  the  passage  by  the  great  majority,  if  not  the 
whole  of  the  ancient  expositors — by  Plutarchus  of  Athens,  Ammonius  or 
Philoponus,  Simplicius,  and  Priscianus  Lydus ;  Themistius  alone  is  silent. 
I  say  nothing  of  the  sequacious  cloud  of  modern  commentators.  It  is  there- 
fore remarkable  that  Dr.  Trendelenburg,  in  his  late  valuable  edition  of  the 
De  Anima,  should  have  apparently  contemplated  the  interpretation  by  local 
motion,  as  the  only  one  proposed  or  possible.  This  may,  however,  adduce 
in  its  favor  the  authority  of  Theophrastus,  among  the  ancients — among  the 
moderns,  of  the  subtle  Scaliger.  From  both  interpretations,  however,  a 
defensible  meaning  can  be  elicited. 

t  This  explicitly  shows  that  by  Number,  Aristotle  means  only  the  neces- 
sary attribution  of  either  unity  or  plurality  to  the  object  of  sense.  Divisibil- 
ity (in  extension,  intension,  pretension)  is  thus  contained  under  Num- 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION.  315 

eral  senses,  for  each  of  these  is  itself  percipient  of  what  is  one.' — 
This  attempt  at  simplification  was  followed  out  by  his  disciples. 
Thus  St.  Thomas  (Summa  Theologise,  P.  i.  Qu.  78,  art.  3),  in 
showing  that  the  common  sensibles  do  not  primarily,  and  of  them- 
selves, act  upon  and  affect  the  sense,  carries  them  all  up  into 
modifications  of  Quantity  (Quantitatis) ; — and  in  another  book 
(De  Sensu  et  Sensibili,  Lect.  ii.)  by  a  variation  of  the  expression 
(for  in  both  cases  he  contemplates  only  the  Extended)  into  species 
of  the  Continuous.  To  quote  the  latter : — '  Sensibilia  communia 
omnia  pertinent  aliquo  modo  ad  Continuum  ;  vel  secundum  inen- 
suram  ejus,  ut  Magnitude ;  vel  secundum  divisionem,  ut  Nu- 
merus  ;  vel  secundum  terminationem,  ut  Figura  ;  vel  secundum 
distantiam  et  propinquitatem,  ut  MotusS 

Aristotle  indeed  (De  Anima,  L.  ii.  c.  6)  virtually  admits,  that 
the  common  are  abusively  termed  sensibles  at  all :  for  he  says, 
'the  proper  alone  are  accurately,  or  pre-eminently,  objects  of 
sense'  (TO,  ISict  xu^i'wg  sdn  cc5(rt)*jra)  ;  and  the  same  seems  also  to 
be  involved  in  his  doctrine,  that  the  common  percepts  (which  in 
one  place  he  even  says  are  only  apprehended  per  accidens) 
are,  in  fact,  within  the  domain  of  sense,  merely  as  being  the 
concomitants  or  consequents  (axoXoudouvra,  i*ofisva)  of  the 
proper.*  (Ibid.  L.  iii.  cc.  1,  4.)  See  also  Alexander  on  the  Soul. 
(A.  ff.  130  b,  134  a  b— B.  ff.  152,  153,  ed.  Aid.) 


ber.    Number  in  the  abstract  is,  of  course,  a  merely  intellectual  concept,  as 
Aristotle  once  and  again  notices.    See  Philoponus  on  63  text    of  second 
book  De  Anima,  Sign.  i.  8  ed.  Trine.  1535.    Of  this  again  under  Locke,  No. 
19 ;  and  Koyer-Collard,  No.  25. 
*  I  have  already  noticed  that  Hutcheson,1  in  saying  that '  Extension,  Fig- 


1  '  It  is  not  easy,'  says  Hutcheson, '  to  divide  distinctly  our  several  sensations  into 
classes.  The  division  of  our  External  Senses  into  the  five  common  classes,  seems  very 
imperfect.  Some  sensations,  received  without  any  previous  idea,  can  either  he  reduced 
to  none  of  them — such  as  the  sensations  of  Hunger,  Thirst,  Weariness,  Sickness;  or  if 
we  reduce  them  to  the  sense  of  Feeling,  they  are  perceptions  as  different  from  the  other 
ideas  of  Touch — such  as  Cold,  Heat,  Hardness,  Softness — as  the  ideas  of  taste  or  smell. 
Others  have  hinted  at  an  external  sense,  different  from  all  these.'  [This  allusion  has 
puzzled  the  Scottish  psychologists.  Hutcheson  evidently  refers  to  the  sixth  sense,  or 
sense  of  venereal  titillation,  proposed  by  the  elder  Scaliger,  and  approved  of  by  Bacon, 
Button,  Voltaire,  &c.]  'The  following  general  account  may  possibly  be  useful.  (1°) — 


316  PHILOSOPHY   OF.  PERCEPTION. 

The  more  modern  Schoolmen  (followed  sometimes  unwittingly 
by  very  recent  philosophers)  have  indeed  contended,  that  on  the 
principles  of  Aristotle  the  several  common  sensibles  are  in  reality 
apprehended  by  other  and  higher  energies  than  those  of  sense. 
Their  argument  is  as  follows  : — Motion  cannot  be  perceived  with- 

urc,  Motion,  and  Rest,  seem  to  l>e  more  properly  ideas  accompanying  the 
sensations  of  Sight  and  Touch  than  the  sensations  of  either  of  these  senses' 
only,  mediately  or  immediately,  repeats  Aristotle ;  to  whom  is  therefore  due 
all  the  praise  which  has  been  lavished  on  the  originality  and  importance  of 
the  observation.  [I  might  have  added,  however,  that  Hutcheson  does  not 
claim  it  as  his  own.1  For  in  his  System  of  Moral  Philosophy  (which  is  to  be 


That  certain  motions  raised  in  our  bodies  are,  by  a  general  law,  constituted  the  occasion 
of  perceptions  in  the  mind.  (2°)  These  perceptions  never  come  entirely  alone,  but 
have  some  other  perception  joined  with  them.  Thus  every  sensation  is  accompanied 
with  the  idea  of  Duration,  and  yet  duration  is  not  a  sensible  idea,  since  it  also 
accompanies  ideas  of  internal  consciousness  or  reflection:  so  the  idea  of  Number 
may  accompany  any  sensible  ideas,  and  yet  may  also  accompany  any  other  ideas,  as 
well  as  external  sensations.  Brutes,  when  several  objects  are  before  them,  have  probably 
all  the  proper  ideas  of  sight  which  we  have,  without  the  idea  of  number.  (S0)  Some 
ideas  are  found  accompanying  the  most  different  sensations,  which  yet  are  not  to  be 
perceived  separately  from  some  sensible  quality.  Such  are  Extension,  Figure,  Motion 
and  Rest,  which  accompany  the  ideas  of  Sight  or  Colors,  and  yet  may  be  perceived 
without  them,  as  in  the  ideas  of  Touch,  at  least  if  we  move  our  organs  along  the  part* 
of  the  body  touched.  Extension,  Figure,  Motion,  or  Rest,  seem,  therefore  to  be  more 
properly  called  ideas  accompanying  the  sen-nations  of  Sight  and  Touch,  than  the 
sensations  of  either  of  these  senses;  since  they  can  be  received  sometimes  without  the 
ideas  of  Color,  and  sometimes  without  those  of  Touching,  though  never  without  the  one 
or  the  other.  The  perceptions  which  are  purely  sensible,  received  each  by  its  proper 
sense,  are  Tastes,  Smells,  Colors,  Sound,  Cold,  Heat,  «fcc.  The  universal  concomitant 
ideas  which  may  attend  any  idea  whatsoever,  are  Duration  and  Number.  The  ideas 
which  accompany  the  most  different  sensations,  are  Extension,  Figure,  Motion,  and  Rest, 
These  all  arise  without  any  previous  ideas  assembled  or  compared — the  concomitant 
ideas  are  reputed  images  o/  something  external.'' — Sect  I.,  Art  1.  The  reader  may, 
likewise  consult  the  same  author's  'Synopsis  Metaphysicte,'  Part  II.,  cap.  I.,  §  8.—  W. 

'  Hamilton  says,  refering  to  the  passage  from  Hutcheson:  'But  here  I  may  observe, 
in  the  first  place,  that  the  statement  made  in  the  preceding  quotation  (and  still  more 
articulately  in  the  "Synopsis"),  that  Duration  or  Time  is  the  inseparable  concomitant 
both  of  sense  and  reflection,  had  been  also  made  by  Aristotle  and  many  other  philoso- 
phers; and  it  is  indeed  curious  how  long  philosophers  were  on  the  verge  of  enunciating 
the  great  doctrine  first  proclaimed  by  Kant— that  Time  is  a  fundamental  condition, 
form,  or  category  of  thought  In  the  second  place,  I  may  notice  that  Hutcheson  is  not 
entitled  to  the  praise  accorded  him  by  Stewart  and  Royer-Collard  for  his  originality  in 
"  the  fine  and  important  observation  that  Extension,  Figure,  Motion,  and  Rest,  arc- 
rather  ideas  accompanying  the  perceptions  of  touch  and  vision,  than  perceptions  of  these 
senses,  properly  so  called."  In  this,  he  seems  only  to  have,  with  others,  repeated  Aris- 
totle, who,  in  his  treatise  on  the  Soul  (Book  II.,  Ch.  6,  Text  64,  and  Book  III.,  Ch.  1. 
Text  186),  calls  Motion  and  Rest,  Magnitude  (Extension),  Figure,  and  Number 
(Hutcheson's  very  list),  the  common  concomitants  (<j«coXow0ai<ra  xal  KOIVO)  of  sight  and 
touch,  and  expressly  denies  them  to  b<-  impressions  of  sense— the  sense  having  no  passive 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION.  317 

out  the  collation  of  past  and  present  time,  without  acts  of  mem- 
ory and  comparison.  Rest,  says  Aristotte,  is  known  as  a  priva- 
tion, but  sense  is  only  of  the  positive;  let  it,  however,  be  consid- 
ed  as  a  state,  and  as  opposed  to  motion,  still  this  supposes  com- 
parison. Number  in  like  manner  as  a  negation,  a  negation  of 
the  continuous,  is  beyond  the  domain  of  sense  ;  and  while  Aris- 
totle in  one  treatise  (Phys.  iv.  14)  attributes  the  faculty  of  nu- 
meration to  intelligence ;  in  another  (Problem,  sect.  30,  §  5,  if 
this  work  be  his),  he  virtually  denies  it  to  sense,  in  denying  it  to 
the  brutes.  Magnitude  (extension),  if  considered  as  comparative, 
is  likewise  manifestly  beyond  the  province  of  mere  sense  ;  Aris- 
totle, indeed,  admits  that  its  apprehension,  in  general,  presup- 
poses Motion.  Finally,  Figure,  as  the  cognition  of  extension 
terminated  in  a  certain  manner,  still  more  manifestly  involves  an 
act  of  comparison.  (Scaliger,  De  Subtilitate,  Ex.  Ixvi.  and 
ccxcviii.  §  15. — Toletus,  in  lib.  de  Anirna,  L.  ii.  c.  6. —  Conim- 
bricences,  ibid. — Irenceus,  De  An.  p.  40. — Compare  Gassendi, 
Phys.  Sect.  iii.  Memb.  Post.  L.  vi.  c.  2. — Du  ffamel,  Philos.  Ve- 
tus  et  Nova,  Phys.  P.  iii.  c.  4. — and  Royer-Collard,  in  (Euvres 
de  Reid,  t.  iii.  p.  428  sq. — to  be  quoted  in  the  sequel,  No.  25.) 


annexed  to  the  other  references)  he  speaks  of  '  what  some  call  the  Concomi- 
tant ideas  of  Sensation.'  (B.  i.  c.  1,  p.  6)].  Dr.  Price  extols  it  as  'a  very 
just  observation  of  Hutcheson.'  (Eev.  p.  56,  ed.  1.)  Mr.  Stewart  calls  it  'a 
remark  of  singular  acuteness' — 'a  very  ingenious  and  original  remark' — and 
'  a  sentence  which,  considering  the  period  at  which  the  author  (Hutcheson) 
wrote,  reflects  the  highest  honor  on  his  metaphysical  acuteness.'  (Essays 
pp.  31,  46,  551,  4°  cd.)  M.  Royer-Collard  says — 'Hutcheson  est  le  premier 
•les  philosophes  modernes  qui  ait  fait  cette  observation  aussi  fine  que  juste 
que,'  &c.  (CEuvres  de  Reid,  t.  iii.  p.  431.) 

I  may  here  observe  that  Philippson  ("Y\ij  avBpwirivii,  p.  335)  is  misled  by  an 
ambiguous  expression  of  Aristotle  in  stating  that  he  assigned  the  common 
sensible*  as  objects  to  the  Common,  Sense.  See  the  Commentaries  of  Philopo- 
nus  and  Simplicius  on  the  134  common  text  of  third  book  De  Anima.  But 
compare  also  Alexander,  in  his  treatise  on  the  Soul,  first  Book,  in  the  chap- 
ter on  the  Common  Sense,  f.  134,  ed.  Aid. 


affection  from  these  qualities.  To  these  five  common  concomitants,  some  of  the  school- 
men added  also  (but  out  of  Aristotle),  Place,  Distance,  Position,  and  Continuity.' — 
lieid,  p.  124.—  W. 


318  PHILOSOPHY    OF    PERCEPTION. 

The  common  sensibles  thus  came,  in  fact,  to  be  considered  by 
many  of  the  acutest  Aristotelians,  as  not  so  much  perceptions  of 
sense  (in  so  far  as  sensible  perception  depends  on  corporeal  afl'ec- 
tion)  as  concomitant  cognitions  to  which  the  impression  on  the 
organ  by  the  proper  sensible  only  afforded  the  occasion.  '  Sensi- 
bile  Commune  dicitur  (says  Compton  Carleton)  quod  vel  percipi- 
tur  pluribus  sensibus,  vel  ad  quod  cognoscendum,  ab  intellectu 
vel  imaginatione  desumitur  occasio  ex  variis  sensibus ;  ut  sunt 
Figura,  Motus,  Ubicatio,  Duratio,  Magnitude,  Distantia,  Nume- 
rus,'  <fec.  (Philosophia  Universa,  De  Anima  Disp.  xvi.  Sect.  2, 

8i.) 

But  before  leaving  Aristotle,  I  should  state,  that  he  himself 
clearly  contemplated,  in  his  distinction  of  Common  and  Proper 
Sensibles,  a  classification  correspondent  to  that  of  the  Primary 
and  Secondary  Qualities  of  bodies,  as  established  by  the  ancient 
Atomists.  This  is  expressly  shown  in  a  passage  wherein  he 
notices  that  4  Democritus,  among  others,  reduced  the  proper  sen- 
sibles to  the  common,  in  explaining,  for  example,  the  differences  of 
color 'by  differences  of  roughness  and  smoothness  in  bodies,  and 
the  varieties  of  savor  by  a  variety  in  the  configuration  of  atoms.' 
(De  Sensu  et  Sensili,  c.  4.) 

Of  a  division  by  Aristotle,  in  a  physical  point  of  view,  of  the 
Qualities  of  body  into  Primary  and  Secondary,  I  shall  speak  in 
the  sequel,  when  considering  this  nomenclature,  as  adopted,  and 
transferred  to  the  psychological  point  of  view,  by  Locke,  No.  1 9. 

7. — GALEN,  whose  works  are  now  hardly  more  deserving  of 
study  by  the  physician  than  by  the  philosopher,  affords  me  some 
scattered  observations  which  merit  notice,  not  merely  in  reference 
to  the  present  subject.  Sensitive  perception,  he  well  observes, 
consists  not  in  the  passive  affection  of  the  organ,  but  in  the  dis- 
criminative recognition — the  dijudication  of  that  affection  by  the 
active  mind.  *E<JVi  Ss  a!<f&i}<Jt$  oJx  aXXoiwtfis,  dXXa  Sia-yvuffig 
aXXoiwtfso)^ .  This  function  of  diagnostic  apprehension  he  accord* 
to  the  dominant  principle  (<ro  ^C/JLOVIXOV)  that  is,  the  imaginative, 
recollective,  and  ratiocinative  mind.  (De  Placit.  Hipp,  et  Plat. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    PERCEPTION.  319 

L.  vii.  cc.  14,  16,  17.)* — Again: — 'The  objects  in  propriety 
called  Sensible,  are  such  as  require  for  their  discriminative  recog- 
nition no  other  faculty  but  that  of  sensitive  perception  itself: 
whereas  those  objects  are  improperly  called  sensible,  whose  rec- 
ognition, besides  a  plurality  of  the  senses,  involves  memoiy  and 
what  is  called  the  compositive  and  collective  (generalizing)  rea 
son.  [I  read  tfuvOs-rjxcj  and  xefpaXaiwrixw.]  Thus  Color  is  an 
object  proper  of  sense,  and  Savor  and  Odor  and  Sound ;  so  like- 
wise are  Hardness  and  Softness,  Heat  and  Cold,  and,  in  a  word, 
all  the  Tactile  qualities.'  Then,  after  stating  that  no  concrete 
object  of  sense — an  apple  for  instance — is  fully  cognizable  by 
sense  alone,  but,  as  Plato  lias  it,  by  opinion  with  the  aid  of 
sense ;  and  having  well  shown  how  this  frequently  becomes  a 
source  of  illusion, — in  all  which  he  is  closely  followed  by  Neme- 
sius, — he  goes  on  : — '  But  to  carry  sense  into  effect  in  all  its 
various  applications,  is  impossible  without  the  co-operation  of 
memory  and  connumeration  (tfuvapj^rjo'ij),  and  this,  which  like- 
wise obtains  the  name  of  summation  (rfuyxspaXajwoV,  conceiving, 
thinking  under  a  class),  is  an.  act  neither  of  sense  nor  of  memory, 
but  of  the  discursive  or  dianoetic  faculty  of  thought.  (Com.  i.  in 
Hipp.  Lib.  De  Medici  Officina,  text.  3.) — In  another  work  we 
have  the  same  doctrine  applied  to  solve  the  question — By  what 
faculty  is  Motion  apprehended  ?  and  it  affords  the  result, — '  That 
all  motion  is  manifestly  recognized,  not  by  a  mere  act  of  sensi- 
tive perception,  not  even  by  sense  with  the  aid  of  memory,  but 
principally  by  a  compositive  act  of  thought'  (cCuXXo/KJ'jxw).  This 
is  a  fourth  synonym  for  the  three  other  convertible  terms  which 
occur  in  the  previous  passage.  They  are  Platonic.  (De  Digno- 
scendis  Pulsibus,  L.  iii.  c.  1.) 

8. — A  remarkable  but  neglected  passage  relative  to  the  pres- 
ent subject  is  to  be  found  in  the  Saggiatore  of  GALILEO,  a  work 
first  published  in  1023.  Mamiani  della  Rovere  is  the  only  phi- 

*  The  annotators  of  Nemesius  have  not  observed  that  this  philosopher  is 
indebted  to  Galen,  really  and  verbally,  for  the  whole  of  his  remarkable  doc- 
trine of  sense.  See  his  treatise  De  Nat.  Horn.  c.  6-11,  ed.  Matthiao. 


320  PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION. 

losopher,  as  far  as  I  am  aware,  who  has  ever  alluded  to  it.  Gali- 
leo there  precedes  Descartes  in  the  distinction,  and  anticipates 
Locke  in  its  nomenclature.  The  following  is  an  abstract  of  his 
doctrine,  which  coincides  with  that  of  the  ancient  Atomists,  in 
some  respects,  and  with  that  of  Kant,  in  others. 

In  conceiving  moMer  or  corporeal  substance  we  cannot  but 
think  that  it  is  somehow  terminated,  and  therefore  of  such  and 
such  a  figure ;  that  in  relation  to  other  bodies  it  is  large  or  small ; 
that  it  exists  in  this  or  that  place ;  in  this  or  that  time ;  that  it 
is  in  motion  or  at  rest ;  that  it  does  or  does  not  touch  another 
body ;  that  it  is  single  or  composed  of  parts ;  and  these  parts 
either  few  or  many.  These  are  conditions  from  which  the  mind 
cannot  in  thought  emancipate  the  object.  But  that  it  is  white  or 
red,  bitter  or  sweet,  sonorous  or  noiseless,  of  a  grateful  or  ungrateful 
odor ; — with  such  conditions  there  is  no  necessity  for  conceiving 
it  accompanied.*  Hence  Tastes,  Odors,  Colors,  <fec.,  considered 
as  qualities  inherent  in  external  objects,  are  merely  names ;  they 
reside  exclusively  in  the  sentient  subject.  Annihilate  the  animal 
percipient  of  such  qualities,  and  you  annihilate  such  qualities 
themselves ;  and  it  is  only  because  we  have  bestowed  on  them 
particular  names  different  from  those  by  which  we  designate  the 
other  primary  and  real  affections  of  matter  (primi  e  reali  acci- 
denti),  that  we  are  disposed  to  believe  that  the  former  are  in 
objects  truly  and  really  different  from  the  latter. 

Having  illustrated  this  doctrine  at  considerable  length  in  rela- 
tion to  the  senses  of  Touch,  Taste,  Smell,  and  Hearing;  and,  in 
imitation  of  Aristotle,  shown  the  analogy  which  these  severally 
hold  to  the  elements  of  Earth,  Water,  Fire,  and  Air,  he  adds : — 
'Ma  che  ne'  corpi  esterni  per  eccitare  in  noi  i  sapori,  gli  odori,  e  i 


*  But,  as  Aristotle  has  observed,  we  cannot  imagine  body  without  all  color, 
though  we  can  imagine  it  without  any  one.  In  like  manner  where  the  qual- 
ities are  mutual  contradictories,  we  cannot  positively  represent  to  ourselves 
an  object  without  a  determination  hy  one  or  other  of  these  oppositcs.  Thus 
we  cannot  conceive  a  body  which  is  not  cither  sapid  or  tasteless,  either  sono- 
rous or  noiseless,  and  so  forth.  This  observation  applies  likewise  to  the  first 
class. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  321 

suoni,  si  richiegga  altro,  que  grandezze,  figure,  moltitudini,  e  mo- 
vimenti  tardi  o  veloci,  io  non  lo  credo.  lo  stimo,  clie  tolti  via  gli 
orecchi,  le  lingue,  e  i  nasi,  restino  bene  ]e  figure,  i  numeri,  e  i 
moti,  ma  non  gia  gli  odori,  ne  i  sapori,  ne  i  suoni,  li  quali  fuor 
dell'  animal  vivente,  non  credo  che  sieno  altro  che  nomi,  come 
appunto  altro  che  nome  non  e  il  solletico,  e  la  titillazione,  rimosse 
1'  ascelle,e  la  pelle  in  torno  al  naso ;  e  come  a  i  quattro  sensi  con- 
siderati  hanno  relazione  i  quattro  element],  cosi  credo,  che  per  la 
vista,  senso  sopra  tutti  gli  altri  eminentissimo,  abbia  relazione  la 
luce,  ma  nou  quella  proporzione  d'  eccellenza,  qual'  e  tra  '1  finite, 
e  1'  infinite,  tra  '1  temporaneo,  e  1'  instantaneo,  tra  '1  quanto,  e 
1'  indivisible,  tra  la  luce,  e  le  tenebre.' 

He  then  applies  this  doctrine  to  the  case  of  Heat,  and  says, — 
'  Ma  che  oltre  alia  figura,  moltitudine,  moto,  penetrazione,  e  toc- 
camento,  sia  nel  fuoco  altra  qualita,  e  che  questa  sia  caldo,  io  non. 
lo  credo  altrimenti,  e  stimo,  che  questo  sia  talmente  nostro,  che 
rimosso  il  corpo  animate,  e  sensitive,  il  calore  non  resti  altro  che 
un  semplice  vocabolo.'  (Opere,  t.  ii.  p.  340  sq.  ed.  Padov.  1T44.) 

9. — DESCARTES  is  always  adduced  as  the  philosopher  by  whom 
the  distinction  in  question  was  principally  developed;  and  by 
whom,  if  not  first  established,  it  was,  at  least  in  modern  times, 
first  restored.  In  truth,  however,  Descartes  originated  nothing. 
He  left  the  distinction  as  he  found  it.  His  only  merit  is  that  of 
signalizing  more  emphatically  than  had  previously  been  done,  the 
different  character  of  the  knowledge  we  are  conscious  of  in  refer- 
ence to  the  two  contrasted  classes  ;  although  this  difference  is  not, 
as  he  thinks,  to  be  explained  by  a  mere  gradation  in  the  clearness 
of  our  perceptions.  But  neither  of  the  one  nor  of  the  other  is  hi* 
enumeration  of  the  contents  exhaustive ;  nor  did  he  bestow  dis- 
tinctive appellations  on  the  counter  classes  themselves. — His  '  Me- 
ditationes'  were  first  published  in  1641,  his  'Principia'  in  1644: 
and  in  these  works  his  doctrine  upon  this  matter  is  contained. 

In  the  latter,  he  observes — '  Nos  longe  alio  modo  cognoscere 
quidnam  sit  in  viso  corpore  Magnitude,  vcl  Figura,  vel  Motus 
(saltern  localis,  philosophi  enim  alios  quosdam  motus  a  locali 

14* 


322  PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION. 

diversos  affingendo,  naturam  ejus  sibi  minus  intelligibilcm  reddi- 
derunt),  vel  Situs,  vel  Duratio,  vel  Numerus,  et  similia,  quae  in 
corporibus  olare  percipi  jam  dictum  est;  quam  quid  in  eodein  cor- 
pore  sit  Color,  vel  Dolor,  vel  Odor,  vel  Sapor,  vel  quid  aliud  ex 
iis,  quae  ad  sensus  dixi  esse  referenda.  Quamvis  enim  videntes 
aliquod  corpus,  non  magis  certi  simus  illud  existere,  quatenus  ap- 
paret  figuratum,  quam  quatenus  apparet  coloratum  ;  longe  tamen 
evidentius  agnoscimus,  quid  sit  in  eo  esse  figuratum,  quam  quid 
sit  esse  coloratum.'  (Princ.  i.  §  69.) 

Of  the  former  class  we  find  enumerated  by  a  collation  of  differ- 
ent passages,  Magnitude  (or  Extension  in  length,  breadth,  and 
thickness),  Figure,  Locomotion,  Position,  Duration,  Number,  Sub- 
stance, and  the  like ; — all  (with  the  exception  of  Substance,  which 
is  erroneously  and  only  once  enumerated)  corresponding  with  the 
Common  Sensibles  of  the  Peripatetics.  Of  the  latter  class,  he 
instances  Colors,  Sounds,  Odors,  Savors,  the  Tactile  qualities*  in 
general,  specially  enumerating,  as  examples,  Heat,  Cold,  Pain, 
Titillation,  and  (N.  B.)  Hardness,  Weight ; — all  conformable  to 
the  Proper  Sensibles  of  Aristotle. — In  the  one  class  we  have  an 
idea  of  the  property,  such  as  it  exists,  or  may  exist  ('  ut  sunt,  aut 
saltern  esse  possunt'),  in  the  external  body ;  in  the  other,  we  have 
only  an  obscure  and  confused  conception  of  a  something  in  that 
body  which  occasions  the  sensation  of  which  we  are  distinctly 
conscious  in  ourselves,  but  which  sensation  does  not  represent  to 
us  aught  external — does  not  afford  us  a  real  knowledge  of  any 
thing  beyond  the  states  of  the  percipient  mind  itself.  (Princ.  P. 
i.  §§  70,  71,  P.  iv.  §§  191,  197,  199.— Medit.  iii.  p.  22,  vi.  pp. 
43,  47,  48.— Resp.  ad.  Med.  vi.  p.  194,  ed.  1658.)  Of  these 
two  classes,  the  attributes  included  under  the  latter,  in  so  far  as 


*  I  am  not  aware  that  Descartes,  any  where>  gives  a  full  and  formal  list  ot 
the  Tactile  qualities.  In  his  treatise  De  Homine,  under  the  special  doctrine 
of  Touch  (§§  29,  30)  wo,  have  Pain,  Titillation,  Smoothness,  Roughness,  Heat, 
Cold,  Humidity,  Dryness,  Weight,  '  and  the  like.1  He  probably  acquiesced 
in  the  Aristotelic  list,  the  one  in  general  acceptation, — viz.,  the  Hot  and  Cold, 
Dry  and  Moist,  Heavy  and  Light,  Hard  and  Soft,  Viscid  and  Friable,  Rough 
and  Smooth,  Thick  and  Thin.  De  Gen.  et  Corr.  ii.  2. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  323 

they  are  considered  as  residing  in  the  objects  themselves  of  our 
sensations,  Descartes,  like  Democritus  and  Galileo,  held  to  be  only 
modifications  of  those  contained  under  the  former.  '  Exceptis 
Magnitudine,  Figura  et  Motu,  quse  qualia  sint  in  unoquoque  cor- 
pore  explicui,  nihil  extra  nos  positum  sentitur  nisi  Lumen,  Color, 
Odor,  Sapor,  Sonus,  et  Tactiles  qualitates ;  quse  nihil  aliud  esse  in 
objectis,  quam  dispositions  quasdam  in  Magnitudine,  Figura  et 
Motu  consistentes,  hactenus  est  demonstratum.  (Princ.  P.  iv. 
§  199. — Med.  Resp.  vi.  p.  194.)  This  distinction,  by  their  mas- 
ter, of  the  two  classes  of  quality,  was,  as  we  shall  see,  associated 
by  the  Cartesians  with  another,  taken  by  themselves, — between 
Idea  and  Sensation. 

I  have  previously  shown,  that  Aristotle  expressly  recognizes  the 
coincidence  of  his  own  distinction  of  the  proper  and  common  sen- 
sibles  with  the  Democritean  distinction  of  the  apparent  and  real 
properties  of  body.  I  have  now  to  state  that  Descartes  was  also 
manifestly  aware  of  the  conformity  of  his  distinction  with  those 
of  Aristotle  and  Democritus.  Sufficient  evidence,  I  think,  will  be 
found — of  the  former,  in  the  Principia,  P.  iv.  §  200,  and  De  Ho- 
mine,  §  42 ; — of  the  latter,  in  the  Principia,  P.  iv.  §  200- 
203.  All  this  enhances  the  marvel,  that  the  identity  of  these 
famous  classifications  should  have  hitherto  been  entirely  over- 
looked. 

10. — The  doctrine  of  DERODON — an  acute  and  independent 
thinker,  who  died  in  1664 — coincides  with  that  of  Aristotle  and 
his  genuine  school ;  it  is  very  distinctly  and  correctly  expressed. 
Sensible  qualities,  he  says,  may  be  considered  in  two  aspects ;  as 
they  are  in  the  sensible  object,  and  as  they  are  in  the  sentient  ani- 
mal. As  in  the  latter,  they  exist  actually  and  formally,  consti- 
tuting certain  affections  agreeable  or  disagreeable,  in  a  word,  sen- 
sations of  such  or  such  a  character.  The  feeling  of  Heat  is  an 
example.  As  in  the  former,  they  exist  only  virtually  or  poten- 
tially ;  for,  correctly  speaking,  the  fire  does  not  contain  heat,  and 
is,  therefore,  not  hot,  but  only  capable  of  heating.  '  Ignis  itaque, 
proprie  loquendo,  non  habere  calorem,  atque  adeo  non  esse  calidum 


324  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

sed  calorificum  ;*  nisi  vocabalum  caloris  sumatur  pro  virtute  pro- 
ducendi  calorem  in  animali.  Scd  pliilosophi  (he  refers  to  the  scho- 
lastic Aristotelians  with  their  substantial  Forms,  and  Intention- 
al Species,  though  among  them  were  exceptions) — sed  pliilosophi 
sunt  prorsus  inexcusabiles,  qui  volunt  calorem,  sumptum  pro  vir- 
tute  calefaciendi,  quse  est  in  igne,  aut  potius  identificatur  cum  ipso 
igne,  et  calorem  productum  in  animali,  esse  ejusdem  speciei,  na- 
turae et  essentisD ;  nam  calor  moderatus  productus  in  animali  con- 
sistit  iu  aliqua  passione  et  quasi  titillatione  grata  quse  sentitur  ab 
animali,  qua3  passio  non  potest  esse  in  igne.'  And  so  forth  in  re- 
gard to  the  other  senses.  (Philos.  Coutr.  Phys.,  p.  190.) 

11. — I  may  adduce  to  the  same  purport  GLANVILLE,  who,  in  his 
'Vanity  of  Dogmatizing'  (1661,  p.  88  sq.),  and  in  his  'Scepsis 
Scientifica'  (1665,  p.  65  sq.),  though  a  professed,  and  not  over- 
scrupulous antagonist  of  Aristotle,  acknowledges,  in  reference  to 
the  present  question,  that '  the  Peripatetic  philosophy  teaches  us, 
that  Heat  is  not  in  the  body  of  the  sun,  as  formally  considered, 
but  only  virtually,  and  as  in  its  cause.'  I  do  not  know  whether 
Glanville  had  Aquinas  specially  in  view  ;  but  the  same  general 
statement  and  particular  example  are  to  be  found  in  the  Summa 
contra  Gentes,  L.  i.  cc.  29,  31,  of  the  Angelic  Doctor. 

12. — It  is  remarkable  that  Mr.  BOYLE'S  speculations  in  regard 
to  the  classification  of  corporeal  Qualities  should  have  been  wholly 
overlooked  in  reference  to  the  present  subject ;  and  this  not  only 
on  account  of  their  intrinsic  importance,  but  because  they  proba- 
bly suggested  to  Locke  the  nomenclature  which  he  has  adopted, 
but,  in  adopting,  has  deformed. 

In  his  treatise  entitled  '  The  origin  of  Forms  and  Qualities,' 
published  at  Oxford  in  1666,  Boyle  denominates  'Matter  and  Mo- 
tion' '  the  most  Catholic  Principles  of  bodies.'  (P.  8.)  '  Magni- 
tude (Size,  Bulk,  or  Bigness),  Shape  (Figure),  Motion  or  Rest,'  to 

*  The  chemists  have  called  Caloric  what  they  ought  to  have  called  Calo- 
rific. The  Lavoiserian  nomenclature,  whatever  it  merits  in  other  respects, 
is  a  system  of  philological  monstrosities,  in  which  it  is  fortunate  when  the 
analogies  of  language  are  only  violated,  and  not  reversed. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  325 

which  he  afterwards  adds  '  Texture,'  he  styles  '  the  Primitive 
Moods  or  Primary  Affections  of  bodies,  to  distinguish  them  from 
those  less  simple  Qualities  (as  Colors,  Tastes,  Odors,  and  the  like) 
that  belong  to  bodies  upon  their  account'  (p.  10).  The  former 
of  these,  he  likewise  designates  '  the  Primitive  or  more  Catholic 
Affections  of  Matter1  (pp.  43,  44) ;  and  in  another  work  (Tracts 
1671,  p.  18),  lthe  Primary  and  most  Simple  Affections  of  Mat- 
ter.'1 To  the  latter  he  gives  the  name  of  '  Secondary  Qualities, 
if  (he  says)  I  may  so  call  them'  (p.  44). 

In  reference  to  the  difficulty, '  That  whereas  we  explicate  colors, 
odors,  and  the  like  sensible  qualities,  by  a  relation  to  our  senses, 
it  seems  evident  that  they  have  an  absolute  being  irrelative  to  us ; 
for  snow  (for  instance)  would  be  white,  and  a  glowing  coal  would 
be  hot,  though  there  were  no  man  or  any  other  animal  in  the 
world'  (p.  42).  And  again  (p.  49)  : — '  So  if  there  were  no  sen- 
sitive Beings,  those  bodies  that  are  now  the  objects  of  our  senses, 
would  be  so  dispositively,  if  I  may  so  speak,  endowed  with  Colors, 
Tastes,  and  the  like,  but  actually  only  with  those  more  catholic 
affections  of  bodies,  Figure,  Motion,  Texture,  &c.'  Is  this  intend- 
ed for  an  Aristotelic  qualification  of  the  Democritean  paradox  of 
Galileo  ? 

In  his  Tracts,  published  at  Oxford,  1671 — in  that  entitled  '  His- 
tory of  particular  Qualities,'  he  says  : — '  I  shall  not  inquire  into 
the  several  significations  of  the  word  Quality,  which  is  used  in 
such  various  senses,  as  to  make  it  ambiguous  enough.  But  thus 
much  I  think  it  not  amiss  to  intimate,  that  there  are  some  things 
that  have  been  looked  upon  as  Qualities,  which  ought  rather  to 
be  looked  on  as  States  of  Matter  or  complexions  of  particular 
Qualities ;  as  animal,  inanimal,  <fec.,  Health,  Beauty.  And  there 
are  some  other  attributes — namely,  Size,  Shape,  Motion,  Rest,  that 
are  wont  to  be  reckoned  among  Qualities,  which  may  more  con- 
veniently be  esteemed  the  Primary  Modes  of  the  parts  of  Matter, 
since  from  these  Simple  Attributes  or  Primordial  Affections,  all 
the  Qualities  are  derived'  (p.  3).  This  is  accurate ;  and  it  is  to 
be  regretted  that  Locke  did  not  profit  by  the  caution. 


326  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

13. — DE  LA  FOROK,  whose  able  treatise '  De  1'Esprit  de  1'Homme 
was  first  published  in  1666,  contributes  little  of  importance  to  the 
observation  of  Descartes,  of  whose  psychology  he  there  exhibits  a 
systematic  view.  To  the  ideas  of  the  primary  attributes,  enumer- 
ated by  Descartes,  he  inconsistently  adds  those  of  Solidity  and 
Fluidity ;  and  among  the  secondary  he  mentions  the  sensations  of 
the  Dry  and  the  Humid  (ch.  10).  In  showing  that  our  sensations 
of  the  secondary  qualities  afford  us  no  knowledge  of  what  these 
are,  as  in  the  external  object ;  and  in  explanation  of  the  theories 
of  Aristotle  and  Descartes,  he  says : — '  Mais  sans  examiner  ici  le- 
quel  a  le  mieux  rencontre,  je  ne  pense  pas  qu'aucun  des  sectateurs 
de  1'un  ni  de  1'autre  fassent  difficulte,  d'avotier  que  le  Sentiment 
qu'excitent  en  lui  les  corps  chauds  ou  froids,  et  Vldge  qu'il  en  a  ne 
lui  represente  rien  de  tout  cela.'  He  thus  correctly  places  the 
Aristotelians  and  Cartesians  on  a  level,  in  admitting  that  both 
equally  confess  our  ignorance  of  what  the  secondary  qualities  are 
in  themselves, — an  ignorance  which  is  commonly  regarded  as  a 
notable  discovery  of  Descartes  alone. 

14. — GEULINX,  a  Cartesian  not  less  distinguished  than  De  la 
Forge,  and  who  with  him  first  explicitly  proclaimed  the  doctrine 
of  Occasional  Causes,  died  in  1669  ;  but  his  '  Annotata'  and '  Dic- 
tata'  on  the  'Principia'  of  Descartes  were  only  published  in  1690 
and  1691.  In  these  works,  like  most  other  Cartesians,  he  uses 
the  term  Idea,  in  reference  to  body,  exclusively  to  denote  the  rep- 
resentations of  its  primary  qualities  ;  but  he  adopts  the  schola**- 
tic  term  Species,  instead  of  Sensatio  (sensation,  sentiment)  as  em- 
ployed by  them,  to  express  our  consciousness  of  the  secondary. — 
(Species,  De  la  Forge  had  made  a  better  use  of,  in  relieving  an 
ambiguity  in  the  philosophical  language  of  Descartes,  who  had 
sometimes  abusively  usurped  the  word  idea  for  the  organic  mo- 
tion in  the  brain,  to  which  the  idea  proper — the  intellectual  repre- 
sentation in  the  mind  itself,  was  by  the  law  of  union  attached.) 
Geulinx  is  the  Cartesian  who,  from  the  occasional  paradox  of  his 
expression,  has  afforded  the  most  valid  foundation  for  the  charge 
so  frequently,  but  so  erroneously,  preferred  against  the  sect,  of 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  327 

denying  all  objective  reality  to  the  secondary  qualities  of 
matter. 

15. — ROHAULT,  another  illustrious  Cartesian,  whose  'Physique' 
was  first  published  in  1671  (and  which  continued  until  about  the 
middle  of  last  century  to  be  a  College  text-book  of  philosophy  in 
the  University  of  Newton),  may  be  adduced  in  disproof  of  this 
accusation — an  accusation  which  will  be  further  refuted  in  the  se- 
quel by  the  testimonies  of  Malebranche  and  Sylvain  Regis. — 
Speaking  of  Heat  and  Cold,  he  says, — '  Ces  deux  mots  ont  chacun 
deux  significations.  Car,  premierement,  par  la  Chaleur  et  par  la 
Froideur  on  entend  deux  sentimens  particuliers  qui  sont  en  nous, 
et  qui  resemblent  en  quelque  facon  a  ceux  qu'on  nomme  douleur 
et  chatouillement,  tels  que  les  sentimens  qu'on  a  quand  on  ap- 
proche  du  feu,  ou  quand  on  touche  de  la  glace.  Secondement, 
par  la  Chaleur  et  par  la  Froideur  on  entend  le  pouvoir  que  cer- 
tains corps  ont  de  causer  en  nous  ces  deux  sentimens  dont  je  viens 
de  parler.'  He  employs  likewise  the  same  distinction  in  treating 
of  Savors  (ch.  24)— of  Odors  (ch.  25)— of  Sound  (ch.  26)— of 
Light  and  Colors  (ch.  27). 

16. — DUHAMEL. — I  quote  the  following  passage  withouj  the 
comment,  which  some  of  its  statements  might  invite,  from  the 
treatise  '  De  Corpore  Animate,'  1673,  of  this  learned  and  ingeni- 
ous philosopher.  It  contains  the  most  explicit  (though  still  a 
very  inadequate)  recognition  of  the  merits  of  Aristotle,  in  refer- 
ence to  our  present  subject,  with  which  I  am  acquainted. — '  Quo- 
circa,  ut  id,  quod  sentio,  paucis  aperiam.  Corpus  omne  sensibile 
vim  habet  in  se,  qua  sensum  moveat ;  sed  forma  ipsa,  qua  perci- 
pimus,  vel  est  motus,  vel  effluvium,  vel  quidam  substantiae  modus, 
quern  possumus  qualitatem  appellare.  Nee  sensibile  solius  quali- 
tatis  prsedicamento  continetur,  sed  per  omnia  fere  vagatur  genera. 
Corporum  enim  Figurae,  Dimensiones,  Motus,  et  varia?  Positiones 
sensum  impellunt.  Itaque  Humor  Siccitas,  Durities,  Figura,  at- 
que  alii  modi,  tales  surit,  quales  a  nobis  percipiuntur.  Rotunditas 
enirn  circuli,  vel  terra  siccitas  a  sensuum  cognitione  non  pendet. 
Idem  fortassis  erit  de  Colore,  Luce,  atque  aliis  activis  qualitatibus 


328  PHILOSOPHY (  OF    PERCEPTION. 

judicium.  Sonus  vero  nihil  est  quam  percussio  organi  ex  motione 
ae'ris,  aut  conflictu  corporum  orta.  Sapor  item  et  Odor  positi 
sunt  in  sola  sensus  impressione.  Tolle  animalia,  nullus  erit  sapor, 
nullus  odor.  Quanquam,  ut  mihi  videtur,  rem  totam  optime  dis- 
tinguit  Aristotcles,  cum  Patibilem  Qualitalem  vocat  id  quod  in 
objecto  est  sensibili,  Passionem  vero  eandern  vocat  qualitatem,  ut  a, 
nobis  percipitur?  (Lib.  i.  c.  3,  §  11.) 

17. — In  the  following  year  (1674),  was  first  published  the  cel- 
ebrated '  Recherche  de  la  Verit6'  of  MALEBRANCHE.  The  admis- 
sions already  quoted  of  his  immediate  predecessor  might  have 
guarded  him,  at  least  on  the  point  under  consideration,  from  the 
signal  injustice  of  his  attack  on  Aristotle,  the  philosophers,  and 
mankind  in  general  as  confounding  our  subjective  sensations  with 
the  objective  qualities  of  matter  ;  and  it  is  only  by  a  not  unmerit- 
ed retribution,  that  he  likewise  has  been  made  the  object  of  a 
counter  accusation,  equally  unfounded,  by  authorities  hardly  infe- 
rior to  himself.  Buffier,*  Reid,f  Royer-Collard,J  and  many  be- 
sides, reproach  Descartes,  Malebranche,  Locke,  and  others,  with 
advancing  it^  without  qualification,  as  a  new  and  an  important 
truth,  that  the  sensible  or  secondary  qualities  have  no  existence,  in 
external  objects,  their  only  existence  being  as  modes  of  the  percipient 
mind.  The  charge  by  Malebranche  in  the  following  passage,  has 
been  already  annihilated,  through  what  has  been  previously  ad- 
duced ;  and  the  passage  itself  sufficiently  disproves  the  charge 
against  Malebranche. — '  As  regards  the  terms  expressive  of  Sen- 
sible ideas,  there  is  hardly  any  one  who  recognizes  that  they  are 
equivocal.  On  this  Aristotle  and  the  ancient  philosophers  have 
not  even  bestowed  a  thought.  [!]  What  I  state  will  be  admitted 
by  all  who  will  turn  to  any  of  their  works,  and  who  are  distinctly 
cognizant  of  the  reason  why  these  terms  are  equivocal.  For  there 
is  nothing  more  evident,  than  that  philosophers  have  believed  on 
this  subject  quite  the  contrary  of  what  they  ought  to  have  be- 
lieved. [! !] 

*  Logique,  §  222,  Coure,  p.  819.  t  P.  181. 

J  (Euvres  de  Reid,  t.  iii.  pp.  386,  447. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  329 

'  For  example,  when  the  philosophers  say  that  fire  is  hot,  the 
grass  green,  the  sugar  sweet,  <fec.,  they  mean,  as  children  and  the 
vulgar  do,  that  the  fire  contains  what  they  feel  when  they  warm 
themselves ;  that  the  grass  has  on  it  the  colors  which  they  be- 
lieve to  be  there :  that  the  sugar  contains  the  sweetness  which 

'  O 

they  taste  in  eating  it ;  and  thus  of  all  the  objects  of  the  different 
senses.  It  is  impossible  to  doubt  of  it  in  reading  their  writings. 
They  speak  of  sensible  qualities  as  of  sensations  ;  they  mistake 
motions  for  heat ;  and  they  thus  confound,  by  reason  of  the  am- 
biguity of  these  terms,  the  modes  in  which  bodies  with  the  modes 
in  which  minds,  exist.  [!  ! !] 

'  It  is  only  since  the  time  of  Descartes  that  those  confused  and 
indeterminate  questions  whether  fire  be  hot,  grass  green,  sugar 
sweet,  &c.,  have  been  answered  by  distinguishing  the  ambiguity 
of  the  terms  in  which  they  are  expressed.  If  by  heat,  color,  sa- 
vor, you  understand  such  a  motion  of  the  insensible  parts,  then 
fire  is  hot,  grass  green,  and  sugar  sweet.  But  if  by  heat  and 
the  other  sensible  qualities,  you  mean  what  I  feel  when  near  the 
fire,  what  I  see  when  I  look  at  the  grass,  &c.,  in  that  case  the 
fire  is  not  hot,  nor  the  grass  green,  &c. ;  «for  the  heat  I  feel  and 
the  color  I  see  are  only  in  the  soul.'  (Recherche,  liv.  vi.  P.  ii. 
c.  2.) 

Malebranche  contributed  to  a  more  precise  discrimination  be- 
tween the  objective  or  primary,  and  the  subjective  or  secondary 
qualities,  by  restricting  the  term  Idea  to  the  former,  and  the  term 
Sensation  to  the  latter.  For  though  the  other  Cartesians  soon 
distinguished,  more  accurately  than  Descartes  himself,  Idea  from 
Sensation,  and  coincided  with  Malebranche,  in  their  application 
of  the  second  ;  yet  in  allowing  Ideas  of  the  modes,  both  of  ex- 
tension and  of  thought,  they  did  not  so  precisely  oppose  it  to 
sensation  as  Malebranche,  who  only  allowed  ideas  of  extension  and 
its  modes.  (See  Recherche,  L.  iii.  P.  ii.  cc.  6,  7,  and  relative 
Eclaircissement).  It  has  not,  I  believe,  been  observed  that  Locke 
and  Leibnitz,  in  their  counter-criticisms  of  Malebranche's  theory, 
have  both  marvellously  overlooked  this  his  peculiar  distinction, 


330  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

and  its  bearing  on  his  scheme ;  and  the  former  has  moreover, 
in  consequence  of  neglecting  the  Cartesian  opposition  of  Idea  and 
Sensation  altogether,  been  guilty  of  an  egregious  mulatto  elenchi 
in  his  strictures  on  the  Cartesian  doctrine  of  Extension,  as  the 
essential  attribute  of  body.  (Essay,  B.  ii.  c.  13,  §  25.) 

18. — The '  Systeme  de  Philosophic'  of  the  celebrated  Cartesian 
SYLVAIN  REGIS  appeared  in  1690.  The  following,  among  other 
passages  of  a  similar  import,  deserve  quotation  from  the  precision 
with  which  the  whole  ambiguity  of  the  terms  expressive  of  the 
secondary  qualities  in  their  subjective  and  objective  relations,  is 
explained  and  rectified. 

'  It  is  evident  that  savors,  taken  formally,  are  nothing  else  than 
certain  sensations  (sentimens)  or  certain  perceptions  of  the  soul, 
which  are  in  the  soul  itself;  and  that  savors,  taken  for  the  physi- 
cal cause  of  formal  savors,  consist  in  the  particles  themselves  of 
the  savory  bodies,  which  according  as  they  differ  in  size,  in  figure, 
and  in  motion,  diversely  affect  the  nerves  of  the  tongue,  and  there- 
by cause  the  sensation  of  different  savors  in  the  soul  in  virtue  of 
its  union  with  the  body.'  This  doctrine,  as  the  author  admits, 
is  conformable  to  that  of  Aristotle,  though  not  to  that  of  his 
scholastic  followers,  '  who  maintain  that  savor  in  the  savory  body 
is  something  similar  to  the  sensation  which  we  have  of  it.' 
(Phys.  L.  viii.  P.  ii.  ch.  4.) 

The  same,  mutatis  mutandis,  is  repeated  in  regard  to  Odors 
(ch.  5),  and  to  Sounds  (ch.  7)  ;  and  so  far,  the  distinction  with 
its  expression  of  formal  as  opposed  to  virtual  is  wholly  borrowed 
from  the  Aristotelians. 

But  a  more  minute  analysis  and  nomenclature  are  given  in 
regard  to  Light  and  to  Color. 

'  The  word  Light  is  not  less  equivocal  than  those  of  Savor, 
Smell,  and  Sound  ;  for  it  is  employed  sometimes  to  express  the 
peculiar  sensation  which  the  soul  receives  from  the  impression 
made  by  luminous  bodies  on  the  eye,  and  sometimes  to  denote 
what  there  is  in  those  bodies  by  which  they  cause  in  the  soul  this 
peculiar  sensation. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  331 

'  Moreover,  as  luminous  bodies  are  not  applied  immediately  to 
the  eye,  and  as  they  act  by  the  intervention  of  certain  interme- 
diate bodies,  as  air,  water,  glass,  &c.,  whatsoever  that  may  be 
which  they  impress  on  these  media  is  also  called  Light,  but  light 
Secondary  and  Derived,  to  distinguish  it  from  that  which  is  in 
the  luminous  body,  which  last  is  styled  Primitive  or  Radical 
Light.'  (ch.  9.) 

*  We  call  the  Sensation  of  Color,  Formal  color  ;  the  quality  in 
bodies  causing  this  Sensation,  Radical  color ;  and  what  these 
bodies  impress  on  the  medium,  Derivative  color.'  (ch.  17.) 

But  this  acute  subdivision  of  objective  Light  and  Color  into 
primitive  or  radical,  and  into  secondary  or  derivative,  is  not  ori- 
ginal with  Regis,  nor  indeed  with  any  Cartesian  at  all.  It  is 
evidently  borrowed  from  the  following  passage  of  Gassendi  : — 
'  Lumen,  ut  Simplicius  ait,  est  quasi  baculus  qui  uno  sui  extreme 
a  sole  motus,  alio  extreme  oculum  moveat :  sicque  motio  in  ipso 
sole  (non  movit  quippe  nisi  moveatur)  est  ipsa  radicalis  et  quasi 
fontana  lux  ; — motio  vero  perspicui  per  omnia  spatia  a  sole  ad 
terram  extensa,  est  lux  difiusa  derivataque  ; — et  motio  in  oculo 
est  perceptio  conspectiove  ipsius  lucis.'  (Animadv.  in  x.  lib.  Diog. 
Laertii,  p.  851.)  Though  apparently  the  whole  sentence  is  here 
given  as  a  quotation  from  Simplicius  (or,  as  I  suspect,  Priscianus) 
in  his  commentary  on  the  De  Anima  of  Aristotle  ;  the  compari- 
son of  the  staff  (or  more  correctly  of  the  lever)  is  alone  his ;  and 
therefore  the  merit  of  the  distinction  in  question  would  belong 
to  Gassendi,  were  it  not  that  the  term  radical  was  an  expression 
common  in  the  Schools  as  a  synonym  of  fundamental,  and  as 
opposed  to  actual  or  formal.  The  distinction  is  thus  substan- 
tially Aristotelian. 

19. — The  Essay  of  LOCKE  on  the  Human  Understanding  was 
published  in  the  same  year  with  the  Systeme  de  Philosophic  of 
Regis, — in  1690.  His  doctrine  in  regard  to  the  attributes  of 
bodies,  in  so  far  as  these  have  power  to  produce  sensations,  or 
perceptions,  or  simple  ideas  in  us,  contains  absolutely  nothing 
new  ;  and  it  is  only  in  consequence  of  the  prevalent  ignorance  in 


332  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

regard  to  the  relative  observations  of  previous  philosophers,  that 
so  much  importance  has  been  attached  to  Locke's  speculations 
on  this  matter.  The  distinction  is,  however,  far  more  correctly 
given  by  him  than  by  many  of  those  who  subsequently  em- 
ployed it 

Neglecting  what  Locke  calls  qualities  mediately  perceivable, 
but  which  lie  altogether  beyond  the  sphere  of  sense,  being  in  re- 
ality powers,  which,  from  the  phenomena  manifested  in  certain 
bodies,  we  infer  to  exist  in  other  bodies  of  producing  these  phe- 
nomena as  their  effects — neglecting  these,  the  following  is  an  ab- 
stract of  the  doctrine  given,  at  great  length,  and  with  much  repe- 
tition, in  the  eighth  chapter  of  the  second  book  of  the  Essay. 

a. — Locke  discriminates  the  attributes  of  sensible  objects  into 
the  same  two  classes  which  had  been  established  by  all  his  prede- 
cessors. 

b. — To  the  one  of  these  he  gives  the  name  of  Primary,  to 
the  other  that  of  Secondary,  Qualities  ;*  calling  likewise  the  for- 
mer Real  or  Original,  the  latter  Imputed,  Qualities. 

Remark. — In  this  nomenclature,  of  which  Locke  is  universally 
regarded  as  the  author,  there  is  nothing  new.  Primary  or  Ori- 
ginal and  Secondary  or  Derived  Qualities  had  been  terms  applied 
by  Aristotle  and  the  Peripatetics  to  mark  a  distinction  in  the  at- 
tributes of  matter  ; — a  distinction,  however,  not  analogous  to  that 
of  Locke,  for  Aristotle's  Primary  and  Secondary  qualities  are 
exclusive  of  Locke's  Primary.f  But  Galileo  had  bestowed  the 

*  The  term  Quality  ought  to  have  been  restricted  to  the  attributes  of  the 
second  class ;  for  these  are  the  properties  of  body  as  such  or  such  body  (cor- 
poris  ut  tale  corpus),  whereas  the  others  arc  the  properties  of  body  as  body 
(corporis  ut  corpus) ;  a  propriety  of  language  which  Locke  was  among  the 
first  to  violate. 

t  Corporeal  qualities,  in  a  physical  point  of  view,  were  according  to  Aris- 
totle (Do  Gen.  et  Corr.  L.  ii.  and  Meteor.  L.  iv.) — and  the  distinction  became 
one  classical  in  the  Schools — divided  into  Primary  and  Secondary ;  the  for- 
mer being  original,  the  latter  derived. 

The  Primary  are  four  in  number,  and  all  tactile— Hot  and  Cold,  Humid 
(Liquid)  and  Dry ;  and  arc  subdivided  into  two  classes — the  two  former  being 
•iftive,  the  two  latter  passive. 

The  Secondary  arc  cither  less  or  more  properly  secondary.    The  former  arc 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  33'3 

names  of  Primary  or  Real  on  the  same  class  of  attributes  with 
Locke,  leaving,  of  course,  the  correlative  appellations  of  Seconda- 
ry, Intentional,  Ideal,  &c.,  to  be  given  to  the  other ;  while  Boyle 
had  even  anticipated  him  in  formally  imposing  the  names  of  Pri- 
mary and  Secondary  on  the  counter- classes.  It  is  indeed  wholly 
impossible  to  doubt,  from  many  remarkable  coincidences  of 
thought  and  expression,  that  Locke  had  at  least  the  relative  trea- 
tises of  his  countryman,  friend,  and  correspondent  under  his  eye  ; 
and  it  is  far  more  probable,  that  by  Boyle,  than  by  either  Aris- 
totle or  Galileo,  were  the  names  suggested,  under  which  Locke 
has  had  the  honor  of  baptizing  this  classical  distinction. 

c. — To  the  first  class  belong  Extension  (or  Bulk),  Solidity  (or 
Impenetrability),  Figure,  Motion  and.  Rest,  (or  Mobility),  Num- 
ber ;*  and  to  these  five  (or  six)  which  he  once  and  again  formally 
enumerates,  he  afterwards,  without  comment,  throws  in  Situation 
and  Texture. 


common  to  elementary  and  to  mixed  bodies ;  and  are  all  potentially  objects 
of  touch.  Of  these  Aristotle  enumerates  fourteen — the  Heavy  and  Light,  the 
Dense  and  Rare,  the  Thick  and  Thin  (Concrescent  and  Fluid),  the  Hard  and 
Soft,  the  Viscid  and  Friable,  the  Rough  and  Smooth,  the  Tenacious  and 
Slippery. — The  latter  are  Color,  Savor,  Odor  [to  which  ought  to  be  added 
Sound] — the  potential  objects  of  the  senses  of  Sight,  Taste,  Smell  [and 
Hearing]. 

This  whole  distinction  of  Qualities,  Primary  and  Secondary,  is  exclusive 
of  Locke's  class  of  Primary.  To  these,  Aristotle  would  not  indeed  have 
applied  the  term  Quality  at  all. 

Cicero  also  may  have  given  the  hint.  '  Qualitaturn  aliae  principes  (vclpri- 
mce),  alise  ex  iis  ortse,'  &c.  The  former  are  the  corporeal  elements,  the  latter 
the  bodies  constituted  by  them.  (Acad.  i.  7.) 

*  Locke  borrowed  Number  (i.  e.  Unity  or  Plurality)  from  the  Cartesians 
— Descartes  from  Aristotle.  It  corresponds  in  a  sort  with  Divisibility,  for 
which  it  has  latterly  been  exchanged.  See  Nos.  20,  21,  22,  23,  24,  25.  Locke 
is  not  therefore  primarily  liable  to  Mr.  Stewart's  censure  for  the  introduction 
of  Number  among  the  Primary  Qualities,  were  that  censure  in  itself  correct. 
But  it  is  not ;  for  Mr.  Stewart  (with  M.  Royer-Collard,  No.  25)  has  misap- 
prehended the  import  of  the  expression.  (Essays  p.  95  4°  ed.)  For  Num- 
ber is  not  used  only  for  the  measure  of  discrete  quantity,  but  likewise  for 
the  continuation  (unity)  or  discontinuation  (plurality)  of  a  percept.  The 
former  is  an  abstract  notion ;  the  latter  is  a  recognition  through  sense.1 


1  See  above,  p.  814,  note  t,  and  below,  chapter  vi.  §  i. —  W. 


334  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

Remark. — In  all  this  there  is  nothing  original.  To  take  the 
last  first : — Situation  (relative  Position  or  Ubication)  was  one  of 
the  Common  Sensibles  current  in  the  Schools.  Texture  is  by 
Boyle,  in  like  manner,  incidentally  enumerated,  though  neither 
formally  recognized  as  a  co-ordinate  quality,  nor  noticed  as  redu- 
cible to  any  other.  Solidity  or  Impenetrability  is,  to  go  no  higher, 
borrowed  from  Gassendi ;  De  la  Forge's  Solidity  is  only  the  con- 
trast of  Fluidity.  But  Solidity  and  Extension  ought  not  thus  to 
be  contradistinguished,  being  attributes  of  body  only,  as  consti- 
tuting its  one  total  property — that  of  occupying  space.*  The 
other  attributes  are  those  of  Aristotle,  Descartes,  and  the  philoso- 


*  The  term  Solidity  (rd  <rrtpt£v,  solidmn),  as  denoting  an  attribute  of  body, 
is  a  word  of  various  significations ;  and  the  non-determination  and  non-dis- 
tinction of  these  have  given  rise  to  manifold  error  and  confusion. 

First  Meaning. — In  its  most  unexclusive  signification,  the  Solid  is  that 
which  fills  or  occupies  space  (rd  I-TI^OV  r6irov).  In  this  meaning  it  is  simply 
convertible  with  Body;  and  is  opposed,  1°,  to  tho  unextended  in  all  or  in 
any  of  the  three  dimensions  of  space,  and  2°,  to  mere  extension  or  empty 
space  itself.  This  we  may  call  Solidity  simply. 

But  the  filling  of  space  may  be  viewed  in  different  phases.  The  conditions  it 
involves,  though  all  equally  essential  and  inseparable,  as  all  involving  each 
other,  may,  however,  in  thought,  be  considered  apart ;  from  different  points 
of  view,  the  one  or  the  other  may  even  be  regarded  as  the  primary ;  and  to 
these  parts  or  partial  aspects,  the  name  of  the  unexclusive  whole  may  be 
conceded.  The  occupation  of  space  supposes  two  necessary  conditions ; — 
and  each  of  these  has  obtained  the  common  name  of  Solidity,  thus  constitu- 
ting a  second  and  a  third  meaning. 

Second  Meaning. — What  is  conceived  as  occupying  space,  is  necessarily 
conceived  as  extended  in,  the  three  dimensions  of  space  (rd  rft\n  Itaarardv). 
This  is  the  phasis  of  Solidity  which  the  Geometer  exclusively  contemplates. 
Trinal  extension  has  accordingly,  by  mathematicians,  been  emphatically 
called  the  Solid ;  and  this  first  partial  Solidity  we  may  therefore  distinguish 
as  the  Mathematical,  or  rather  the  Geometrical. 

Third  Meaning. — On  the  other  hand,  what  is  conceived  as  occupying 
space,  is  necessarily  conceived  as  what  cannot  be  eliminated  from  space. 
But  this  supposes  a  power  of  resisting  such  elimination.  This  is  the 
phasis  of  solidity  considered  exclusively  from  the  physical  point  of  view. 
Accordingly,  by  the  men  of  natural  science  the  impossibility  of  com- 
pressing a  body  from  an  extended  to  an  unextended  has  been  emphati- 
cally styled  Solidity  ;  and  this  second  partial  solidity  we  may  therefore  dis- 
tinguish as  the  Physical.  The  resisting  force  here  involved  has  been  called 
the  Impenetrability  of  matter ;  but  most  improperly  and  most  ambiguously. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    PERCEPTION.  335 

phers  in  general ; — their  legitimacy  will  be  considered  in  the 
sequel. 

d. — The  principle  which  constitutes  the  preceding  qualities  into 

It  might  more  appropriately  be  termed  its  Ultimate  or  Absolute  Incompressi- 
Wity.1 

In  each  of  these  its  two  partial  significations,  Solidity  denotes  an  essential 
attribute  of  body;  and  which  soever  of  these  attributes  be  sisted  as  the 
prior,  the  other  follows,  as  a  necessary  consequent.  In  regard  to  their  pri- 
ority, opinions  are  divided.  Precedence  is  accorded  to  trinal  extension  by 
Descartes,  at  the  head  of  one  body  of  philosophers ;  to  impenetrability  by 
Leibnitz,  at  the  head  of  another.  Both  parties  are  right,  and  both  are 
wrong.  Each  is  right  as  looking  from  its  peculiar  point  of  view ;  each  is 
wrong  in  not  considering  that  its  peculiar  is  only  a  partial  point  of  view,  and 
neither  the  one  sole,  nor  even  the  one  absolutely  preferable.  From  the  psy- 
chological point  of  view,  Descartes  is  triumphant ;  for  extension  is  first  in  the 
order  of  thought.  From  the  physical  point  of  view,  Leibnitz  is  victorious  ; 
for  impenetrability  is  the  more  distinctive  attribute  of  body.  The  two 
properties,  the  two  points  of  view,  ought  not,  in  truth,  to  be  disjoined ;  and 
the  definitions  of  body  by  the  ancients  are,  as  least  exclusive,  still  the  most 
philosophical  that  have  been  given ; — TO  circxov  rtiirov,  and  rb  Tpi\fj  SiaaTarbv 
/xtr'  avriTvirias,  and  oyfos  avTirv~o;  ocrov  e(f>'  four<3. 

Locke  is  therefore  wrong,  really  and  verbally.  Really  he  is  wrong,  in  dis- 
tinguishing trinal  extension  and  impenetrability  (or  ultimate  incompressibil- 
ity)  as  two  primary  and  separate  attributes,  instead  of  regarding  them  only 
as  one-sided  aspects  of  the  same  primary  and  total  attribute — the  occu- 
pying of  space.  Each  supposes  the  other.  The  notion  of  a  thing  trinally 
extended,  eo  ipso,  excludes  the  negation  of  such  extension.  It  therefore 
includes  the  negation  of  that  negation.  Bat  this  is  just  the  assertion  of  its 
ultimate  incompressibility.  Again,  the  notion  of  a  thing  as  ultimately 
incompressible,  is  only  possible  under  the  notion  of  its  trinal  extension. 
For  body  being,  ex  hypothesi,  conceived  or  conceivable  only  as  that  which 
occupies  space ;  the  final  compression  of  it  into  what  occupies  no  space,  goes 
to  reduce  it,  either  from  an  entity  to  a  non-entity,  or  from  an  extended  to  an 
unextended  entity.  But  neither  alternative  can  be  realized  in  thought.  Not 
the  former ;  i'or  annihilation,  not  as  a  mere  change  in  an  effect,  not  as  a  mere 
resumption  of  creative  power  in  a  cause,  but  as  a  taking  out  from  the  sum 
total  of  existence,  is  positively  and  in  itself  incogitable.  Not  the  latter;  for 
the  conception  of  matter,  as  an  unextended  entity,  is  both  in  itself  inconceiv- 
able, and  ex  hypothesi  absurd.  Verbally,  Locke  is  wrong,  in  bestowing  the 
name  of  solidity,  without  a  qualification,  exclusively  on  the  latter  of  these 
two  phases ;  each  being  equally  entitled  to  it  with  the  other,  and  neither  so 
well  entitled  to  it,  without  a  difference,  as  the  total  attribute  of  which  they 
are  the  partial  expressions. — But  these  inaccuracies  of  Locke  are  not  so 
important  as  the  errors  of  subsequent  philosophers,  to  which,  however,  they 

1  See  below,  p.  356.—  W. 


336  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PEKOEPTION. 

a  separate  class,  is  that  the  mind  finds  it  impossible  to  think  any 
particle  of  matter,  as  divested  of  such  attributes. 

Remark. — In  this  criterion  Locke  was  preceded  by  Galileo. 


seem  to  have  afforded  the  occasion.  For  under  the  term  Solidity,  and  on 
the  authority  of  Locke,  there  have  been  introduced  as  primary,  certain 
qualities  of  body  to  which  in  common  language  the  epithet  Solid  is  applied, 
but  which  have  no  title  whatever  to  the  rank  in  question.  Against  this 
abuse,  it  must  be  acknowledged,  Locke  not  only  guarded  himself,  but  even 
to  a  certain  extent,  cautioned  others ;  for  he  articulately  states  that  Solidity, 
in  his  sense,  is  not  to  be  confounded  with  Hardness.  (B.  ii.  c.  4,  §4.)  It 
must,  however,  also  be  confessed,  that  in  other  passages  he  seems  to  iden- 
tify Solidity  and  Cohesion ;  while  on  Solidity  he,  at  the  same  time,  makes 
'  the  mutual  impulse,  resistance  and  protrusion  of  bodies  to  depend.'  (Ibid. 
§  5.)  But  I  am  anticipating. 

In  a  psychological  point  of  view  —  and  this  is  that  of  Locke  and 
metaphysicians  in  general  —  no  attribute  of  body  is  primary  which  is 
not  necessary  in  thought;  that  is,  which  is  not  necessarily  evolved 
out  of,  as  necessarily  implied  in,  the  very  notion  of  body.  And  such  is 
Solidity  in  the  one  total  and  the  two  partial  significations  heretofore  enu- 
merated. But  in  its  physical  application,  this  term  is  not  always  limited  to 
denote  the  ultimate  incompressibility  of  matter.  Besides  that  necessary 
attribute,  it  is  extended,  in  common  language,  to  express  other  powers  of 
resistance  in  bodies  of  a  character  merely  contingent  in  reference  to  thought. 
(See  §  ii.)  These  may  be  reduced  to  the  five  following : 

Fourth  Meaning. — The  term  Solid  is  very  commonly  employed  to  denote 
not  merely  the  absolutely,  but  also  the  relatively  incompressible,  the  Dense, 
in  contrast  to  the  relatively  compressible,  the  Eare,  or  Hollow.  (In  Latin, 
moreover,  Solldus  was  not  only  employed,  in  this  sense,  to  denote  that  a 
thing  fully  occupied  the  space  comprehended  within  its  circumference  ;  but 
likewise  to  indicate,  1°,  its  entireness  in  quantity — that  it  was  whole  or  com- 
plete ;  and,  2°,  its  entireness  in  quality — that  it  was  pure,  uniform,  homoge- 
neous. This  arose  from  the  original  identity  of  the  Latin  Kolidum  with  the 
Oscan  sollum  or  solam,  and  the  Greek  oW.  See  Festus  or  Verrius  Floccns, 
vv.  Solitavrilia  and  Sotto ;  also  J.  C.  Scaliger,  De  Subtilitate,  ex.  76.) 

Fifth  Meaning. — Under  the  Vis  Inertia,  a  body  is  said  to  be  Solid,  i.  e. 
Inert,  Stable,  Immovable,  in  proportion  as  it,  whether  in  motion  or  at 
rest,  resists,  in  general,  a  removal  from  the  place  it  would  otherwise  occupy 
in  space. 

Sixth  Meaning. — Under  Gravity,  &  body  is  said  to  be  Solid,  i.  e.  Heavy,  in 
proportion  as  it  resists,  in  particular,  a  displacement  by  being  lifted  up. 

The  two  following  meanings  fall  under  Cohesion,  the  force  with  which 
matter  resists  the  distraction  of  its  parts ;  for  a  body  is  said  in  a 

Seventh  Meaning,  to  be  Solid,  i.  e.  Hard,  in  contrast  to  Soft ;  and  in  &n 

Eighth  Meaning,  to  be  Solid,  i.  e.  Concrete,  in  opposition  to  Fluid. 

The  term  Solidity  thus  denotes  besides  the  absolute  and  necessary  prop- 
erty of  occupying  space,  simply  and  in  its  two  phases  of  Extension  and  Im- 
penetrability, also  the  relative  and  contingent  qualities  of  the  Dense,  the 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  337 

Bat  it  does  not,  alone,  suffice  to  discriminate  the  primary  from 
the  secondary  qualities.  For,  as  already  noticed,  of  two  contra- 
dictory qualities,  one  or  other  must,  on  the  logical  principle  of  ex- 
cluded1 middle,  be  attributed  to  every  object.  Thus,  odorous  or 
inodorous,  sapid  or  tasteless,  &c.,  though  not  primary  qualities, 
cannot  both  be  abstracted  in  thought  from  any  material  object ; 
and,  to  take  a  stronger  example,  color,  which,  psychologically 
speaking,  contains  within  itself  such  contradictions  (for  light  and 
darkness,  white  and  black,  are,  in  this  relation,  all  equally  colors) 
is  thus  a  necessary  concomitant  of  every  perception,  and  even 
every  imagination,  of  extended  substance  ;  as  has  been  observed 
by  the  Pythagoreans,  Aristotle,  Themistius,  and  many  others. 

e. — These  attributes  really  exist  in  the  objects,  as  they  are 
ideally  represented  to  our  minds. 

Remark, — In  this  statement  Locke  followed  Descartes ;  but 
without  the  important  qualification,  necessary  to  its  accuracy, 
under  which  Descartes  advances  it.  On  the  doctrine  of  both  phi- 
losophers, we  know  nothing  of  material  existence  in  itself;  we 
know  it  only  as  represented  or  in  idea.  When  Locke,  therefore, 
is  asked,  how  he  became  aware  that  the  known  idea  truly  repre- 
sents the  unknown  reality ;  he  can  make  no  answer.  On  the 
first  principles  of  his  philosophy,  he  is  wholly  and  necessarily 
ignorant,  whether  the  idea  does,  or  does  not,  represent  to  his 
mind  the  attributes  of  matter,  as  they  exist  in  nature.  His  as- 
sertion is,  therefore,  confessedly  without  a  warrant ;  it  transcends, 


Inert,  the  Heavy,  the  Hard,  the  Concrete ;  and  the  introduction  of  these  lat- 
ter, with  their  correlative  opposite^,  into  the  list  of  Primary  Qualities  was 
facilitated,  if  not  prepared,  by  Locke's  vacillating  employment  of  the  vague 
expression  Solid;  in  partial  designation  of  the  former.  By  Kaines,  accord- 
ingly, Gravity  and  Inertia  were  elevated  to  this  rank ;  while  Cohesion,  in  its 
various  modifications  and  degrees,  was,  by  Kames,  Eeid,  Fergusson,  Stew- 
art, Royer-Collard,  and  many  others,  not  only  recognized  as  Primary,  but 
expressly  so  recognized  as  in  conformity  with  the  doctrine  of  Locke.  See 
the  sequel  of  this  §  and  §  ii. 

1  It  is  an  axiom  in  Logic,  that  of  two  contradictory  propositions,  if  one  be 
false,  the  other  must  be  true.  This  is  called  the  principle  of  Excluded  Mid- 
dle; i.  e.  between  two  contradictories. —  W. 

15 


333  PHILOSOPHY  OF   PERCEPTION. 

ex  hypothesi,  the  sphere  of  possible  knowledge.  Descartes  is 
more  cautious.  He  only  says,  that  our  ideas  of  the  qualities  in 
question  represent  those  qualities  as  they  are,  or  as  they  may  ex- 
ist ; — '  ut  suut,  vel  saltern  esse  possunt.'  The  Cosmothetic  Ideal- 
ist can  only  assert  to  them  a  problematical  reality. 

f. — To  the  second  class  belong  those  qualities  which,  as  in  ob- 
jects themselves,  are  nothing  but  various  occult  modifications  of 
the  qualities  of  the  former  class  ;  these  modifications  possessing, 
however,  the  power  of  determining  certain  manifest  sensations  or 
ideas  in  us.  Such,  for  example,  are  colors,  sounds,  tastes,  smells, 
&c., — all,  in  a  word,  commonly  known  by  the  name  of  Sensible 
Qualities.  These  qualities,  as  in  the  reality,  are  properly  only 
powers  ;  powers  to  produce  certain  sensations  in  us.  As  in  us, 
they  are  only  sensations,  and  cannot,  therefore,  be  considered  as 
attributes  of  external  things. 

Remark. — All  this  had,  long  before  Locke,  become  mere  philo- 
sophical commonplace.  With  the  exception  of  the  dogmatical 
assertion  of  the  hypothetical  fact,  that  the  subjective  sensations 
of  the  secondary  depend  exclusively  on  the  objective  modifica- 
tions of  the  primary  qualities,  this  whole  doctrine  is  maintained 
by  Aristotle ;  while  that  hypothetical  assertion  itself  had  been  ad- 
vanced by  the  ancient  Atomists  and  their  followers  the  Epicure- 
ans, by  Galileo,  by  Descartes  and  his  school,  by  Boyle,  and  by 
modern  philosophers  in  general.  That  the  secondary  qualities, 
as  in  objects,  are  only  powers  of  producing  sensations  in  us — this, 
as  we  have  seen,  has  been  explicitly  stated,  after  Aristotle,  by  al- 
most every  theorist  on  the  subject.  But  it  was  probably  borrow- 
ed by  Locke  from  the  Cartesians. 

It  is  not  to  be  forgotten,  that  Locke  did  not  observe  the  pro- 
priety of  language  introduced  by  the  Cartesians,  of  employing 
the  term  Idea,  in  relation  to  the  primary,  the  term  Sensation,  in 
relation  to  the  secondary,  qualities.  Indeed  Locke's  whole  philo- 
sophical language  is  beyond  measure  vague,  vacillating,  and  am- 
biguous ;  in  this  respect,  he  has  afforded  the  worst  of  precedents, 
and  has  found  only  too  many  among  us  to  follow  his  example. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION.  339 

20. — PURCHOT'S  doctrine  on  this  subject  deserves  to  be  no- 
ticed— which  it  never  has  been.  It  struck  me  from  its  corres- 
pondence, in  certain  respects,  with  that  which  I  had  myself  pre- 
viously thought  out.  The  first  edition  of  his  Institutiones  Philo- 
sophicae  did  not  appear  at  Paris  until  a  year  or  two  after  the  pub- 
lication of  Locke's  Essay, — the  second  was  in  1698;  but  the 
French  cursualist  does  not  appear  to  have  been  aware  of  the  spec- 
ulations of  the  English  philosopher,  nor  does  he  refer  to  Boyle. 
His  doctrine — which  is  not  fully  stated  in  any  single  place  of  his 
work — is  as  follows : 

a. — The  one  Primary  Affection  or  Attribute  of  Body  is  Exten- 
sion. Without  this,  matter  cannot  be  conceived.  But  in  the 
notion  of  Extension  as  an  attribute  is  immediately  involved  that 
of  Solidity  or  Impenetrability,  i.  e.  the  capacity  of  filling  space  to 
the  exclusion  of  another  body. 

b. —  But  extended  substance  (eo  ipso,  solid  or  impenetrable) — 

1",  Necessarily  exists  under  some  particular  mode  of  Extension, 
in  other  words,  it  has  a  certain  magnitude  ;  and  is  Divisible  into 
parts ; 

2°,  Is  necessarily  thought  as  capable  of  Motion  and  Rest ; 

3°,  Necessarily  supposes  a  certain  Figure  ;  and  in  relation  to 
other  bodies  a  certain  Position  ; 

These  five,  1,  Magnitude  or  measure  of  extension,  involving 
Divisibility ;  2,  Motion ;  3,  Rest ;  4,  Figure ;  5,  Position  or 
Situation,^  styles  the  simple  and  secondary  attributes,  affections, 
or  qualities  which  flow  immediately  from  the  nature  of  Body,  i.  e. 
Extension. 

c. — Out  of  these  Primary  Affections  of  Body  there  are  educed, 
and  as  it  were  compounded,  other  affections  to  which  the  name 
of  Quality  in  a  more  emphatic  and  appropriate  sense  belongs  ; 
such  among  others  are  Light,  Colors,  Sounds,  Odors,  Tastes, 
and  the  Tactile  qualities,  Heat,  Cold,  Moisture,  Dryness,  &c. 
These  he  denominates  the  secondary  and  composite  qualities  or 
affections  of  Body.  (Instit.  Philos.  t  ii.  Phys.  Sectt.  i.  iv.  v.  pp. 
87,  205,  396,  ed.  4.) 


340  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 

21. — LE  CLERC  does  not  borrow  his  doctrine  on  this  head  from 
his  friend  Locke ;  and  his  point  of  view  is  not  purely  pschycologi- 
cal.  The  five  properties  common  to  all  bodies — Extension — Di- 
visibility—  Solidity  (Impenetrability)  —  Figure  —  Mobility  —  he 
very  properly  does  not  denominate  Qualities,  but  reserves  that 
name  for  what  serves  to  distinguish  bodies  from  each  other.  Un- 
der this  restriction,  he  divides  Qualities  into  Primitive  and  Deriv- 
ative. By  Primitive  he  designates  those  occult  qualities  in  body 
which  are  known  to  us  only  in  their  effects ;  as,  for  example,  the 
cause  of  Solidity.  The  Derivative,  he  says,  are  those  which  flow 
from  the  Primitive  and  affect  our  senses,  as  color,  savor,  odor, 
&c.  His  doctrine  is,  however,  neither  fully  evolved  nor  unambig- 
uously expressed.  (Clerici  Opera  Philos.  Phys.,  L.  v.  cc.  1,  6.) 

22. — LORD  KAMES,  in  the  first  edition  of  his  '  Essays  on  the 
principles  of  Morality  and  Natural  Religion,'  (1751),  touches  only 
incidentally  on  the  present  subject.  He  enumerates  Softness, 
Hardness,  Smoothness,  Roughness,  among  the  Primary  Qualities 
(p.  248) ;  and  he  was,  I  am  confident,  the  only  philosopher  be- 
fore Reid,  by  whom  this  amplification  was  sanctioned,  although 
Mr.  Stewart  has  asserted  that  herein  Reid  only  followed  the  clas- 
sification of  most  of  his  immediate  predecessors.*  (Essays, 
p.  91.)  The  second  edition  I  have  not  at  hand.  In  the  third 
and  last  (1779),  there  is  introduced  a  chapter  expressly  on 
the  distinction,  which  is  treated  of 'in  detail.  He  does  not  here 
repeat  his  previous  enumeration  ;  but  to  Size,  Figure,  Solidity 
(which  he  does  not  define),  and  Divisibility,  he  adds,  as  primary 
qualities,  Gravity,  the  Vis  Inertice,  and  the  Vis  Incita ;  the  two 
last  being  the  Vis  Incita  or  Vis  Inertine  of  Kepler  and  Newton 
divided  into  a  double  power.  See  Reid's  Correspondence,  pp.  55, 
56.  Eames  unwittingly  mixes  the  psychological  and  physical 


*  Mr.  Stewart  also  says  that  Berkeley  '  employs  the  word  Soliditity  as 
synonymous  with  Hardness  and  Resistance.'  This  is  not  correct.  Berkeley 
does  not  consider  hardness  and  resistance  as  convertible;  and  these  he 
mentions  as  two  only  out  of  three  significations  in  which,  he  thinks,  the 
term  Solidity  is  used. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION.  341 

points  of  view  ;  and  otherwise,  his  classification  in  so  far  as  origi- 
nal, is  open  to  manifold  objections.  See  the  foot-note  *  at  p.  334 
c.  and  §  ii. 

23. — REID. — We  have  seen  that  Descartes  and  Locke,  to  say 
nothing  of  other  metaphysicians,  admitted  a  fundamental  differ- 
ence between  the  primary  and  the  secondary  qualities:  the  one 
problematically,  the  other  assertorily,  maintaining,  that  the  pri- 
mary qualities,  as  known,  correspond  with  the  primary  qualities, 
as  existent :  whereas  that  the  secondary  qualities,  as  sensations  in 
us,  bear  no  analogy  to  these  qualities  as  inherent  in  matter.  On 
the  general  doctrine,  however,  of  these  philosophers,  both  classes  of 
qualities,  as  known,  are  confessedly  only  states  of  our  own  minds ; 
and,  while  we  have  no  right  from  a  subjective  affection  to  infer 
the  existence,  far  less  the  corresponding  character  of  the  existence, 
of  any  objective  reality,  it  is  evident  that  their  doctrine,  if  fairly 
evolved,  would  result  in  a  dogmatic,  or  in  a  skeptical,  negation  of 
the  primary,  no  less  than  of  the  secondary  qualities  of  body,  as 
more  than  appearances  in  and  for  us.  This  evolution  was  ac- 
cordingly soon  accomplished ;  and  Leibnitz,  Berkeley,  Hume, 
Condillac,  Kant,  Fichte,  and  others,  found  no  difficulty  in  demon- 
strating, on  the  principles  of  Descartes,  and  Locke,  and  modern 
Representation] sts  in  general,  that  our  notions  of  Space  or  Exten- 
sion, with  its  subordinate  forms  of  Figure,  Motion,  &c.,  has  no 
higher  title  to  be  recognized  as  objectively  valid,  than  our  sensa- 
tions of  Color,  of  Savor,  of  Odor ;  and  were  thus  enabled  tri- 
umphantly to  establish  their  several  schemes  of  formal  or  virtual 
idealism.  Hence  may  we  explain  the  fact  that  this  celebrated 
distinction  is  overlooked  or  superseded  in  the  speculation,  not  of 
some  merely,  but  of  all  the  more  modern  German  Schools. 

It  is  therefore  manifest  that  the  fundamental  position  of  a  con- 
sistent theory  of  dualistic  realism  is — that  our  cognitions  of  Ex- 
tension and  its  modes  are  not  wholly  ideal ; — that  although  Space 
be  a  native,  necessary,  a  priori,  form  of  imagination,  and  so  far, 
therefore,  a  mere  subjective  state,  that  there  is,  at  the  same  time, 
competent  to  us,  in  an  immediate  perception  of  external  things, 


342  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

the  consciousness  of  a  really  existent,  of  a  really  objective  ex- 
tended world.  To  demonstrate  this  was  therefore  prescribed,  as 
its  primary  problem  to  a  philosophy  which,  like  that  of  Reid, 
proposed  to  re-establish  the  philosophy  of  natural  realism — of 
common  sense,  on  a  refutation  of  every  idealism  overt  or  implied. 
Such  is  the  problem.  It  remains  for  us  to  see  how  it  was  dealt 
with. 

Reid's  doctrine,  in  regard  to  the  Primary  and  Secondary  Qual- 
ities, is  to  be  found  in  the  Inquiry,  ch.  5,  sect.  4—6,  p.  123-126, 
and  in  the  Intellectual  Powers,  Essay  ii.  ch.  17,  p.  313-318. 

In  his  enumeration  of  the  Primary  qualities  Reid  is  not  invari- 
able; for  the  list  in  the  Inquiry  is  not  identical  with  that  in  the 
Essays.  In  the  former,  without  professing  to  furnish  an  exhaust- 
ive catalogue,  he  enumerates  Extension,  Figure,  Motion,  Hard- 
ness and  Softness,  Roughness  and  Smoothness.  The  four  last  are, 
as  we  have  seen,  to  be  found,  for  the  first  time,  in  the  earliest  edi- 
tion of  Lord  Kames's  Essays  on  Morality,  which  preceded  Reid's 
Inquiry  by  thirteen  years.  In  the  latter  he  gives  another  list, 
which  he  does  not  state  to  be  an  altered  edition  of  his  own,  but 
which  he  apparently  proposes  as  an  enumeration  identical  with 
Locke's.  '  Every  one,'  he  says,  '  knows  that  Extension,  Divisibil- 
ity, Figure,  Motion,  Solidity,  Hardness,  Softness,  and  Fluidity, 
were  by  Locke  called  primary  qualities  of  body.'  In  reference  to 
himself — this  second  catalogue  omits  Roughness  and  Smoothness, 
which  were  contained  in  his  first :  and  introduces,  what  were 
omitted  in  the  first,  Divisibility  (which  Kames  had  also  latterly 
added),  Solidity,  and  Fluidity.  In  reference  to  Locke — this  and 
the  former  list  are  both  very  different  from  his.  For,  allowing 
Divisibility  to  replace  Number,  and  say  nothing  in  regard,  either 
to  the  verbal  inaccuracy  of  making  Motion  stand  for  Mobility,  or 
to  the  real  inaccuracy  of  omitting  Rest  as  the  alternative  of  Mo- 
tion ;  we  find  in  both  lists  a  series  of  qualities  unrecognized  as 
primary  by  Locke ;  or,  as  far  as  I  know,  by  any  other  philosopher 
previous  to  Lord  Kames  and  himself.  These  are  Roughness  and 
Smoothness  in  the  Inquiry ;  Fluidity  in  the  Essays ;  and  Hard- 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  343 

ness  and  Softness  in  both.  But  these  five  qualities  are  not  only 
not  to  be  ascribed  to  the  list  of  primary  qualities  by  Locke ;  they 
ought  not  to  be  viewed  as  co-ordinate  with  Extension,  Solidity 
(which  Reid  more  rigorously  than  Locke  limits  to  the  ultimate  in- 
compressibility  of  matter),  Figure,  Mobility,  and  Divisibility,  i.  e. 
not  as  primary  qualities  at  all.  Of  these  five  qualities,  the  last 
three,  as  he  himself  states  (p.  314  a),  are  only  different  degrees 
of  Cohesion  ;  and  the  first  two  are  only  modifications  of  Figure 
and  Cohesion  combined.  But  Cohesion,  as  will  be  shown  (§  ii.), 
is  not  a  character  necessarily  involved  in  our  notion  of  body  ;  for 
though  Cohesion  (and  we  may  say  the  same  of  Inertia),  in  all  its 
modes,  necessarily  supposes  the  occupation  of  space,  the  occupa- 
tion of  space  while  it  implies  a  continuity  does  not  necessarily 
imply  a  cohesion  of  the  elements  (whatever  they  may  be)  of  that 
which  occupies  space.  At  the  same  time,  the  various  resistances 
of  cohesion  and  of  inertia  cannot  be  reduced  to  the  class  of  Sec- 
ondary qualities.  It  behooves  us  therefore,  neither  with  Locke 
and  others,  to  overlook  them ;  nor  to  throw  them  in  without 
qualification  or  remark,  either  with  Descartes  among  the  Second- 
ary, or  with  Reid  among  the  Primary,  qualities.  But  of  this 
again. 

Independently  of  these  minor  differences,  and  laying  also  out 
of  account  Reid's  strictures  on  the  cruder  forms  of  the  represen- 
tative hypothesis,  as  held  by  Descartes  and  Locke,  but  which 
there  is  no  sufficient  ground  to  suppose  that  Descartes,  at  least, 
adopted ;  Reid's  doctrine  touching  the  present  distinction  cor- 
responds, in  all  essential  respects,  with  that  maintained  by  these 
two  philosophers.  He  does  not  adopt,  and  even  omits  to  notice, 
the  erroneous  criterion  of  inseparability  in  thought,  by  which 
Locke  attempts  to  discriminate  the  primary  qualities  from  the 
secondary.  Like  Descartes,  he  holds  that  our  notions  of  the  pri- 
mary qualities  are  clear  and  distinct ;  of  the  secondary,  obscure 
and  confused ;  and,  like  both  philosophers,  he  considers  that  the 
former  afford  us  a  knowledge  of  what  the  corresponding  qualities 
are  (or,  as  Descartes  cautiously  interpolates,  may  be)  in  themselves, 


344  PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION. 

while  the  latter  only  point  to  the  unknown  cause  or  occasion  of 
sensations  of  which  we  are  conscious  ourselves.  Reid  therefore 
calls  the  notion  we  have  of  the  primary  qualities,  direct ;  of  the 
secondary,  relative.  (I.  P.  313  b.)  On  this  subject  there  is,  thus, 
no  important  difference  of  opinion  between  the  three  philoso- 
phers. For  if  we  modify  the  obnoxious  language  of  Descartes 
and  Locke ;  and,  instead  of  saying  that  the  ideas  or  notions  of 
the  primary  qualities  resemble,  raerely  assert  that  they  truly  rep- 
resent, their  objects,  that  is,  afford  us  such  a  knowledge  of  their 
nature  as  we  should  have  were  an  immediate  intuition  of  the  ex- 
tended reality  in  itself  competent  to  man, — and  this  is  certainly 
all  that  one,  probably  all  that  either  philosopher,  intended, — Reid's 
doctrine  and  theirs  would  be  found  in  perfect  unison.  The  whole 
difficulty  and  dispute  on  this  point  is  solved  on  the  old  distinction 
of  similarity  in  existences  and  similarity  in  representation,  which 
Reid  and  our  more  modern  philosophers  have  overlooked.  Touch- 
ing this,  see,  as  stated  above,  the  doctrine  of  those  Schoolmen 
who  held  the  hypothesis  of  species  (p.  257  a  b) ;  and  of  those 
others  who,  equally  with  Reid,  rejected  all  representative  entities 
different  from  the  act  itself  of  cognition  (p.  257  b.  note). 

But  much  more  than  this  was  called  for  at  Reid's  hands.  His 
philosophy,  if  that  of  Natural  Realism,  founded  in  the  common 
sense  of  mankind,  made  it  incumbent  on  him  to  show,  that  we 
have  not  merely  a  notion,  a  conception,  an  imagination,  a  sub- 
jective representation — of  Extension,  for  example,  'called  up  or 
suggested?  in  some  incomprehensible  manner  to  the  mind,  on  oc- 
casion of  an  extended  object  being  presented  to  the  sense ;  but 
that  in  the  perception  of  such  an  object,  we  really  have,  as  by 
nature  we  believe  we  have,  an  immediate  knowledge  or  conscious- 
ness of  that  external  object,  as  extended.  In  a  word,  that  in  sen- 
sitive perception  the  extension,  as  known,  and  the  extension,  as 
existing,  are  convertible ;  known,  because  existing,  and  existing, 
since  known. 

Reid,  however,  unfortunately,  did  not  accomplish — did  not  at- 
tempt this.  He  makes  no  articulate  statement,  even,  that  in  per- 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  345 

ception  we  have  an  immediate  knowledge — an  objective  conscious- 
ness, of  an  extended  non-ego,  actually  existing ;  as  in  imagina- 
tion we  have  a  subjective  consciousness  of  a  mode  of  the  ego,  rep- 
resenting such  an  extended  non-ego,  and  thereby  affording  us  a 
mediate  knowledge  of  it  as  possibly  existing.  On  the  contrary 
were  we  to  interpret  his  expressions  rigidly,  and  not  in  liberal  con- 
formity with  the  general  analogy  of  his  philosophy,  we  might,  as 
repeatedly  noticed,  found  on  the  terms  in  which  he  states  his  doc- 
trine of  the  primary  qualities,  and,  in  particular,  his  doctrine  con- 
cerning our  cognition  of  extension,  a  plausible  argument  that  his 
own  theory  of  perception  is  as  purely  subjective,  and  therefore  as 
easily  reducible  to  an  absolute  Idealism,  as  that  of  any  of  the 
philosophers  whom  he  controverts. 

Thus  when  Reid,  for  example  (Inq.  123  b),  states  'that  Exten- 
sion '  is  a  quality  suggested  to  us  by  certain  sensations,'  i.  e.  by 
certain  merely  subjective  affections ;  and  when  (324  b)  he  says 
•  that  Space  [Extension]  whether  tangible  or  visible,  is  not  so 
properly  an  object  of  sense  as  a  necessary  concomitant  *  of  the 
objects  both  of  sight  and  touch ;'  he  apparently  denies  us  all  im- 
mediate perception  of  any  extended  reality.  But  if  we  are  not 
percipient  of  any  extended  reality,  we  are  not  percipient  of  body 
as  existing ;  for  body  exists,  and  can  only  be  known  immediately 
and  in  itself,  as  extended.  The  material  world,  on  this  supposi- 
tion, sinks  into  something  unknown  and  problematical ;  and  its 
existence,  if  not  denied,  can,  at  best,  be  only  precariously  affirmed, 
as  the  occult  cause,  or  incomprehensible  occasion,  of  certain  sub- 
jective affections  we  experience  in  the  form,  either  of  a  sensation 
of  the  secondary  quality,  or  of  a  perception  of  the  primary. 


1  'According  to  Eeid,  Extension  (Space)  ia  a  notion  a  posteriori,  the  result 
of  experience.  According  to  Kant,  it  is  a  priori;  experience  only  affording 
the  occasions  required  by  the  mind  to  exert  the  facts,  of  which  the  intuition 
of  space  is  a  condition.  To  the  former  it  is  thus  a  contingent:  to  the  latter, 
a  necessary  mental  possession.' —  W. 

*  '  It  seemingly  requires  but  little  to  rise  to  Kant's  view  of  the  conception 
of  space  as  an  a, priori,  or  native  form  of  thought.' —  W. 

15* 


34:6  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

Thus  interpreted,  what  is  there  to  distinguish  the  doctrine  of  Reid 
from  the  undeveloped  idealism  of  Descartes  or  of  Kant  ? ' 

Having  noticed  the  manifest  incongruity  of  Reid's  doctrine  on 
this  point  with  the  grand  aim  of  his  philosophy, — an  incongruity 
which  I  am  surprised  has  not  been  long  ago  adverted  to  either 
by  friend  or  foe, — I  may  take  this  opportunity  of  modifying  a 
former  statement  (p.  123  b,  note*),8 — that,  according  to  Reid, 
Space  is  a  notion  a  posteriori,  the  result  of  experience.  On  re- 
considering more  carefully  his  different  statements  on  this  subject 
(Inq.  123  sq.  I.  P.  324  sq.),  I  am  now  inclined  to  think  that  his 
language  implies  no  more  than  the  chronological  posteriority  of 
this  notion ;  and  that  he  really  held  it  to  be  a  native,  necessary,  a 
priori  form  of  thought,  requiring  only  certain  prerequisite  condi- 
tions to  call  it  from  virtual  into  manifest  existence.  I  am  con- 
firmed in  this  view  by  finding  it  is  also  that  of  M.  Royer-Collard. 
Mr.  Stewart  is  however  less  defensible,  when  he  says,  in  opposi- 
tion to  Kant's  doctrine  of  Space — 'I  rather  lean  to  the  common 
theory  which  supposes  our  first  ideas  of  Space  or  Extension  to  be 
formed  by  oilier  qualities  of  matter.'  (Dissertation,  <fec.  p.  281, 
2d  ed.) 

Passing  over  the  less  important  observations  of  several  inter- 
mediate philosophers  in  the  wake  of  Reid,  I  proceed  to  the  most 
distinguished  of  his  disciples. 

•24. — STEWART,  while  he  agrees  with  his  master  in  regard  to 
the  contrast  of  Primary  and  Secondary  Qualities,  proposes  the 
following  subdivision,  and  change  of  nomenclature  in  reference  to 
the  former.  '  I  distinguish,'  he  says,  '  Extension  and  Figure  by 
the  title  of  mathematical  affections  of  matter',  restricting  the 
phrase  primary  qualities  to  Hardness  and  Softness,  Roughness 
and  Smoothness,  and  other  properties  of  the  same  description. 
The  line  which  I  would  draw  between  primary  and  secondary 
qualities  is  this ;  that  the  former  necessarily  involve  the  notion  of 


1  Sec  above,  chapter  iii.  §  ii.  p.  270,  sq. —  W, 
*  See  note  1,  on  the  preceding  page. —  W. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  34T 

extension,  and  consequently  of  externality  or  outness ;  whereas 
the  latter  are  only  conceived  as  the  unknown  causes  of  known 
sensations ;  and  when  first  apprehended  by  the  mind  do  not  im- 
ply the  existence  of  any  thing  locally  distinct  from  the  subjects  of 
its  own  self-consciousness.'  (Essays,  p.  94.) 

The  more  radical  defects  of  this  ingenious  reduction  are,  as  they 
appear  to  me,  the  following  : 

1°.  That  it  does  not  depart  from  the  central  notion  of  body — 
from  Solidity  Absolute,  the  occupying  of  space.  .(See  p.  334  c, 
note  *.)  In  logical  propriety  Extension  and  Figure  are  not  prox- 
imately  attributes  of  body  but  of  space ;  and  belong  to  body  only 
as  filling  space.  Body  supposes  them ;  they  do  not  suppose 
body;  and  the  inquiry  is  wholly  different  in  regard  to  the  nature 
of  extension  and  figure  as  space,  and  of  the  extended  and  figured 
as  body. 

2°.  This  original  defect  in  the  order  of  evolution,  has  led,  how- 
ever, to  more  important  consequences.  Had  Mr.  Stewart  looked 
at  Extension  (Solidity  Mathematical),  as  a  property  of  body,  in 
virtue  of  body  filling  space,  he  would  not  only  not  have  omitted, 
but  not  have  omitted  as  an  attribute  co-ordinate  with  extension, 
the  Ultimate  Incompressibility  or  Impenetrability  of  body  (Sol- 
idity Physical). 

3°.  But  while  omitting  this  essential  property,  the  primary 
qualities  which,  after  Reid,  he  enumerates  (Hardness,  Softness, 
Roughness,  Smoothness),  are,  as  already  noticed,  and  to  be  here- 
after shown,  not  primary,  not  being  involved  in  the  necessary 
notion  of  body.  For  these  are  all  degrees  or  modifications  of 
Cohesion  ;  but  a  Cohesion  of  its  ultimate  elements  it  is  not  ne- 
cessary to  think  as  a  condition  or  attribute  of  matter  at  all.  See 
§  ii.  Moreover,  Roughness  and  Smoothness,  as  more  than  the 
causes  of  certain  sensations  in  us,  therefore  only  secondary  quali- 
ties, are  modifications,  not  only  of  Cohesion,  but  of  Figure,  and 
would,  therefore,  on  Mr.  Stewart's  distribution,  fall  under  the  cat- 
egory of  the  Mathematical  Affections  of  Body. 

As  regards  the  great  problem  of  Natural  Realism, — to  prove 


348  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

that  we  have  an  immediate  perception  of  the  primary  qualities  of 
body, — this  was  left  by  Mr.  Stewart  where  it  was  left,  by  Reid. 

25. — The  last  philosopher  to  be  adduced  is  the  illustrious 
founder  of  the  Scoto-Gallican  School,  M.  ROYER-COLLARD.  The 
sum  of  his  doctrine  touching  the  Primary  Qualities  is  given  in 
the  following  passage,  which  I  translate  from  the  Fragments  of 
his  Lectures,  published  by  M.  Jouffroy  as  Appendices  to  his  ver- 
sion of  the  Works  of  Reid  (Vol.  iii.  p.  429  sq.) ; — Fragments 
which,  with  M.  Jouffroy's  general  Preface,  I  have  reason  to  hope 
will  be  soon  given  to  the  British  public  by  a  translator  eminently 
qualified  for  the  task.  My  observations  I  find  it  most  convenient 
to  subjoin  in  the  form  of  notes ;  and  admiring  as  I  do  both  the 
attempt  itself  and  the  ability  of  its  author,  I  regret  to  differ  here 
so  widely,  not  only  from  the  doctrines  which  M.  Royer-Collard 
holds  in  common  with  other  philosophers,  but  from  those  which 
are  peculiar  to  himself.  On  the  former,  however,  in  so  far  as, 
with  his  more  immediate  predecessors,  he  confounds  in  one  class 
qualities  which  I  think  ought  to  be  discriminated  into  two,  I 
deem  it  unnecessary  to  make  any  special  comment ;  as  this  mat- 
ter, which  has  been  already  once  and  again  adverted  to,  is  to  be 
more  fully  considered  in  the  sequel.  (§  ii.)  As  to  the  latter,  it 
will  be  seen  that  the  more  important  differences  arise  from  the 
exclusive  point  of  view  from  which  M.  Royer-Collard  has  chosen 
to  consider  the  Qualities  in  question. 

'  Among  the  Primary  Qualities,  that  of  Number  is  peculiar  to 
Locke.*  It  is  evident  that  Number,  far  from  being  a  quality  of 
matter,  is  only  an  abstract  notion,  the  work  of  intellect  and  not 
of  sense.f 


*  Number  is,  with  Locke,  common  to  Aristotle  and  the  Aristotelians, 
Galileo,  Descartes,  and  the  Cartesians,  &c. 

t  Number,  as  an  abstract  notion,  is  certainly  not  an  object  of  sense.  But 
it  was  not  as  an  abstract  notion  intended  by  the  philosophers  to  denote  an 
attribute  of  Body.  This  tnisprision  was  expressly  guarded  against  by  the 
Aristotelians.  See  Tolctus  in  Arintotelcm  Do  Anima,  L.  ii.  c.  6,  qn.  15. 
Number  may  be  said  to  correspond  to  Divisibility ;  see  p.  315  a,  and  p.  884 
a.  If  it  cannot  be  said  that  sense  is  percipient  of  objocte  as  many,  it  can- 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION.  349 

'  Divisibility  is  proper  to  Reid.*  On  this  quality  and  Mobility 
I  will  observe,  that  neither  ought  to  have  been  placed  among  the 
qualities  manifested  through  sense ;  and  yet  this  is  what  Reid  un- 
derstands by  the  Primary  Qualities,  for  he  distinguishes  them 
from  the  Secondary  by  this — that  we  have  of  the  former  a  direct 
notion.f  Divisibility  is  known  to  us  by  division ;  and  a  body 
divided  is  known  to  us,  as  such,  by  memory.  For  did  we  not 
recollect  that  it  had  previously  been  one,  we  should  not  know  that 
it  is  at  present  two  ;  we  should  be  unable  to  compare  its  present 
with  its  past  state ;  and  it  is  by  this  comparison  alone  that  we 
become  aware  of  the  fact  of  division.  Is  it  said  that  the  notion 
of  Divisibility  is  not  acquired  by  the  fact  of  division,  but  that  it- 
presents  itself  immediately  to  the  mind  prior  to  experience  ?  In 
this  case  it  is  still  more  certain  that  it  is  not  a  cognition  proper  to 
sense.J 

not  be  said  to  be  percipient  of  an  object  as  one.  Perception,  moreover,  is  a 
consciousness,  and  consciousness  is  only  realized  under  the  condition  of  plu- 
rality and  difference.  Again,  if  we  deny  that  through  sense  we  perceive  a 
plurality  of  colors,  we  must  deny  that  through  sense  we  perceive  a  figure  or 
even  a  line.  And  if  three  bodies  are  not  an  object  of  sense,  neither  ia  a  tri- 
angle. Sense  and  intellect  cannot  thus  be  distinguished. 

*  Sundry  philosophers  preceded  Eeid  in  making  Divisibility  (which  cor- 
responds also  to  Number)  one  of  the  Primary  Qualities.  See  Nos.  20,  21,  22. 

t  M.  Eoyer-Collard  not  only  takes  his  point  of  view  exclusively  from 
Sense ;  but  sense  he  so  limits,  that,  if  rigorously  carried  out,  no  sensible 
perception,  as  no  consciousness,  could  be  brought  to  bear.  The  reason  he 
gives  why  Eeid  must  be  held  as  of  the  same  opinion,  I  do  not  understand. 
Psychologically  speaking,  an  attribute  would  not  be  primary  if  it  could  be 
thought  away  from  body  ;  and  the  notion  of  body  being  supposed  given, 
every  primary  quality  is  to  be  evolved  out  of  that  notion,  as  necessarily  in- 
volved in  it,  independently  altogether  of  any  experience  of  sense.  In  this 
respect,  such  quality  is  an  object  of  intellect.  At  the  same  time,  a  primary 
quality  would  not  be  an  attribute  of  body,  if  it  could  not,  contingently,  to 
some  extent,  at  least,  be  apprehended  as  an  actual  phenomenon  of  sense.  In 
this  respect,  such  quality  is  an  object  of  perception  and  experience. 

t  I  am  afraid  that  this,  likewise,  is  a  misapprehension  of  the  meaning  of 
the  philosophers.  Divisibility,  in  their  view,  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  pro- 
cess of  dividing.  It  denotes  either  the  alternative  attribute,  applicable  to  all 
body,  of  unity  or  plurality;  or  the  possibility  that  every  single  body  may,  as 
extended,  be  sundered  into  a  multitude  of  extended  parts.  Every  material 
object  being  thus,  though  actually  one,  always  potentially  many,  it  is  thus 
convertible  with  Number ;  see  foot-note  t. 


350  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

• 

'  As  to  the  notion  of  Mobility  it  is  evidently  posterior  to  that 
of  motion  ;*  that  of  motion  supposes  not  less  evidently  the  exer- 
cise of  memory  and  the  idea  of  time  ;  it  is  thus  not  derived  exclu- 
sively from  sense.f  As  Divisibility  also  supposes  motion,  this 
again  is  an  additional  proof  that  the  notion  of  divisibility  is  not 
immediate. 

'  Figure  is  a  modification  of  Extension. 

'  Solidity,  Impenetrability,  Resistance,  are  one  and  the  same 
thing ;:}:  Hardness,  Softness,  Fluidity,  are  modifications  of  Solid- 
ity and  its  different  degrees  ;  while  the  Roughness  and  Smooth- 
ness of  surfaces  express  only  sensations  attached  to  certain  per- 
ceptions of  Solidity. 

'The  Primary  Qualities  may  be  thus  generalized,  if  I  may  so 
express  myself,  into  Extension  and  Solidity.1 


The  distinction  of  these  different  classes  of  material  qualities 
has,  as  already  noticed,  no  real  importance,  no  real  foundation, 
on  the  hypothesis  of  Idealism,  whether  absolute  or  cosmothetic, 
— in  no  philosophy,  indeed,  but  that  of  Natural  Realism ;  and 
its  recognition,  in  the  systems  of  Descartes  and  Locke,  is,  therefore, 
with  them  a  superficial  observation,  if  not  a  hors  d'oeuvre.  It 
was,  accordingly,  with  justice  formally  superseded,  because  virtu- 
ally null,  in  the  philosophy  of  Leibnitz,  the  complement  of  the 
Cartesian,  and  in  the  philosophy  of  Condillac,  the  complement 


*  Mobility,  as  applied  in  this  relation,  is  merely  a  compendious  expression 
for  the  alternative  attributions  of  motion  or  rest;  and  both  of  these,  as  possi- 
ble attributes,  are  involved  in  the  notion  of  body.  See  §  ii.  of  this  Excursus. 

t  Compare  above  pp.  312-314.  But  Perception  can  no  more  be  separated 
from  all  memory  than  from  all  judgment;  for  consciousness  involves  both. 

J  This  is  only  correct  from  M.  Royer-Collard's  exclusive  point  of  view — 
from  sense  alone.  On  the  various  meanings  of  the  term  Solidity,  see  p.  334, 
note  *.  The  confusion  also  resulting  from  the  ambiguity  of  the  word  Impen- 
etrability as  denoting  both  a  resistance  absolute  and  insuperable,  and  a  resist- 
ance relative  and  superable,  both  what  is  necessary,  and  what  is  contingent 
to  body,  is  here  shown,  either  in  the  reduction  to  a  single  category  of  quali- 
ties of  a  wholly  heterogeneous  character,  or  in  the  silent  elimination  of  the 
higher. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  351 

of  the  Lockian.  The  Kantian  system,  again,  is  built  on  its  pos- 
itive negation,  or  rather  its  positive  reversal.  For  Kant's  tran- 
scendental Idealism  not  only  contains  a  general  assertion  of  the 
subjectivity  of  all  our  perceptions ;  its  distinctive  peculiarity  is, 
in  fact,  its  special  demonstration  of  the  absolute  subjectivity  of 
Space  or  Extension,  and  in  general  of  the  primary  attributes  of 
matter  ;  these  constituting  what  he  calls  the  Form,  as  the  Second- 
ary constitutes  what  he  calls  the  Matter,  of  our  Sensible  intuitions. 
(See,  in  particular,  Proleg.,  §  13,  Anm.  2.)  This,  I  repeat,  may 
enable  us  to  explain  why  the  discrimination  in  question  has,  both 
in  the  intcllectualism  of  Germany  and  in  the  sensualism  of 
France,  been  so  generally  overlooked ;  and  why,  where  in  rela- 
tion to  those  philosophers  by  whom  the  distinction  has  been 
taken,  any  observations  on  the  point  have  been  occasionally 
hazarded  (as  by  Tetens  with  special  reference  to  Reid),  that  these 
are  of  too  perfunctory  a  character  to  merit  any  special  commem- 
oration.* 

Such,  then,  are  the  forms  under  which  the  distinction  of  the 


*  To  this  also  are  we  to  attribute  it,  that  the  most  elaborate  of  the  recent 
histories  of  philosophy  among  the  Germans,  slur  over,  if  they  do  not  positive- 
ly misconceive,  the  distinction  in  question.  In  the  valuable  expositions  of 
the  Cartesian  doctrine  by  the  two  distinguished  Hegelians,  Feuerbnch  and 
Erdmann,  it  obtains  from  the  one  no  adequate  consideration,  from  the 
other  no  consideration  at  all.  In  the  Lectures  on  the  History  of  Philosophy 
by  their  illustrious  master,  a  work  in  which  the  erudition  is  often  hardly  less 
remarkable  than  the  force  of  thought,  almost  every  statement  in  reference  to 
the  subject  is,  to  say  the  least  of  it,  inaccurate.  Hegel,  as  he  himself  em- 
ploys, apparently  makes  Aristotle  and  Descartes  employ,  the  term  Solidity 
simply  for  Hardness.  This, however, neither  one  nor  other  ever  does;  while 
by  Locke,  the  terms  are  even  expressly  distinguished.  (Vol.  iii.  pp.  360, 
431.)  He  confounds  Descartes'  distinction  (baptized  by  Locke  that)  of  the 
Primary  and  Secondary  qualities,  with  Descartes'  distinction  of  the  Primi- 
tive and  Derivative  attributes  of  body ;  distinctions  not  coincident,  though 
not  opposed.  Figure,  for  example,  in  the  one  is  primary,  but  not  in  the 
other  primitive.  In  regard  to  his  criticism  of  Locke  (p.  431),  suffice  it  to 
say,  that  Locke,  so  far  from  opposing,  in  fact  follows  Descartes  in  making 
'Figure  and  so  forth'  primary  qualities;  nor  does  Descartes  denominate 
any  class  of  qualities  'secondary.' — (pp.  359,  430.)  Finally  Aristotle's  dis- 
tinction of 'external  qualities'  into  primary  and  secondary,  if  this  be  re- 
ferred ta,  corresponds  with  that  so  styled  by  Locke  only  in  the  name. 


352  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

Primary  and  Secondary  Qualities  of  the  Body  has  been  pre- 
sented, from  its  earliest  promulgation  to  its  latest  development. 
In  this  historical  survey,  I  have  to  acknowledge  no  assistance 
from  the  researches  of  preceding  inquirers;  for  what  I  found 
already  done  in  this  respect  was  scanty  and  superficial,  even 
when  not  positively  erroneous.  Every  thing  had  thus  anew  to 
be  explored  and  excavated.  The  few  who  make  a  study  of  philos- 
ophy in  its  sources,  can  appreciate  the  labor  of  such  a  research  ; 
and  from  them,  at  least,  I  am  sure  of  indulgence  for  the  imper- 
fections of  what  I  offer  not  as  a  history,  but  as  a  hasty  collection 
of  some  historical  materials. 

§  II. — DISTINCTION  OF  THE  PRIMARY  AND  SECONDARY  QUALITIES 

OF    BODY  CRITICALLY  CONSIDERED. 

From  what  has  been  said  in  the  foregoing  section,  it  will  be 
seen  that  I  am  by  no  means  satisfied  with  the  previous  reduction 
of  the  Qualities  of  Body  to  two  classes  of  Primary  and  Secondary. 
Without  preamble,  I  now  go  on  to  state  what  I  deem  their  true 
and  complete  classification  ;  limiting  the  statement,  however,  to 
little  more  than  an  enouncement  of  the  distribution  and  its  princi- 
ples, not  allowing  myself  to  enter  on  an  exposition  of  the  correla- 
tive doctrine  of  perception,  and  refraining,  in  general,  from  much 
that  I  might  be  tempted  to  add,  by  way  of  illustration  and 
support. 

The  Qualities  of  body  I  divide  into  three  classes. 

Adopting  and  adapting,  as  far  as  possible,  the  previous  nomen- 
clature— the  first  of  these  I  would  denominate  the  class  of  Pri- 
mary, or  Objective,  Qualities  ;  the  second,  the  class  of  Secundo- 
Primary,  or  Subjective-  Objective,  Qualities  ;  the  third,  the  class 
of  Secondary,  or  Subjective,  Qualities. 

The  general  point  of  view  from  which  the  Qualities  of  Matter 
are  here  considered  is  not  the  Physical,  but  the  Psychological. 
But,  under  this,  the  ground  of  principle  on  which  these  qualities 
are  divided  and  designated  is,  again,  two-fold.  There  are,  in 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  353 

fact,  within  the  psychological,  two  special  points  of  view ;  that  of 
Sense,  and  that  of  Understanding.  Both  of  these  ought  to  be 
taken,  but  taken  separately,  into  account  in  a  classification  like 
the  present ;  and  not,  as  has  been  often  done,  either  one  only 
adopted,  or  both  fortuitously  combined.  Differing,  however,  as 
these  widely  do  from  each  other,  they  will  be  found  harmonious- 
ly to  conspire  in  establishing  the  three-fold  distribution  and  no- 
menclature of  the  qualities  in  question  which  I  have  ventured  to 
propose. 

The  point  of  view  chronologically  prior,  or  first  to  us,  is  that 
of  Sense.  The  principle  of  division  is  here  the  different  circum- 
stances under  which  the  qualities  are  originally  and  immediately 
apprehended.  On  this  ground,  as  apprehensions  or  immediate 
cognitions  through  Sense,  the  Primary  are  distinguished  as 
objective,  not  subjective,*  as  percepts  proper,  not  sensations 
proper  ;  the  Secundo-primary,  as  objective  and  subjective,  as  per- 
cepts proper  and  sensations  proper  ;  the  Secondary,  as  subjective, 
not  objective,  cognitions,  as  sensations  proper,  not  percepts 
proper. 

The  other  point  of  view  chronologically  posterior,  but  first  in 
nature,  is  that  of  Understanding.  The  principle  of  division  is 
here  the  different  character  under  which  the  qualities,  already 
apprehended,  are  conceived  or  construed  to  the  mind  in  thought. 
On  this  ground,  the  Primary,  being  thought  as  essential  to  the 
notion  of  Body,  are  distinguished  from  the  Secundo-primary  and 
Secondary,  as  accidental ;  while  the  Primary  and  Secundo-pri- 
mary, being  thought  as  manifest  or  conceivable  in  their  own 
nature,  are  distinguished  from  the  Secondary,  as  in  their  own 


*  All  knowledge,  in  one  respect,  is  subjective;  for  all  knowledge  is  an 
energy  of  the  Ego.  But  when  I  perceive  a  quality  of  the  Non-Ego,  of  the 
object-object,  as  in  immediate  relation  to  my  mind,  I  am  said  to  have  of  it 
an  objective  knowledge  ;  in  contrast  to  the  subjective  knowledge,  I  am  said  to 
have  of  it  when  supposing  it  only  as  the  hypothetical  or  occult  cause  of  an 
affection  of  which  I  am  conscious,  or  thinking  it  only  mediately  through  a 
subject-object  or  representation  in,  and  of,  the  mind.  But  see  below,  in 
foot-note  to  Par.  15,  and  first  foot-note  to  Par.  18. 


354  PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION. 

nature  occult  and  inconceivable.  For  the  notion  of  Matter  having 
been  once  acquired,  by  reference  to  that  notion,  the  Primary 
Qualities  are  recognized  as  its  a  priori  or  necessary  constituents ; 
and  we  clearly  conceive  how  they  must  exist  in  bodies  in  know- 
ing what  they  are  objectively  in  themselves ;  the  Secuudo-primacy 
Qualities,  again,  are  recognized  as  a  posteriori  or  contingent 
modifications  of  the  Primary,  and  we  clearly  conceive  how  they 
do  exist  in  bodies  in  knowing  what  they  are  objectively  in  their 
conditions ;  finally,  the  Secondary  Qualities  are  recognized  as  a 
posteriori  or  contingent  accidents  of  matter,  but  we  obscurely 
surmise  how  they  may  exist  in  bodies  only  as  knowing  what  they 
are  subjectively  in  their  effects. 

It  is  thus  apparent  that  the  primary  qualities  may  be  deduced 
a  priori,  the  bare  notion  of  matter  being  given ;  they  being,  in 
fact,  only  evolutions  of  the  conditions  which  that  notion  neces- 
sarily implies :  whereas  the  Secundo-primary  and  Secondary 
must  be  induced  a  posteriori ;  both  being  attributes  contingent- 
ly superadded  to  the  naked  notion  of  matter.  The  Primary 
Qualities  thus  fall  more  under  the  point  of  view  of  understand- 
ing, the  Secundo-primary  and  Secondary  more  under  tho  point 
of  view  of  Sense. 

Deduction  of  the  Primary  Qualities. — Space  or  extension  is  a 
necessary  form  of  thought.  We  cannot  think  it  as  non-existent ; 
we  cannot  but  think  it  as  existent.  But  we  are  not  so  necessi- 
tated to  imagine  the  reality  of  aught  occupying  space  ;  for  while 
unable  to  conceive  as  null  the  space  in  which  the  material  uni- 
verse exists,  the  material  universe  itself  we  can,  without  difficulty, 
annihilate  in  thought.  All  that  exists  in,  all  that  occupies  space, 
becomes,  therefore,  known  to  us  by  experience :  we  acquire,  we 
construct,  its  notion.  The  notion  of  space  is  thus  native,  or  a 
priori  ;  the  notion  of  what  space  contains,  adventitious,  or  a  pos- 
teriori. Of  this  latter  class  is  that  of  Body  or  Matter. 

But  on  the  hypothesis,  always,  that  body  lias  been  empirically 
apprehended,  that  its  notion  has  been  acquired ; — What  are  the 
a  priori  characters  in  and  through  which  we  must  conceive  that 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION.  355 

notion,  if  conceived  it  be  at  all,  in  contrast  to  the  a  posteriori 
characters  under  which  we  may,  and  probably  do,  conceive  it,  but 
under  which,  if  we  conceive  it  not,  still  the  notion  itself  stands 
unannihilated  ?  In  other  words,  what  are  the  necessary  or  essen- 
tial, in  contrast  to  the  contingent  or  accidental  properties  of 
Body,  as  apprehended  and  conceived  by  us  ?  The  answer  to  this 
question  affords  the  class  of  Primary,  as  contradistinguished  from 
the  two  classes  of  Secundo-primary  and  Secondary  Qualities. 

Whatever  answer  may  be  accorded  to  the  question — How  do 
we  come  by  our  knowledge  of  Space  or  trinal  extension  ?  it  will 
be  admitted  on  all  hands,  that  whether  given  solely  a  priori  as  a 
native  possession  of  the  mind,  whether  acquired  solely  a  posteri- 
ori as  a  generalization  from  the  experience  of  sense,  or  whether, 
as  I  would  maintain,  we  at  once  must  think  Space  as  a  necessary 
notion,  and  do  perceive  the  extended  in  space  as  an  actual  fact ; 
still,  on  any  of  these  suppositions,  it  will  be  admitted,  that  we  are 
only  able  to  conceive  Body  as  that  which  (I.)  occupies  space,  and 
(II.)  is  contained  in  space. 

But  these  catholic  conditions  of  body,  though  really  simple,  are 
logically  complex.  We  may  view  them  in  different  aspects  or 
relations,  which,  though  like  the  sides  and  angles  of  a  triangle, 
incapable  of  separation,  even  in  thought,  supposing  as  they  do 
each  other,  may  still,  in  a  certain  sort,  be  considered  for  them- 
selves, and  distinguished  "by  different  appellations. 

I. — The  property  of  filling  space  (Solidity  in  its  unexclusive 
signification,  Solidity  Simple)  implies  two  correlative  conditions  : 
(A)  the  necessity  of  trinal  extension,  in  length,  breadth,  and  thick- 
ness (Solidity  geometrical)  ;  and  (B)  the  corresponding  impossi- 
bility of  being  reduced  from  what  is  to  what  is  not  thus  extended 
(Solidity  Physical,  Impenetrability). 

A. — Out  of  the  absolute  attribute  of  Trinal  Extension  may  be 
again  explicated  three  attributes,  under  the  form  of  necessary  re 
lations  : — (i.)  Number  or  Divisibility  ;  (ii.)  Size,  Bulk,  or  Mag- 
nitude ;  (iii.)  Shape  or  Figure. 

i. — Body  necessarily  exists,  and  is  necessarily  known,  either  as 


356  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

one  body  or  as  many  bodies.  Number,  i.  e.  the  alternative  attri- 
bution of  unity  or  plurality,  is  thus,  in  a  first  respect,  a  primary 
attribute  of  matter.  But  again,  every  single  body  is  also,  in  dif- 
ferent points  of  view,  at  the  same  time  one  and  many.  Consid- 
ered as  a  whole,  it  is,  and  is  apprehended,  as  actually  one ;  con- 
sidered as  an  extended  whole,  it  is,  and  is  conceived,  potentially 
many.  Body  being  thus  necessarily  known,  if  not  as  already 
divided,  still  as  always  capable  of  division,  Divisibility  or  Num- 
ber is  thus  likewise,  in  a  second  respect,  a  primary  attribute  of 
matter.  (See  p.  314  a.) 

ii. — Body  (multo  majus  this  or  that  body)  is  not  infinitely  ex- 
tended. Each  body  must  therefore  have  a  certain  finite  exten- 
sion, which  by  comparison  with  that  of  other  bodies  must  be  less^ 
or  greater,  or  equal ;  in  other  words,  it  must  by  relation  have  a 
certain  Size,  Bulk,  or  Magnitude ;  and  this,  again,  as  estimated 
both  (a)  by  the  quantity  of  space  occupied,  and  (b)  by  the  quan- 
tity of  matter  occupying,  affords  likewise  the  relative  attributes 
of  Dense  and  Rare. 

iii. — Finally,  bodies,  as  not  infinitely  extended,  have,  conse- 
quently, their  extension  bounded.  But  bounded  extension  is  ne- 
cessarily of  a  certain  Shape  or  Figure. 

B. — The  negative  notion — the  impossibility  of  conceiving  the 
compression  of  body  from  an  extended  to  an  unextended,  its  elim- 
ination out  of  space — affords  the  positive  notion  of  an  insupera- 
ble power  in  body  of  resisting  such  compression  or  elimination. 
This  force,  which,  as  absolute,  is  a  conception  of  the  understand- 
ing, not  an  apprehension  through  sense,  has  received  no  precise 
and  unambiguous  name ;  for  Solidity,  even  with  the  epithet 
Physical,  and  Impenetrability  and  Extreity  are  vague  and  equiv- 
ocal.— (See  p.  334  c,  note  *.)  We  might  call  it,  as  I  have  said, 
Ultimate  or  Absolute  Incompressibility.  It  would  be  better, 
however,  to  have  a  positive  expression  to  denote  a  positive  no- 
tion, and  we  might  accordingly  adopt,  as  a  technical  term,  Autan- 
titypy.  This  is  preferable  to  Antitypy  (avriruiria),  a  word  in 
Greek  applied  not  only  to  this  absolute  and  essential  resistance 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PEKCEPTTON.  357 

of  matter,  qua  matter,  but  also  to  the  relative  and  accidental  re- 
sistances from  cohesion,  inertia,  and  gravity. 

II. — The  other  most  general  attribute  of  matter — that  of  being 
contained  in  space — in  like  manner  affords,  by  explication,  an 
absolute  and  a  relative  attribute  :  viz.  (A)  the  Mobility,  that  is, 
the  possible  motion,  and,  consequently,  the  possible  rest,  of  a 
body ;  and  (B)  the  Situation,  Position,  Ubication,  that  is,  the 
local  correlation  of  bodies  in  space.  For 

A. — Space  being  conceived  as  infinite  (or  rather  being  incon- 
ceivable as  not  infinite),  and  the  place  occupied  by  body  as  finite, 
body  in  general,  and,  of  course,  each  body  in  particular,  is  con- 
ceived capable  either  of  remaining  in  the  place  it  now  holds,  or 
of  being  translated  from  that  to  any  then  unoccupied  part  of  space. 
And 

B. — As  every  part  of  space,  i.  e.  every  potential  place,  holds  a 
certain  position  relative  to  every  other,  so,  consequently,  must 
bodies,  in  so  far  as  they  are  all  contained  in  space,  and  as  each 
occupies,  at  one  time,  one  determinate  place. 

To  recapitulate  : — The  necessary  constituents  of  our  notion  of 
Matter,  the  Primary  Qualities  of  Body,  are  thus  all  evolved  from 
the  two  catholic  conditions  of  matter — (I.)  the  occupying  space, 
and  (II.)  the  being  contained  in  space.  Of  these  the  former  af- 
fords (A)  Trinal  Extension,  explicated  again  into  (i.)  Divisibility, 
(ii.)  Size,  containing  under  it  Density  or  Rarity,  (iii.)  Figure  ; 
and  (B)  Ultimate  Incompressibility  :  while  the  latter  gives  (A) 
Mobility ;  and  (B)  Situation.  Neglecting  subordination,  we 
have  thus  eight  proximate  attributes ;  1,  Extension  ;  2,  Divisi- 
bility ;  3,  Size  ;  4,  Density,  or  Rarity  ;  5,  Figure  ;  6,  Incompres- 
sibility  absolute ;  7,  Mobility  ;  8,  Situation. 

The  primary  qualities  of  matter  thus  develop  themselves  with 
rigid  necessity  out  of  the  simple  datum  of — substance  occupying 
space.  In  a  certain  sort,  and  by  contrast  to  the  others,  they  are, 
therefore,  notions  a  priori,  and  to  be  viewed,  pro  tanto,  as  prod- 
ucts of  the  understanding.  The  others,  on  the  contrary,  it  is 
manifestly  impossible  to  deduce,  i.  e.  to  evolve  out  of  such  a  given 


358  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

notion.  They  must  be  induced,  i.  e.  generalized  from  expe- 
rience ;  are,  therefore,  in  strict  propriety,  notions  a  posteriori, 
and,  in  the  last  resort,  mere  products  of  sense.  The  following 
may  be  given  as  consummative  results  of  such  induction  in  the 
establishment  of  the  two  classes  of  the  Secundo-primary  and  Sec- 
ondary Qualities. 

Induction  of  the  Class  of  Secundo-primary  Qualities. — This 
terminates  in  the  following  conclusions. — These  qualities  are  mod- 
ifications, but  contingent  modifications,  of  the  Primary.  They 
suppose  the  Primary  ;  the  Primary  do  not  suppose  them.  They 
have  all  relation  to  space,  and  motion  in  space ;  and  are  all  con- 
tained under  the  category  of  Resistance  or  Pressure.  For  they 
are  all  only  various  forms  of  a  relative  or  superable  resistance  to 
displacement,  which,  we  learn  by  experience,  bodies  oppose  to 
other  bodies,  and,  among  these,  to  our  organism  moving  through 
space ; — a  resistance  similar  in  kind  (and  therefore  clearly  con- 
ceived) to  that  absolute  or  insuperable  resistance,  which  we  are 
compelled,  independently  of  experience,  to  think  that  every  part 
of  matter  would  oppose  to  any  attempt  to  deprive  it  of  its  space, 
by  compressing  it  into  an  inextended. 

In  so  far,  therefore,  as  they  suppose  the  primary,  which  are 
necessary,  while  they  themselves  are  only  accidental,  they  exhibit, 
on  the  one  side,  what  may  be  called  a  quasi  primary  quality ; 
and,  in  this  respect,  they  are  to  be  recognized  as  percepts,  not 
sensations,  as  objective  affections  of  things,  and  not  as  subjective 
affections  of  us.  But,  on  the  other  side,  this  objective  element  is 
always  found  accompanied  by  a  secondary  quality  or  sensorial 
passion.  The  Secundo-primary  qualities  have  thus  always  two 
phases,  both  immediately  apprehended.  On  their  primary  or 
objective  phasis  they  manifest  themselves  as  degrees  of  resistance 
opposed  to  our  locomotive  energy ;  on  their  secondary  or  sub- 
jective phasis,  as  modes  of  resistance  or  pressure  affecting  our 
sentient  organism.  Thus  standing  between,  and,  in  a  certain 
sort,  made  up  of  the  two  classes  of  Primary  and  Secondary  qual- 
ities, to  neither  of  which,  however,  can  they  be  reduced ;  this 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    PERCEPTION.  359 

their  partly  common,  partly  peculiar  nature,  vindicates  to  them 
the  dignity  of  a  class  apart  from  both  the  others,  and  this  under 
the  appropriate  appellation  of  the  Secundo-primary  qualities. 

They  admit  of  a  classification  from  two  different  points  of  view. 
They  may  be  physically,  they  may  be  psychologically,  distrib- 
uted.— Considered  physically,  or  in  an  objective  relation,  they 
are  to  be  reduced  to  classes  corresponding  to  the  different  sources 
in  external  nature  from  which  the  resistance  or  pressure  springs. 
And  these  sources  are,  in  all,  three  : — (I.)  that  of  Co-attraction  ; 
(II.)  that  of  Repulsion  ;  (III.)  that  of  Inertia. 

I. — Of  the  resistance  of  Co-attraction  there  may  be  distin- 
guished, on  the  same  objective  principle,  two  subaltern  genera  ; 
to  wit  (A)  that  of  Gravity,  or  the  co-attraction  of  the  particles  of 
body  in  general ;  and  (B)  that  of  Cohesion,  or  the  co-attraction 
of  the  particles  of  this  and  that  body  in  particular. 

A. — The  resistance  of  Gravity  or  Weight  according  to  its  de- 
gree (which,  again,  is  in  proportion  to  the  Bulk  and  Density  of 
ponderable  matter)  affords,  under  it,  the  relative  qualities  of 
Heavy  and  Light  (absolute  and  specific). 

B. — The  resistance  of  Cohesion  (using  that  term  in  its  most 
unexclusive  universality)  contains  many  species  and  counter- 
species.  Without  proposing  an  exhaustive,  or  accurately  subor- 
dinated, list ; — of  these  there  may  be  enumerated  (i.)  the  Hard 
and  Soft ;  (ii.)  the  Firm  (Fixed,  Stable,  Concrete,  Solid),  and 
Fluid  (Liquid),  the  Fluid  being  again  subdivided  into  the  Thick 
and  Thin  ;  (iii.)  the  Viscid  and  Friable ;  with  (iv.)  the  Tough 
and  Brittle  (Irruptile  and  Ruptile)  ;  (v.)  the  Rigid  and  Flexible  ; 
(vi.)  the  Fissile  and  Inftssile ;  (vii.)  the  Ductile  and  Inductile 
(Extensible  and  Inextensible) ;  (viii.)  the  Rectractile  and  Irretrac- 
tile  (Elastic  and  Inelastic)  ;  (ix.)  (combined  with  Figure)  the 
Rough  and  Smooth  ;  (x.)  the  Slippery  and  Tenacious. 

II. — The  resistance  from  Repulsion  is  divided  into  the  counter 
qualities  of  (A)  the  (relatively)  Compressible  and  Incompressible  ; 
(B)  the  Resilient  and  Irresilicnt  (Elastic  and  Inelastic). 

III. — The  resistance  from    Inertin  (eoinbnH  with  Bulk  and 


360  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

Cohesion)  comprises  the  counter  qualities  of  the  (relatively) 
Movable  and  Immovable. 

There  are  thus,  at  least,  fifteen  pairs  of  counter  attributes 
which  we  may  refer  to  the  Secundo-primary  Qualities  of  Body ; 
— all  obtained  by  the  division  and  subdivision  of  the  resisting 
forces  of  matter,  considered  in  an  objective  or  physical  point  of 
view.  [Compare  Aristotle,  Meteor.  L.  iv.  c.  8.] 

Considered  psychologically,  or  in  a  subjective  relation,  they  are 
to  be  discriminated,  under  the  genus  of  the  Relatively  resisting, 
[I.]  according  to  the  degree  in  which  the  resisting  force  might 
counteract  our  locomotive  faculty  or  muscular  force ;  and,  [II.] 
according  to  the  mode  in  which  it  might  affect  our  capacity  of 
feeling  or  sentient  organism.  Of  these  species,  the  former  would 
contain  under  it  the  gradations  of  the  quasi-primary  quality,  the 
latter  the  varieties  of  the  secondary  quality — these  constituting 
the  two  elements  of  which,  in  combination,  every  Secundo-primary 
quality  is  made  up.  As,  however,  language  does  not  afford  us 
terms  by  which  these  divisions  and  subdivisions  can  be  unambig- 
uously marked,  I  shall  not  attempt  to  carry  out  the  distribution, 
which  is  otherwise  sufficiently  obvious,  in  detail. — So  much  for 
the  induction  of  the  Secundo-primary  qualities. 

But  it  has  sometimes  been  said  of  the  Secundo-primary  quali- 
ties as  of  the  Primary,  that  they  are  necessary  characters  in  our 
notion  of  body  ;  and  this  has  more  particularly  been  asserted  of 
Gravity,  Cohesion,  and  Inertia.  This  doctrine,  though  never 
brought  to  proof,  and  never,  I  believe,  even  deliberately  main- 
tained, it  is,  however,  necessary  to  show,  is  wholly  destitute  of 
foundation. 

That  Gravity,  Cohesion,  Inertia,  and  Repulsion,  in  their  various 
modifications,  are  not  conceived  by  us  as  necessary  properties  of 
matter,  and  that  the  resistances  through  which  they  are  mani- 
fested do  not  therefore,  psychologically,  constitute  any  primary 
quality  of  body:  this  is  evident,  1°,  from  the  historical  fact  of 
the  wavering  and  confliction  of  philosophical  opinion,  in  regard 
to  the  nature  of  these  properties ;  and,  2°,  from  the  response 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  361 

afforded  to  the  question  by  our  individual  consciousness.     These 
in  their  order : 

1. — The  vascillation  of  philosophical  opinion  may  be  shown 
under  two  heads  ;  to  wit,  from  the  Psychological,  and  from  the 
Physical,  point  of  view. 

As  to  the  Psychological  point  of  view,  the  ambiguous,  and  at 
the  same  time  the  unessential,  character  of  these  qualities,  is 
shown  by  the  variation  of  philosophers  in  regard  to  which  of  the 
two  classes  of  Primary  or  Secondary  they  would  refer  them  ;  for 
the  opinion,  that  philosophers  are  in  this  at  one,  is  an  error  aris- 
ing from  the  perfunctory  manner  in  which  this  whole  subject  has 
hitherto  been  treated.  Many  philosophers  in  their  schemes  of 
classification,  as  Galileo,  Boyle,  Le  Clerc,  overlook,  or  at  least 
omit  to  enumerate  these  qualities.  In  point  of  fact,  however, 
they  undoubtedly  regarded  them  as  Sensible,  and  therefore,  as  we 
shall  see,  as  Secondary,  qualities.  The  great  majority  of  philos- 
ophers avowedly  consider  them  as  secondary.  This  is  done,  im- 
plicitly or  explicitly,  by  Aristotle  and  the  Aristotelians,  by  Galen, 
by  Descartes*  and  his  school,  by  Locke,f  by  Purchot,  &c. ;  for 
these  philosophers  refer  Hardness,  Softness,  Roughness,  Smooth- 
ness, and  the  like,  to  the  Tactile  qualities — the  sensible  qualities 
of  Touch ;  while  they  identify  the  sensible  qualities  in  general, 
that  is,  the  sensations  proper  of  the  several  senses,  with  the  class 
of  Secondary,  the  percepts  common  to  more  than  a  single  sense, 
with  the  class  of  Primary,  qualities.  In  this  Aristotle,  indeed,  is 


*  See,  besides  what  is  said  under  Descartes,  No.  9,  Eegis,  Phys.  L.  viii. 
P.  ii.  ch.  2.  Spinosa,  Princ.  Philos.  Cartes.  P.  ii.  Lem.  2,  pr.  1. 

t  Compare  Essay,  B.  ii.  c.  3,  §  1,  and  c.  4,  §  4,  and  c.  8,  §§  14,  23; 
with  Lee's  Notes,  B.  ii.  c.  8,  §  4,  p.  56.  Looking  superficially  at  certain 
casual  ambiguities  of  Locke's  language,  we  may,  with  Kames,  Reid,  and 
philosophers  in  general,  suppose  him  to  have  referred  the  qualities  in 
question  to  the  class  of  Primary.  Looking  more  closely,  we  may  hold 
him  to  have  omitted  them  altogether,  as  inadvertently  stated  at  p.  341  b. 
But  looking  critically  to  the  whole  analogy  of  the  places  now  quoted,  and, 
in  particular,  considering  the  import  of  the  term  '  sensible  qualities,'  as 
then  in  ordinary  use,  we  can  have  no  doubt  that,  like  the  Peripatetics 
and  Descartes,  he  viewed  them  as  pertaining  to  the  class  of  Secondary. 

16 


362  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

found  not  always  in  unison  with  himself;  or  rather,  at  different 
times  he  views  as  proximate  the  different  phases  presented  by  the 
qualities  in  question.  For  though  in  general  he  regards  the 
Rough  and  the  Smooth  as  sensations  proper  to  Touch  (De  Gen. 
et  Corr.  ii.  2,  et  alibi),  on  one  occasion  he  reduces  these  to  the 
class  of  common  percepts,  as  modifications  of  Figure  (De  Sensu 
et  Sensili,  c.  4).  Recently,  however,  without  suspecting  their  con- 
fliction  with  the  older  authorities,  nay,  even  in  professed  confor- 
mity with  the  doctrine  of  Descartes  and  Locke,  psychologists 
have,  with  singular  unanimity,  concurred  in  considering  the  qual- 
ities in  question  as  Primary.  For  to  say  nothing  of  the  anom- 
alous and  earlier  statements  of  De  La  Forge  and  Du  Hamel 
(Nos.  13,  14),  and  passing  over,  as  hardly  of  psychological  import, 
the  opinion  of  Cotes  (Praaf.  ad  Newtoni  Princ.  ed.  2),  this  has 
been  done  by  Kames,  Reid,  Fergusson,  Stewart,  and  Royer-Col- 
lard — philosophers  who  may  be  regarded  as  the  authors  or  prin- 
cipal representatives  of  the  doctrine  now  prevalent  among  those 
by  whom  the  distinction  is  admitted. 

Looking,  therefore,  under  the  surface  at  the  state  of  psychologi- 
cal opinion,  no  presumption,  assuredly,  can  be  drawn  from  the 
harmony  of  philosophers  against  the  establishment  of  a  class  of 
qualities  different  from  those  of  Primary  and  Secondary.  On  the 
contrary,  the  discrepancy  of  metaphysicians,  not  only  with  each 
other,  but  of  the  greatest  even  with  themselves,  as  to  which  of 
these  two  classes  the  qualities  1  call  Secundo-primary  should  be 
referred,  does,  in  fact,  afford  a  strong  preliminary  probability  that 
these  qualities  can  with  propriety  be  reduced  to  neither ;  them- 
selves, in  fact,  constituting  a  peculiar  class,  distinct  from  each, 
though  intermediate  between  both. 

As  to  the  Physical  point  of  view,  I  shall  exhibit  in  detail  the 
variation  of  opinion  in  relation  to  the  several  classes  of  those  qual- 
ities which  this  point  of  view  affords. 

a. — Gravity.  In  regard  to  weight,  this,  so  far  from  being  uni- 
versally admitted,  from  the  necessity  of  its  conception,  to  be  an 
essential  attribute  of  body,  philosophers,  ancient  and  modern, 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    PERCEPTION.  363 

very  generally  disallow  all  matter  to  be  heavy ;  and  many  have 
even  dogmatically  asserted  to  certain  kinds  of  matter  a  positive 
levity.  This  last  was  done  by  Aristotle,  and  his  Greek,  Arabian, 
and  Latin  followers ;  i.  e.  by  the  philosophic  world  in  general  for 
nearly  two  thousand  years.  At  a  recent  period,  the  same  doctrine 
was  maintained,  as  actually  true,  by  Gren  and  other  advocates  of 
the  hypothesis  of  Phlogiston,  among  many  more  who  allowed  its 
truth  as  possible  ;  and  Newton  had  previously  found  it  necessary 
to  clothe  his  universal  ether  with  a  quality  of  negative  gravity 
(or  positive  lightness),  in  order  to  enable  him  hypothetically  to 
account  for  the  phenomenon  of  positive  gravity  in  other  matter. 

Of  Gravity,  some,  indeed,  have  held  the  cause  to  be  internal 
and  essential  to  matter.  Of  these  we  have  the  ancient  Atomists 
(Democritus,  Leucippus,  Epicurus,  <fec.),  with  Plato  and  a  few  in- 
dividual Aristotelians,  as  Strato  and  Themistius ;  and  in  modern 
times  a  section  of  the  Newtonians,  as  Cotes,  Freind,  Keill,  with 
Boscovich,  Kant,  Kames,  Schelling,  and  Hegel.  But  though 
holding  (physically)  weight  to  be,  de  facto,  an  essential  property 
of  matter,  these  philosophers  were  far  from  holding  (psychologi- 
cally) the  character  of  weight  to  be  an  essential  constituent  of  the 
notion  of  mattter.  Kant,  for  example,  when  speaking  psychologi- 
cally, asserts  that  weight  is  only  a  synthetic  predicate  which  ex- 
perience enables  us  to  add  on  to  our  prior  notion  of  body  (Or.  d. 
r.  Vern.  p.  12,  ed.  2 — Proleg.  §  2,  p.  25,  ed.  1.) ;  whereas,  when 
speaking  physically,  he  contends  that  weight  is  a  universal  attri- 
bute of  matter,  as  a  necessary  condition  of  its  existence  (Met. 
Anfangsgr.  d.  Naturwiss.  p.  71,  ed.  2). 

But  the  latter  opinion — that  weight  is  only,  in  reality,  as  in 
thought,  an  accident  of  body — is  that  adopted  by  the  immense 
majority,  not  only  of  philosophers,  but  of  natural  philosophers. 
Under  various  modifications,  however  ;  some,  for  example,  hold- 
ing the  external  cause  of  gravity  to  be  physical,  others  to  be  hy- 
perphysical.  Neglecting  subordinate  distinctions,  to  this  class 
belong  Anaxagoras,  Democritus,  Melissus,  Diogenes  of  Apollonia, 
Aristotle  and  his  school,  Algazel,  Avicembron,  Copernicus,  Bruno, 


364  PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION. 

Kepler,  Gilbert,  Berigardus,  Digby,  Torricelli,  Descartes,  Gas- 
send  i,  Lana,  Kircher,  Andala,  Malebranche,  Rohault,  De  Guer- 
icke,  Perrault,  H.  Moore,Cudwortb,  Du  Hamel,  Huygens,  Sturmius, 
Hooke,  Is.  Vossius,  Newton,  S.  Clarke,  Halley,  Leibnitz,  Saurin, 
Wolf,  Mueller,  Bilfinger,  the  Bernoullis  James  and  Jobn,  Canz, 
Harnberger,  Varignon,  Villemot,  Fatio,  Euler,  Baxter,  Colden, 
Saussure,  Le  Sage,  L'lluillier,  Prevost,  De  Luc,  Monboddo,  Hors- 
ley,  Drummond,  Playfair,  Blair,  <fec.  In  particular  this  doctrine 
is  often  and  anxiously  inculcated  by  Newton — who  seems,  indeed, 
to  have  sometimes  inclined  even  to  an  immaterial  cause  ;  but  this 
more  especially  after  his  follower,  Cotes,  had  ventured  to  announce 
an  adhesion  to  the  counter  theory,  in  his  preface  to  the  second 
edition  of  the  'Principia,'  which  he  procured  in  1713.  See  New- 
ton's letter  to  Boyle,  1678 — Letters,  second  and  third,  to  Bentley, 
1693  ; — Principia,  L.  i.  c.  5.  L.  iii.  reg.  3,  alibi ; — in  particular, 
Optics,  ed.  1717,  B.  iii.  Qu.  21. 

b. —  Cohesion,  comprehending  under  that  term  not  only  Cohe- 
sion proper,  but  all  the  specific  forces  (Adhesion,  Capillarity, 
Chemical  Affinity,  &c.),  by  which  the  particles  of  individual  bod- 
ies tend  to  approach,  and  to  maintain  themselves  in  union — Co- 
hesion is  even  less  than  Gravity,  than  the  force  by  which  matter 
in  general  attracts  matter,  a  character  essential  to  our  notion  of 
body.  Upon  Gravity,  indeed,  a  majority  of  the  earlier  Newto- 
nians maintained  Cohesion,  in  some  inexplicable  manner,  to  de- 
pend ;  and  the  other  hypotheses  of  an  external  agency,  all  pro- 
ceed upon  the  supposition  that  it  is  merely  an  accident  of  matter. 
Cohesion,  the  cause  of  which  Locke  wisely  regarded  as  inconceiv- 
able, Descartes  attempted  to  explain  by  the  quiescence  of  the  ad- 
joining molecules  ;  Malebranche  (as  an  occasional  cause),  by  the 
agitation  of  a  pervading  invisible  matter ;  Stair,  by  the  pressure 
(whence,  he  does  not  state)  of  the  physical  points,  his  supposed 
constituents  of  body,  to  a  common  centre  ;  and  James  Bernoulli, 
by  the  pressure  of  a  circumambient  fluid — an  hypothesis  to  which 
Newton  likewise  seems  to  have  inclined  :  while  a  host  of  others, 
following  Algazel  and  Avicembron,  Biel  and  D'Ailly,  spurned  all 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    PERCEPTION.  365 

mechanical  media,  these  being  themselves  equally  inexplicable  as 
the  phenomenon  in  question,  and  resorted  to  the  immediate 
agency  of  an  immaterial  principle.  The  psychologists,  therefore, 
who  (probably  from  confounding  hardness  with  solidity,  solidity 
with  impenetrability)  have  carried  up  the  resistance  of  cohesion 
into  the  class  of  primary  qualities,  find  but  little  countenance  for 
their  procedure,  even  among  the  crude  precedents  of  physical 
speculation. 

c. —  Vis  Inertice.  But  if,  on  the  ground  of  philosophical  agree 
ment,  Gravity  and  Cohesion  are  not  to  be  regarded  as  primary 
qualities  of  matter ;  this  dignity  is  even  less  to  be  accorded  to 
that  force  by  which  bodies  resist  any  change  of  state,  whether  that 
be  one  of  quiescence  or  of  motion.  This,  variously  known  under 
the  names  of  Vis  Inertise,  Inertia,  Vis  Insita  Resistentiae,  Resisten 
tia  Passiva,  &c.,  was,  indeed,  if  not  first  noticed,  only  first  gener 
alized  at  a  comparatively  recent  period — to  wit,  by  Kepler; 
while  the  subsequent  controversies  in  regard  to  its  nature  and 
comprehension,  equally  concur  in  showing  that  there  is  no  neces- 
sity for  thinking  it  as  an  essential  attribute  of  matter.  The  Car- 
tesians, among  others,  viewed  it  as  a  quality  not  only  derivative, 
but  contingent ;  and  even  those  Newtonians,  who,  in  opposition 
to  Newton,  raised  Gravity  to  the  rank  of  a  primary  quality,  did 
not,  however,  venture  to  include  inertia  under  the  same  category. 
(See  Cotes's  Preface  to  the  second  edition  of  the  Principia.) 
Leibnitz,  followed,  among  others,  by  Wolf,  divided  this  force  into 
two  ; — discriminating  the  vis  activa  or  matrix,  from  the  vis  pas- 
siva  or  inertia.  The  former  they  held  not  to  be  naturally  inher- 
ent in,  but  only  supernaturally  impressed  on,  matter.  Without 
reference  to  Leibnitz,  a  similar  distinction  was  taken  by  D'Alem- 
bert,  in  which  he  is  followed  by  Destutt  de  Tracy  ;  a  distinction, 
as  we  have  seen,  which  also  found  favor  with  Lord  Kames,  who 
in  this,  however,  stands  alone  among  metaphysicians,  that  he 
places  both  his  vis  inertice  and  vis  incita  among  the  primary  qual- 
ities of  body. 

Finally,  Physical  speculators,  in  general,  distinguish  Inertia  and 


366  PHILOSOPHY    OF  PERCEPTION. 

Weight,  as  powers,  though  proportional,  still  distinct.  Many, 
however,  following  Wiedeburg,  view  the  former  as  only  a  modifi- 
cation or  phasis  of  the  latter. 

d. — Repulsion,  meaning  by  that  terra  more  than  the  resist- 
ance of  impenetrability,  gravity,  cohesion,  or  inertia,  has,  least 
of  all,  authority  to  plead  in  favor  of  its  pretension  to  the 
dignity  of  a  primary  quality.  The  dynamical  theories  of  mat- 
ter, indeed,  view  Attraction  and  Repulsion  not  merely  as  fun- 
damental qualities,  but  even  as  its  generic  forces ;  but  the 
ground  of  this  is  the  necessity  of  the  hypothesis,  not  the  neces- 
sity of  thought. 

2. — But  the  voice  of  our  individual  consciousness  is  a  more  di- 
rect and  cogent  evidence  than  the  history  of  foreign  opinion  ; — 
and  this  is  still  less  favorable  to  the  claim  in  question.  The  only 
resistance  which  we  think  as  necessary  to  the  conception  of  body, 
is  a  resistance  to  the  occupation  of  a  body's  space — the  resistance 
of  ultimate  incompressibility.  The  others,  with  their  causes,  we 
think  only  as  contingent,  because,  one  and  all  of  them  we  can 
easily  annihilate  in  thought. 

Repulsion  (to  take  them  backwards) — a  resistance  to  the 
approximation  and  contact  of  other  matter — we  come  only  by  a 
late  and  learned  experience  to  view  as  an  attribute  of  body,  and 
of  the  elements  of  body  ;  nay,  so  far  is  it  from  being  a  character 
essential  in  our  notion  of  matter,  it  remains,  as  apparently  an  ac- 
tio  in  distans,  even  when  forced  upon  us  as  a  fact,  still  inconceiv- 
able as  a  possibility.  Accordingly,  by  no  philosopher  has  the  re- 
sistance of  Repulsion  been  psychologically  regarded  as  among  the 
primary  qualities. 

Nor  has  Inertia  a  greatly  higher  claim  to  this  distinction. 
There  is  no  impossibility,  there  is  little  difficulty,  in  imagining  a 
thing,  occupying  space,  and  therefore  a  body  ;  and  yet,  without 
attraction  or  repulsion  for  any  other  body,  and  wholly  indifferent 
to  this  or  that  position,  in  space,  to  motion  and  to  rest ;  opposing, 
therefore,  no  resistance  to  any  displacing  power.  Such  imagina- 
tion is  opposed  to  experience,  and  consequently  to  our  acquired 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION.  367 

habitudes  of  conceiving  body ;  but  it  is  not  opposed  to  the  neces- 
sary conditions  of  that  concept  itself. 

It  was  on  this  psychological  ground  that  Descartes  reduced  in- 
ertia to  a  mere  accident  of  extension.  Physically  reasoning,  Des- 
cartes may  not  perhaps  be  right ;  but  Karnes  is  certainly,  as  he 
is  singularly  wrong,  in  psychologically  recognizing  Inertia  as  a 
primary  attribute  of  body. 

Of  the  two  attractions,  Cohesion  is  not  constituent  of  the  notion 
of  what  occupies,  or  is  trinally  extended  in  space.  This  notion 
involves  only  the  supposition  of  parts  out  of  parts  ;  and  although 
what  fills  an  uninterrupted  portion  of  space,  is,  pro  tanto,  consider- 
ed by  us  as  one  thing ;  the  unity  which  the  parts  of  this  obtain  in 
thought,  is  not  the  internal  unity  of  cohesion,  but  the  external 
unity  of  continuity  or  juxtaposition.  Under  the  notion  of  reple- 
tion of  space,  a  rock  has  not  in  thought  a  higher  unity  than  a  pile 
of  sand.  Cohesion,  consequently,  is  not,  in  a  psychological  view, 
an  essential  attribute  of  body.  [In  saying  this,  I  may  notice  pa- 
renthetically, that  I  speak  of  cohesion  only  as  between  the  ulti- 
mate elements  of  body,  whatever  these  may  be  ;  and  fortunately 
our  present  discussion  does  not  require  us  to  go  higher,  that  is,  to 
regard  cohesion  in  reference  to  our  conception  of  these  considered 
in  themselves.  In  forming  to  ourselves  such  concept,  two  counter 
inconceivabilities  present  themselves, — inconceivabilities  from  the 
one  or  other  of -which,  as  speculators  have  recoiled,  they  have  em- 
braced one  or  other  of  the  counter  theories  of  Atomism  and  Dy- 
namism.] But  if  cohesion  be  not  thought  as  an  essential  attribute 
of  body,  Kames,  Reid,  Fergusson,  Stewart,  Royer-Collard,  and 
other  recent  philosophers,  were  wrong  to  introduce  the  degrees  of 
cohesive  resistance  among  the  primary  qualities  ;  either  avowedly 
under  the  explicit  titles  of  the  Hard,  the  Soft,  <fec.,  or  covertly, 
under  the  ambiguous  head  of  Solidity.  But  though  Locke  did 
not,  as  they  believe,  precede  them  in  this  doctrine,  his  language, 
to  say  the  least  of  it,  is  unguarded  and  inaccurate.  For  he  em- 
ploys cohesion  and  continuity  as  convertible  terms ;  and  states, 
without  the  requisite  qualification,  that  '  upon  the  solidity  [to  him 


368  PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION. 

*  I 

the  impenetrability  or  ultimate  incompressibility]  of  bodies  de- 
pend their  mutual  impulse,  resistance,  and  protrusion.'  (ii.  4,  5.) 

As  to  Weight, — we  have  from  our  earliest  experience  been  ac- 
customed to  find  all  tangible  bodies  in  a  state  of  gravitation  ;  and 
by  the  providence  of  nature,  the  child  has,  even  anteriorly  to 
experience,  an  instinctive  anticipation  of  this  law  in  relation  to 
his  own.  This  has  given  weight  an  advantage  over  the  other 
qualities  of  the  same  class ;  and  it  is  probably  through  these  influ- 
ences, that  certain  philosophers  have  been  disposed  to  regard 
gravity,  as,  physically  and  psychologically,  a  primary  quality  of 
matter.  But  instinct  and  consuetude  notwithstanding,  we  find 
no  difficulty  in  imagining  the  general  co-attraction  of  matter  to 
be  annihilated  ;  nay,  not  only  annihilated,  but  reversed.  For  as 
attraction  and  repulsion  seem  equally  actiones  in  distans,  it  is  not 
more  difficult  to  realize  to  ourselves  the  notion  of  the  one,  than 
the  notion  of  the  other. 

In  reference  to  both  Cohesion  and  Gravity,  I  may  notice,  that 
though  it  is  only  by  experience  we  come  to  attribute  an  internal 
unity  to  aught  continuously  extended,  that  is,  consider  it  as  a  sys- 
tem or  constituted  whole ;  still,  in  so  far  as  we  do  so  consider  it, 
we  think  the  parts  as  held  together  by  a  certain  force,  and  the 
whole,  therefore,  as  endowed  with  a  power  of  resisting  their 
distraction.  It  is,  indeed,  only  by  finding  that  a  material  conti- 
nuity resists  distraction,  that  we  view  it  as  more  than  a  fortuitous 
aggregation  of  many  bodies,  that  is,  as  a  single  body.  The  mate- 
rial universe,  for  example,  though  not  de  facto  continuously  ex- 
tended, we  consider  as  one  system,  in  so  far,  but  only  in  so  far,  as 
we  find  all  bodies  tending  together  by  reciprocal  attraction.  But 
here  I  may  add,  that  though  a  love  of  unity  may  bias  us,  there  is 
no  necessity  for  supposing  this  co-attraction  to  be  the  effect  of  any 
single  force.  It  may  be  the  result  of  any  plurality  of  forces,  pro- 
vided that  these  co-operate  in  due  subordination.  Thus  we  are 
not  constrained  to  view  the  universe  of  matter  as  held  together  by 
the  power  of  gravity  alone.  For  though  gravity  be  recognized  as 
the  prime,  proximate,  and  most  pervading  principle  of  co-attrac- 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION.  369 

tion,  still,  until  the  fact  be  proved,  we  are  not  required  to  view  it 
as  the  sole.  We  may  suppose  that  a  certain  complement  of 
parts  are  endowed  with  weight ;  and  that  the  others,  immediate- 
ly and  in  themselves  indifferent  to  gravitation,  are  mediately 
drawn  within  its  sphere,  through  some  special  affinity  or  attrac- 
tion subsisting  between  them  and  the  bodies  immediately  subject- 
ed to  its  influence.  Let  the  letters  A,  B,  C,  x,  y,  z,  represent  in 
general  the  universe  of  matter ;  the  capital  letters  representing,  in 
particular,  the  kinds  of  matter  possessed  of,  the  minor  letters  re- 
presenting the  kinds  of  matter  destitute  of  weight.  Of  themselves, 
A,  B,  C  will,  therefore,  gravitate  ;  x,  y,  z  will  not.  But  if  x  have 
a  peculiar  affinity  for  A,  y  for  B,  and  z  for  C  ;  x,  y,  z,  though  in 
themselves  weightless,  will,  through  their  correlation  to  A,  B,  C, 
come  mediately  under  the  influence  of  gravitation,  and  enter  along 
with  their  relatives,  as  parts,  into  the  whole  of  which  gravity  is 
the  proximate  bond  of  unity.  To  prove,  therefore,  a  priori,  or  on 
any  general  principle  whatever,  that  no  matter  is  destitute  of 
weight,  is  manifestly  impossible.  All  matter  may  possibly  be 
heavy :  but  until  experiment  can  decide,  by  showing,  in  detail, 
that  what  are  now  generally  regarded  as  imponderable  fluids,  are 
either  in  truth  ponderable  substances,  or  not  substances  at  all,  we 
have  no  data  on  which  to  infer  more  than  a  conjectural  affirma- 
tive of  little  probability.  On  the  dynamical  theories  of  matter, 
the  attempts  made  from  Boscovich  to  Hegel,  to  demonstrate  that 
weight  is  a  catholic  property,  as  a  fundamental  condition  of  mat- 
ter, are  all  founded  on  petitory  premises.  This  is  justly  ac- 
knowledged by  Hegel  hims'elf  of  the  Kantian  deduction  (Werke, 
vol.  vii.  p.  i.  §  262)  ;  and,  were  the  proof  of  psychological  con- 
cernment, the  same  might  no  less  justly  be  demonstrated  of  his 
own.* 


*  Since  writing  the  above,  I  am  indebted  to  the  kindness  of  Mr.  Whewell 
for  his  '  Demonstration  that  all  Matter  is  Heavy,'  published  in  the  Transac- 
tions of  the  Cambridge  Philosophical  Society,  Vol.  vii.  Part  ii. ; — an  author 
whose  energy  and  talent  all  must  admire,  even  while  convinced  the  least  by 
the  cogency  of  his  reasoning.  As  this  demonstration  proceeds  not  on  a 
mere  physical  ground,  but  on  the  ground  of  a  certain  logical  or  psychologi- 

16* 


370  PHILOSOPHY  OF   PERCEPTION. 

Induction  of  the  Secondary  Qualities. — Its  results  are  the  fol- 
lowing.— The  Secondary  as  manifested  to  us,  are  not,  in  propriety, 
qualities  of  Body  at  all.  As  apprehended,  they  are  only  sub- 

eal  law,  and  as  it  is  otherwise  diametrically  opposed  to  the  whole  tenor  of 
the  doctrine  previously  maintained,  I  shall  briefly  consider  it  in  its  general 
bearing; — which  Mr.  "Whewell  thus  states,  afterwards  illustrating  it  in 
detail : 

'  The  question  then  occurs,  whether  we  can,  by  any  steps  of  reasoning, 
point  out  an  inconsistency  in  the  conception  of  matter  without  weight.  This 
I  conceive  we  may  do,  and  this  I  shall  attempt  to  show.  The  general  mode 
of  stating  the  argument  ia  this :—  The  quantity  of  matter  is  measured  by 
those  sensible  properties  of  matter  [Weight  and  Inertia]  which  undergo 
quantitative  addition,  subtraction,  and  division,  as  the  mutter  is  added,  sub- 
tracted, and  divided.  The  quantity  of  matter  cannot  be  known  in  any  other 
way.  But  this  mode  of  measuring  the  quantity  of  matter,  in  order  to  be 
true  at  all,  must  be  universally  true.  If  it  were  only  partially  true,  the 
limits  within  which  it  is  to  be  applied  would  be  arbitrary ;  and,  therefore,  the 
whole  procedure  would  be  arbitrary,  and,  as  a  method  of  obtaining  philo- 
sophical truth,  altogether  futile.'  [But  this  is  not  to  be  admitted.  '  We 
must  suppose  the  rule  to  be  universal.  If  any  bodies  have  weight,  all  bod- 
ies must  have  weight.'] 

1°.  This  reasoning  assumes  in  chief  that  we  cannot  but  have  it  in  our 
power,  by  some  means  or  other,  to  ascertain  the  quantity  of  mutter  as  a 
physical  truth.  But  gratuitously.  For  why  may  not  the  quantity  of  matter 
be  one  of  that  multitude  of  problems,  placed  beyond  the  reach,  not  of  human 
curiosity,  but  of  human  determination  ? 

2°.  But,  subordinate  to  the  assumption  that  some  measure  we  must  have, 
the  reasoning  further  supposes  that  a  measure  of  the  weight  (and  inertia)  is 
the  only  measure  we  can  have  of  the  quantity  of  matter.  But  is  even  this 
correct?  We  may,  certainly,  attempt  to  estimate  the  quantity  of  matter  by 
the  quantity  of  two,  at  least,  of  the  properties  of  matter;  to  wit — a)  by  the 
quantity  of  space  of  which  it  is  found  to  resist  the  occupation ;  and — b)  by 
the  quantity  of  weight  (and  inertia),  which  it  manifests.  We  need  not 
inquire  whether,  were  these  measures  harmonious  in  result,  they  would,  in 
combination,  supply  a  competent  criterion ;  for  they  are  at  variance ;  and, 
if  either,  one  must  be  exclusively  selected.  Of  the  two,  the  former,  indeed, 
at  first  sight,  recommends  itself  as  the  alone  authentic.  For  the  quantity  of 
matter  is,  on  all  hands,  admitted  to  be  in  proportion  to  the  quantity  of  space 
it  fills,  extension  being  necessarily  thought  as  the  essential  property  of  body ; 
whereas  it  is  not  universally  admitted  that  the  quantity  of  matter  is  in  pro- 
portion to  its  amount  of  weight  and  inertia ;  these  being,  on  the  contrary, 
conceivable  and  generally  conceived  as  adventitious  accidents,  and  not, 
therefore,  as  necessary  concomitants  of  matter.  But  then  it  may  be  compe- 
tently objected, — The  cubical  extension  of  compressed  bodies  cannot  be 
taken  as  an  authentic  measure  of  the  quantity  of  space  they  fill,  because  we 
are  not  assured  that  the  degree  of  compressing  force  which  we  can  actually 


PHILOSOPHY    OF  PERCEPTION.  371 

jective  affections,  and  belong  only  to  bodies  in  so  far  as  these  are 
supposed  furnished  with  the  powers  capable  of  specifically  deter- 
mining the  various  parts  of  our  nervous  apparatus  to  the  peculiar 
action,  or  rather  passion,  of  which  they  are  susceptible ;  which 
determined  action  or  passion  is  the  quality  of  which  alone  we  are 
immediately  cognizant,  the  external  concause  of  that  internal 
effect  remaining  to  perception  altogether  unknown.  Thus,  the 
Secondary  qualities  (and  the  same  is  to  be  said,  mutatis  mutan- 
dis, of  the  Secundo-primary)  are,  considered  subjectively,  and 
considered  objectively,  affections  or  qualities  of  things  diamet- 
rically opposed  in  nature — of  the  organic  and  inorganic,  of  the 
sentient  and  insentient,  of  mind  and  matter :  and  though,  as  mu- 
tually correlative,  and  their  several  pairs  rarely  obtaining  in  com- 
mon language  more  than  a  single  name,  they  cannot  well  be  con- 
sidered, except  in  conjuction,  under  the  same  category  or  general 
class ;  still  their  essential  contrast  of  character  must  be  ever  care- 
fully borne  in  mind.  And  in  speaking  of  these  qualities,  as  we 
are  here  chiefly  concerned  with  them  on  their  subjective  side,  I 


apply  is  an  accurate  index  of  what  their  cubical  extension  would  be  in  a 
state  of  ultimate  or  closest  compression.  But  though  this  objection  must  be 
admitted  to  invalidate  the  certainty  of  the  more  direct  and  probable  crite- 
rion, it  does  not,  however,  leave  the  problem  to  be  determined  by  the  other ; 
against  which,  indeed,  it  falls  to  be  no  less  effectually  retorted.  For  as  lit- 
le,  at  least,  can  we  be  assured  that  there  is  not  (either  separately,  or  in  com- 
bination with  gravitating  matter)  substance  occupying  space,  and,  therefore, 
material,  but  which,  being  destitute  of  weight,  is,  on  the  standard  of  pon- 
derability, precisely  as  if  it  did  not  exist.  This  supposition,  be  it  observed, 
the  experiments  of  Newton  and  Bessel  do  not  exclude.  Nay,  more ;  there 
are,  in  fact,  obtruded  ou  our  observation  a  series  of  apparent  fluids  (as 
Light,  or  its  vehicle,  the  Calorific,  Electro-galvanic,  and  Magnetic  agents), 
which,  in  our  present  state  of  knowledge,  we  can  neither,  on  the  one  hand, 
denude  of  the  character  of  substance,  nor,  on  the  other,  close  with  the  attri- 
bute of  weight. 

3".  This  argument  finally  supposes,  as  a  logical  canon,  that  a  presumption 
from  analogy  affords  a  criterion  of  truth,  subjectively  necessary,  and  objec- 
tively certain.  But  not  the  former ;  for  however  inclined,  we  are  never 
necessitated,  a  posteriori,  to  think,  that  because  some  are,  therefore  all  the 
constituents  of  a  class  must  be,  the  subjects  of  a  predicate  a  priori  contingent. 
Not  the  latter;  for  though  a  useful  stimulus  and  guide  to  investigation, 
analogy  is,  by  itself,  a  very  doubtful  guarantee  of  truth. 


372  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

request  it  may  be  observed,  that  I  shall  employ  the  expression 
Secondary  qualities  to  denote  those  phenomenal  affections  deter- 
mined in  our  sentient  organism  by  the  agency  of  external  bodies, 
and  not,  unless  when  otherwise  stated,  the  occult  powers  them- 
selves from  which  that  agency  proceeds. 

Of  the  Secondary  qualities,  in  this  relation,  there  are  various 
kinds ;  the  variety  principally  depending  on  the  differences  of  the 
different  parts  of  our  nervous  apparatus.  Such  are  the  proper 
sensibles,  the  idiopathic  affections  of  our  several  organs  of  sense, 
as  Color,  Sound,  Flavor,  Savor,  and  Tactual  sensation ;  such  are 
the  feelings  from  Heat,  Electricity,  Galvanism,  &c. ;  nor  need  it 
be  added,  such  are  the  muscular  and  cutaneous  sensations  which 
accompany  the  perception  of  the  Secundo-primary  qualities. 
Such,  though  less  directly  the  result  of  foreign  causes,  are  Titil- 
lation,  Sneezing,  Horripilation,  Shuddering,  the  feeling  of  what  is 
called  Setting-the-teeth-on-edge,  &c.,  <fec.^  such,  in  fine,  are  all 
the  various  sensations  of  bodily  pleasure  and  pain  determined  by 
the  action  of  external  stimuli. — So  much  for  the  induction  of  the 
Secondary  Qualities  in  a  subjective  relation. 

It  is  here,  however,  requisite  to  add  some  words  of  illustration. 
— What  are  denominated  the  secondary  qualities  of  body,  are,  I 
have  said,  as  apprehended,  not  qualities  of  body  at  all ;  being 
only  idiopathic  affections  of  the  different  portions  of  our  nervous 
organism — affections  which,  however  uniform  and  similar  in  us, 
may  be  determined  by  the  most  dissimilar  and  multiform  causes 
in  external  things.  This  is  manifest  from  the  physiology  of  our 
senses  and  their  appropriate  nerves.  Without  entering  on  details, 
it  is  sufficient  to  observe,  that  we  are  endowed  with  various  as- 
sortments of  nerves ;  each  of  these  being  astricted  to  certain  defi- 
nite functions;  and  each  exclusively  discharging  the  function 
which  specially  belongs  to  it.  Thus  there  are  nerves  of  feeling 
(comprehending  under  that  term  the  sensations  of  cutaneous 
touch  and  feeling  proper,  of  the  muscular  sense,  and  of  the  vital 
sense,  or  sensus  vagus,  in  all  its  modifications),  of  seeing,  of  hear- 
ing, of  smelling,  of  tasting,  <fec. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  373 

The  nerves  of  feeling  afford  us  sensations  to  which,  in  opposite 
extremes,  we  emphatically,  if  not  exclusively,  attribute  the  qual- 
ities of  pain  and  pleasure.  Acute  pain — pain  from  laceration — 
may,  indeed,  be  said  to  belong  exclusively  to  these ;  for  the 
nerves  appropriated  to  the  other  and  more  determinate  senses, 
are,  like  the  brain,  in  this  respect  altogether  insensible  ;  and  it  is 
even  probable  that  the  pain  we  experience  from  their  over-excite- 
ment is  dependent  on  the  nerves  of  feeling  with  which  they  are 
accompanied.  Now  pain  and  pleasure  no  one  has  ever  attributed 
as  qualities  to  external  things :  feeling  has  always  been  regarded 
as  purely  subjective,  and  it  has  been  universally  admitted  that  its 
affections,  indicating  only  certain  conscious  states  of  the  sentient 
animal,  afforded  no  inference  even  to  definite  causes  of  its  produc- 
tion in  external  nature.  So  far  there  is  no  dispute. 

The  case  may,  at  first  sight,  seem  different  with  regard  to  the 
sensations  proper  to  the  more  determinate  senses ;  but  a  slight 
consideration  may  suffice  to  satisfy  us  that  these  are  no  less  sub- 
jective than  the  others ; — as  is  indeed  indicated  in  the  history  al- 
ready given  of  the  distinction  of  Primary  and  Secondary  quali- 
ties. As,  however,  of  a  more  definite  character,  it  is  generally,  I 
believe,  supposed  that  these  senses,  though  they  may  not  pre- 
cisely convey  material  qualities  from  external  existence  to  internal 
knowledge,  still  enable  us  at  least  to  infer  the  possession  by 
bodies  of  certain  specific  powers,  each  capable  exclusively  of  exci- 
ting a  certain  correlative  manifestation  in  us.  But  even  this  is 
according  greatly  too  large  a  share  in  the  total  sensitive  effect  to 
the  objective  concause.  The  sensations  proper  to  the  several 
senses  depend,  for  the  distinctive  character  of  their  manifestation, 
on  the  peculiar  character  of  the  action  of  their  several  nerves  ;  and 
not,  as  is  commonly  supposed,  on  the  exclusive  susceptibility  of 
these  nerves  for  certain  specific  stimuli.  In  fact  every  the  most 
different  stimulus  (and  there  are  many  such,  both  extra  and  in- 
tra-organic,  besides  the  one  viewed  as  proper  to  the  sense),  which 
can  be  brought  to  bear  on  each  several  nerve  of  sense,  determines 
that  nerve  only  to  its  one  peculiar  sensation.  Thus  the  stimulus 


374  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

by  the  external  agent  exclusively  denominated  Light,  though  the 
more  common,  is  not  the  only  stimulus  which  excites  in  the  vis- 
ual apparatus  the  subjective  affection  of  light  and  colors.  Sensa- 
tions of  light  and  colors,  are  determined  among  other  causes,  from 
within,  by  a  sanguineous  congestion  in  the  capillary  vessels  of 
the  optic  nerve,  or  by  various  chemical  agents  which  affect  it 
through  the  medium  of  the  blood ;  from  without,  by  the  applica- 
tion to  the  same  nerve  of  a  mechanical  force,  as  a  blow,  a  com- 
pression, a  wound,  or  of  an  imponderable  influence,  as  electricity 
or  galvanism.  In  fact  the  whole  actual  phenomena  of  vision 
might  be  realized  to  us  by  the  substitution  of  an  electro-galvanic 
stimulus,  were  this  radiated  in  sufficient  intensity  from  bodies, 
and  in  conformity  with  optical  laws.  The  blind  from  birth  are 
thus  rarely  without  all  experience  of  light,  color,  and  visual  ex- 
tension, from  stimulation  of  the  interior  organism. — The  same  is 
the  case  with  the  other  senses.  Apply  the  aforementioned  or 
other  extraordinary  stimuli  to  their  several  nerves ;  each  sense 
will  be  excited  to  its  appropriate  sensation,  and  its  appropriate 
sensation  alone.  The  passion  manifested  (however  heterogeneous 
its  external  or  internal  cause)  is  always — of  the  auditory  nerves, 
a  sound,  of  the  olfactory,  a  smell,  of  the  gustatory,  a  taste.  But 
of  the  various  common  agencies  which  thus  excite  these  several 
organs  to  their  idiopathic  affection,  we  are  manifestly  no  more 
entitled  to  predicate  the  individual  color,  sound,  odor,  or  savor  of 
which,  in  each  case,  we  have  a  sensation,  than  we  are  to  attrib- 
ute the  pain  we  feel  to  the  pin  by  which  we  are  pricked.  But  if 
this  must  per  force  be  admitted  of  the  extraordinary  external 
causes  of  these  sensations,  it  is  impossible  to  deny  it  of  the  ordi- 
nary. 

In  this  respect  Aristotle  (and  the  same  may  also  be  said  of 
Theophrastus)  was  far  in  advance  of  many  of  our  modern  philos- 
ophers. In  his  treatise  on  Dreams,  to  prove  that  sensation  is 
not  a  purely  objective  cognition,  but  much  more  a  subjective 
modification  or  passion  of  the  organ,  he  shows,  and  with  a  detail 
very  unusual  to  him,  that  this  sensible  affection  does  not  cease 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION.  375 

with  the  presence,  and,  therefore,  does  not  manifest  the  quality, 
of  the  external  object.  '  This  (he  says)  is  apparent  so  often  as  we 
have  the  sensation  of  a  thing  for  a  certain  continuance.  For  then, 
divert  as  we  may  the  sense  from  one  object  to  another,  still  the 
affection  from  the  first  accompanies  the  second ;  as  (for  example) 
when  we  pass  from  sunshine  into  shade.  In  this  case  we  at  first 
see  nothing,  because  of  the  movement  in  the  eyes  still  subsisting, 
which  had  been  determined  by  the  light.  In  like  manner  if  we 
gaze  for  a  while  upon  a  single  color,  say  white  or  green,  whatev- 
er we  may  now  turn  our  sight  on  will  appear  of  that  tint.  And 
if,  after  looking  at  the  sun  or  other  dazzling  object,  we  close  our 
eyelids,  we  shall  find,  if  we  observe,  that,  in  the  line  of  vision, 
there  first  of  all  appears  a  color  such  as  we  had  previously  beheld, 
which  then  changes  to  red,  then  to  purple,  until  at  last  the  affec- 
tion vanishes  in  black ;' — -with  more  to  the  same  effect  (C.  2.) 
And  in  the  same  chapter  he  anticipates  modern  psychologists  in 
the  observation — that  '  Sometimes,  when  suddenly  awoke,  we 
discover,  from  their  not  incontinently  vanishing,  that  the  images 
which  had  appeared  to  us  when  asleep  are  really  movements  in 
the  organs  of  sense ;  and  to  young  persons  it  not  unfrequently 
happens,  even  when  wide  awake,  and  withdrawn  from  the  excite- 
ment of  light,  that  moving  images  present  themselves  so  vividly, 
that  for  fear  they  are  wont  to  hide  themselves  under  the  bed- 
clothes.' (C.  2.)  See  also  Ockham,  in  Sent.,  L.  ii.  qq.  17,  18. — 
Biel,  in  Sent.,  L.  ii.  Dist.  iii.  q.  2. — Berigardus,  Circulus  Pisa- 
nus,  P.  vi.  Circ.  12,  ed.  2. — ffobbes,  Human  Nature,  ch.  ii.  §  7- 
10. — Boerhaave,  Prselectiones  in  proprias  Institutions,  §§  284, 
579. — Sprenr/el,  Semiotik,  §  770-773  ;  Pathologic,  vol.  ii.  §  719. 
— Qruithuisen,  Anthropologie,  §  449. — Sir  Charles  Bell,  An 
Idea,  <fec.  (in  Shaw's  Narrative,  p.  35,  sq.) ;  The  Hand,  <kc.,  p. 
175,  sq. — Plateau,  Essai  d'une  Theorie,  <fec.,  p.  . — J.  Mueller, 
Physiology,  Book  v.,  Preliminary  Considerations,  p.  1059,  sq., 
Engl.  Transl. 

Such  being  the  purely  subjective  character  of  the  secondary 
qualities,  as  apprehended  or  immediately  known  by  us,  we  must 


376 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION. 


reject  as  untenable  the  doctrine  on  this  point,  however  ingenious- 
ly supported,  of  the  celebrated  Neapolitan  philosopher,  Baron 
Galluppi ;  who,  while,  justly  I  think,  dissatisfied  with  the  opinion 
of  Reid,  that  the  perception  of  the  primary  qualities  is  a  concep- 
tion instinctively  suggested  on  occasion  of  our  sensation  of  the 
secondary,  errs  on  the  opposite  extreme,  in  his  attempt  to  show 
that  this  sensation  itself  affords  us  what  is  wanted, — an  immedi- 
ate cognition,  an  objective  apprehension,  of  external  things.  The 
result  of  his  doctrine  he  thus  himself  states : — '  Sensation  is  of 
Its  very  nature  objective  ;  in  other  words,  objectivity  is  essential 
to  every  sensation.'1  Elementi  di  Filosofia,  vol.  i.e.  10,  ed.  4, 
Florence,  1837.  The  matter  is  more  amply  treated  in  his  Criti- 
ca  della  Conoscenza,  L.  ii.  c.  6,  and  L.  iv. — a  work  which  I  have 
not  yet  seen.  Compare  Bonelli,  Institutiones  Logico-Metaphysi- 
cae,  t.  i.  pp.  184,  222,  ed.  2,  1837. 

Such  is  the  general  view  of  the  grounds  on  which  the  psycho- 
logical distinction  of  the  Qualities  of  Bodies,  into  the  three  classes 
of  Primary,  Secundo-primary,  and  Secondary  is  established.  It 
now  remains  to  exhibit  their  mutual  differences  and  similarities 
more  in  detail.  In  attempting  this,  the  following  order  will  be 
pursued. — I  shall  state  of  the  three  relative  classes, — (A)  What 
they  are,  considered  in  general  ;  then,  (B)  What  they  are,  consid- 
ered in  particular.  And  under  this  latter  head  I  shall  view 
them,  (1°)  as  in  Bodies  :  (2°)  as  in  Cognition  ;  and  this  (a)  a* 
in  Sensitive  Apprehension ;  (b)  as  in  Thought ;  (c)  as  in  both. 
— For  the  conveniency  of  reference  the  paragraphs  will  be  num- 
bered/ 

A. —  What  they  are  in  general. 

1.  The  Primary  are  less  properly  denominated  Qualities  (Such- 
nesses),  and  deserve  the  name  only  as  we  conceive  them  to  dis- 
tinguish body  from  not-body, — corporeal  from  incorporeal  sub- 
stance. They  are  thus  merely  the  attributes  of  body  as  body, — 
corporis  ut  corpus.  The  Secundo-primary  and  Secondary,  on 
the  contrary,  are  in  strict  propriety  denominated  Qualities,  for 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  377 

they  discriminate  body  from  body.     They  are  the  attributes  of 
body  as  this  or  that  kind  of  body, — coporis  ut  tale  co/yws.* 

2.  The  Primary  rise  from  the  universal  relations  of  body  to 
itself;  the  Secundo-primary  from  the  general  relations  of  this 
body  to  that ;  the  Secondary  from  the  special  relations  of  this 
kind  of  body  to  this  kind  of  animated  or  sentient  organism. 

3.  The  Primary  determine  the  possibility  of  matter  absolutely ; 
the  Secundo-primary,  the  possibility  of  the  material  universe  as 
actually  constituted  ;  the  Secondary,  the  possibility  of  our  rela- 
tion as  sentient  existences  to  that  universe. 

4.  Under  the  Primary  we  apprehend  modes  of  the  Non-ego ; 
under  the  Secundo-primary  we  apprehend  modes  both  of  the  Ego 
and  of  the  Non-ego ;  under  the  Secondary  we/apprehend  modes 
of  the  Ego,  and  infer  modes  of  the  Non-ego.     (See  par.  15.) 

5.  The  Primary  are  apprehended  as  they  are  in  bodies ;  the 
Secondary,  as  they  are  in  us ;  the  Secundo-primary,  as  they  are 
in  bodies,  and  as  they  are  in  us.     (See  par.  15.) 

6.  The  term  quality  in  general,  and  the  names  of  the  several 
qualities  in  particular,  are — in  the  case  of  the  primary,  univocal, 
one  designation  unambiguously  marking  out  one  quality  ;f — in  the 
case  of  the  Secundo-primary  and  Secondary,  equivocal,  a  single 
term  being  ambiguously  applied  to  denote  two  qualities,  distinct 
though  correlative — that,  to  wit,  which  is  a  mode  of  existence  in 
bodies,  and  that  which  is  a  mode  of  affection  in  our  organism.}. 
(See  par.  24.) 

*  Thus  in  the  Aristotelic  and  other  philosophies,  the  title  Quality  would 
not  be  allowed  to  those  fundamental  conditions  on  which  the  very  possibility 
of  matter  depends,  but  which  modern  philosophers  have  denominated  its 
Primary  Qualities. 

t  For  example,  there  is  no  subjective  Sensation  of  Magnitude,  Figure, 
Number,  &c.,  but  only  an  objective  Perception.  (See  par.  15-19.) 

%  Thus,  in  the  Secundo-primary  the  term  Hardness,  for  instance,  denotes 
both  a  certain  resistance,  of  which  we  are  conscious,  to  our  motive  energy, 
and  a  certain  feeling  from  pressure  on  our  nerves.  The  former,  a  Perception, 
is  wholly  different  from  the  latter,  a  Sensation ;  and  we  can  easily  imagine 
that  we  might  have  been  so  constituted,  as  to  apprehend  Resistance  as  we  do 
Magnitude,  Figure,  &c.,  without  a  corresponding  organic  passion.  (See  par. 
18.) — In  the  Secondary  the  term  Heat,  for  example,  denotes  ambiguously  both 


378  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

7.  The  Primary,  and  also  the  Secundo-primary  qualities,  are 
definite  in  number  and  exhaustive;  for  all  conceivable  relations 
of  body  to  itself,  or  of  body  to  body  merely,  are  few,  and  all  these 
found  actually  existent.     The  Secondary,  on  the  contrary,  are  in 
number  indefinite ;  and  the  actual  hold  no  proportion  to  the  pos- 
sible.    For  we  can  suppose,  in  an  animal  organism,  any  number  of 
unknown  capacities  of  being  variously  affected ;  and,  in  matter, 
any  number  of  unknown  powers  of  thus  variously  affecting  it  ;* 
and  this  though  we  are  necessarily  unable  to  imagine  to  ourselves 
what  these  actually  may  be. 

B. —  What  they  are  in  particular  ;  and  1°,  Considered  as  in 

Bodies, 

8.  The  Primary  are  the  qualities  of  body  in  relation  to  our  or- 
ganism, as  a  body  simply ;  the  Secundo-primary,  are  the  qualities 
of  body  in  relation  to  our  organism,  as  a  propelling,  resisting,  co- 
hesive body ;  the  Secondary  are  the  qualities  of  body  in  relation 
to  our  organism,  as  an  idiopathically  excitable  and  sentient  body. 
(See  p.  374  b— 376  a.) 

9.  Under  this  head  we  know  the  Primary  qualities  immedi- 
ately as  objects  of  perception ;  the  Secundc»-priinary,  both  imme- 
diately as  objects  of  perception  and  mediately  as  causes  of  sen- 
sation ;  the  Secondary,  only  mediately  as  causes  of  sensation. 
In  other  words : — The  Primary  are  known  immediately  in  them- 
selves ;  the  Secundo-primary,  both  immediately  in  themselves  and 
mediately  in  their  effects  on  us ;  the  Secondary,  only  mediately 
in  their  effects  on  us.     (See  par.  15.) 

10.  The  Primary  are  known  under  the  condition  of  sensations ; 
the  Secundo-primary,  in  and  along  with  sensations ;  the  Second- 
ary, in  consequence  of  sensations.     (See  par.  20.) 

the  quality  which  we  infer  to  be  in  bodies  and  the  quality  of  which  we  are 
conscious  in  ourselves. 

*  Sextus  Empiricus,  Montaigne,  Voltaire,  Hemsterhuis,  Krueger,  &c.,  no- 
tice this  as  possible ;  but  do  not  distinguish  the  possibility  as  limited  to  the 
Secondary  Qualities. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  379 

11.  The  Primary  are  thus  apprehended  objects ;  the  Secondary, 
inferred  powers ;  the  Secundo-primary,  both  apprehended  objects 
and  inferred  powers. 

12.  The  Primary  are  conceived  as  necessary  and  perceived  as 
actual ;    the  Secundo-primary  are  perceived  and  conceived  as 
actual ;  the  Secondary  are  inferred  and  conceived  as  possible. 

13.  The  Primary  are  perceived  as  conceived.     The  Secundo- 
primary  are  conceived  as  perceived.     The  Secondary  are  neither 
perceived  as  conceived,  nor  conceived  as  perceived ; — for  to  per- 
ception they  are  occult,  and  are  conceived  only  as  latent  causes  to 
account  for  manifest  effects.     (See  par.  15,  and  foot-note  *.) 

14.  The  Primary  may  be  roundly  characterized  as  mathemat- 
ical;   the  Secundo-primary,  as  mechanical;   the  Secondary,  as 
physiological. 

2°.   Considered  as   Cognitions ;    and  here  (a)  As  in   Sensitive 
Apprehension,  or  in  relation  to  Sense. 

15.  In  this  relation  the  Primary  qualities  are,  as  apprehended, 
unambiguously  objective  (object-objects) ;  the  Secondary,  unam- 
biguously  subjective   (subject-objects)  ;*    the   Secundo-primary, 
both  objective  and  subjective  (object-objects  and  subject-objects). 
In  other  words : — We  are  conscious,  as  objects,  in  the  Primary 
qualities,  of  the  modes  of  a  not-self;  in  the  Secondary,  of  the 
modes  of  self;*  in  the  Secundo-primary,  of  the  modes  of  self  and 
of  a  not-self  at  once.f 

*  How  much  this  differs  from  the  doctrine  of  Reid,  Stewart,  &c.,  who  hold 
that  in  every  sensation  there  is  not  only  a  subjective  object  of  sensation,  but, 
also  an  objective  object  of  perception,  see  Note  D*,  §  I.1 

t  In  illustration  of  this  paragraph,  I  must  notice  a  confusion  and  ambigu- 
ity in  the  very  cardinal  distinction  of  psychology  and  its  terms — the  distinc- 
tion I  mean  otevbfecti/M  and  olgective,  which,  as  far  as  I  am  aware,  has  never 
been  cleared  up,  nay,  never  even  brought  clearly  into  view. 

Our  nervous  organism  (the  rest  of  our  body  may  be  fairly  thrown  out  of 
account),  in  contrast  to  r.ll  exterior  to  itself,  appertains  to  the  concrete  human 
Ego,  and  in  this  respect  is  subjective,  internal;  whereas,  in  contrast  to  the 


Chapter  vL  below,  in  this  vol.—  W. 


380  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PEBCEPTION. 

16.  Using  the  terms  strictly,  the  apprehensions  of  the  Primary 
are  perceptions,  not  sensations ;  of  the  Secondary,  sensations,  not 
perceptions ;  of  the  Secundo-primary,  perceptions  and  sensations 
together.  (See  par.  15,  foot-note  *.) 


abstract  immaterial  Ego,  the  pure  mind,  it  belongs  to  the  Non-ego,  and  in 
this  respect  is  objective,  external.  Hero  is  one  source  of  ambiguity  sufficiently 
perplexing ;  but  the  discrimination  is  here  comparatively  manifest,  and  any 
important  inconvenience  from  the  employment  of  the  terms  may,  with  prop- 
er attention,  be  avoided. 

The  following  problem  is  more  difficult.  Looking  from  the  mind,  and  not 
looking  beyond  our  animated  organism,  are  the  phenomena  of  which  we  are 
conscious  in  that  organism  all  upon  a  level,  i.  e.,  equally  objective  or  equally 
subjective ;  or  is  there  a  discrimination  to  be  made,  and  some  phenomena  to 
be  considered  as  objective,  being  modes  of  our  organism  viewed  as  a  mere  por- 
tion of  matter,  and  in  this  respect  a  Non-ego,  while  other  phenomena  are  to 
be  considered  as  subjective,  being  the  modes  of  our  organism  as  animated  by 
or  in  union  with  the  mind,  and  therefore  states  of  the  Ego?  Without  here 
attempting  to  enter  on  the  reasons  which  vindicate  my  opinion,  suffice  it  to 
say,  that  I  adopt  the  latter  alternative  ;  and  hold  further,  that  the  discrim- 
ination of  the  sensorial  phenomena  into  objective  and  subjective,  coincides 
with  the  distinction  made  of  the  qualities  of  body  into  Primary  and  Second- 
ary, the  Secundo-primary  being  supposed  to  contribute  an  element  to  each. 
Our  nervous  organism  is  to  be  viewed  in  two  relations ; — 1°,  as  a  body  simply, 
and — 2°,  as  an  animated  body.  As  a  body  simply  it  can  possibly  exist,  and 
can  possibly  be  known  as  existent,  only  under  those  necessary  conditions  of 
all  matter,  which  have  been  denominated  its  Primary  qualities.  As  an  ani- 
mated body  it  actually  exists,  and  is  actually  known  to  exist,  only  as  it  is  sus- 
ceptible of  certain  affections,  which,  and  the  external  causes  of  which,  have 
been  ambiguously  called  the  Secondary  qualities  of  matter.  Now,  by  a  law 
of  our  nature,  we  are  not  conscious  of  the  existence  of  our  organism,  conse- 
quently not  conscious  of  any  of  its  primary  qualities,  unless  when  we  are 
conscious  of  it,  as  modified  by  a  secondary  quality,  or  some  other  of  ite 
affections,  as  an  animated  body.  But  the  former  consciousness  requires  the 
latter  only  as  its  negative  condition,  and  is  neither  involved  in  it  as  a  part, 
nor  properly  dependent  on  it  as  a  cause.  The  object  in  the  one  conscious- 
ness is  also  wholly  different  from  the  object  in  the  other.  In  that,  it  is  a  con- 
tingent passion  of  the  organism,  as  a  constituent  of  the  human  self;  in 
this,  it  is  some  essential  property  of  the  organism,  as  a  portion  of  the  uni- 
verse of  matter,  and  though  apprehended  by,  not  an  affection  proper  to,  the 
conscious  self  at  all.  In  these  circumstances,  the  secondary  quality,  say  a 
color,  whicli  the  mind  apprehends  in  the  organism,  is,  as  a  passion  of  self, 
recognized  to  be  a  subjective  object;  whereas  the  primary  quality,  extension, 
or  figure,  or  number,  which,  when  conscious  of  such  affection,  the  mind 
therein  at  the  same  time  apprehends,  is,  as  not  a  passion  of  self,  but  a  com- 
mon property  of  matter,  recognized  to  be  an  objective  object.  (See  par.  16-19, 
with  foot-note  t,  and  par.  18,  with  foot-note  %.) 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION.  381 

17.  In  the  Primary  there  is,  thus,  no  concomitant  Secondary 
quality ;  in  the  Secondary  there  is  no  concomitant  primary  qual- 
ity ;  in  the  Secundo-primary,  a  secondary  and  quasi-primary  qual- 
ity accompany  each  other. 

18.  In  the  apprehension  of  the  Primary  qualities  the  mind  is 
primarily  and  principally  active;  it  feels  only  as  it  knows.     In 
that  of  the  Secondary,  the  mind  is  primarily  and  principally  pas- 
sive ;  it  knows  only  as  it  feels.*     In  that  of  the  Secundo-primary 


*  Thus  in  vision  the  secondary  quality  of  color  is,  in  the  strictest  sense,  a 
passive  affection  of  the  sentient  ego ;  and  the  only  activity  the  mind  can  be 
said  to  exert  in  the  sensation  of  colors,  is  in  the  recognitive  consciousness 
that  it  is  so  and  so  affected.  It  thus  knows  as  it  feels,  in  knowing  that  it  feels. 

But  the  apprehension  of  extension,  figure,  divisibility,  &c.,  which,  under 
condition  of  its  being  thus  affected,  simultaneously  takes  place,  is,  though 
necessary,  wholly  active  and  purely  spiritual ;  inasmuch  as  extension,  figure, 
&c.,  are,  directly  and  in  their  own  nature,  neither,  subjectively  considered, 
passions  of  the  animated  sensory,  nor,  objectively  considered,  efficient  qual- 
ities in  things  by  which  such  passion  can  be  caused.  The  perception  of  parts 
out  of  parts  is  not  given  in  the  mere  affection  of  color,  but  is  obtained  by 
a  reaction  of  the  mind  upon  such  affection^Tt  is  merely  the  recognition  of 
a  relation.  But  a  relation  is  neither  a  passion  nor  a  cause  of  passion ;  and, 
though  apprehended  through  sense,  is,  in  truth,  an  intellectual,  not  a  sensi- 
tive cognition ; — unless  under  the  name  of  sensitive  cognition^we  compre- 
hend, as  I  think  we  ought,  more  than  the  mere  recognition  of  an  organic 
passion.1  The  perception  of  Extension  is  not,  therefore,  the  mere  conscious- 
ness of  an  affection — a  mere 'sensation. — This  is  still  more  manifest  in  regard 
to  Figure,  or  extension  bounded.  Visual  figure  is  an  expanse  of  color 
bounded  in  a  certain  manner  by  a  line.  Here  all  is  nothing  but  relation. 
'  Expanse  of  color'  is  only  colored  extension ;  and  extension,  as  stated,  is  only 
the  relation  of  parts  out  of  parts.  '  Bounded  in  a  certain  manner,'1  is  also 
only  the  expression  of  various  relations.  A  thing  is  'bounded,'  only  as  it 
has  a  limited  number  of  parts;  but  limited,  number,  and  parts,  are,  all  three, 
relations :  and,  further,  lin  a  certain  manner'  denotes  that  these  parts  stand 
to  each  other  in  one  relation  and  not  in  another.  The  perception  of  a  thing 
as  bounded,  and  bounded  in  a  certain  manner,  is  thus  only  the  recognition 
of  a  thing  under  relations.  Finally,  '  by  a  line1  still  merely  indicates  a  rela- 
tion ;  for  a  line  is  nothing  but  the  negation  of  each  other,  by  two  intersect- 
ing colors.  Absolutely  considered,  it  is  a  nothing;  and  so  far  from  there 
being  any  difficulty  in  conceiving  a  breadthless  line,  a  line  is,  in  fact,  not  a 
line  (but  a  narrow  surface  between  two  lines)  if  thought  as  possessed  of 
breadth.  In  such  perceptions,  therefore,  if  the  mind  can  be  said  to  feel,  it 
can  be  said  to  feel  only  in  being  conscious  of  itself  as  purely  active ;  that  is, 
aa  spontaneously  apprehensive  of  an  object-object  or  mode  of  the  non-ego, 

i  See  the  next  chapter,  §  i.—  W. 


382  PHILOSOPHY  OF   PERCEPTION. 

the  mind  is  equally  and  at  once  active  and  passive ;  in  one  re- 
spect, it  feels  as  it  knows,  in  another,  it  knows  as  it  feels.* 

and  not  of  a  subject-object  or  affection  of  the  ego.  (See  par.  16-19,  and  rel- 
ative foot-note  t.) 

The  application  of  the  preceding  doctrine  to  the  other  primary  qualities  is 
even  more  obtrusive. 

To  prevent  misunderstanding,  it  may  be  observed,  that  in  saying  the  mind 
it  active,  not  passive,  in  a  cognition,  I  do  not  mean  to  say  that  the  mind  is  free 
to  exert  or  not  to  exert  the  cognitive  act,  or  even  not  to  exert  it  in  a  deter- 
minate manner.  The  mind  energizes  as  it  lives,  and  it  cannot  choose  but  live ; 
it  knows  as  it  energizes,  and  it  cannot  choose  but  energize.  An  object  being 
duly  presented,  it  is  unable  not  to  apprehend  it,  and  apprehend  it,  both  in  it- 
self, and  in  the  relations  under  which  it  stands.  We  may  evade  the  present- 
ation, not  the  recognition  of  what  is  presented.1  But  of  this  again. 

*  This  is  apparent  when  it  is  considered  that  under  the  cognition  of  a 
secundo-primary  quality  are  comprehended  both  the  apprehension  of  a  sec- 
ondary quality,  i.  e.  the  sensation  of  a  subjective  affection,  and  the  appre- 
hension of  a  quasi-primary  quality,  i.  e.  the  perception  of  an  objective  force. 
Take,  for  example,  the  Secundo-primary  quality  of  Hardness.  In  the  sen- 
sitive apprehension  of  this  we  are  aware  of  two  facts.  The  first  is  the  fact 
of  a  certain  affection,  a  certain  feeling,  in  our  sentient  organism  (Muscular 
and  Skin  senses).  This  is  the  sensation,  the  apprehension  of  a  feeling  conse- 
quent on  the  resistance  of  a  body,  and  which  in  one  of  its  special  modifica- 
tions constitutes  Hardness,  viewed  as  an  affection  in  us ; — a  sensation  which 
we  know,  indeed,  by  experience  to  be  the  effect  of  the  pressure  of  an  un- 
yielding body,  but  which  we  can  easily  conceive  might  be  determined  in  us 
independently  of  all  internal  movement,  all  external  resistance ;  while  we 
can  still  more  easily  conceive  that  such  movement  and  resistance  might  be 
apprehended  independently  of  such  concomitant  sensation.  Here,  there- 
fore, we  know  only  as  we  feel,  for  here  we  only  know,  that  is,  are  conscious 
that  we  feel. — The  second  is  the  fact  of  a  certain  opposition  to  the  voluntary 
movement  of  a  limb — to  our  locomotive  energy.  Of  this  energy  we  might 
be  conscious,  without  any  consciousness  of  the  state,  or  even  the  existence, 
of  the  muscles  set  in  motion ;  and  we  might  also  be  conscious  of  resistance 
to  ita  exertion,  though  no  organic  feeling  happened  to  be  its  effect.  But  as 
it  is,  though  conscious  of  the  sensations  connected  both  with  the  active  state 
of  our  muscular  frame  determined  by  its  tension,  and  of  the  passive  state  in 
our  skin  and  flesh  determined  by  external  pressure ;  still,  over  and  above 
these  animal  sensations,  we  are  purely  conscious  of  the  fact,  that  the  overt 
exertion  of  our  locomotive  volition  is,  in  a  certain  sort,  impeded.  This  con- 
sciousness is  the  perception,  the  objective  apprehension,  of  resistance,  which 
in  one  of  its  special  modifications  constitutes  Hardness,  as  an  attribute  of 
body.  In  this  cognition,  if  we  can  be  said  with  any  propriety  to  feel,  we 
can  be  said  only  to  feel  as  we  know,  because  we  only  feel,  i.  e.  are  conscious, 
that  we  know.  (See  par.  18,  foot-note  t,  and  par.  25,  first  foot-note,  Parti.) 


See  Cousin's  History  of  Philosophy,  second  series,  lecture  xxv.— W. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  383 

19.  Thus  Perception  and  Activity  are  at  the  maximum  in  the 
Primary  qualities  ;  at  the  minimum  in  the  Secondary ;  Sensation 
and  Passivity  are  at  the  minimum  in  the  Primary,  at  the  maxi- 
mum in  the  Secondary ;  while,  in  the  Secundo-primary,  Percep- 
tion and  Sensation,  Activity  and  Passivity,  are  in  equipoise. — 
Thus  too  it  is,  that  the  most  purely  material  phenomena  are  ap- 
prehended in  the  most  purely  inorganic  energy.* 

*  The  doctrine  of  paragraphs  16-19  seems  to  have  been  intended  by  Aris- 
toile  (see  above,  page  314  b),  in  saying  that  the  Common  Sensibles  (=  the 
Primary  Qualities)  are  percepts  concomitant  or  consequent  on  the  sensation 
of  the  Proper  (=  the  Secondary  Qualities),  and  on  one  occasion  that  the 
Common  Sensibles  are,  in  a  certain  sort,  only  to  be  considered  as  apprehen- 
sions of  sense  per  accidens.  For  this  may  be  interpreted  to  mean,  that  our 
apprehension  of  the  common  sensibles  is  not,  like  that  of  the  proper,  the 
mere  consciousness  of  a  subjective  or  sensorial  passion,  but,  though  only 
exerted  when  such  passion  is  determined,  is  in  itself  the  spontaneous  energy 
of  the  mind  in  objective  cognition. 

Tending  towards,  though  not  reaching  to,  the  same  resiilt,  might  be  ad- 
duced many  passages  from  the  works  of  the  Greek  interpreters  of  Aristotle. 
In  particular,  I  would  refer  to  the  doctrine  touching  the  Common  Sensibles, 
stated  by  Simplicius  in  his  Commentary  on  the  De  Anima  (L.  ii.  c.  6,  f,  35  a, 
L.  iii.  c.  1,  f,  51  a,  ed.  Aid.),  and  by  Priscianus  Lydus,  in  his  Metaphrase  of 
the  Treatise  of  Theophrastus  on  Sense  (pp.  274, 275,  285,  ed.  Basil.  Theoph.) : 
— but  (as  already  noticed)  these  books  ought,  I  suspect,  from  strong  internal 
evidence,  both  to  be  assigned  to  Priscianus  as  their  author ;  while  the  doc- 
trine itself  is  probably  only  that  which  lamblichus  had  delivered,  in  his  lost 
treatise  upon  the  Soul.  It  is  to  this  effect : — The  common  sensibles  might 
appear  not  to  be  sensibles  at  all,  or  sensibles  only  per  accidens,  as  making 
no  impression  on  the  organ,  and  as  objects  analogous  to,  and  apprehended 
by,  the  understanding  or  rational  mind  alone.  This  extreme  doctrine  is  not, 
however,  to  be  admitted.  As  sensibles,  the  common  must  be  allowed  to 
act  somehow  upon  the  sense,  though  in  a  different  manner  from  the  proper. 
Comparatively  speaking,  the  proper  act  primarily,  corporeally,  and  by  caus- 
ing a  passion  in  the  sense ;  the  common,  secondarily,  formally,  and  by  elicit- 
ing the  sense  and  understanding  to  energy.  But  though  there  be,  in  the 
proper  more  of  passivity,  in  the  common  more  of  activity,  still  the  common 
are,  in  propriety,  objects  of  sense  per  se ;  being  neither  cognized  (as  sub- 
stances) exclusively  by  the  understanding,  nor  (as  is  the  sweet  by  vision) 
accidentally  by  sense. 

A  similar  approximation  may  be  detected  in  the  doctrine  of  the  more 
modern  Aristotelians.  (See  page  315  a.)  Expressed  in  somewhat  different 
terms,  it  was  long  a  celebrated  controversy  in  the  schools,  whether  a  certain 
class  of  objects,  under  which  common  sensibles  were  included,  did  or  did 
not  modify  the  organic  sense ;  and  if  this  they  did,  whether  primarily  and 
of  themselves,  or  only  secondarily  through  their  modification  of  the  proper 


384  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

20.  In  the  Primary,  a  sensation  of  organic  affection  is  the 
condition  of  perception,  a  mental  apprehension  ;  in  the  Secundo- 
primary,  a  sensation  is  the  concomitant  of  the  perception ;  in  the 
Secondary,  a  sensation  is  the  all  in  all  which  consciousness  ap- 
prehends.    (See  par.  10.) 

21.  In  the  Primary,  the  sensation,  the  condition  of  the  percep- 
tion, is  not  itself  caused  by  the  objective  quality  perceived ;  in 

sensiblcs,  with  which  they  were  associated.  Ultimately,  it  became  the  prev- 
alent doctrine,  that  of  Magnitude,  Figure,  Place,  Position,  Time,  Relation  in 
general,  &c.,  'nullam  esse  cfficaciam  vcl  actionem :'  that  is,  these  do  mt, 
like  the  affective  qualities  (qualitatcs  patibiles)  or  proper  Benaiblcs,  make 
any  real,  any  material  impress  on  the  sense  ;  but  if  they  can  be  said  to  act 
at  all,  act  only,  either,  as  some  held,  spiritually  or  intentionally,  or  as  others, 
by  natural  resultance  (vel  spiritualiter  sivo  intentioualiter,  vel  per  naturalem 
resnltantiam).  See  Tbletus,  Comm.  De  Anima,  L.  ii.  c.  6,  qq.  14,  15 ; — Za- 
barella,  Comm.  De  Anima,  L.  ii.  Text.  65 ;  De  Eebus  Naturalibus,  p.  939  sq., 
De  Sensu  Agcnte,  cc.  4,  5 ; — ffocUnius,  Adversaria,  q.  55 ; — Suaree,  Meta- 
physicae  Disputationes,  disp.  xviii.  sec.  4 ; — Scheibler,  Metaphysica,  L.  ii.  c. 
5,  art.  5,  puuct.  1 ;  De  Anima,  P.  ii.  disp.  ii.  §  24 ;  Liber  Sententiarum,  Ex. 
vi.  ax.  4,  Ex.  xii.  ax.  10. 

The  same  result  seems,  likewise,  confirmed  indirectly,  by  the  doctrine  of 
those  philosophers  who,  as  Condillac  in  his  earlier  writings,  Stewart,  Brown, 
Mill,  J.  Young,  &c.,  hold  that  extension  and  color  are  only  mutually  con- 
comitant in  imagination,  through  the  influence  of  inveterate  association. 
In  itself,  indeed,  this  doctrine  I  do  not  admit ;  for  it  supposes  that  we  could 
possibly  be  conscious  of  color  without  extension,  of  extension  without  color. 
Not  the  former;  for  we  are  only,  as  in  sense,  so  in  the  imagination  of  sense, 
aware  of  a  minimum  visible,  as  of  a  luminous  or  colored  point,  in  contrast 
to  and  out  of  a  surrounding  expanse  of  obscure  or  differently  colored  sur- 
face ;  and  a  visual  object,  larger  than  the  minimum,  is,  ex  hypothesi,  pre- 
sented, or  represented,  as  extended.  Not  the  latter;  for,  as  I  have  already 
observed,  psychologically  speaking,  the  sensation  of  color  comprehends  con- 
tradictory opposites ;  to  wit,  both  the  sensation  of  positive  color,  in  many 
modes,  and  the  sensation  of  a  privation  of  all  color,  in  one.  But  of  contra- 
dictory predicates  one  or  other  must,  by  the  logical  law  of  excluded  middle, 
be  attributed  in  thought  to  every  object  of  thought.  We  cannot,  therefore, 
call  up  in  imagination  an  extended  object,  without  representing  it  either  at 
somehow  positively  colored  (red,  or  green,  or  blue,  &c.),  or  as  negatively 
colored  (black).  But  though  I  reject  this  doctrine,  I  do  not  reject  it  as  ab- 
solutely destitute  of  truth.  It  is  erroneous,  I  think ;  but  every  error  is  a 
truth  abused ;  and  the  abuse  in  this  case  seems  to  lie  in  the  extreme  recoil 
from  the  counter  error  of  the  common  opinion,— that  the  apprehension 
through  sight  of  color,  and  the  apprehension  through  sight  of  extension  and 
figure,  are  as  inseparable,  identical  cognitions  of  identical  objects.— See  Keid, 
Inq.  145. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION.  385 

the  Secundo-primary,  the  concomitant  sensation  is  the  effect  of 
the  objective  quality  perceived  :  in  the  Secondary,  the  sensation 
is  the  effect  of  an  objective  quality  supposed,  but  not  perceived. 
In  other  words  : — In  the  apprehension  of  the  Primary,  there  is 
no  subject-object  determined  by  the  object-object ;  in  the  Secun- 
do-primary, there  is  a  subject-object  determined  by  the  object- 
object  ;  in  the  Secondary,  a  subject-object  is  the  only  object  of 
immediate  cognition. 

22.  In  the  Primary,  the  sensation  of  the  secondary  quality, 
which  affords  its  condition  to  the  perception  of  the  primary,  is 
various  and  indefinite  ;*  in  the  Secundo-primary,  the  sensation 


*  The  opinions  so  generally  prevalent,  that  through  touch,  or  touch  and 
muscular  feeling,  or  touch  and  sight,  or  touch,  muscular  feeling,  and  sight, 
— that  through  these  senses,  exclusively,  we  are  percipient  of  extension. 
&c.,  I  do  not  admit.  On  the  contrary,  I  hold  that  all  sensations  whatsoever, 
of  which  we  are  conscious,  as  one  out  of  another,  eo  ipso,  afford  us  the  con- 
dition of  immediately  and  necessarily  apprehending  extension :  for  in  the 
consciousness  itself  of  such  reciprocal  outness  is  actually  involved  a  percep- 
tion of  difference  of  place  in  space,  and  consequently,  of  the  extended. 
Philosophers  have  confounded  what  supplies  the  condition  of  the  more 
prompt  and  precise  perception  of  extension,  with  what  supplies  the  condi- 
tion of  a  perception  of  extension  at  all. 

And  be  it  observed,  that  it  makes  no  essential  difference  in  this  doctrine, 
whether  the  mind  be  supposed  proximately  conscious  of  the  reciprocal  out- 
ness of  the  sensations  at  the  central  extremity  of  the  nerves,  in  an  extended 
sensorium  commune,  where  each  distinct  nervous  filament  has  its  separate , 
locality,  or  at  the  peripheral  extremity  of  the  nerves,  in  the  places  them- 
selves where  sensations  are  excited,  and  to  which  they  are  referred.  From 
many  pathological  phenomena  the  former  alternative  might  appear  the  more 
probable.  In  this  view,  each  several  nerve,  or  rather,  each  several  nervous 
filament  (for  every  such  filament  has  its  peculiar  function,  and  runs  isolated 
from  every  other),  is  to  be  regarded  merely  as  one  sentient  point ;  which 
yields  one  indivisible  sensation,  out  of  and  distinct  from  that  of  every  other, 
by  the  side  of  which  it  is  arranged ;  and  not  as  a  sentient  line,  each  point 
of  which,  throughout  its  course,  has  for  itself  a  separate  local  sensibility. 
For  a  stimulus  applied  to  any  intermediate  part  of  a  nerve,  is  felt  not  as 
there,  but  as  if  applied  to  its  peripheral  extremity  ;  a  feeling  which  continues 
when  that  extremity  itself,  nay,  when  any  portion  of  the  nerve,  however 
great,  has  been  long  cut  off.  Thus  it  is  that  a  whole  line  of  nerve  affords,  at 
all  its  points,  only  the  sensation  of  one  determinate  point.  One  point,  there- 
fore, physiologically  speaking,  it  is  to  be  considered.  (See  Plutarch,  De 
Plac.  Philos.  L.  iv.  c.  23 ; — Nemesius,  De  Horn.  c.  8  ; — Fabriclua  Ifildanus, 
Obs.  Cent.  iii.  obs.  15  ;— Descartes,  Princ.  P.  iv.  §  196  \-Blancard,  Coll.  Med. 

17 


386  PHILOSOPHY  OF   PERCEPTION. 

of  the  secondary  quality,  which  accompanies  the  perception  of 
the  quasi  primary,  is  under  the  same  circumstances,  uniform  and 
definite ;  in  the  Secondary,  the  sensation  is  itself  definite,  but  its 


Phys.  cent.  vii.  obs.  15 : — Stuart,  De  Motu  Muse.  c.  5 ; — Kaau  Boerhaaw, 
Imp.  fac.  §  368  sq. ;— Sir  Ch.  Bell,  Idea,  &c.  p.  12 ;  The  Hand,  p.  159 ;— Ma- 
yendie,  Journ.  t.  v.  p.  88 ;  Mueller,  Phys.  pp.  692-696,  Engl.  tr.) 

Take  for  instance  a  man  whose  leg  has  been  amputated.  If  now  two  nerv- 
ous filaments  be  irritated,  the  one  of  which  ran  to  his  great,  the  other  to  his 
little  toe — he  will  experience  two  pains,  as  in  these  two  members.  Nor  is 
there,  in  propriety,  any  deception  in  such  sensations.  For  his  toes,  as  all 
his  members,  arc  his  only  as  they  are  to  him  sentient ;  and  they  are  only 
sentient  and  distinctly  sentient,  as  endowed  with  nerves  and  distinct  nerves. 
The  nerves  thus  constitute  alone  the  whole  sentient  organism.  In  these 
circumstances,  the  peculiar  nerves  of  the  several  toes,  running  isolated  from 
centre  to  periphery,  and  thus  remaining,  though  curtailed  in  length,  unmu- 
tilated  in  function,  will,  if  irritated  at  any  point,  continue  to  manifest  their 
original  sensations ;  and  these  being  now,  as  heretofore,  manifested  out  of 
each  other,  must  afford  the  condition  of  a  perceived  extension,  not  less  real 
than  that  which  they  afforded  prior  to  the  amputation. 

The  hypothesis  of  an  extended  sensorium  commune,  or  complex  nervous 
centre,  the  mind  being  supposed  in  proximate  connection  with  each  of  its 
constituent  nervous  terminations  or  origins,  may  thus  be  reconciled  to  the 
doctrine  of  natural  realism  ;  and  therefore  what  was  said  at  page  276  a,  No. 
2,  and  relative  places,  with  reference  to  a  sensorium  of  a  different  character, 
is  to  be  qualified  in  conformity  to  the  present  supposition. 

It  is,  however,  I  think,  more  philosophical,  to  consider  the  nervous  sys- 
tem as  one  whole,  with  each  part  of  which  the  animating  principle  is  equal- 
ly and  immediately  connected,  so  long  as  each  part  remains  in  continuity 
with,  the  centre.  To  this  opinion  may  be  reduced  the  doctrine  of  Aristotle, 
that  the  soul  contains  the  body,  rather  than  the  body  the  soul  (De  An.  L.  5. 
c.  9,  §  4) — a  doctrine  on  which  was  founded  the  common  dogma  of  the 
Schools,  that  the  Soul  is  all  in  the  whole  body,  and  all  in  every  of  its  parts, 
meaning,  thereby,  that  the  simple,  unextended  mind,  in  some  inconceivable 
manner,  present  to  all  the  organs,  is  percipient  of  the  peculiar  affection 
which  each  is  adapted  to  receive,  and  actuates  each  in  the  peculiar  function 
which  it  is  qualified  to  discharge.  See  also  St.  Gregory  of  Nyssa  (De  Horn. 
Opif.  cc.  12, 14, 15),  the  oldest  philosopher  I  recollect  by  whom,  this  dogm; 
is  explicitly  enounced.  Compare  Galen,  De  Sympt.  Causis.  L.  ii.  c.  01 
modern  authorities  to  the  same  result,  are — Perrault  (Du  Mouv.  dee  Yeux,  p. 
591,  and  Du  Toucher,  p.  531) ;  Tabor  (Tract,  iii.  c.  3) ;  Stuart  (De  Motu 
Muse.  c.  5);  Leidenfrost  (De  Mente  Humana,  c.  iii.  §§  11,  14, 15);  Tiede- 
mann  (Psychologic,  p.  809,  sq.) ;  Berard,  (Rapports  &c.  ch.  i.  §  2) ;  JS.  G. 
Carus  (Vorles  ueb.  Psychologic,  passim) ;  Urnbreit  (Psychologic,  c.  1,  and 
Beilage,  passim) ;  F.  FUclter  (Ueb.  d.  Sitz  d.  Seele,  passim,  and  Psychologic, 
c.  4).  The  two  last  seem  to  think  that  their  opinion  on  this  matter  is  some- 
thing new  ?  Bosmini  also  maintains  the  same  doctrine,  but  as  I  have  not 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION.  387 

exciting  cause,  the  supposed  quality  in  bodies,  various  and  indefi- 
nite.    (See  p.  374  b — 376  a.) 

23.  The  Primary  and  Secondary  qualities  are,  in  this  relation, 


yet  obtained  his  relative  works,  I  am  unable  to  refer  to  them  articulately. — 
See  Bibl.  Univ.  de  Geneve,  No.  76,  June,  1842,  p.  241  sq. 

As  to  the  question  of  materialism  this  doctrine  is  indifferent.  For  the 
connection  of  an  unextended  with  an  extended  substance  is  equally  incom- 
prehensible, whether  we  contract  the  place  of  union  to  a  central  point,  or 
whether  we  leave  it  coextensive  with  organization. 

The  causes  why  the  sensations  of  different  parts  of  the  nervous  apparatus 
vary  so  greatly  from  each  other  in  supplying  the  conditions  of  a  perception  of 
extension,  &c.,  seem  to  me  comprehended  in  two  general  facts,  the  one  con- 
stituting a  physiological,  the  other  a  psychological,  law  of  perception  ;  iawa, 
neither  of  which,  however,  has  yet  obtained  from  philosophers  the  consid- 
eration which  it  merits. 

The  Physiological  law  is — That  a  nervom  point  yields  a  sensation  felt  as  lo- 
cally distinct,  in  proportion,  as  it  is  isolated  in  its  action  from  any  othw.  Phys- 
iological experiment  has  not  yet  been,  and  probably  never  may  be,  able  to 
prove  anatomically  the  truth  of  this  law  which  I  have  here  ventured  to 
enounce  ;  physiologists  indeed,  seem  hitherto  to  have  wholly  neglected  the 
distinction.  So  far,  however,  is  it  from  being  opposed  to  physiological 
observation,  it  may  appeal  in  its  confirmation  to  the  analogy  of  all  the  facts  to 
which  such  observation  reaches  (see  par  25,  first  note,  III.) ;  while  the  psycho- 
logical phenomena  are  such  as  almost  to  necessitate  its  admission.  To  say 
nothing  of  the  ganglionic  fusions,  which  are  now  disproved,  the  softness  and 
colliqueseeiice  of  the  olfactory  nerves  and  nervous  expansion,  for  example, 
correspond  with  the  impossibility  we  experience,  in  sinell,  of  distinctly  ap- 
prehending one  part  of  the  excited  organism  as  out  of  another  ;  while  the  mar- 
vellous power  we  have  of  doing  this  in  vision,  seems,  by  every  more  minute 
investigation  of  the  organic  structure,  more  clearly  to  depend  upon  the  iso- 
lation, peculiar  arrangement,  and  tenuity  of  the  primary  fibrils  of  the  retina 
and  optic  nerve ;  though  microscopical  anatomy,  it  must  be  confessed,  has 
not  as  yet  been  able  to  exhibit  any  nervous  element  so  inconceivably  small 
as  is  the  minimum  visibile.  Besides  the  older  experiments  of  Porterfield, 
Haller,  &c.,  see  Treviranus,  Beytraege,  1835,  p.  63  sq. ; — Volkmann,  Neue 
Beytraege,  1836,  pp.  61  sq.,  197  sq. ;— Mueller,  Phys.  1838,  pp.  1073  sq.,  1121 
sq.  Engl.  tr.  ; — also  Boer,  Anthropologie,  1824,  §  153. — Of  Touch  and  Feel- 
ing I  am  to  speak  immediately. 

And  here  I  may  say  a  word  in  relation  to  a  difficulty  which  has  perplexed 
physiologists,  and  to  which  no  solution,  I  am  aware  of,  has  been  attempted. 
— The  retina,  as  first  shown  by  Treviranus,  is  a  pavement  of  perpendicular 
rods  terminating  in  papillas ;  a  constitution  which  may  be  roughly  repre- 
sented to  imagination  by  the  bristles  of  a  thick-set  brush.  The  retina  is, 
however,  only  the  terminal  expansion  of  the  optic  nerve  ;  and  the  rods 
which  make  up  its  area,  after  bending  behind  to  an  acute  angle,  run  back  as 
the  constituent,  but  isolated  fibrils  of  that  nerve,  to  their  origin  in  the  brain. 


388  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

simple  and  self-discriminated.  For  in  the  perception  of  a  prima- 
ry, there  is  involved  no  sensation  of  a  secondary  with  which  it 
can  be  mixed  up  ;  while  in  the  sensation  of  a  secondary  there  is 

On  the  wmnllcr  size  of  the  papillae  and  fibrils  of  the  optic  nerve,  principally 
depends,  as  already  stated,  the  greater  power  we  possess,  in  the  eye,  of  dis- 
criminating one  sensation  as  out  of  another,  consequently  of  apprehending 
extension,  figure,  &c. — But  here  the  difficulty  arises  :  Microscopic  observa- 
tions on  the  structure  of  the  retina  give  the  diameter  of  the  papillae,  as  uhont 
the  eight  or  nine  thousandth  part  of  an  inch.  Optical  experiments,  again, 
on  the  ultimate  capacity  of  vision,  show  that  a  longitudinal  object  (as  a  hair), 
viewed  at  such  a  distance  that  its  breadth,  as  reflected  to  the  retina,  is  not 
more  than  the  six  hundred  thousandth  or  millionth  of  an  inch,  is  distinctly 
visible  to  a  good  eye.  Now  there  is  here — 1°,  a  great  discrepancy  between 
the  superficial  extent  of  the  apparent  ultimate  fibrils  of  the  retina,  and  the 
extent  of  the  image  impressed  on  the  retina  by  the  impinging  rays  of  light, 
the  one  being  above  a  hundred  times  greater  than  the  other  ;  and,  2°,  it  is 
impossible  to  conceive  the  existence  of  distinct  fibrils  so  minute  as  would  be 
required  to  propagate  the  impression,  if  the  breadth  of  the  part  affected 
were  actually  no  greater  than  the  breadth  of  light  reflected  from  the  object 
to  the  retina.  To  me  the  difficulty  seems  soluble  if  we  suppose,  1°,  that  the 
ultimate  fibrils  and  papilla}  are,  in  fact,  the  ultimate  units  or  minima  of  sen- 
sation ;  and,  2°,  that  a  stimulus  of  light,  though  applied  only  to  part  of  a 
papilla,  idiopnthically  affects  the  whole.  This  theory  is  confirmed  by  the 
analogy  of  the  nerves  of  feeling,  to  which  I  shall  soon  allude.  The  objec- 
tions to  which  it  is  exposed  I  see;  but  I  think  that  they  may  easily  be  an- 
swered. On  the  discussion  of  the  point  I  cannot  however  enter. 

The  Psychological  law  is — Tliat  though  a  perception  be  only  possible  under 
condition  of  a  sensation .;  still,  that  above  a  certain  limit  the  more  intense  tht 
sensation  or  subjective  consciousness,  the  more  indistinct  tlie  perception  or  object- 
ive consciousness. 

On  this,  which  is  a  special  case  of  a  still  higher  law,  I  have  already  inci- 
dentally spoken,  and  shall  again  have  occasion  to  speak.1 

1°.  That  we  are  only  conscious  of  the  existence  of  our  organism  as  a  phys- 
ical body,  under  our  consciousness  of  its  existence  as  an  animal  body,  and 
are  only  conscious  of  its  existence  as  an  animal  body  under  our  conscious- 
ness of  it  as  somehow  or  other  sensitively  affected. 

20.  That  though  the  sensation  of  our  organism  as  animally  affected,  is,  as 
it  were,  the  light  by  which  it  is  exhibited  to  onr  perception  as  a  physically 
extended  body ;  still,  if  the  affection  be  too  strong,  the  pain  or  pleasure  too 
intense,  the  light  blinds  by  its  very  splendor,  and  the  perception  is  lost  in 
the  sensation.  Accordingly,  if  we  take  a  survey  of  the  senses,  we  shall  find, 
that  exactly  in  proportion  as  each  affords  an  idiopathic  sensation  more  or  less 
capable  of  being  carried  to  an  extreme  either  of  pleasure  or  of  pain,  does  it 
afford,  but  in  an  inverse  ratio,  the  condition  of,an  objective  perception  more 
or  less  distinct.  In  the  senses  of  Sight  and  Hearing,  as  contrasted  with  those 


'•  See  the  next  chapter. —  W. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    PEPvCKPTION.  389 

no  perception  of  a  primary  at  all.  Thus  prominent  in  themselves, 
and  prominently  contrasted  as  mutual  extremes,  neither  class  can 
be  overlooked,  neither  class  can  be  confounded  with  the  other. 

of  Taste  and  Smell,  the  counter-proportions  are  precise  and  manifest ;  and 
precisely  as  in  animals  these  latter  senses  gain  in  their  objective  character 
as  means  of  knowledge,  do  they  lose  in  their  subjective  character  as  sources 
of  pleasurable  or  painful  sensations.  To  a  dog,  for  instance,  in  whom  the 
sense  of  smell  is  so  acute,  all  odors  seem,  in  themselves,  to  be  indifferent.  In 
Touch  or  Feeling  the  same  analogy  holds  good,  and  within  itself;  for  in  this 
case,  where  the  sense  is  diffused  throughout  the  body,  the  subjective  and  ob- 
jective vary  in  their  proportions  at  different  parts.  The  parts  most  subject- 
ively sensible,  those  chiefly  susceptible  of  pain  and  pleasure,  furnish  precisely 
the  obtuscst  organs  of  touch  ;  and  the  acutest  organs  of  touch  do  not  possess, 
if  ever  even  that,  more  than  an  average  amount  of  subjective  sensibility.  I 
am  disposed,  indeed,  from  the  analogy  of  the  other  senses,  to  surmise,  that  the 
nerves  of  touch  proper  (the  more  objective)  and  of  feeling  proper  (the  more 
subjective)  are  distinct;  and  distributed  in  various  proportions  to  different 
parts  of  the  body.  I  should  also  surmise,  that  the  ultimate  fibrils  of  the  former 
run  in  isolated  action  from  periphery  to  centre,  while  the  ultimate  fibrils  of  the 
latter  may,  to  a  certain  extent,  be  confounded  with  each  other  at  their  terminal 
expansion  in  the  skin;  so  that  for  this  reason,  likewise,  they  do  not,  as  the 
former,  supply  to  consciousness  an  opportunity  of  so  precisely  discriminating 
the  reciprocal  outness  of  their  sensations.  The  experiments  of  Weber  have 
shown,  how  differently  in  degree  different  parts  of  the  skin  possess  the  power 
of  touch  proper;  this  power,  as  measured  by  the  smallness  of  the  interval  at 
which  the  blunted  points  of  a  pair  of  compasses,  brought  into  contact  with  the 
skin,  can  be  discriminated  as  double,  varying  from  the  twentieth  of  an  En- 
glish inch  ut  the  tip  of  the  tongue,  and  a  tenth  on  the  volar  surface  of  the 
third  finger,  to  two  inches  and  a  half  over  the  greater  part  of  the  neck,  back, 
arms,  and  thighs. — (De  Pulsu,  &c.,  p.  44-81,  in  particular,  p.  58.  An  ab- 
stract, not  altogether  accurate,  is  given  by  Mueller,  Phys.  p.  700).  If  these 
experiments  be  repeated- with  a  pair  of  compasses  not  very  obtuse,  and  ca- 
pable, therefore,  by  a  slight  pressure,  of  exciting  a  sensation  in  the  skin,  it 
will  be  found,  that  while  Weber's  observations,  as  to  the  remarkable  differ- 
ence of  the  different  parts  in  the  power  of  tactile  discrimination,  are  correct ; 
that,  at  the  same  time,  what  he  did  not  observe,  there  is  no  corresponding 
difference  between  the  parts  in  their  sensibility  to  superficial  pricking, 
scratching,  &c.  On  the  contrary,  it  will  be  found  that,  in  the  places  where 
objectively,  touch  is  most  alive,  subjectively  feeling  is,  in  the  first  instance 
at  least,  in  some  degree  deadened ;  and  that  the  parts  the  most  obtuse  in 
discriminating  the  duplicity  of  the  touching  points,  are  by  no  means  the 
least  acute  to  the  sensations  excited  by  their  pressure. 

For  example  ; — the  tip  of  the  tongue  has  fifty,  the  interior  surface  of  the 
third  finger  twenty-fine,  times  the  tactile  discrimination  of  the  arm.  But  it 
will  be  found,  on  trial,  that  the  arm  is  more  sensitive  to  a  sharp  point  ap- 
plied, but  not  strongly,  to  the  skin,  than  either  the  tongue  or  the  finger, 


390  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

The  Secundo-primary  qualities,  on  the  contrary,  are,  at  once, 
complex  and  confusive.  For,  on  the  one  hand,  as  perceptions 
approximating  to  the  primary,  on  the  other,  as  sensations  identi- 


and  (depilated  of  course)  at  least  as  alive  to  the  presence  of  a  very  light  body, 
an  a  hair,  a  thread,  a  feather,  drawn  along  the  surface.  In  the  several  places 
the  phenomena  thus  vary : — In  those  parts  where  touch  proper  prevails,  a 
subacute  point,  lightly  pressed  upon  the  skin,  determines  a  sensation  of 
which  we  can  hardly  predicate  either  pain  or  pleasure,  and  nearly  limited 
to  the  place  on  which  the  pressure  is  made.  Accordingly,  when  two  such 
points  are  thus,  at  the  same  time,  pressed  upon  the  skin,  we  are  conscious 
of  two  distinct  impressions,  even  when  the  pressing  points  approximate 
pretty  closely  to  each  other. — In  those  parts,  on  the  other  hand,  where  feel 
ing  proper  prevails,  a  subacute  point,  lightly  pressed  upon  the  skin,  deter- 
mines a  sensation  which  we  can  hardly  call  indifferent;  and  which  radiates, 
to  a  variable  extent,  from  the  place  on  which  the  pressure  is  applied.  Ac- 
cordingly, when  two  such  points  are  thus,  at  the  same  time,  pressed  upon 
the  skin,  we  arc  not  conscious  of  two  distinct  impressions,  unless  the  pres- 
sing points  are  at  a  considerable  distance  from  each  other;  the  two  impres- 
sions, running,  as  it  were,  together  and  thus  constituting  one  indivisible 
sensation.  The  discriminated  sensations  in  the  one  case,  depend  manifest- 
ly on  the  discriminated  action,  through  the  isolated  and  unexpandcd  termi- 
nation of  the  nervous  fibrils  of  touch  proper;  and  the  indistinguishable  sen- 
sation in  the  other,  will,  I  have  no  doubt,  be  ultimately  found  by  microsco- 
pic anatomy  to  depend,  in  like  manner,  on  the  nervous  fibrils  of  feeling 
proper  being,  as  it  were,  fused  or  interlaced  together  at  their  termination,  or 
rather,  perhaps,  on  each  ultimate  fibril,  each  primary  sentient  unit  being 
expanded  through  a  considerable  extent  of  skin.  The  supposition  of  such 
expansion  seems,  indeed,  to  be  necessitated  by  these  three  facts : — 1",  that 
every  point  of  the  skin  is  sensible  ;  2°,  that  no  point  of  the  skin  is  sensible 
except  through  the  distribution  to  it  of  nervous  substance  ;  and,  3°,  that  the 
ultimate  fibrils,  those  minima,  at  least,  into  which  anatomists  have,  as  yet, 
been  able  to  analyze  the  nerves,  are  too  large,  and  withal  too  few,  to  carry 
sensation  to  each  cutaneous  point,  unless  by  un  attenuation  and  diffusion  of 
the  finest  kind. — Within  this  superficial  sphere  of  cutaneous  apprehension, 
the  objective  and  subjective,  perception  and  sensation,  touch  proper  and 
feeling  proper,  are  thus  always  found  to  each  other  in  an  inverse  ratio. 

But  take  the  same  places,  and  puncture  deeply.  Then,  indeed,  the  sense 
of  pain  will  be  found  to  be  intenser  in  the  tongue  and  finger  than  in  the 
arm  ;  for  the  tongue  and  finger  are  endowed  with  comparatively  more  nu- 
merous nerves,  and  consequently  with  a  more  concentrated  sensibility,  than 
the  arm  ;  though  these  may  either,  if  different,  lie  beneath  the  termination 
of  the  nerves  of  touch,  or,  if  the  same,  commence  their  energy  as  feeling 
only  at  the  pitch  where  their  energy  as  touch  concludes.  lie  this,  however, 
as  it  may,  it  will  be  always  found,  that  in  proportion  as  the  internal  feeling 
of  a  part  becomes  excited,  is  it  incapacitated  for  the  time,  as  an  organ  of  ex- 
ternal touch. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF    PERCEPTION.  391 

fied  with  the  secondary,  they  may,  if  not  altogether  overlooked, 
lightly  be,  as  they  have  always  hitherto  been,  confounded  with 
the  one  or  with  the  other  of  these  classes.  (See  pp.  361  b,  363  a.) 

24.  In  the  same  relation  a  Primary  or  a  Secondary  quality, 
as  simple,  has  its  term  univocal.     A  Secundo-primary,   on  the 
contrary,  being  complex,  its  term,  as  one,  is  necessarily  equivocal. 
For,  viewed  on  one  side,  it  is  the  modification  of  a  primary  ;  on 
the  other,  it  is,  in  reality,  simply  a  secondary  quality. — (How,  in 
a  more  general  point  of  view,  the  Secondary  qualities  are  no  less 
complex,  and  their  terms  no  less  ambiguous  than  the  Secundo- 
primary,  see  par.  6.) 

25.  All  the  senses,  simply  or  in  combination,  afford  conditions 
for  the  perception  of  the  Primary  qualities  (par.  22,  note) ;  and 
all,  of  course,  supply  the  sensations  themselves  of  the  Secondary. 
As  only  various  modifications  of  resistance,  the  Secundo-primary 
qualities  are  all,  as  percepts  proper,  as  quasi-primary  qualities,  ap- 
prehended through  the  locomotive  faculty,*  and  our  conscious- 

I  do  not  therefore  assert,  without  a  qualification,  that  touch  and  feeling 
are  everywhere  manifested  in  an  inverse  ratio ;  for  both  together  may  be 
higher,  both  together  may  be  lower,  in  one  place  than  another.  But  whilst  I 
diffidently  hold  that  they  are  dependent  upon  different  conditions — that  the 
capacity  of  pain  and  pleasure,  and  the  power  of  tactual  discrimination,  which 
a  part  possesses,  are  not  the  result  of  the  same  nervous  fibres  ;  I  maintain, 
with  confidence,  that  these  senses  never,  in  any  part,  coexist  in  exercise  in 
any  high  degree,  and  that  wherever  the  one  rises  to  excess,  there  the  other 
will  be  found  to  sink  to  a  corresponding  deficiency. 

In  saying,  in  the  present  note,  that  touch  is  more  objective  than  feeling,  I 
am  not  to  be  supposed  to  mean,  that  touch  is,  in  itself,  aught  but  a  subject- 
ive affection — a  feeling — a  sensation.  Touch  proper  is  here  styled  objective, 
iiot  absolutely,  but  only  in  contrast  and  in  comparison  to  feeling  proper;  1°, 
inasmuch  as  it  affords  in  the  cycle  of  its  own  phenomena  a  greater  amount  of 
information  ;  2°,  as  it  affords  more  frequent  occasions  of  perception  or  objec- 
tive apprehension  ;  and,  3°,  as  it  is  feebly,  if  at  all,  characterized  by  the  sub- 
jective affections  of  pain  and  pleasure. 

*  I. — On  the  Locomotive  Faculty  and  Muscular  Sen#e,  in  relation,  to  Percep- 
tion.— I  say  that  the  Secundo-primnry  qualities,  in  their  quasi-primary  pha- 
»is,  are  apprehended  through  the  locomotive  faculty,  and  not  the  muscular 
sense;  for  it  is  impossible  that  the  state  of  muscular  feeling  can  enable  us  to 
be  immediately  cognizant  of  the  existence  and  degree  of  a  resisting  force.  On 
the  contrary,  supposing  all  muscular  feeling  abolished,  the  power  of  mov- 
ing the  muscles  at  will  remaining,  however,  entire,  I  hold  (as  will  anon  be 


392  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

nesft  of  its  energy  ;  as  sensations,  as  secondary  qualities,  they  are 
apprehended  as  modifications  of  touch  proper,  and  of  cutaneous 
and  muscular  feeling.* 

shown)  that  the  consciousness  of  the  mental  motive  energy,  and  of  the 
greater  or  less  intensity  of  such  energy  requisite,  in  different  circumstances, 
to  accomplish  our  intention,  would  of  itself  enable  us  always  to  perceive  the 
fact,  and  in  some  degree  to  measure  the  amount,  of  any  resistance  to  our 
voluntary  movements ;  howbeit  the  concomitance  of  certain  feeling's  with 
the  different  states  of  muscular  tension,  renders  this  cognition  not  only 
easier,  but,  in  fact,  obtrudes  it  upon  our  attention.  Scaligcr,  therefore,  in  re- 
ferring the  apprehension  of  weight,  &c.,  to  the  locomotive  faculty,  is,  in  my 
opinion,  far  more  correct  than  recent  philosophers,  in  referring  .it  to  the 
muscular  sense.  (See  II.  of  this  foot-note.) 

We  have  here  to  distinguish  three  things : 

1°.  The  still  immanent  or  purely  mental  act  of  will :  what  for  distinction's 
sake  I  would  call  the  Jiyperorganic  volition  to  move  ; — the  actio  tliclta  of  the 
schools.  Of  this  volition  we  are  conscious,  even  though  it  do  not  go  out 
into  overt  action. 

2°.  If  this  volition  become  transeunt,  be  carried  into  effect,  it  passes  into 
the  mental  effort  or  nisns  to  move.  This  I  would  call  the  enorganic  volition, 
or,  by  an  extension  of  the  scholastic  language,  the  actio  imperans.  Of  this 
we  are  immediately  conscious.  For  we  are  conscious  of  it,  though  by  a  nar- 
cosis or  stupor  of  the  sensitive  nerves  we  lose  all  feeling  of  the  movement 
of  the  limb; — though  by  a  paralysis  of  the  motive  nerves,  no  movement  in 
the  limb  follows  the  mental  effort  to  move ; — though  by  an  abnormal  stimu- 
lus of  the  muscular  fibres,  a  contraction  in  them  is  caused  even  in  opposi- 
tion to  our  will. 

8°.  Determined  by  the  enorganic  volition,  the  cerebral  influence  is  trans- 
mitted by  the  motive  nerves ;  the  muscles  contract  or  endeavor  to  contract, 
so  that  the  limb  moves  or  endeavors  to  move.  This  motion  or  effort  to  move 
I  would  call  the  organic  movement,  the  organic  nisux ;  by  a  limitation  of  the 
scholastic  term,  it  might  be  denominated  the  act'w  imperata. 

It  might  seem  at  first  sight, — 1°,  that  the  organic  movement  is  immediate- 
ly determined  by  the  enorganic  volition ;  and,  2°,  that  we  are  immediately 
conscious  of  the  organic  nisus  in  itself.  But  neither  is  the  case. — Not  the 
former:  for  even  if  we  identify  the  contraction  of  the  muscles  and  the  overt 
movement  of  the  limb,  this  is  only  the  mediate  result  of  the  enorganic  voli- 
tion, through  the  action  of  the  nervous  influence  transmitted  from  the  brain. 
The  mind,  therefore,  exerts  its  effort  to  move,  proximatcly  in  determining 
this  transmission ;  but  we  are  unconscious  not  only  of  the  mode  in  which 
this  operation  is  performed,  but  even  of  the  operation  itself. — Not  the  lat- 
ter :  for  all  muscular  contraction  is  dependent  on  the  agency  of  one  set  of 
nerves,  all  feeling  of  muscular  contraction  on  another.  Thus,  from  the  ex- 
clusive paralysis  of  the  former,  or  the  exclusive  stupor  of  the  latter,  the  one 
function  may  remain  entire,  while  the  other  is  abolished  ;  and  it  is  only  be- 
cause certain  muscular  feelings  are  normally,  though  contingently,  associated 
with  the  different  muscular  states,  that,  independently  of  the  consciousness 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION.  393 


b) — As  in  Thought  ;  as  in  relation  to  Intellect. 

26.  As  modes  of  matter,  the  Primary  qualities  are  thought  as 
necessary  and  universal ;  the  Secundo-primary,  as  contingent  and 
common  ;  the  Secondaiy,  as  contingent  and  peculiar. 

of  the  enorganic  volition,  we  are  indirectly  made  aware  of  the  various  de- 
grees of  the  organic  nisus  exerted  in  our  different  members.*  But  though 
indirect,  the  information  thus  forced  upon  us  is  not  the  less  valuable.  By 
the  associated  sensations  our  attention  is  kept  alive  to  the  state  of  our  mus- 
cular movements ;  by  them  we  are  enabled  to  graduate  with  the  requisite 
accuracy  the  amount  of  organic  eifort,  and  to  expend  in  each  movement  pre- 
cisely the  quantum  necessary  to  accomplish  its  purpose.  Sir  Charles  Bell 
records  the  case  of  a  mother  who,  while  nursing  her  infant,  was  affected  with 
paralysis  or  loss  of  muscular  motion  on  one  side  of  her  body,  and  by  stupor 
or  loss  of  sensibility  on  the  other.  With  the  arm  capable  of  movement  she 
could  hold  her  child  to  her  bosom  ;  and  this  she  continued  to  do  so  long  as 
her  attention  remained  fixed  upon  the  infant.  But  if  surrounding  objects 
withdrew  her  observation,  there  being  no  admonitory  sensation,  the  flexor 
muscles  of  the  arm  gradually  relaxed,  and  the  child  was  in  danger  of  falling. 
(The  Hand,  p.  204.) 

These  distinctions  in  the  process  of  voluntary  motion,  especially  the  two 
last  (for  the  first  and  second  may  be  viewed  as  virtually  the  same),  are  of 
importance  to  illustrate  the  double  nature  of  the  secundo-primary  qualities, 
each  of  which  is,  in  fact,  the  aggregate  of  an  objective  or  quasi-primary  qual- 
ity, apprehended  in  a  perception,  and  of  a  secondary  or  subjective  quality 
caused  by  the  other,  apprehended  in  a  sensation.  Each  of  these  qualities, 
each  of  these  cognitions,  appertains  to  a  diiferent  part  of  the  motive  process. 
The  quasi-primary  quality  and  its  perception,  depending  on  the  enorganic 
volition  and  the  nerves  of  motion;  the  secondary  quality  and  its  sensation, 
depending  on  the  organic  nisus  and  the  nerves  of  sensibility. 


*  I  must  here  notice  an  error  of  inference,  which  runs  through  the  experiments  by 
Professor  Weber  of  Leipsic,  in  regard  to  the  shares  which  the  sense  of  touch  proper 
and  the  consciousness  of  muscular  effort  have  in  the  estimation  of  weight,  as  detailed 
in  his  valuable  '  Annotationes  de  Pulsu,  Resorptione,  Audita  etTactu,'  1S34,  pp.  81-113, 
1.34,  159-161. — Weight  he  supposes  to  be  tested  by  the  Touch  alone,  when  objects  are 
laid  upon  the  hand,  reposing,  say,  on  a  pillow.  Here  there  appears  to  me  a  very  palpa- 
ble mistake.  For  without  denying  that  different  weights,  up  to  a  certain  point,  produce 
dift'erent  sensations  on  the  nerves  of  touch  and  feeling,  and  that  consequently  an  expe- 
rience of  the  difference  of  such  sensation  may  help  us  to  an  inference  of  a  difference  of 
weight;  it  is  manifest,  that  if  a  body  be  laid  upon  a  muscular  part,  that  we  estimate  its 
weight  proximately  and  principally  by  the  amount  of  lateral  pressure  on  the  muscles, 
and  this  pressure  itself,  by  the  difficulty  we  find  in  lifting  the  body,  however  imper- 
ceptibly, by  a  contraction  or  bellying  out  of  the  muscular  fibres.  When  superincum- 
bent bodies,  however  different  in  weight,  are  all  still  so  heavy  as  to  render  this  contrac- 
tion almost  or  altogether  impossible ;  it  will  be  found,  that  our  power  of  measuring 
their  comparative  weights  becomes,  in  the  one  case  feeble  and  fallacious,  in  the  other 
null. 

17* 


394  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

27.  Thought  as  necessary,  and  immediately  apprehended  as 
actual,  modes  of  matter,  we  conceive  the  Primary  qualities  in 
what  they  objectively  are.  The  Secundo-primary,  thought  in 


The  quasi-primary  quality  is,  always,  simply  a  resistance  to  our  enorganic' 
volition,  as  realized  in  a  muscular  effort.  But,  be  it  remembered,  there  may 
be  muscular  effort,  even  if  a  body  weighs  or  is  pressed  upon  a  part  of  our 
muscular  frame  apparently  at  rest.  (See  foot-note  *  of  page  293.) — And  how 
is  the  resistance  perceived  ?  I  have  frequently  asserted,  that  in  perception 
we  are  conscious  of  the  external  object  immediately  and  in  itself.  This  is 
the  doctrine  of  Natural  Realism.  But  in  saying  that  a  thing  is  known  in 
itself,  I  do  not  mean  that  this  object  is  known  in  its  absolute  existence,  that 
is,  out  of  relation  to  us.  This  is  impossible;  for  our  knowledge  is  only  of 
the  relative.  To  know  a  thing  in  itself  or  immediately,  is  an  expression  I 
use  merely  in  contrast  to  the  knowledge  of  a  tiling  in  a  representation,  or 
mediately.1  On  this  doctrine  an  external  quality  is  said  to  be  known  in  it- 
self, when  it  is  known  as  the  immediate  and  necessary  correlative  of  an  in- 
ternal quality  of  which  I  am  conscious.  Tims,  when  I  am  conscious  of  the 
exertion  of  an  enorganic  volition  to  move,  and  aware  that  the  muscles  are 
obedient  to  my  will,  but  at  the  same  time  aware  that  my  limb  is  arrested  in 
ito  motion  by  some  external  impediment ; — in  this  case  I  cannot  be  conscious 
of  myself  as  the  resisted  relative  without  at  the  same  time  being  conscious, 
being  immediately  percipient,  of  a  not-self  as  the  resisting  correlative.  In 
this  cognition  there  is  no  sensation,  no  subjectivo-organic  affection.  I  sim- 
ply know  myself  as  a  force  in  energy,  the  not-self  as  a  counter  force  in  ener- 
gy.— So  much  for  the  quasi-primary  quality,  as  dependent  on  the  enorganic 
volition. 

But  though  such  pure  perception  may  be  detected  in  the  simple  appre- 
hension of  resistance,  in  reality  it  does  not  stand  alone ;  for  it  is  always  ac- 
companied by  sensations,  of  which  the  muscular  nisus  or  quiescence,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  resisting,  the  pressing  body,  on  the  other,  are  the  causes. 
Of  these  sensations,  the  former,  to  wit,  the  feelings  connected  with  the  states 
of  tension  and  relaxation,  lie  wholly  in  the  muscles,  and  belong  to  what  lias 
sometimes  been  distinguished  as  the  muscular  sense.  The  latter,  to  wit  the 
sensations  determined  by  the  foreign  pressure,  lie  partly  in  the  skin,  and 
belong  to  the  sense  of  touch  proper  and  cutaneous  feeling,  partly  in  the  flesh, 
and  belonging  to  the  muscular  sense.  These  affections,  sometimes  pleasur- 
able, sometimes  painful,  are,  in  either  case,  merely  modifications  of  the  sen- 
sitive nerves  distributed  to  the  muscles  and  to  the  skin  ;  and,  as  manifested 
to  us,  constitute  the  secondary  quality,  the  sensation  of  which  accompanies 
the  perception  of  every  sccundo-primary. 

Although  the  preceding  doctrine  coincide,  in  result,  with  that  which  M. 
Maine  de  Biran,  after  a  hint  by  Locke,  has  so  ably  developed,  more  espe- 
cially in  his  '  Nouvelles  Considerations  sur  les  Rapports  du  Physique  et  du 
Moral  de  1'Homme ;'  I  find  it  impossible  to  go  along  with  his  illustrious  ed- 


I  See  chapter  ii.  above.—  W. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION.  395 

their  objective  phasis,  as  modifications  of  the  Primary,  and,  in 
both  their  objective  and  subjective  phases,  immediately  appre- 
hended, we  conceive  them  in  what  they  objectively,  as  well  as  in 


itor,  M.  Cousin  (p.  xxv.  of  Preface),  in  thinking  that  his  examination  of 
Hume's  reasoning  against  the  deduction  of  our  notion  of  Power  from  the 
consciousness  of  efficacy  in  the  voluntary  movement  of  our  muscles,  'leaves 
nothing  to  desire,  and  nothing  to  reply.'  On  the  contrary,  though  always 
dissenting  with  diffidence  from  M.  Cousin,  I  confess  it  does  not  seem  to  me, 
that  in  any  of  his  seven  assaults  on  Hume,  has  De  Biran  grappled  with  the 
most  formidable  objections  of  the  great  skeptic.  The  second,  third,  and  sev- 
enth, of  Hume's  arguments,  as  stated  and  criticised  by  Biran,  are  not  pro- 
posed, as  arguments,  by  Hume  at  all ;  and  the  fourth  and  fifth  in  Biran's 
array  constitute  only  a  single  reasoning  in  Hume's.  Of  the  three  arguments 
which  remain,  the  first  and  sixth  in  Biran's  enumeration  are  the  most  im- 
portant.— But,  under  thejirst,  the  examples  alleged  by  Hume,  from  cases  of 
sudden  palsy,  Biran  silently  passes  by;  yet  these  present  by  far  the  most 
perplexing  difficulties  for  his  doctrine  of  conscious  efficacy.  In  another  and 
subsequent  work  (Eeponses,  &c.,  p.  386)  he,  indeed,  incidentally  considers 
this  objection,  referring  us  back  for  its  regular  refutation  to  the  strictures  on 
Hume,  where,  however,  as  stated,  no  such  refutation  is  to  be  found.  Nor 
does  he  in  this  latter  treatise  relieve  the  difficulty.  For  as  regards  the  argu- 
ment from  our  non-consciousness  of  loss  of  power,  prior  to  an  actual  attempt 
to  move,  as  shown  in  the  case  of  paralysis  supervening  during  sleep, — this, 
it  seems  to  me,  can  only  be  answered  from  the  fact,  that  we  are  never  con- 
scious of  force,  as  unexerted  or  in  potentia  (for  the  ambiguous  term  power, 
unfortunately  after  Locke  employed  by  Hume  in  the  discussion,  is  there 
equivalent  to  force,  vis,  and  not  to  mere  potentiality  as  opposed  to  actuality), 
but  only  of  force,  as  in  actu  or  exerted.  For  in  this  case,  we  never  can  pos- 
sibly be  conscious  of  the  absence  of  a  force,  previously  to  the  effort  made  to 
put  it  forth. — The  purport  of  the  sixth  argument  is  not  given,  as  Hume,  not- 
withstanding the  usual  want  of  precision  in  his  language,  certainly  intended 
it ; — which  was  to  this  effect : — Volition  to  move  a  limb,  and  the  actual 
moving  of  it,  are  the  first  and  last  in  a  series  of  more  than  two  successive 
events ;  and  cannot,  therefore,  stand  to  each  other,  immediately,  in  the  re- 
lation of  cause  and  effect.  They  may,  however,  stand  to  each  other  in  the 
relation  of  cause  and  effect,  mediately.  But,  then,  if  they  can  be  known  in 
consciousness  as  thus  mediately  related,  it  is  a  necessary  condition  of  such 
knowledge,  that  the  intervening  series  of  causes  and  effects,  through  which 
the  final  movement  of  the  limb  is  supposed  to  be  mediately  dependent  on 
the  primary  volition  to  move,  should  be  known  to  consciousness  immediate- 
ly under  that  relation.  But  this  intermediate,  this  connecting  series  is,  con- 
fessedly, unknown  to  consciousness  at  all,  far  less  as  a  series  of  causes  and 
effects.  It  follows  therefore,  a  fortiori,  that  the  dependency  of  the  last  on 
the  first  of  these  events,  as  of  an  effect  upon  its  cause,  must  be  to  conscious- 
ness unknown.  In  other  words : — having  no  consciousness  that  the  volition 
10  move  is  the  efficucious  force  (power)  by  which  even  the  event  immediately 


396  PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION. 

what  they  subjectively  are.  The  Secondary  being  neither 
thought  as  necessary,  nor  immediately  apprehended  in  their  ex- 
ternal reality,  we  conceive  adequately  what  they  are  in  their 


consequent  on  it  (say  the  transmission  of  the  nervous  influence  from  bruin 
to  muscle)  is  produced,  such  event  being  in  fuct  itself  to  consciousness  oc- 
cult ;  inulto  minus  can  we  have  a  consciousness  of  that  volition  being  the 
efficacious  force,  by  which  the  ultimate  movement  of  the  limb  is  mediately 
determined  ?  This  is  certainly  the  argument  which  Hume  intended,  and  as 
a  refutation  of  the  doctrine,  that  in  our  voluntary  movements  at  least,  we 
have  an  apprehension  of  the  causal  nexus  between  the  mental  volition  as 
cause  and  the  corporeal  movement  as  effect,  it  seems  to  me  unanswerable. 
But  as  stated,  and  easily  refuted,  by  De  Biran,  it  is  only  tantamount  to  the 
reasoning — That  as  we  arc  not  conscious  how  we  move  a  limb,  we  cannot  be 
conscious  of  the  feeling  that  we  do  exert  a  motive  force.  But  such  a  feeling 
of  force,  action,  energy,  Hume  did  not  deny. 

II. — Historical  notices  touching  the  recognition  of  tht.  Locomotive  FafuU'j 
its  a  medium  of  perception,  and  of  the  Muscular  Sense. — That  the  recognition 
of  the  Locomotive  Faculty,  or  rather,  the  recognition  of  the  Muscular  Sense 
as  a  medium  of  apprehension,  is  of  a  recent  date,  and  by  psychologists  of  this 
country,  is  an  opinion  in  both  respects  erroneous. — As  far  as  I  am  aware,  this 
distinction  was  originally  taken  by  two  Italian  Aristotelians,  some  three 
centuries  ago ;  and  when  the  observation  was  again  forgotten,  both  France 
and  Germany  are  before  Scotland  in  the  merit  of  its  modern  revival. 

It  was  first  promulgated  by  Julius  Caesar  Scaliger  about  the  middle  of  the 
sixteenth  century  (1557).  Aristotle,  followed  by  philosophers  in  general,  had 
referred  the  perception  of  weight  (the  heavy  and  light)  to  the  sense  of 
Touch ;  though,  in  truth,  under  Touch,  Aristotle  seems  to  have  compre- 
hended both  the  Skin  and  Muscular  senses.  See  Hist.  An.  i.  4.  De  Part. 
An.  ii.  1.  10.  De  Anima,  ii.  11.  On  this  particular  doctrine,  Scaliger,  inter 
alia,  observes : '  Et  sane  sic  videtur.  Namque  gravitas  et  levitas  tangendo  de- 
prchenditur.  Ac  nemo  est,  qui  non  putet,  attrectatione  sese  cognoscere  gra- 
vitatem  et  levitatem.  Mihi  tamen  baud  persuadetur.  Tactu  motum  depre- 
hcndi  fateor,  gravitatem  nego.  Est  autem  maximum  argumentum  hoc. 
(iravitas  est  objectum  motivse  potestatis  :  cui  sane  competit  aclio.  At  tactus 
non  fit,  nisi  patiendo.  Gravitas  ergo  percipitur  a  motiva  potestate,  non  a 
tactu.  Nam  duo  cum  Bint  instrumenta  (de  nervis  atque  spiritibus  loquor), 
ad  senstim  et  ob  motum,  a  se  invicem  distincta :  male  confunderernus,  quod 
est  motricis  objectum,  cum  objecto  motae.  Movetur  enim  tactus,  non  itgit. 
Motrix  autem  inovet  grave  corpus,  non  autem  movetur  ab  eo.  Idque  mani- 
testum  est  in  paralysi.  Sentitur  calor,  non  sentitur  gravitas  Motrici  namque 
instrumenta  sublata  sunt. — An  vero  sentitur  gravitas  ?  Sentitnr  quidem  a 
motrice,  atque  ab  ea  judicalur  :  quemadmodum  difficile  quippiam  enunciatu 
[enunciatur  ?]  ab  ipsa  intellectus  vi :  qua?  tauien  agit,  non  patitur,  cum  enun- 
ciat.  Est  enim  omnibus  commune  rebus  nostratibus  hisce,  quse  pendent  a 
materia:  ut  agendo  patiantur.— Poterit  aliquid  objici  de  compressione.  Nam 
etc. ...Sunt  pneterea  duae  rationes.  Quando  et  sine  tactu  sentimus  gravita- 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  397 

subjective  effects,  but  inadequately  what  they  are  as  objective 
causes. 

28.  Our  conceptions  of  the  Primary  are  clear  and  distinct ;  of 


tern,  et  quia  tactu  non  sentimus.  Nempe  cuipiam  gravi  corpori  manus  im- 
poslta  contingit  illud :  at  non  sentitgravitatem.  Sine  tactu,  vero,  virtus  motrix 
sentiet.  Appensum  filo  plumbum  grave  sentitur.  Manus  tamen  filum,  non 
plumbum  tanget.  Deinde  hoc.  Brachium  suo  pondere  cum  deorsum  fertur, 
sentitur  grave.  At  nihil  tangit.'  (De  Subtilitate,  contra  Cardanum,  ex.  109.) 

It  should,  however,  be  noticed,  that  Scaliger  may  have  taken  the  hint  for 
the  discrimination  of  this  and  another  sense,  from  Cardan.  This  philosopher 
makes  Tonch  fourfold.  One  sense  apprehending  the  four  primary  qualities, 
the  Hot  and  Cold,  the  Dry  and  Humid ;  a  second  the  Pleasurable  and  Pain- 
ful ;  a  third  the  Venereal  sensations ;  a  fourth  the  Heavy  and  Light.  (De 
Subtilitate,  L.  xiii.) 

This  doctrine  did  not  excite  the  attention  it  deserved.  It  was  even  redar- 
gued by  Scaliger's  admiring  expositor  Goclenius.  (Adversaria,  p.  75-89) ;  nor 
do  I  know,  indeed,  that  previous  to  its  revival  in  very  recent  times,  with  the 
exception  to  be  immediately  stated,  that  this'  opinion  was  ever  countenanced 
by  any  other  philosopher.  Towards  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  ceutury  it  is 
indeed  commemorated  by  Chauvin,  no  very  erudite  authority,  in  the  first 
edition  of  his  Lexicon  Philosophicum  (vv.  Tactile  and  &ravitos),  as  an  opin- 
ion that  had  found  supporters ;  but  it  is  manifest  from  the  terms  of  the 
statement,  for  no  names  are  given,  that  Scaliger  and  Scalier  only  is  referred 
to.  In  the  subsequent  edition  the  statement  itself  is  omitted. 

By  another  philosophical  physician,  the  celebrated  Ctesalpinus  of  Arezzo, 
it  was  afterwards  (in  1569)  still  more  articulately  shown,  that  only  by  the  ex- 
ercise of  the  motive  power  are  we  percipient  of  those  qualities  which  I  de- 
nominate the  Secundo-Primary ;  though  he  can  hardly  be  said,  like  Scaliger, 
to  have  discriminated  that  power  as  a  faculty  of  perception  or  active  appre- 
hension, from  touch  as  a  capacity  of  sensation  or  mere  consciousness  of  pas- 
sion. It  does  not  indeed  appear  that  Csesalpinus  was  aware  of  Scaliger's 
speculation  at  all. 

'  Tactus  igitur  si  unus  est  sensus,  circa  unam  erit  contrarietatem,  reliqute 
autem  ad  ipsam  redncentur.  [Compare  Aristotle,  De  Anima,  ii.  11.]  Patet 
autem  Caliduni  et  Frigidum  maxime  proprie  ipsius  tactus  esse ;  solum  enim 
tangendo  comprehcnduntur.  Humidum  autem  et  Siccum  (Fluid  and  Solid), 
Durum  et  Molle,  Grave  et  Leve,  Asperum  et  Lene,  Earurn  et  Densum,  alia- 
que  hujusmodi,  ut  tactu  comprehendantur,  non  satis  est  ea  tangere,  sed  necesse 
est  motum  quendam  adhibere,  aut  comprimeudo,  autimpellendo,  aut  trahendo, 
aut  alia  ratione  patiendi  potentiam  experiendo.  Sic  enim  quod  proprium 
terminurn  non  retinet,  et  quod  facile  dividitur,  Humidum  esse  cognoscimus  ; 
quod  autem  opposite  modo  se  habet,  Siccum  :  et  quod  cedit  comprimenti, 
Molle,  quod  non  cedit,  Durum.  Similiter  autem  et  rcliquce  tactivai  qualitates 
sine  motu  non  percipiuntur.  Idcirco  et  a  reliquis  sensibus  cognosci  possunt, 
ut  a  visa.  [But  not  immediately.]  Motus  enim  inter  cornmunia  seusibilia 
ponitur.  [There  is  here  through  ambiguity  a  mutatio  elenchi.]  Nihil  autem 


398  PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION. 

the  Secundo-primary,  both  as  secondary  and  quasi-primary  qual- 
ities, clear  and  distinct :  of  the  Secondary,  as  subjective  affec- 
tions, clear  and  distinct,  as  objective,  obscure  and  confused.  For 


refert,  an  motus  in  organo  an  in  re  fiat.'  [?]  (Quastionos  Peripatetic®,  L. 
iv.  qn.  1.) 

In  more  recent  times,  the  action  of  the  voluntary  motive  faculty  and  its  rel- 
ative sense  in  the  perception  of  Extension,  Figure,  Weight,  Resistance,  &c., 
was  in  France  brought  vaguely  into  notice  by  Condillac,  and  subsequently 
about  the  commencement  of  the  present  century  more  explicitly  developed, 
among  others,  by  his  distinguished  follower  M.  Destutt  de  Tracy,  who  estab- 
lished the  distinction  between  active  and  passive  touch.  The  speculations  of 
M.  Maine  de  Biran  on  muscular  effort  (from  1803)  I  do  not  here  refer  to ;  as 
these  have  a  different  and  greatly  higher  significance.  ( Condillac,  Traite"  de« 
Sensations,  P.  ii.  cc.  8, 12.—  De  Tracy,  Ideologic,  t.  i.  cc.  9-13 ;  t.  iii.  cc.  5,  9. 
— Compare  Deyerando,  Histoire  des  Systemes,  t.  iii.  p.  445,  pq.  orig.  ed.,  and 
Labouliniere,  Precis,  p.  322,  sq.) — In  Germany,  before  the  conclusion  of  the 
last  century,  the  same  analysis  was  made,  and  the  active  touch  there  first  ob- 
tained the  distinctive  appellation  of  the  Muscular  Sense  (Muskel  Sinn.)  The 
German  physiologists  and  psychologists  not  only — what  had  been  previously 
done — professedly  demonstrated  the  share  it  had  in  the  empirical  apprehen- 
sion of  Space,  &c.,  and  established  its  necessity  as  a  condition  even  of  the 
perceptions  of  Touch  proper — the  Skin  Sense ;  they -likewise  for  the  first  time 
endeavored  to  sho^r  how  in  vision  we  are  enabled  to  recognize  not  only  figure, 
but  distance,  and  the  third  dimension  of  bodies,  through  the  conscious  ad- 
justment of  the  eye.  (Tittel,  Kantische  Denkformen  (1787),  p.  188,  sq. — 
Tiedemann,  in  Hessische  Beytracge  (1789),  St.  i.  p.  119,  sq. ;  Theaetet(1794), 
passim ;  Idealistische  Briefe  (1798),  p.  84,  sq. ;  Psychologic  (1804),  p.  405,  sq. 
— Schulz,  Pruefung  (1791),  i.  p.  182,  sq.  —  Engel,  in  Memoires  de  1' Academic  dc 
Berlin  (1802). — GruUhuisen,  Anthropologie  (1810),  pp.  180,  sq.  361,  sq.  and 
the  subsequent  works  of  Herbart,  JIartmann,  Lenkossek,  Tourtual,  Beneke, 
and  a  host  of  others.)  But  see  Reid,  188,  b. 

Britain  has  not  advanced  the  inquiry  which,  if  we  discount  some  result- 
lens  tendencies  by  Hartley,  Wells,  and  Darwin,  she  was  the  last  in  taking  up ; 
and  it  is  a  curious  instance  of  the  unacquaintance  with  such  matters  preva- 
lent among  us,  that  the  views  touching  the  functions  of  the  will,  and  of  the 
muscular  sense,  which  constitute,  in  this  relation  certainly,  not  the  least  val- 
uable part  of  Dr.  Brown's  psychology,  should  to  the  present  hour  be  regarded 
as  original,  howbeit  these  views,  though  propounded  as  new,  are  manifestly 
derived  from  sources  with  which  all  interested  in  psychological  disquisitions 
might  reasonably  be  presumed  familiar.  This  is  by  no  means  a  solitary  in- 
stance of  Brown's  silent  appropriation  ;  nor  is  he  the  only  Scottish  metaphy- 
sician who  has  borrowed,  without  acknowledgment,  these  and  other  psycho- 
logical analyses  from  the  school  of  Condillac.  De  Tracy  may  often  equally 
reclaim  his  own  at  the  hands  of  Dr.  John  Young,  Professor  of  Philosophy 
in  Belfast  College,  whose  frequent  coincidences  with  Brown  are  not  the  mar- 
vels he  would  induce  us  to  believe,  when  we  know  the  common  sources  from 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION.  399 

the  Primary,  Secundo-primary,  and  Secondary,  as  subjective  aft'ec- 
tions,  we  can  represent  in  imagination  ;  the  Secondary,  as  objec- 
tive powers,  we  cannot. 


which  the  resembling  doctrines  are  equally  derived.  It  must  be  remembered, 
however,  that  the  Lectures  of  both  Professors  were  posthumously  published  ; 
and  are  therefore  not  to  be  dealt  with  as  works  deliberately  submitted  to 
general  criticism  by  their  authors.  Dr.  Young,  it  should  likewise  be  noticed, 
was  a  pupil  of  the  late  Professor  Mylne  of  Glasgow,  whose  views  of  mental 
philosophy  are  well  known  to  have  closely  resembled  those  of  M.  De  Tracy. 
I  see  from  M.  Mignet's  eloquent  eloge  that  this  acute  philosopher  was,  like 
Kant,  a  Scotsman  by  descent,  and  '  of  the  clan  Stutt,'  (Stott  ?) 

These  notices  of  the  gradual  recognition  of  the  sense  of  muscular  feeling, 
as  a  special  source  of  knowledge,  are  not  given  on  account  of  any  importance 
it  may  be  thought  to  possess  as  the  source  from  which  is  derived  our  notion 
of  Space  or  Exteffeion.  This  notion,  I  am  convinced,  though  first  manifest- 
ed in,  cannot  be  evolved  out  of,  experience  ;  and  what  was  observed  by  Eeid 
(Inq.  p.  126,  a),  by  Kant  (Cr.  d.  r.  V.  p.  38),  by  Schulz  (Pruef.  i.  p.  114),  and 
Stewart  (Essays,  p.  564),  in  regard  to  the  attempts  which  had  previously 
been  made  to  deduce  it  from  the  operations  of  sense,  and  in  particular,  from 
the  motion  of  the  hand,  is  equally  true  of  those  subsequently  repeated.  In 
all  these  attempts,  the  experience  itself  is  only  realized  through  a  substitution 
of  the  very  notion  which  it  professes  to  generate ;  there  is  always  a  conceal- 
ed petitio  principii.  Take  for  example  the  deduction  so  laboriously  essayed 
by  Dr.  Brown,  and  for  which  he  has  received  such  unqualified  encomium. 
(Lectt.  28  and  24). — Extension  is  made  up  of  three  dimensions ;  but  Brown's 
exposition  is  limited  to  length  and  breadth.  These  only,  therefore,  can  be 
criticised. 

As  far  as  I  can  find  his  meaning  in  his  cloud  of  words,  he  argues  thus : — 
The  notion  of  Time  or  succession  being  supposed,  that  of  longitudinal  ex- 
tension is  given  in  the  succession  of  feelings  which  accompanies  the  gradual 
contraction  of  a  muscle  ;  the  notion  of  this  succession  constitutes,  ipso  facto, 
the  notion  of  a  certain  length ;  and  the  notion  of  this  length  [he  quietly  takes 
for  granted]  is  the*notion  of  longitudinal  extension  sought  (p.  146  a). — The 
paralogism  here  is  transparent. — Length  is  an  ambiguous  term ;  and  it  is 
length  in  space,  extensive  length,  and  not  length  in  time,  protensive  length, 
whose  notion  it  is  the  problem  to  evolve.  To  convert,  therefore,  the  notion 
of  a  certain  kind  of  length  (and  that  certain  kind  being  also  confessedly  only 
length  in  time)  into  the  notion  of  a  length  in  space,  is  at  best  an  idle  begging 
of  the  question. — Is  it  not  ?  Then  I  would  ask,  whether  the  series  of  feelings 
of  which  we  are  aware  in  the  gradual  contraction  of  a  muscle,  involve  the 
consciousness  of  being  a  succession  or  length  (1),  in  time  alone  '  or  (2)  in 
space  alone  ? — or  (8)  in  time  and  space  together  ?  These  three  cases  will  be 
allowed  to  be  exhaustive.  If  the  first  be  affirmed,  if  the  succession  appear 
to  consciousness  a  length  in  time  exclusively,  then  nothing  has  been  accom- 
plished ;  for  the  notion  of  extension  or  space  is  in  no  way  contained  in  the 
notion  of  duration  or  time. — Again,  if  the  second  or  the  third  be  affirmed, 


400  PHILOSOPHY    OF    1'KRCEPTION. 

29.  Finally — The  existential  judgments  are  of  the  Primary 
assertory  ;  of  the  Secundo-primary,  in  both  their  aspects,  assert- 
ory ;  of  the  Secondary,  as  modes  of  mind,  assertory,  as  modes  of 
matter,  problematic.  (See  par.  11,  12,  13.) 


if  the  series  appear  to  consciousness  a  succession  of  length,  either  in  space 
alone,  or  in  space  and  time  together,  then  is  the  notion  it  behooved  to  generate 
employed  to  generate  itself. 

In  the  deduction  of  the  notion  of  superficial  extension  he  is  equally  illog- 
ical ;  for  here,  too,  his  process  of  evolution  only  in  the  end  openly  extracts 
what  in  the  commencement  it  had  secretly  thrown  in.  The  elements,  out  of 
which  he  constructs  the  notion  of  extension,  in  the  second  dimension,  he 
finds  in  the  consciousness  we  have  of  several  contemporaneous  series  of 
muscular  feelings  or  lengths,  standing  in  relation  to  each  other,  as  proximate, 
distant,  intermediate,  «fec. — Proximate!  In  what?  In  time?  No;  for  the 
series  are  supposed  to  be  in  time  coexistent;  and  were  it  OTherwise,  the  pro- 
cess would  be  unavailing,  for  proximity  in  time  does  not  afford  proximity  in 
space.  In  space,  then  ?  Necessarily.  On  this  alternative,  however,  the  no- 
tion of  space  or  extension  is  already  involved  doubly  deep  in  the  elements 
themselves,  out  of  which  it  is  proposed  to  construct  it ;  for  when  two  or 
more  things  are  conceived  as  proximate  in  space,  they  are  not  merely  con- 
ceived as  in  different  places  or  out  of  each  other,  but  over  and  above  this 
elementary  condition  in  which  extension  simply  is  involved,  they  are  con- 
ceived as  even  holding  under  it  a  secondary  and  more  complex  relation. 
But  it  is  needless  to  proceed,  for  the  petition  of  the  point  in  question  is  even 
more  palpable  if  we  think  the  series  under  the  relations  of  the  distant,  the 
intermediate,  &c. — The  notion  of  Space,  therefore,  is  not  shown  by  this  ex- 
planation of  its  genesis  to  be  less  a  native  notion  than  that  of  Time,  which  it 
admits.  Brown's  is  a  modification  of  De  Tracy's  deduction,  the  change  being 
probably  suggested  by  a  remark  of  Stewart  (1.  c.) ;  but  though  both  involve 
a  paralogism,  it  is  certainly  far  more  shrewdly  cloaked  in  the  original. 

III. — Historical  notices  in  regard  to  the  distinction  of  Nerves  and  nervous 
Filaments  into  Motive  and  Sensitive  ;  and  in  regard  to  the  peculiarity  of  func- 
tion, and  absolute  isolation,  of  tJte  ultimate  nervous  Filaments. — The  important 
discovery  of  Sir  Charles  Bell,  that  the  spinal  nerves  are  the  organs  of  motion 
through  their  anterior  roots,  of  sensation  through  their  posterior;  and  the 
recognition  by  recent  physiologists,  that  each  ultimate  nervous  filament  is 
distinct  in  function,  and  runs  isolated  from  its  origin  to  its  termination ; — 
these  are  only  the  last  of  a  long  series  of  previous  observations  to  the  same 
effect, — observations,  in  regard  to  which  (as  may  be  inferred  from  the  recent 
discussions  touching  the  history  of  these  results)  the  medical  world  is,  in  a 
great  measure,  uninformed.  At  the  same  time,  as  these  are  the  physiolog- 
ical facts  with  which  psychology  is  principally  interested ;  as  a  contribution 
towards  this  doctrine  and  its  history,  I  shall  throw  together  a  few  notices, 
which  have  for  the  most  part  fallen  in  my  way  when  engaged  in  researches 
for  a  different  purpose. 

The  cases  of  paralysis  without  narcosis  (stupor),  and  of  narcosis  without 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  401 

c) — As  both  in  Sensitive  Apprehension  and  in  Thought ;  as  in 
relation  both  to  Sense  and  Intellect. 

30.  In  the  order  of  nature  and   of  necessary  thought,  the  Pri- 


paralysis — for  the  ancient  propriety  of  these  terms  ought  to  be  observed — 
that  is,  the  ciises  in  which  either  motion  or  sensibility,  exclusively,  is  lost, 
were  too  remarkable  not  to  attract  attention  even  from  the  earliest  periods  ; 
and  at  the  same  time,  too  peremptory  not  to  necessitate  the  conclusion,  that 
the  several  phenomena  are,  either  the  functions  of  different  organs,  or,  if  of 
the  same,  at  least  regulated  by  different  conditions.  Between  these  alterna- 
tives all  opinions  on  the  subject  are  divided  ;  and  the  former  was  the  first,  as 
it  has  been  the  last,  to  be  adopted. 

No  sooner  had  the  nervous  system  been  recognized  as  the  ultimate  organ 
of  the  animal  and  vital  functions,  and  the  intracranial  medulla  or  encephalos 
(encephalon  is  a  modern  misnomer)  ascertained  to  be  its  centre,  than  Erasis- 
tratus  proceeded  to  appropriate  to  different  parts  of  that  organism  the  func- 
tions which,  along  with  Herophilus,  he  had  distinguished,  of  sensibility  and 
voluntary  motion.  He  placed  the  source — of  the  former  in  the  meninges  or 
membranes,  of  the  latter  in  the  substance,  of  the  encephalos  in  general,  that 
is,  of  the  Brain-proper  and  After-brain  or  Cerebellum.  And  while  the  nerves 
were,  mediately  or  immediately,  the  prolongations  of  these,  he  viewed  the 
nervous  membranes  as  the  vehicle  of  sensation,  the  nervous  substance  as  the 
vehicle  of  motion.  (Eufus  Ephesius,  L.  i.  c.  22;  L.  ii.  cc.  2,  17.)  This  the- 
ory which  is  remarkable,  if  for  nothing  else,  for  manifesting  the  tendency 
from  an  early  period  to  refer  the  phenomena  of  motion  and  sensation  to  dis- 
tinct parts  of  the  nervous  organism,  has  not  obtained  the  attention  which  it 
even  intrinsically  merits.  In  modern  times,  indeed,  the  same  opinion  has 
been  hazarded,  even  to  my  fortuitous  knowledge,  at  least  thrice.  Firstly  by 
Fernelius  (1550,  Physiologia,  v.  10,  15);  secondly  by  Eosetti  (1722,  Raccolta 
d'Opuscoli,  &c.,  t.  v.  p.  272  sq.) ;  thirdly  by  Le  Cat  (1740,  Traite  des  Sensa- 
tions, CEuv.  Phys.  t.  i.  p.  124,  and  Diss.  sur  la  Sensibilite  des  Meninges,  §  i.) 
— By  each  of  these  the  hypothesis  is  advanced  as  original.  In  the  two  last 
this  is  not  to  be  marvelled  at;  but  it  is  surprising  how  the  opinion  of  Era- 
sistratus  could  have  escaped  the  erudition  of  the  first.  I  may  observe,  that 
Erasistratus  also  anticipated  many  recent  physiologists  in  the  doctrine,  that 
the  intelligence  of  man,  and  of  animals  in  general  is  always  in  proportion  to 
the  depth  and  number  of  the  cerebral  convolutions,  that  is,  in  the  ratio  of 
the  extent  of  cerebral  surface,  not  of  cerebral  mass. 

The  second  alternative  was  adopted  by  Galen,  who  while  he  refutes  ap- 
parently misrepresents  the  doctrine  of  Erasistratus ;  for  Erasistratus  did  not, 
if  we  may  credit  Kufus,  an  older  authority  than  Galen,  derive  the  nerves 
from  the  membranes  of  the  encephalos,  to  the  exclusion  of  its  substance ;  or 
if  Galen  be  herein  correct,  this  is  perhaps  the  early  doctrine  which  Erasis- 
tratus is  by  him  said  in  his  maturer  years  to  have  abandoned ; — a  doctrine, 
however,  which,  under  modifications,  has  in  modern  times  found  supporters 
in  Kondeletius  and  others.  (LaurentiiJkt.  Anat.  iv.  qu.  13.) — Recognizing,. 


402  PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION. 

mary  qualities  are  prior  to  the  Secundorprimary  and  Secondary  ; 
but  in  the  order  of  empirical  apprehension,  though  chronologi- 
cally simultaneous,  they  are  posterior  to  both.  For  it  is  only 


what  has  always  indeed  been  done,  the  contrast  of  the  two  phenomena  of 
sensibility  and  motion,  Galen  did  not,  however,  regard  them  as  necessarily 
the  products  of  distinct  parts  of  the  nervous  system,  although,  de  facto,  dif- 
ferent parta  of  that  system  were  often  subservient  to  their  manifestation. 
As  to  the  problem — Do  the  nerves  perform  their  double  function  by  the  con- 
veyance of  a  corporeal  fluid,  or  through  the  irradiation  of  an  immaterial 
power? — Galen  seems  to  vacillate ;  for  texts  may  be  adduced  in  favor  of  each 
alternative.  He  is  not  always  consistent  in  the  shares  which  he  assigns  to 
the  heart  and  to  the  brain,  in  the  elaboration  of  the  animal  spirits ;  nor  is  he 
even  uniform  in  maintaining  a  discrimination  of  origin,  between  the  animal 
spirits  and  the  vital.  Degrading  the  membranes  to  mere  envelopments,  he 
limits  every  peculiar  function  of  the  nervous  organism  to  the  enveloped  sub- 
stance of  the  brain,  the  after-brain,  the  spinal  chord  and  nerves.  But  as  the 
animal  faculty  is  one,  and  its  proximate  vehicle  the  animal  spirits  is  homo- 
geneous, so  the  nervous  or  cerebral  substance  which  conducts  these  spirits 
is  in  its  own  nature  uniform  and  indifferently  competent  to  either  function ; 
it  being  dependent  upon  two  accidental  circumstances,  whether  this  sub- 
stance conduce  to  motion,  to  sensation,  or  to  motion  and  sensation  together. 

The  first  circumstance  is  the  degree  of  hardness  or  softness ;  a  nerve 
being  adapted  to  motion,  or  to  sensation,  in  proportion  as  it  possesses  the 
former  quality  or  the  latter.  Nerves  extremely  soft  are  exclusively  compe- 
tent to  sensation.  Nerves  extremely  hard  are  pre-eminently,  but  not  exclu- 
sively, adapted  to  motion ;  for  no  nerve  is  wholly  destitute  of  the  feeling  of 
touch.  The  soft  nerves,  short  and  straight  in  their  course,  arise  from  the 
anterior  portion  of  the  cncephalos  (the  Brain  proper) ;  the  hard,  more  devi- 
ous in  direction,  spring  from  the  posterior  portion  of  the  brain  where  it 
joins  the  spinal  chord  (Medulla  oblongata?)  the  spinal  chord  being  a  contin- 
uation of  the  After-brain,  from  which  no  nerve  immediately  arises ;  the 
hardest  originate  from  the  spinal  chord  itself,  more  especially  towards  its  in- 
ferior extremity.  A  nerve  soft  in  its  origin,  and,  therefore,  fitted  only  for 
sense,  may,  however,  harden  in  its  progress,  and  by  this  change  become 
suitable  for  motion. 

The  second  circumstance  is  the  part  to  which  a  nerve  is  sent ;  the  nerve 
being  sensitive  or  motive  as  it  terminates  in  an  organ  of  sense,  or  in  an  or- 
gan of  motion— a  muscle ;  every  part  being  recipient  only  of  the  virtue 
appropriate  to  its  special  function. 

This  theory  of  Galen  is  inadequate  to  the  phenomena.  For  though  loss 
of  motion  without  the  loss  of  sense  may  thus  be  accounted  for,  on  the  sup- 
position that  the  innervating  force  is  reduced  so  low  as  not  to  radiate  the 
stronger  influence  required  for  movement,  and  yet  to  radiate  the  feebler  influ- 
ence required  for  feeling ;  still  this  leaves  the  counter  case  (of  which,  though 
less  frequently  occurring,  Galen  has  himself  recorded  some  illustrious  ex- 
amples) not  only  unexplained,  but  even  renders  it  inexplicable.  In  this  the- 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION.  403 

under  condition  of  the  Sensation  of  a  Secondary,  that  we  are  per- 
cipient of  any  Primary  quality. 

31.  The  apprehension  of  a  Primary  quality  is  principally  an 


ory  Galen  is,  likewise,  not  always  consistent  with  himself.  The  distinction 
of  hard  and  soft,  as  corresponding  with  the  distinction  of  motory  and  sensi- 
tive, nerves,  though  true  in  general,  is,  on  his  own  admission,  not  absolutely 
through-going.  (I  must  observe,  however,  that  among  other  recent  anat- 
omists this  is  maintained  by  Albinus,  Malacarne,  and  Eeil.)  And  to  say  noth- 
ing of  other  vacillations,  Galen,  who  in  one  sentence,  in  consistency  with  his 
distinction  of  cerebral  and  (mediately)  cerebellar  nerves,  is  forced  to  accord 
exclusively  to  those  of  the  spine  the  function  of  motion ;  in  another  finds 
himself  compelled,  in  submission  to  the  notorious  fact,  to  extend  to  these 
nerves  the  function  of  sensation  likewise.  But  if  Galen's  theory  be  inade- 
quate to  their  solution,  it  never  leads  him  to  overlook,  to  dissemble,  or  to 
distort,  the  phenomena  themselves ;  and  with  these  no  one  was  ever  more 
familiarly  acquainted.  So  marvellous,  indeed,  is  his  minute  knowledge  of 
the  distribution  and  functions  of  the  several  nerves,  that  it  is  hardly  too 
much  to  assert,  that,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  minor  particulars,  his  pa- 
thological anatomy  of  the  nervous  system  is  practically  on  a  level  with  the 
pathological  anatomy  of  the  present  day.  (De  Usu  Partium,  i.  7,  v.  9,  7, 14, 
viii.  3,  6,  10,  12,  ix.  1,  xii.  10,  11,  15,  xiii.  8,  xvi.  1,  3,  5,  xvii.  2,  3.— De  Causis 
Sympt.,  i.  5. — De  Motu  Muse.,  i.  13. — De  Auat.  Adm.,  vii.  8.— Ars  parva, 
10, 11.— De  Locis  Aff.,  i.  6,  7, 12,  iii.  6,  12.— De  Diss.  Nerv.,  1.— De  Plac. 
Hipp,  et  Plat.  ii.  12,  vii.  3,  4,  5,  8.) 

The  next  step  was  not  made  until  the  middle  of  the  fourteenth  century, 
subsequent  to  Galen's  death ;  when  Bondeletliis  (c.  1550),  reasoning  from 
the  phenomena  of  paralysis  and  stupor,  enounced  it  as  an  observation  never 
previously  made,  that '  All  nerves,  from  their  origin  in  the  brain,  are,  even 
in  the  spinal  marrow  itself,  isolated  from  each  other.  The  cause  of  paraly- 
sis is  therefore  not  so  much  to  be  sought  for  in  the  spinal  marrow,  as  in 
the  encephalic  heads  of  the  nerves  ;  Galen  himself  having  indeed,  remarked, 
that  paralysis  always  supervenes,  when  the  origin  of  the  nerve  is  obstructed 
or  diseased.'  (Curandi  Methodus,  c.  32.) 

This  observation  did  not  secure  the  attention  which  it  deserved ;  and 
some  thirty  years  later  (1595),  another  French  physiologist,  another  cele- 
brated professor  in  the  same  university  with  Rondelet,  I  mean  Laurentius  of 
Montpellier,  advanced  this  very  doctrine  of  bis  predecessor,  as  'a  new  and 
hitherto  unheard-of  observation.'  This  anatomist  has,  however,  the  merit 
of  first  attempting  a  sensible  demonstration  of  the  fact,  by  resolving,  under 
water,  the  spinal  chord  into  its  constituent  filaments.  '  This  new  and  admira- 
ble observation,'  he  says,  '  explains  one  of  the  obscurest  problems  of  nature ; 
why  it  is  that  from  a  lesion,  say  of  the  cervical  medulla,  the  motion  of  the 
thigh  may  be  lost,  while  the  motions  of  the  arms  and  thorax  shall  remain 
entire.  In  the  second  edition  of  his  Anatomy,  Dulaurens  would  seem,  how- 
ever, less  confident,  not  only  of  the  absolute  originality,  but  of  the  absolute 
accuracy,  of  the  observation.  Nor  does  he  rise  above  the  Galenic  doctrine, 


404  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

intellectual  cognition,  in  so  far  as  it  is,  in  itself,  a  purely  mental 
activity,  and  not  the  mere  sensation  of  an  organic  passion  ;  and 
secondarily,  a  sensible  cognition,  in  so  far  as  it  is  the  perception 


that  sensibility  and  motion  may  be  transmitted  by  the  same  fibre.  In  fact, 
rejecting  the  discrimination  of  hard  and  soft  nerves,  he  abolishes  even  the 
accidental  distinction  which  had  been  recognized  by  Galen.  (Compare  Hist. 
Anat.,  later  editions,  iv.  c.  18,  qq.  9,  10,  11 ;  x.  c.  12,  with  the  relative 
places  in  the  first.) 

The  third  step  was  accomplished  by  Varottius  (1572)  who  showed  Galen 
to  be  mistaken  in  holding  that  the  spinal  chord  is  a  continuation  of  the 
After-brain  alone.  He  demonstrated,  against  all  previous  anatomists,  that 
this  chord  is  made  up  of  four  columns,  severally  arising  from  four  ence- 
phalic rools ;  two  roots  or  trunks  from  the  Brain-proper  being  prolonged 
into  it«  anterior,  and  two  from  the  After-brain  into  its  posterior  columns. 
(Anatomia,  L. iii:  De  Nervis  Opticis  Epistolee.) 

At  the  same  time  the  fact  was  signalized  by  other  contemporary  anato- 
mists (as  Colter,  1572,  Laurentius,  1595),  that  the  spinal  nerves  arise  by 
double  roots ;  one  set  of  filaments  emerging  from  the  anterior,  another  from 
the  posterior,  portion  of  the  chord.  It  was  in  general  noticed,  too  (as  by 
Gnter,  and  G.  Jlauhinug,  1590),  that  these  filaments,  on  issuing  from  the 
chord,  passed  into  a  knot  or  ganglion  ;  but,  strange  to  say,  it  was  reserved 
for  the  second  Monro  (1783),  to  record  the  special  observation,  that  this  gan- 
glion is  limited  to  the  fibres  of  the  posterior  root  alone. 

Such  was  the  state  of  anatomical  knowledge  touching  this  point  at  the 
close  of  the  sixteenth  century ;  and  it  may  now  seem  marvellous,  that  aware 
of  the  independence  of  the  motory  and  sensitive  functions, — aware  that  of 
these  functions  the  cerebral  nerves  were,  in  general,  limited  to  one,  while 
the  spinal  nerves  were  competent  to  both, — aware  that  the  spinal  nerves,  the 
nerves  of  double  function,  emerged  by  double  roots  and  terminated  in  a  two- 
fold distribution, — and,  finally,  aware  that  each  nervous  filament  ran  dis- 
tinct from  its  peripheral  extremity  through  the  spinal  chord  to  its  central 
origin;  aware,  I  say,  of  all  these  correlative  facts,  it  may  now  seem  marvel- 
lous that  anatomists  should  have  stopped  short,  should  not  have  attempted 
to  lay  fact  and  fact  together,  should  not  have  surmised  that  in  the  spinal 
nerves  difference  of  root  is  correspondent  with  difference  of  function,  should 
not  have  instituted  experiments,  and  anticipated  by  two  centuries  the  most 
remarkable  physiological  discover}-  of  the  present  day.  But  our  wonder 
will  be  enhanced,  in  finding  the  most  illustrious  of  the  more  modern  schools 
of  medicine  teaching  the  same  doctrine  in  greater  detail,  and  yet  never  pro- 
posing to  itself  the  question — May  not  the  double  roots  correspond  with  the 
double  function  of  the  spinal  nerves?  But  so  has  it  been  with  all  the  .most 
momentous  discoveries.  When  Harvey  proclaimed  the  circulation  of  the 
blood,  he  only  proclaimed  a  doctrine  necessitated  by  the  discovery  of  the 
venous  valves ;  and  the  Newtonian  theory  of  the  heavens  was  but  a  final 
generalization,  prepared  by  foregone  observations,  and  even  already  partially 
enounced. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  405 

of  an  attribute  of  matter,  and,  though  not  constituted  by,  still 
not  realized  without,  the  sensation  of  an  organic  passion.— The 
apprehension  of  a  Secondary  quality  is  solely  a  sensible  cogni- 


The  school  I  refer  to  is  that  of  Leyden — the  school  of  Boerhaave  and  his 
disciples. — Boerhaave  held  with  Willis  that  the  Brain-proper  is  the  organ  of 
aniraality ;  a  distinct  part  thereof  being  destined  to  each  of  its  two  func- 
tions, sense  and  voluntary  motion;  that  the  After-brain  is  the  organ  of 
vitality,  or  the  involuntary  motions : — and  that  the  two  encephalic  organs 
are  prolonged,  the  former  into  the  anterior,  the  latter  into  the  posterior, 
columns  of  the  spinal  chord.  In  his  doctrine  all  nerves  are  composite, 
being  made  up  of  fibrils  of  a  tenuity,  not  only  beyond  our  means  of  ob- 
servation, but  almost  beyond  our  capacity  of  imagination.  Some  nerves 
are  homogeneous,  their  constituent  filaments  being  either  for  a  certain 
kind  of  motion  alone,  or  for  a  certain  kind  of  sensation  alone ;  others  are 
heterogeneous,  their  constituent  fibrils  being  some  for  motion,  some  for 
sensation; — and  of  this  latter  class  are  the  nerves  which  issue  from  the 
spine.  On  Boerhaave's  doctrine,  however,  the  spinal  nerves,  in  so  far  as 
they  arise  from  the  anterior  column,  are  nerves  both  of  the  sensation  and 
voluntary  motion— of  animality ;  in  so  far  as  they  arise  from  the  poste- 
rior column,  are  nerves  of  involuntary  motion — of  vitality.  A  homoge- 
neous nerve  does  not,  as  a  totality,  perform  a  single  office ;  for  every  ele- 
mentary fibril  of  which  it  is  composed  runs  from  first  to  last  isolated 
from  every  other,  and  has  its  separate  sphere  of  exercise.  As  many  dis- 
tinct spheres  of  sensation  and  motion,  so  many  distinct  nervous  origins 
:md  terminations ;  and  as  many  different  points  of  local  termination  in  the 
body,  so  many  different  points  of  local  origin  in  the  brain.  The  Senso- 
rium  Commune,  the  centre  of  sensation  and  motion,  is  not  therefore  an 
indivisible  point,  not  even  an  undivided  place ;  it  is,  on  the  contrary,  the 
aggregate  of  as  many  places  (and  millions  of  millions  there  may  be)  as 
there  are  encephalic  origins  of  nervous  fibrils.  No  nerve,  therefore,  in  pro- 
priety of  speech,  gives  oflf  a  branch ;  their  sheaths  of  dura  mater  alone 
are  ramified ;  and  there  is  no  intercourse,  no  sympathy  between  the  ele- 
mentary fibrils,  except  through  the  sensorium  commune.  That  the  nerves 
are  made  up  of  fibrils  is  shown,  though  inadequately,  by  various  anatom- 
ical processes  ;  and  that  these  fibrils  are  destined  for  distinct  and  often 
different  purposes,  is  manifested  by  the  phenomena  of  disjoined  paralysis 
and  stupor.  (De  Morbis  Nervorum  Prselectiones,  by  Van  Eems.  pp.  261, 
490-497,  696,  713-717.  Compare  Kaau  Hoerhaave,  Impetum  faoiens,  §  197 
-200.) 

The  developed  doctrine  of  Boerhaave  on  this  point  is  to  be  sought  for, 
neither  in  his  Aphorisms  nor  in  his  Institutions  and  his  Prelections  on 
the  Institutions — the  more  prominent  works  to  which  his  illustrious  disci- 
ples, HaUer  and  Van  Swiften,  appended  respectively  a  commentary.  The 
latter  adopts,  but  does  not  advance  the  doctrine  of  his  master.  (Ad  Aph. 
701,  711,  774,  1057,  1060.)— The  former,  who  in  his  subsequent  writings 
silently  abandoned  the  opinion  that  sensation  and  motion  are  conveyed 


406  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

tion  ;  for  it  is  nothing  but  the  sensation  of  an  organic  passion. — 
The  apprehension  of  a  Secundo-primary  quality  is,  equally  and 
at  once,  an  intellectual  and  sensible  cognition ;  for  it  involves 


by  different  nervous  fibrils,  in  two  unnoticed  passages  of  his  annotations 
on  Boerbaave  (1740),  propounds  it  as  a  not  improbable  conjecture — that  a 
total  nerve  may  contain  within  its  sheath  a  complement  of  motory  and 
of  sensitive  tubules,  distinct  in  their  origin,  transit,  and  distribution,  but 
which  at  their  peripheral  extremity  communicate ;  the  latter,  like  veins, 
carrying  the  spirits  back  to  the  bruin,  which  the  former  had,  like  arteries, 
carried  out.  (Ad.  Boerh.  Instil.  §288,  n.  2,  §298,  n.  2.) 

The  doctrine  of  the  school  of  Leyden,  on  this  point,  was  however  still 
more  articulately  evolved  by  the  younger  (Bernard  Siegfried)  Alinnvs ; 
not  in  any  of  his  published  works,  but  in  the  prelections  he  delivered 
for  many  years,  in  that  university,  on  physiology.  From  a  copy  in  my 
possession  of  his  dictata  in  this  course,  very  fully  taken  after  the  middle 
of  the  century,  by  Dr.  William  Grant  (of  Kothiemurcus),  subsequently  a 
distinguished  medical  author  and  practical  physician  in  London,  compared 
with  another  very  accurate  copy  of  these  dictata,  taken  by  an  anonymous 
writer  in  the  year  1741 ;  I  am  enabled  to  present  the  following  general 
abstract  of  the  doctrine  taught  by  this  celebrated  anatomist,  though  obliged 
to  retrench  both  the  special  cases,  and  the  reasoning  in  detail  by  which 
it  is  illustrated  and  confirmed. 

The  nerves  have  a  triple  destination  as  they  minister  (1.)  to  voluntary 
motion,  (2.)  to  sensation,  (3.)  to  the  vital  energies — secretion,  digestion, 
<fcc.  Albinus  seems  to  acquiesce  in  the  doctrine,  that  the  Brain-proper 
is  the  ultimate  organ  of  the  first  and  second  function,  the  After-brain  of 
the  third. 

Nerves,  again,  are  of  two  kinds.  They  are  cither  such  in  which  the  func- 
tion of  each  ultimate  fibril  remains  isolated  in  function  from  centre  to  peri- 
phery (the  cerebro-spinal  nerves) ;  or  such  in  which  these  are  mutually 
confluent  (the  ganglionic  nerves). 

To  speak  only  of  the  cerebro-spinal  nerves,  and  of  these  only  in  relation 
to  the  functions  of  motion  and  sensation ; — they  are  to  be  distinguished 
into  three  classes  according  as  destined,  (1.)  to  sense,  (2.)  to  motion,  (3.)  to 
both  motion  and  sensation.  Examples — of  the  first  class  are  the  olfactory, 
the  optic,  the  auditory,  of  which  last  he  considers  the  portio  mollis  and  the 
portio  dura  to  be,  in  propriety,  distinct  nerves  ; — of  the  second  class,  are  the 
large  portion  of  those  passing  to  muscles,  as  the  fourth  and  sixth  pairs: — 
of  the  third  class  are  the  three  lingual  nerves,  especially  the  ninth  pair, 
fibrils  of  which  he  had  frequently  traced,  partly  to  the  muscles,  partly  to 
the  gustatory  papillae  of  the  tongue,  and  the  subcutaneous  nerves,  which 
are  seen  to  give  off  branches,  first  to  the  muscles,  and  thereafter  to  the  tac- 
tile papillae  of  the  skin.  The  nervous  fibres  which  minister  to  motion  are 
distinct  in  origin,  in  transit,  in  termination,  from  those  which  minister  to 
sensation.  This  is  manifest,  in  the  case  of  those  nerves  which  run  from  their 
origin  in  separate  sheaths,  either  to  an  organ  of  sense  (as  the  olfactory  and 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  407 

both  the  perception  of  a  quasi-primary  quality,  and  the  sensation 
of  a  secondary.     (See  par  15,  sq.1) 


optic),  or  to  an  organ  of  motion  (as  the  fourth  and  eixth  pairs,  which  go  to 
the  muscles  of  the  eye)  ;  but  it  is  equally,  though  not  so  obtrusively  true, 
in  the  case  where  a  nerve  gives  off  branches  partly  to  muscles,  partly  to  the 
cutaneous  papillae.  In  this  latter  case,  the  nervous  fibrils,  or  fistulae,  are, 
from  their  origin  in  the  medulla  oblongata  to  their  final  termination  in  the 
skin,  perfectly  distinct. — The  Medulla  Oblongata  is  a  continuation  of  the 
encephalos ;  made  up  of  two  columns  from  the  Brain-proper,  and  of  two 
columns  from  the  After-brain.  Immediately  or  mediately,  it  is  the  origin, 
as  it  is  the  organ,  of  all  the  nerves.  And  in  both  respects  it  is  double ;  for 
one  part,  the  organ  of  sense,  affords  an  origin  to  the  sensative  fibrils ;  whilst 
another,  the  organ  of  motion,  does  the  same  by  the  motory.  In  their  pro- 
gress, indeed,  after  passing  out,  the  several  fibrils,  whether  homogeneous  or 
not,  are  so  conjoined  by  the  investing  membranes  as  to  exhibit  the  appear- 
ance of  a  single  nerve  ;  but  when  they  approach  their  destination  they 
separate,  those  for  motion  ramifying  through  the  muscles,  those  for  sensa- 
tion going  to  the  cutaneous  papillae  or  other  organs  of  sense.  Examples  of 
this  are  afforded — in  the  ninth  pair,  the  fibres  of  which  (against  more  mod- 
ern anatomists),  he  holds  to  arise  by  a  double  origin  in  the  medulla,  and 
which,  after  running  in  the  same  sheath,  separate  according  to  their  differ- 
ent functions  and  destinations ;  and  in  the  seventh  pair,  the  hard  and  soft 
portions  of  which  are  respectively  for  motion  and  for  sensation,  though 
these  portions,  he  elsewhere  maintains,  ought  rather  to  be  considered  as 
two  distinct  nerves  than  as  the  twofold  constituents  of  one. 

The  proof  of  this  is  of  various  kinds. — In  the  first  place,  it  is  a  theory 
forced  upon  us  by  the  phenomena ;  for  only  on  this  supposition  can  we  ac- 
count for  the  following  facts: — (1)  That  we  have  distinct  sensations  trans- 
mitted to  the  brain  from  different  parts  of  the  same  sensitive  organ  (as  the 
tongue)  through  which  the  same  total  nerve  is  diffused.  (2)  That  we  can 
send  out  from  the  brain  a  motive  influence  to  one,  nay,  sometimes  to  a  part 
of  one  muscle  out  of  a  plurality,  among  which  the  same  total  nerve  (e.  g.  the 
ischiatic)  is  distributed.  (3)  That  sometimes  a  part  is  either,  on  the  one 
hand,  paralyzed,  without  any  loss  of  sensibility  ;  or,  on  the  other,  stupefied, 
without  a  diminution  of  its  mobility. 

In  the  second  place,  we  can  demonstrate  the  doctrine,  proceeding  both  from 
centre  to  periphery,  and  from  periphery  to  centre. — Though  ultimately  divid- 
ing into  filaments  beyond  our  means  of  observation,  we  can  still  go  far  in 
following  out  a  nerve  both  in  its  general  ramifications,  and  in  the  special  dis- 
tribution of  its  filaments,  for  motion  to  the  muscles  and  for  sensation  to  the 
skin,  <fcc. ;  and  how  far  soever  we  are  able  to  carry  our  investigation,  we  al- 
ways find  the  least  fibrils  into  which  we  succeed  in  analyzing  a  nerve,  equally 
distinct  and  continuous  as  the  chord  of  which  they  were  constituent. — And 
again,  in  following  back  the  filaments  of  motion  from  the  muscles,  the  fila- 

1  And  the  next  chapter,  §  1. —  W. 


408  PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION. 

mcnta  of  sensation  from  the  skin,  we  find  them  ever  collected  into  larger 
and  larger  bundles  within  the  same  sheath,  bat  never  losing  their  individu- 
ality, never  fused  together  to  form  the  substance  of  a  larger  chord. — The 
nerves  are  thus  not  analogous  to  arteries,  which  rise  from  a  common  trunk, 
convey  a  common  fluid,  divide  into  branches  all  similar  in  action  to  eacli 
other  and  to  the  primary  trunk.  For  even-  larger  nerve  is  only  a  comple- 
ment of  smaller  nerves,  and  every  smallest  nerve  only  a  fasciculus  of  nervous 
fibrils ;  and  these  not  only  numerically  different,  but  often  differing  from 
each  other  in  the  character  of  their  functions. 

In  the  third  place,  that  in  the  nerves  for  both  motion  and  sensation  are  en- 
veloped distinct  nerves  or  fibrils  for  these  several  functions — this  is  an  infer- 
ence supported  by  the  analogy  of  those  nerves  which  are  motive  or  sensitive, 
exclusively.  And  in  regard  to  these  latter,  it  becomes  impossible,  in  some 
cases,  to  conceive  why  a  plurality  of  nerves  should  have  been  found  neces- 
sary, as  in  the  case  of  the  two  portions  of  the  seventh  pair,  in  reality  distinct 
nerves,  if  we  admit  the  supposition  that  each  nerve,  each  nervous  fibril,  is 
competent  to  the  double  office. 

In  the  fourth  place,  the  two  species  of  nerve  are  distinguished  by  a  differ- 
ence of  structure.  For  he  maintains  the  old  Galenic  doctrine,  that  the  nerves 
of  motion  are,  as  compared  with  those  of  sensation,  of  a  harder  and  more 
fibrous  texture ; — a  diversity  which  he  does  not  confine  to  the  homogeneous 
nerves,  but  extends  to  the  counter  filaments  of  the  heterogeneous. — This 
opinion,  in  modern  times,  by  the  majority  surrendered  rather  than  refuted, 
has  been  also  subsequently  maintained  by  a  small  number  of  the  most  accu- 
rate anatomists,  as  Malacarne  and  Reil ;  and  to  this  result  the  recent  observa- 
tians  of  Ehrenberg  and  others  seem  to  tend.  (See  memoirs  of  the  Berlin 
Academy  for  1836,  p.  605,  sq. ;  Mueller's  Phys.  p.  598.) 

Finatty,  to  the  objection — Why  has  nature  not,  in  all  cases  as  in  some,  in- 
closed the  motive  and  the  sentient  fibrils  in  distinct  sheaths  ? — as  answer,  and 
fifth  argument,  he  shows,  with  great  ingenuity,  that  nature  does  precisely 
what,  in  the  circumstances,  always  affords  the  greatest  security  to  both,  more 
especially  to  the  softer,  fibrils  ;  and  he  might  have  added,  as  a  sixth  reason 
and  second  answer — with  the  smallest  expenditure  of  means. 

The  subtilty  of  the  nervous  fibres  is  much  greater  than  is  commonly  sus- 
pected ;  and  there  is  probably  no  point  of  the  body  to  which  they  are  not 
distributed.  What  is  the  nature  of  their  peripheral  terminations  it  is,  how- 
ever, difficult  to  demonstrate  ;  and  the  doctrines  of  Ruysch  and  Malpighi  in 
this  respect  are,  as  he  shows,  unsatisfactory. 

The  doctrine  of  Albinus,  indeed,  of  the  whole  school  of  Boerhaave,  in  re- 
gard to  the  nervous  system,  and,  in  particular,  touching  the  distinction  and 
the  isolation  of  the  ultimate  nervous  filaments,  seems  during  a  century  of 
interval  not  only  to  have  been  neglected  but  absolutely  forgotten  ;  and  a  coun- 
ter opinion  of  the  most  erroneous  character,  with  here  and  there  a  feeble 
echo  of  the  true,  to  have  become  generally  prevalent  in  its  stead.  For, 
strange  to  say,  this  very  doctrine  is  that  recently  promulgated  as  the  last  con- 
summation of  nervous  physiology  by  the  most  illustrious  physiologist  in 
Europe.  'That  the  primitive  fibres  of  all  the  cerebro-spinal  nerves  are  to 
be  regarded  as  isolated  and  distinct  from  their  orign  to  their  termination,  and 
as  radii  issuing  from  the  axis  of  the  nervous  system,'  is  the  grand  result,  as 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   PEECEPTION.  409 

stated  by  himself,  of  the  elaborate  researches  of  Johann  Mueller ;  and  to  the 
earliest  discovery  of  this  general  fact  he  carefully  vindicates  his  right  against 
other  contemporary  observers,  by  stating  that  it  had  been  privately  commu- 
nicated by  him  to  Van  der  Kolk,  of  Utrecht,  so  long  ago  as  the  year  1830. 
(Phys.  p.  596-603.) 

In  conclusion,  I  may  observe  that  it  is  greatly  to  be  regretted  that  these 
Prelections  of  Albinus  were  never  printed.  They  present,  not  only  a  full  and 
elegant  digest  of  all  that  was  known  in  physiology  at  the  date  of  their  deliv- 
ery (and  Albinus  was  celebrated  for  the  uncommon  care  which  he  bestowed 
on  the  composition  of  his  lectures) ;  but  they  likewise  contain,  perdue,  many 
original  views,  all  deserving  of  attention,  and  some  which  have  been  subse- 
quently reproduced  to  the  no  small  celebrity  of  their  second  authors.  The 
speculation,  for  example,  of  John  Hunter  and  Dr.  Thomas  Young,  in  regard 
to  the  self-contractile  property  of  the  Crystalline  lens  is  here  anticipated ; 
and  that  pellucidity  and  fibrous  structure  are  compatible,  shown  by  the  anal- 
ogy of  those  gelatinous  mollusca,  the  medusae  or  sea-blubbers,  which  are  not 
more  remarkable  for  their  transparency,  than  for  their  contractile  and  dila- 
tive powers. 

As  I  have  already  noticed,  the  celebrity  of  the  Leyden  School  far  from 
commanding  acceptance,  did  not  even  secure  adequate  attention  to  the  doc- 
trine of  its  illustrious  masters ;  and  the  Galenic  theory,  to  which  Haller  lat- 
terly adhered,  was,  under  the  authority  of  Cullen  and  the  Monros,  that  which 
continued  to  prevail  in  this  country,  until  after  the  commencement  of  the 
present  century.  Here  another  step  in  advance  was  then  made  by  Mr.  Alex- 
ander Walker,  an  ingenious  Physiologist  of  Edinburgh ;  who,  in  1809,  first 
started  the  prolific  notion,  that  in  the  spinal  nerves  the  filaments  of  sen- 
sation issue  by  the  one  root,  the  filaments  of  motion  by  the  other.  His  attri- 
bution of  the  several  functions  to  the  several  roots — sensation  to  the  anterior, 
motion  to  the  posterior — with  strong  presumption  in  its  favor  from  general 
analogy,  and  its  conformity  with  the  tenor  of  all  previous,  and  much  subse- 
quent observation,  is,  however,  opposed  to  the  stream  of  later  and  more  pre- 
cise experiment.  Anatomists  have  been  long  agreed  that  the  anterior  col- 
umn of  the  spinal  marrow  is  in  continuity  with  the  brain-proper,  the  poste- 
rior, with  the  after-brain.  To  say  nothing  of  the  Galenic  doctrine,  Willis 
and  the  School  of  Boerhaave  had  referred  the  automatic,  Hoboken  and  Pou- 
teau  the  automatic  and  voluntary,  motions  to  the  cerebellum.  Latterly,  the 
experiments  of  Rolando,  Flourens,  and  other  physiologists,  would  show  that 
to  the  after-brain  belongs  the  power  of  regulated  or  voluntary  motion  ;  while 
the  parallelism  which  I  have  myself  detected,  between  the  relative  develop- 
ment of  that  part  of  the  encephalos  in  young  animals  and  their  command  over 
the  action  of  their  limbs,  goes,  likewise,  to  prove  that  such  motion  is  one,  at 
least,  of  the  cerebellic  functions.  (See  Munro's  Anatomy  of  the  Brain,  1831, 
p.  4r-9.)  In  contending,  therefore,  that  the  nervous  filaments  of  sensation 
ascend  in  the  anterior  rachitic  column  to  the  brain-proper,  and  the  nervous 
filaments  of  motion  in  the  posterior,  to  the  after-brain  ;  Mr.  Walker  origin- 
ally proposed,  and  still  maintains,  the  alternative  which,  independently  of 
precise  experiment,  had  the  greatest  weight  of  general  probability  in  its 
favor.  (Archives  of  Science  for  1809  ;  The  Nervous  System,  1834,  p.  50,  sq.) 

In  1811,  Sir  Charles  Bell,  holding  always  the  connection  of  the  brain- 

18 


410  PHILOSOPHY   OF    PKRCEPTION. 

proper  with  the  anterior,  of  the  after-bruin  with  the  posterior,  column  of 
the  spinal  chord,  proceeding,  however,  not  on  general  probabilities,  but  on 
experiments  expressly  instituted  on  the  roots  themselves  of  the  spinal  nerves, 
first  advanced  the  counter  doctrine,  that  to  the  filaments  ascending  by  the 
posterior  roots  belongs  exclusively  the  function  of  sensation  ;  and  thereafter, 
but  still,  as  is  now  clearly  proved,  previously  to  any  other  physiologist,  he 
•  further  established  by  a  most  ingenious  combination  of  special  analogy  and 
experiment,  the  correlative  fact,  that  the  filaments  descending  by  the  ante- 
rior roots  are  the  sole  vehicles  of  voluntary  motion.  These  results,  con- 
firmed as  they  have  been  by  the  principal  physiologists  throughout  Europe, 
seem  now  placed  above  the  risk  of  refutation.  It  still,  however,  remains  to 
reconcile  the  seeming  structural  connection,  and  the  manifest  functional  op- 
position, of  the  after-brain  and  posterior  rachitic  column ;  for  the  decussation 
in  the  medulla  oblongata,  observed,  among  others,  by  Rolando  and  Solly, 
whereby  the  cerebellum  and  anterior  column  are  connected,  is  apparently  too 
partial  to  reconcile  the  discordant  phenomena.  (BeWa  Nervous  System ; 
Shaw's  Narrative;  MueUer's  Physiology,  &c.) 


As  connected  with  the  foregoing  notices,  I  may  here  call  attention  to  a  re- 
markable case  reported  by  M.  Key  Regis,  a  medical  observer,  in  his  '  Histoire 
Naturelle  de  1'Ame.'  This  work,  which  is  extremely  rare,  I  have  been  un- 
able to  consult,  and  must  therefore  rely  on  the  abstract  given  by  M.  de  Biran 
in  his  '  Nouvelles  Considerations,'  p.  96,  sq.  This  case,  us  far  as  I  am  aware, 
has  escaped  the  observation  of  all  subsequent  physiologists.  In  its  phe- 
nomena, and  in  the  inferences  to  which  they  lead,  it  stands  alone ;  but 
whether  the  phenomena  are  themselves  anomalous,  or  that  experiments,  with 
the  same  intent,  not  having  been  made,  in  like  cases,  they  have  not  in  these 
been  brought  in  like  manner  into  view,  I  am  unable  to  determine. — A  man 
lost  the  power  of  movement  in  one  half  of  his  body  (one  lateral  half,  proba- 
bly, but  in  De  Biran's  account  the  paralysis  is  not  distinctly  stated  as  hemi- 
plegia) ;  while  the  sensibility  of  the  parts  affected  remained  apparently  en- 
tire. Experiments,  various  and  repeated,  were,  however,  made  to  ascertain 
with  accuracy,  whether  the  loss  of  the  motive  faculty  had  occasioned  any 
alteration  in  the  capacity  of  feeling  ;  and  it  was  found  that  the  patient,  though 
as  acutely  alive  as  ever  to  the  sense  of  pain,  felt,  when  this  was  secretly  in- 
flicted, as  by  compression  of  his  hand  under  the  bed-clothes,  a  sensation  of 
suffering  or  uneasiness,  by  which,  when  the  pressure  became  strong,  he  was 
compelled  lustily  to  cry  out ;  but  a  sensation  merely  general,  he  being  alto- 
gether unable  to  localize  the  feeling,  or  to  say  from  whence  the  pain  pro- 
ceeded. Jt  is  unfortunately  not  stated  whether  he  could  discriminate  one 
pain  from  another,  say  the  pain  of  pinching  from  the  pain  of  pricking;  but 
had  this  not  been  the  case,  the  notice  of  so  remarkable  a  circumstance  could 
hardly,  I  presume,  have  been  overlooked.  The  patient,  as  he  gradually  re- 
covered the  use  of  his  limbs,  gradually  also  recovered  the  power  of  localizing 
his  sensations. — It  would  be  important  to  test  the  value  of  this  observation 
by  similar  experiments,  made  on  patients  similarly  affected.  Until  this  be 
done,  it  would  be  rash  to  establish  any  general  inferences  upon  its  facts. 


th 

till 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  411 

I  may  notice  also  another  problem,  the  solution  of  which  ought  to  engage 
the  attention  of  those  who  have  the  means  of  observation  in  their  power, 
the  sensation  of  heat  dependent  upon  a  peculiar  set  of  nerves  ?  This  to 

ie  seems  probable  ;  1°,  because  certain  sentient  parts  of  the  body  are  in- 
sensible to  this  feeling  ;  and,  2°,  because  I  have  met  with  cases  recorded,  in 
which,  while  sensibility  in  general  was  abolished,  the  sensibility  to  heat  re- 
mained apparently  undiminished.1 


i  Here  may  be  added  a  curious  item,  from  the  foot-notes  to  Reid  (p.  246) :  '  However 
astonishing,  it  is  now  proved  beyond  all  rational  doubt,  that,  in  certain  abnormal  states 
of  the  nervous  organism,  perceptions  are  possible  through  other  than  the  ordinary 
channels  of  the  senses.' — W. 


CHAPTER    VI. 

PERCEPTION  PROPER    AND   SENSATION   PROPER.* 

§  I. — PRINCIPAL  MOMENTA  OF  THE  EDITOR'S  DOCTRINE  OF 
PERCEPTION. 

A) — In  itself: 
i. — Perception  in  general. 

I.  Sensitive  Perception,  or  Perception  simply,  is  that  act  of 
Consciousness  whereby  we  apprehend  in  our  body, 

*  A  word  as  to  the  various  meanings  of  the  terms  here  prominent — 
Perception,  Sensation,  Sense. 

\. — Perception.  (Perceptio ;  Perception  ;  Percezione;  Perception,  Wahrneh- 
mung)  has  different  significations;  but  under  all  and  each  of  these,  the  term 
has  a  common  ambiguity,  denoting  as  it  may,  either  1°  the  perceiving  Facul- 
ty, or  2°  the  Perceiving  Act,  or  8°  the  Object  perceived.  Of  these  the  only 
ambiguity  of  importance  is  the  last ;  and  to  relieve  it  I  would  propose  the 
employment,  in  this  relation,  of  Percept,  leaving  Perception  to  designate  both 
the  faculty  and  its  act ;  for  these  it  is  rarely  necessary  to  distinguish,  as  what 
is  applicable  to  the  one  is  usually  applicable  to  the  other. 

But  to  the  significations  of  the  term,  aa  applied  to  different  faculties,  acts, 
and  objects ;  of  which  there  are  in  all  four  • 

1.  Perceptio — which  has  been  naturalized  in  all  the  principal  languages  of 
modern  Europe,  with  the  qualified  exception  of  the  German,  in  which  the 
indigenous  term  Wahrnehmung  has  again  almost  superseded  it — Perceptio. 
in  its  primary  philosophical  signification,  as  in  the  mouths  of  Cicero  anil 
Quintilian,  is  vaguely  equivalent  to  Comprehension,  Notion,  or  Cognition  in 
general. 

2.  From  this  first  meaning  it  was  easily  deflected  to  a  second,  in  which  it 
corresponds  to  an  apprehension,  a  becoming  aware  of,  in  a  word,  a  conscious- 
ness.   In  this  meaning,  though  long  thus  previously  employed  in  the  schools, 
it  was  brought  more  prominently  and  distinctively  forward  in  the  writings 
of  Descartes.    From  him  it  passed,  not  only  to  his  own  disciples,  but,  like 
the  term  Idea,  to  his  antagonist,  Gassendi,  and,  thereafter,  adopted  equally 
by  Locke  and  Leibnitz,  it  remained  a  household  word  in  every  subsequent 
philosophy,  until  its  extent  was  further  limited,  and  thus  a  third  signification 
given  to  it. 

Under  this  second  meaning  it  is,  however,  proper  to  say  a  word  in  regard 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  4:13 

a.)  Certain  special  affections,  whereof  as  an  animated  organism 
it  is  contingently  susceptible ;  and 

b.)  Those  general  relations  of  extension  under  which  as  a  ma- 
terial organism  it  necessarily  exists. 


to  the  special  employment  of  the  term  in  the  Cartesian  and  Leibnitzio-Wol- 
fian  philosophies. — Perception  the  Cartesians  really  identified  with  Idea  (using 
this  term  in  its  unexclusive  universality,  but  discounting  Descartes'  own 
abusive  application  of  it  to  the  organic  movement  in  the  brain,  of  which  the 
mind  has,  ex  hypothesi,  no  consciousness) — and  allowed  them  only  a  logical 
distinction ; — the  same  representative  act  being  called  Idea,  inasmuch  as  we 
regard  itt  as  a  representation,  i.  e.  view  it  in  relation  to  what  through  it, 
as  represented,  is  mediately  known,  and  Perception,  inasmuch  as  we  regard 
it  as  a  consciousness  of  such  representation,  i.  e.  view  it  in  relation  to  Jhe 
knowing  mind. — The  Leibnitzio-Wolfians,  on  the  other  hand,  distinguished 
three  acts  in  the  process  of  representative  cognition : — 1°  the  act  of  repre- 
senting a  (mediate)  object  to  the  mind ;  2°  the  representation,  or,  to  speak 
more  properly,  representamen,  itself  as  an  (immediate  or  vicarious)  object 
exhibited  to  the  mind ;  3°  the  act  by  which  the  mind  is  conscious,  immedi- 
ately of  the  representative  object,  and,  through  it,  mediately  of  the  remote 
object  represented.  They  called  the  first  Perception  ;  the  last  Apperception  ; 
the  second  Idea — sensual,  to  wit,  for  what  they  styled  the  material  Idea  was 
only  an  organic  motion  propagated  to  the  brain,  which,  on  the  doctrine  of 
the  pre-established  harmony,  is  in  sensitive  cognition  the  arbitrary  concom- 
itant of  the  former,  and,  of  course,  beyond  the  sphere  of  consciousness  or 
apperception. 

3.  In  its  third  signification,  Perception  is  limited  to  the  apprehensions  of 
Sense  alone.     This  limitation  was  first  formally  imposed  upon  the  word  by- 
Reid,  for  no  very  cogent  reason  besides  convenience  (222  b) ;  and  thereafter 
by  Kant.    Kant,  again,  was  not  altogether  consistent ;  for  he  employs  '  Per- 
ception1 in  the  second  meaning,  for  the  consciousness  of  any  mental  presenta- 
tion, and  thus  in  a  sense  corresponding  to  the  Apperception  of  the  Leibnitz- 
ians,  while  its  vernacular  synonym  '  Wahrnehmung'  he  defines  in  conform- 
ity with  the  third,  as  the  consciousness  of  an  empirical  intuition.     Imposed 
by  such  authorities,  this  is  now  the  accredited  signification  of  these  terms, 
in  the  recent  philosophies  of  Germany,  Britain,  France,  Italy,  &c. 

4.  But  under  this  third  meaning  it  is  again,  since  the  time  and  through 
the  authority  of  Eeid,  frequently  employed  in  a  still  more  restricted  accep- 
tation, viz.  as  Perception  (proper)  in  contrast  to  Sensation  (proper).     The 
import  of  these  terms,  as  used  by  Eeid  and  other  philosophers  on  the  one 
hund,  and  by  myself  on  the  other,  is  explained  in  the  text. 

ii. — Sensation  (Svnsntio ;  Sensation,  Sentiment;  Sensazionc;  Empfindung) 
has  various  significations ;  and  in  all  of  these,  like  Perception,  Conception, 
Imagination,  and  other  analogous  terms  in  the  philosophy  of  mind,  it  is  am- 
biguously applied  ; — 1°,  for  a  Faculty — 2°,  for  its  Act— 3°,  for  its  Object. 
Here  there  is  no  available  term  like  Percept,  Concept,  &c.,  whereby  to  dis- 
criminate the  last. 


414  PHILOSOPHY    OF   PERCEPTION. 

Of  these  Perceptions,  the  former,  which  is  thus  conversant  about 
a  subject-object,  is  Sensation  proper  ;  the  latter,  which  is  thus 
conversant  about  an  object-object,  is  Perception  proper.1 

2.  All  Perception  is  an  act  of  Consciousness ;  no  Perception, 
therefore,  is  possible,  except  under  the  conditions  under  which 
Consciousness  is  possible.     The  eight  following  conditions   are 
partly  common  to  perception  with  the  other  acts  of  Consciousness ; 
partly  proper  to  it  as  a  special  operation. 

3.  The  first  is  a  certain  concentration  of  consciousness  on  an  ob- 
ject of  sense ; — an  act  of  Attention,  however  remiss.* 

4.  The  second  is  (independently  of  the  necessary  contrast  of  a 
svfbject  and  an  object),  a  plurality,  alteration,  difference  on  the 
part  of  the  perceived  object  or  objects,  and  of  a  recognition  or 


There  are  two  principal  meanings  in  whfch  this  term  has  been  employed. 

1.  Like  the  Greek  oRtithe-si-s,  it  was  long  and  generally  used  to  comprehend 
the  process  of  sensitive  apprehension  both  in  its  subjective  and  its  objective 
relations. 

2.  As  opposed  to  Idea,  Perception,  &c.,  it  was  limited,  first  in  the  Carte- 
sian school,  and  thereafter  in  that  of  Reid,  to  the  subjective  phasis  of  our 
sensitive  cognitions ;  that  is,  to  our  consciousness  of  the  affections  of  our 
animated  organism, — or  on  the  Neo-Platonic,  Cartesian,  and  Leibnitzian  hy- 
potheses, to  the  affections  of  the  mind  corresponding  to,  but  not  caused  by, 
the  unknown  mutations  of  the  body.     Under  this  restriction,  Sensation 
may,  both  in  French  and  English,  be  employed  to  designate  our  corporeal 
or  lower  feelings,  in  opposition  to  Sentiment,  as  a  term  for  our  higher,  i.  e. 
our  intellectual  and  moral,  feelings. 

iii. — Sense  (Sensns ;  Sens ;  Senso ;  Sinn)  is  employed  in  a  looser  and  in  a 
stricter  application. 

Under  the  former  head  it  has  two  applications  ; — 1°,  a  psychological,  as  a 
popular  term  for  Intelligence  :  2°,  a  logical,  as  a  synonym  for  Meaning. 

Under  the  latter  head,  Sense  is  employed  ambiguously ; — 1°,  for  the  Fac- 
ulty of  sensitive  apprehension  ;  2n,  for  its  Act ;  3°,  for  its  Organ. 

In  this  relation,  Sense  has  been  distinguished  into  External  and  Internal ; 
but  under  the  second  term,  in  so  many  vague  and  various  meanings,  that  1 
cannot  here  either  explain  or  enumerate  them. 

On  the  analogical  employments  of  the  word,  see  above,  p.  878  sq. 

*  St.  Jerome — 'Quod  ment*  videat  et  mens  audiat,  et  quod  nee  audire 
quidpiam  nee  videro  possumus,  nisi  sensus  in  ea  quas  cernimus  et  audimus 
intentug,  vetus  sententia.'  (Adv.  Jovin.  ii.  9.)  See  Aristotle  (Probl.  xi.  33), 
whom  Jerome  manifestly  had  in  his  eye ;  Strato  Physicus,  as  quoted  by 
Plntarch  (Dc  Sol.  An.  Opera,  t.  ii.  p.  961);  and  Plutarch  himself  (ibid.) 

1  See  p.  880.—  W. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  415 

discrimination  thereof  on  the  part  of  the  perceiving  subject.* — 
This  supposes  the  following  : — Quality  proper  ;  Quantity,  Pro- 
tensive  (Time),  Extensive  (Space),  Intensive  (Degree) ;  and  Rela- 
tion. Therefore — 

5.  The  third  is   Quality,  quality  strictly  so  called.     For  one 
affection  is  distinguished  from  another  as  it  is,  or  is  not,  such  and 
such  ;  in  other  words,  as  it  has,  or  has  not,  this  or  that  quality 
(suchness). 

6.  The  fourth  is  Time  ;  which  supposes  Memory,  or,  to  speak 
more  correctly,  a  certain  continuous  representation  of  the  late  and 
latest  past,  known  with  and  in  contrast  to  our  apprehension  of 
the  passing  present.     For  without  such  continuity  of  conscious- 
ness, no  consciousness  is  possible. 

7.  The  fifth  is  Space.     For  we  are  only  conscious  of  perceiv- 
ing, as  we  are  conscious  of  perceiving  something  as  discriminated 
from  other  'coexistent  things.     But  this  in  perception  is  to  be 
conscious  of  one  thing  as  out  of  another,  that  is,  as  extended,  that 
is,  as  in  space. 

8.  The  sixth  is  Degree.     For  all  sensations  are,  though  possi- 
bly of  any,  actually  of  one  definite  intensity ;  and  distinguished 
not  only  by  differences  in  Quality,  Time,  Space,  but  also  by  differ- 
ences in  Degree. 

9.  The  seventh  is  Relation.     For  discrimination,  which  all  per- 
ception supposes,  is  a  recognition  of  a  relation,  the  relation  of 
contrast ;  and  differences  in  Quality,  Time,  Space,  Degree,  are  only 
so  many  various  kinds  of  such  relativity. 

1 0.  Finally,  the  eighth  is  an  Assertory  Judgment,  that  within 
the  sphere  of  sense  an  object  (a)  exists,  and  (b)  exists  thus  or  thus 
conditioned.^     All  consciousness  is  realized  tfi  the  enunciation — 


*  It  has  been  well  said  by  Hobbes,  in  regard  to  the  former, — '  Sentire  sem- 
per idem,  et  non  sentirc,  ad  idem  recidunt'  (Eleni.  Philos.  P.  iv.  c.  25,  §  5); 
and  by  Galen  and  Nemesius  in  reference  to  the  latter, — '  Sensation  is  not  an 
alteration  (affection,  modification),  but  the  recognition  of  an  alteration.' 

t  Aristotle  in  various  passage?  asserts  that  Sensitive  perception  is  a  dis- 
crimination or  &  judgment.  (Anal.  Post.  L.  ii.  c.  19,  §5. — Top.  L.  ii.  c,  4, 


416  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

That  is  there  (or  This  is  here).  All  Perception  consequently 
enounces — That  is  there;  but  in  this  case,  there  is  especially 
understood  by  the  That — an  object  manifested  through  one  or 
more  qualities,  Secondary,  Secundo-primary,  Primary ;  and  by 
the  is  there — apprehended  in,  or  in  immediate  relation  to,  our 
organism.* 

1 1 .  Such  being  the  general  conditions  of  Perception,  it  is  man- 
ifestly impossible  to  discriminate  with  any  rigor  Sense  from  Intel- 
ligence. Sensitive  apprehension  is,  in  truth,  only  the  recognition 
by  Intelligence  of  the  phenomena  presented  in  or  through  its  or- 
gans^ 


§  2.— De  An.  L.  iii.  c.  1,  §  10 ;  c.  10,  §1;  alibi.)  And  the  Aphrodisian :— '  Al- 
though sensation  be  only  brought  to  benr  through  certain  corporeal  passions, 
yet  Sensation  itself  is  not  a  passion,  but  ajudymentS  (On  the  Soul,  f.  138  b, 
ed.  Aid.)  Eeid  has  the  merit  among  modern  philosophers  of  first  approxi- 
mating to  the  recognition  of  judgment  as  an  element  or  condition  of  con- 
sciousness in  general,  in  laying  it  at  the  root  of  Perception,  Sensation,  Mem- 
ory, and  [Self]  Consciousness  ;  though  he  unfortunately  fell  short  of  the  truth 
in  refusing  an  existential  judgment  also  to  the  acts  of  the  representative  fac- 
ulty, his  Conception,  Imagination,  or  Simple  Apprehension. 

*  In  this  qualitative  judgment  there  is  only  the  consciousness  of  the  qual- 
ity perceived  in  itself  as  a  distinct  object.  The  judgment,  again,  by  which 
it  is  recognized  of  such  a  class  or  such  a  name,  is  a  higher  energy,  and  ought 
not,  as  is  sometimes  done,  to  be  etyled  Perception ;  it  is  Judgment,  emphati- 
cally so  called,  a  simple  act  of,  what  I  would  call,  the  elaborative,  or  diano- 
etic,  or  discursive  faculty,  the  faculty  of  relations,  or  comparison. 

t  Tertullian : — '  Non  enim  et  sentire  -intelligere  est,  et  intelligere,  sentire. 
At  quid  erit  Sensus,  nisi  ejus  rei  qu&  sentitur  intetteclus?  Quid  erit  intellcc- 
tus,  nisi  ejus  rei  quse  intelligitur  sensus?  Unde  ista  tormeuta  cruciandae 
simplicitatis,  et  suspendendse  veritatis  ?  Quis  mini  exhibebit  sensum  non  in- 
telligentem  quod  seutit ;  aut  intellectum  non  sentientem  quod  intelligit?' — 
(De  Anima,  c.  18;  compare  De  Carne  Christi,  c.  12.) — To  the  same  effect 
St.  Gregory  of  Nyssa.  (De  Opif.  Horn.  cc.  6,  10;  and  De  Anima  et  Kesur., 
Opera,  t.  ii.  p.  623  ed.  Paris,  1615.) — See  also  St.  Jerome  as  quoted  in  note 
*  414. — But  this  doctrine  we  may  trace  back  to  Aristotle  and  his  school,  and 
even  higher.  'There  is  extant,'  says  Plutarch,  'a  discourse  of  Strato  Phys- 
icus,  demonstrating — That  a  sensitive  apprehension  is  wholly  impossible  with- 
out an  act  of  Intellect.'  (Op.  Mor.  p.  961.)  And  as  to  Aristotle  "himself: — 
'  To  divorce  (he  says)  Sensation  from  Understanding,  is  to  reduce  Sensation 
to  an  insensible  process ;  wherefore  it  has  been  said — Intellect  sees,  and  In- 
tellect hears.'  (Probl.  xi.  33.) 

This  saying,  as  recorded  by  Aristotle,  constitutes  in  the  original  (a  differ- 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    PERCEPTION.  417 

12.  All  perception  is  an  immediate  or  presentative  cognition  : 
and  has,  therefore,  in  either  form,  only  one  univocal  object ;  that, 
to  wit,  which  it  apprehends  as  now  and  here  existent.1 

ence  of  dialect  discounted)  the  first  hemistich  of  the  famous  verse  of  Epi- 
charmus : 

Nets  bptj  xai  Notif  aKoi'ei.  ruAAa  Ktixpd  xai  rv^Aa. 
Mind  it  seeth,  Mind  it  heareth  ;  all  beside  is  deaf  and  blind  ; 
or  less  literally — 

What  sees  is  Mind,  what  hears  is  Mind  ; 
The  ear  and  eye  are  deaf  and  Hind. 

Though  overlooked  as  a  quotation,  by  both  the  commentators  on  the  Prob- 
lems, by  Erasmus,  and  many  others,  it  has  never  been  suspected  that  these 
words,  as  quoted,  are  not  a  quotation  from  the  Syracusan  poet.  This  nega- 
tive I,  however,  venture  to  maintain,  at  least,  as  a  probable  thesis ;  for  I  am 
inclined  to  think  that  the  line,  however  great  its  merit,  does  not  ascend  to 
Epicharmus,  but  was  forged  and  fathered  on  him  in  an  age  considerably 
later  than  Aristotle's.  My  reasons  are  these : 

1.  Epicharmus  was  a  Pythagorean  philosopher  and  a  Doric  poet.    But  to 
fabricate  Pythagorean  treatises  in  the  Doric  dialect  seems  to  have  become 
in  the  latter  ages  a  matter  of  exercise  and  emulation  among  the  Greek  So- 
phistae  and   Syncretists.      In  fact,  of  the  numerous  fragments  under  the 
names  of  Pythagoras,  Theano,  Timasus,  Ocellus,  Archytas,  Hippodamus, 
Euryphamus,  Hipparchus,  Theages,  Metopus,  Clinias,  Crito,  Polus,  Lysis, 
Melissa,  Mya,  &c. ;  there  are  hardly  any  to  a  critical  eye  not  manifestly  spu- 
rious, and  none  whatever  exempt  from  grave  suspicion.  On  general  grounds, 
therefore,  forgeries  on  Epicharmus  are  not  only  not  improbable,  but  likely. 

2.  And  that  such  were  actually  committed  we  are  not  without  special  evi- 
dence.    We  know  from  Athenasus  (L.  xiv.),  that  there  were  many  Pseudce~ 
picharmia  in  circulation.    Besides  Apollodorus,  he  cites,  as  authorities  for 
this,  Aristoxenus  (who  was  a  scholar  of  Aristotle)  in  the  eighth  book  of  his 
Polity,  and  Philochorus  (who  lived  about  a  century  later)  in  his  treatise  on 
Divination.     Among  the  more  illustrious  fabricators,  the  former  of  these 
commemorates  Chrysogonus  the  flute-player  ;  the  latter,  Axiopistus  of  Lo- 
crus  or  Sicyon,  with  the  names  of  his  two  supposititious  works,  the  Canon 
and  the  Gnomce.     Of  either  of  these,  judging  from  their  title,  the  line  in 
question  may  have  formed  a  part ;    though  it  is  not  improbably  of  a  still 
more  recent  origin. 

8.  The  words  (and  none  could  be  more  direct  and  simple)  which  make  up 
the  first  hemistich  of  the  verse,  we  find  occasionally  quoted  as  a  proverbial 
pbilosopheme,  subsequently  to  the  time  of  Plato.  To  Plato's  doctrine,  and 
his  language,  I  would  indeed  attribute  its  rise  ;  for  it  is  idle  to  suppose,  with 
Jacobs,  that  Sophocles  ((Ed.  T.  889)  and  Euripides  (Hel.  118)  had  either  the 
verse  or  dogma  in  their  eye.  Aristotle,  at  least,  the  author  of  the  Problems, 


>  See  chapter  iii.  §  i.  4,  S,  11.—  W. 
18* 


418  PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION. 

13.  All  Perception  is  a  sensitive  cognition  :  it,  therefore,  appre- 
hends the  existence  of  no  object  out  of  its  organism,  or  not  in 
immediate  correlation  to  its  organism  ;  for  thus  only  can  an  ob- 
ject exist,  now  and  here,  to  sense. 


is  the  oldest  testimony  for  such  a  usage ;  and  long  after  Aristotle,  after,  in- 
deed, the  line  had  been  already  fathered  on  Epicharmus,  wo  have  Pliny  (II. 
N.  xi.  87),  Cassius  Felix  (Pr.  22),  St.  Jerome  (Adv.  Jovin.  ii.  9),  the  manu- 
scripts of  Stobaeus  (iv.  42),  and  the  Scholiast  of  Aristophanes  (PI.  48),  all  ad- 
ducing it  only  as  an  adage.  It  is  not,  however,  till  nearly  six  centuries  after 
Epicharmus,  and  considerably  more  than  four  centuries  after  Aristotle,  that 
we  find  the  saying  either  fully  cited  as  a  verse,  or  the  verse  ascribed  to  the 
Syracusan.  But  from  the  time  of  Plutarch,  who  himself  thrice  alleges  it,  its 
quotation  in  either  fashion  becomes  frequent ;  as  by  Tertullian,  Clement  of 
Alexandria,  Maximus  Tyrius,  Julian,  Theodoret,  Olympiodorus  (twice),  and 
Tzetzes  (four  times).  Porphyry  (thrice)  records  it — but  as  a  saying  of  Py- 
thagoras ;  and  lamblichus,  as  a  dictum  of  the  Pythagorean  School.  These 
authors  both  had  learning,  though  neither,  certainly,  was  ever  critical  in  its 
application.  Their  statements  can  only,  therefore,  be  held  to  favor  the  opin- 
ion that  they  were  unaware  of  any  decisive  evidence  to  vindicate  the  verse 
to  Epicharmus. 

4.  But  if  improbable,  even  at  first  sight,  that  such  a  verse  of  such  an  au- 
thor, should  not,  if  authentic,  have  been  adduced  by  any  writer  now  extant, 
during  the  long  period  of  six  hundred  years,  the  improbability  is  enhanced 
when  we  come  to  find,  that  during  that  whole  period  it  is  never  quoted, 
even  under  circumstances  when,  had  it  been  current  as  aline  of  Epicharmus, 
it  could  not  but  have  been  eagerly  appealed  to.  Plato,  as  observed  by  Alci- 
raus  and  Laertius,  was  notoriously  fond  of  quoting  Epicharmus ;  and  there 
were  at  least  two  occasions — in  the  Thewtetus  (§  102,  sq.),  and  in  the  Phsedo 
(§  25  [11  Wytt.]) — when  this  gnome  of  his  favorite  poet  would  have  confirmed 
and  briefly  embodied  the  doctrine  he  was  anxiously  inculcating.  Could  he  fail 
to  employ  it  ?  In  fact,  it  comes  to  this ; — these  passages  must  either  be  held  to 
follow,  or  to  found,  the  philosopheme  in  question. — In  like  manner  Cicero,  in 
his  exposition  of  the  first  passage  (Tusc.  i.  20),  couldhardly  have  avoided  as- 
sociating Epicharmus  with  Plato,  as  Tertullian  and  Olympiodorus  have  done  in 
their  expositions  of  the  second — had  the  line  been  recognized  in  the  age  of  the 
former,  as  it  was  in  the  age  of  the  two  latter.  Nor  could  such  an  apothegm  of 
such  a  poet  have  been  unknown  to  Cicero, — to  Cicero,  so  generally  conver- 
sant with  Hellenic  literature, — and  who,  among  other  sayings  of  Epicharmus 
himself,  adduces  in  Greek,  as  his  brother  Quintus  paraphrases  in  Latin,  the 
no  less  celebrated  maxim— 

Be  softer,  and  to  doubt  incUn'd  : 
.  These  are  the  very  joints  of  mind  ; 
or  on  the  other  reading— 

Be  cool,  and  eke  to  doubt  prepense  : 
These  are  the  sinews  of  good  seme. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  419 

ii. — Sensation  proper  and  Perception  proper,  in  correlation. 

14.  In  perception  proper  there  is  a  higher  energy  of  intelli- 
gence, than  in  Sensation  proper.     For  though  the  latter  be  the 
apprehension  of  an  affection  of  the  Ego,  and  therefore,  in  a  certain 
sort,  the  apprehension  of  an  immaterial  quality  ;  still  it  is  only 
the  apprehension  of  the  fact  of  an  organic  passion  ;  whereas  the 
former,  though  supposing  Sensation  as  its  condition,  and  though 
only  the  apprehension  of  the  attributes  of  a  material  Non-ego,  is, 
however,  itself  without  corporeal  passion,  and,  at  the  same  time, 
the  recognition  not  merely  of  a  fact,  but  of  relations.    (See  22,  29, 
and  p.  379  notef.) 

15.  Sensation  proper  is  the  conditio  sine  qua  non  of  a  Percep- 
tion proper  of  the  Primary  qualities.     For  we  are  only  aware  of 
the  existence  of  our  organism,  in  being  sentient  of  it,  as  thus  or 
thus  affected  ;  and  are  only  aware  of  it  being  the  subject  of  exten- 
sion, figure,  division,  motion,  <fec.,  in  being  percipient  of  its  affec- 
tions, as  like  or  as  unlike,  and  as  out  of,  or  locally  external  to, 
each  other. 

16.  Every  Perception  proper  has  a  Sensation  proper  as  its  con- 
dition ;  but  every  Sensation  has  not  a  Perception  proper  as  its 
conditionate — unless,  what  I  think  ought  to  be  done,  we  view  the 
general  consciousness  of  the  locality  of  a  sensorial  affection  as  a 
Perception  proper.     In  this  case,  the  two  apprehensions  will  be 
always  coexistent. 

17.  But  though  the  fact  of  Sensation  proper,  and  the  fact  of 
Perception  proper  imply  each  other,  this  is  all, — for  the  two  cog- 
nitions, though  coexistent,  are  not  proportionally  coexistent.     On 
the  contrary,  although  we  can  only  take  note  of,  that  is  perceive, 
the  special  relations  of  sensations,  on  the  hypothesis  that  these 
sensations  exist ;  a  sensation,  in  proportion  as  it  rises  above  a  low 
degree  of  intensity,  interferes  with  the  perception  of  its  relations, 
by  concentrating  consciousness  on  its  absolute  affection  alone.    It 
may  accordingly  be  stated  as  a  general  rule — That,  above  a  cer- 
tain point,  the  stronger  the  Sensation,  the  weaker  the  Perception  ; 


420  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

and  the  distincter  the  perception  the  less  obtrusive  the  sensation  ; 
in  other  words — Though  Perception  proper  and  Sensation  proper 
exist  only  as  they  coexist,  in  the  degree  or  intensity  of  their  exist- 
ence, they  are  always  found  in  an  inverse  ratio  to  each  other.  (See 
387  b,  sq.) 

18.  The  organism  is  the  field  of  apprehension,  both  to  Sensa- 
tion proper  and  Perception  proper ;  but  with  this  difference, — 
that  the  former  views  it  as  of  the  Ego,  the  latter,  as  of  the  Non- 
ego  ;  that  the  one  draws  it  within,  the  other  shuts  it  out  from  the 
sphere  of  self.     As  animated,  as  the  subject  of  affections  of  which 
I  am  conscious,  the  organism  belongs  to  me ;  and  of  these  affec- 
tions, which  I  recognize  as  mine,  Sensation  proper  is  the  appre- 
hension.    As  material,  as  the  subject  of  extension,  figure,  divisi- 
bility, and  so  forth,  the  organism  does  not  belong  to  me,  the  con- 
scious unit ;  and  of  these  properties,  which  I  do  not  recognize  as 
mine,  Perception  proper  is  the  apprehension.* — (See  38,  39,  and 
p.  379  a  f.) 

19.  The  affections  in  Sensation  proper  are  determined,  (a)  by 
certain  intra-organic,  or  (b)  by  certain  extra-organic  causes.    The 

*  It  may  appear,  not  a  paradox  merely,  but  a  contradiction  to  say,  that  the 
organism  is,  at  once,  within  and  without  the  mind ;  is,  at  once,  subjective 
and  objective ;  is,  at  once,  Ego  and  Non-ego.  But  so  it  is  ;  and  so  we  must 
admit  it  to  be,  unless  on  the  one  hand,  as  MateriHlists,  we  identify  mind 
with  matter,  or,  on  the  other,  as  Idealists,  we  identify  matter  with  mind. 
The  organism,  as  animated,  as  sentient,  is  necessarily  ours ;  and  its  affec- 
tions are  only  felt  as  affections  of  the  indivisible  Ego.  In  this  respect,  and 
to  this  extent,  our  organs  are  not  external  to  ourselves.  But  our  organism 
is  not  merely  a  sentient  subject,  it  is  at  the  same  time  an  extended,  figured, 
divisible,  in  a  word,  a  material,  subject ;  and  the  same  sensations  which  are 
reduced  to  unity  in  the  indivisibility  of  consciousness  are  in  the  divisible  or- 
ganism recognized  as  plural  and  reciprocally  external,  and,  therefore,  as  ex- 
tended, figured,  and  divided.  Such  is  the  fact:  but  how  the  immaterial  can 
be  united  with  matter,  how  the  unextended  can  apprehend  extension,  how 
the  indivisible  can  measure  the  divided, — this  is  the  mystery  of  mysteries  to 
man.  '  Modus  (says  the  Pseudo-Augustin) — Modus  quo  corporibus  adhse- 
rent  spiritus,  omnino  mirus  est,  nee  comprehend!  ab  hominibus  potest;  et 
hoc  ipse  homo  est.'  Thus  paraphrased  by  Pascal : — '  Man  is,  to  himself,  the 
mightiest  prodigy  of  nature.  For  he  is  unable  to  conceive  what  is  Body, 
still  less  what  is  Mind,  and,  least  of  all,  how  there  can  be  united  a  body  and 
*  mind.  This  is  the  climax  of  his  difficulties ;  yet  this  is  his  peculiar  nature.' 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  421 

latter,  as  powers  in  bodies,  beyond  the  sphere  of  perception,  and 
their  effects  in  us,  the  objects  of  Sensation,  are  both  (therefore 
ambiguously)  denominated,  either,  in  the  language  of  modern 
philosophers,  the  Secondary  Qualities  of  Matter,  or,  in  the  lan- 
guage of  Aristotle  and  his  school,  the  Proper  Sensibles.1 

20.  Sensation  proper  has  no  object  but  a  subject-object,  i.  e.  the 
organic  affection  of  which  we  are  conscious.     The  cause  of  chat 
affection,  whether  without  organism  or  within,  that  is,  whether 
or  not  a  secondary  quality  of  body,  is  immediately  or  in  its  own 
nature  unknown ;  being  known  only,  if  known  it  ever  be,  me- 
diately, by  observation,  induction,  inference,  conjecture.     Even  in 
the  perception  of  the  Secundo-primary  qualities,  where  there  is 
the  perception  proper  of  a  quasi-primary  quality,  in  some  degree 
of  resistance,  and  the  sensation  proper  of  a  secondary  quality,  in 
some  affection  of  the  sentient  organism,  its  effect ;  still  to  Sensa- 
tion proper  there  is  no  other  object  but  the  subjective  affection ; 
and  even  its  dependence,  as  an  effect,  upon  the  resistance,  as  a 
cause,  is  only  a  conclusion  founded  on  the  observed  constancy  of 
their  concomitance.     (See  36,  37,  and  p.  376  b,  sq.) 

21.  Nay,  the  Perception  proper,  accompanying  a  sensation 
proper,  is  not  an  apprehension,  far  less  a  representation,  of  the 
external  or  internal  stimulus,  or  concause,  which  determines  the 
affection  whereof  the  sensation  is  the  consciousness. — Not  the 
former ;  for  the  stimulus  or  concause  of  a  sensation  is  always,  in 
itself,  to  consciousness  unknown.     Not  the  latter ;  for  this  would 
turn  Perception  into  Imagination — reduce  it  from  an  immediate, 
and  assertory,  and  objective,  into  a  mediate,  and  problematic,  and 
subjective  cognition.     In  this  respect,  Perception  proper  is  an 
apprehension  of  the  relations  of  sensations  to  each  other,  prima- 
rily in  Space,  and  secondarily  in  Time  and  Degree.     (See  31.) 

iii. — Sensation  proper. 

22.  Sensation  proper,  viewed  on  one  side,  is  a  passive  affection 


1  See  previous  chapter. —  W. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

of  the  organism ;  but  viewed  on  the  other,  it  is  an  active  apper- 
ception, by  the  mind,  of  that  affection.  And  as  the  former  only 
exists  for  us,  inasmuch  as  it  is  perceived  by  us;  and  as  it  is 
only  perceived  by  us,  inasmuch  as  it  is  apprehended,  in  an 
active  concentration,  discrimination,  judgment,  of  the  mind ; — 
the  latter,  an  act  of  intelligence,  is  to  be  viewed,  as  the  principal 
factor  in  the  percipient  process,  even  in  its  lower  form,  that  of 
Sensation  proper.*  (See  4,  10,  11,  14,  with  notes.) 

iv. — Perception  proper. 

23.  In  Perception  proper,  the  object-object  perceived  is,  always, 
either  a  Primary  quality,  or  the  quasi-Primary  phasis  of  a 
Secundo-primary.     (See  p.  376  b,  sq.) 

24.  The  primary  qualities  are  perceived  as  in  our  organism  ; 
the  Quasi-primary  phasis  of  the  Secundo-primary  as  in  correla- 
tion to  our  organism.     (See  394  a.) 

25.  Thus  a  perception  of  the   Primary  qualities   does   not, 


*  This  is  the  true  doctrine  of  Aristotle  and  his  school,  who  are,  however, 
not  unfrequently  misrepresented  by  relation  to  the  extreme  counter-opinion 
of  the  Platonists,  as  viewing  in  the  cognitions  of  Sense  a  mere  passion — a  mis- 
representation to  which,  undoubtedly,  a  few  of  the  Latin  Schoolmen  have 
afforded  grounds.  It  is,  indeed,  this  twofold  character  of  the  Sensitive  pro- 
cess that  enables  us  to  reconcile  the  apparent  confliction  of  those  passages  of 
Aristotle,  where  (as  De  Anima,  L.  ii.  c.  4,  §  8;  c.  5,  §  2;  c.  11,  §  14;  c.  12,  § 
1 ;  De  Sensu  et  Sensili,  c.  1,  §  5;  Physica,  L.  vii.  c.  8.  §  12,  Paciari  division) 
he  calls  Sensation  a  passion  or  alteration  of  the  Sentient ;  and  those  other* 
where  (as  De  Anima,  L.  iii.  c.  8,  §  2)  he  asserts  that  in  Sensation  the  Sen- 
tient is  not  passively  affected.  In  the  former  passages  the  sentient  faculty  is 
regarded  on  its  organic  side,  in  the  latter  on  its  mental.  Compare  De  Somuo 
et  Vigilia,  c.  1,  §  6,  where  it  is  said,  that  'Sensation  is  a  process  belonging 
exclusively  neither  to  the  soul  nor  to  the  body,  but,  as  energy,  a  motion  of 
the  soul,  through  the  [medium  of  the]  body ;' — a  text  which,  however,  may 
still  be  variously  expounded. — See  Alexander,  in  note  t,  P-  415;  who,  with 
the  other  Greek  interpreters,  Ammonius,  Simplicins,  Philoponus,  solves  the 
difficulty  by  saying,  that  it  is  not  the  sentient  mind  that  suffers,  but  the  sen- 
tient organ.  To  the  same  effect  are  Galen  and  Nemesius,  as  quoted  in  note 
*,  p.  415.  Eeid  is  partly  at  one  with  the  Peripatetics  ;  with  whose  doctrine, 
indeed,  he  is  more  frequently  in  accordance  than  he  is  always  himself  aware. 
(Inq.  114  a.) 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  423 

originally  and  in  itself,  reveal  to  us  the  existence,  and  qualitative 
existence,  of  aught  beyond  the  organism,  apprehended  by  us  as 
extended,  figured,  divided,  &c. 

26.  The  primary  qualities  of  things  external  to  our  organism 
we  do  not  perceive,  i.  e.  immediately  know.     For  these  we  only 
learn  to  infer,  from  the  affections  which  we  come  to  find  that 
they  determine  in  our  organs ; — affections  which,  yielding  us  a 
perception  of  organic  extension,  we  at  length  discover,  by  obser- 
vation and  induction,  to  imply  a  corresponding  extension  in  the 
extra-organic  agents. 

27.  Further,  in  no  part  of  the  organism  have  we  any  apprehen- 
sion, any  immediate  knowledge  of  extension  in  its  true  and  abso- 
lute magnitude ;  perception  noting  only  the  fact  given  in  sensa- 
tion, and  sensation  affording  no  standard,  by  which  to  measure 
the  dimensions  given  in  one  sentient  part  with  those  given  in 
another.     For,  as  perceived,  extension  is  only  the  recognition  of 
one  organic  affection  in  its  outness  from  another ;  as  a  minimum 
of  extension  is  thus  to  perception  the  smallest  extent  of  organism 
in  which  sensations  can  be  discriminated  as  plural : — and  as  in 
one  part  of  the  organism  this  smallest  extent  is,  perhaps,  some 
million,  certainly  some  myriad  times  smaller  than  in  others ;  it 
follows  that,  to  perception,  the  same  real  extension  will  appear, 
in  this  place  of  the  body,  some  million  or  myriad  times  greater 
than  in  that.*     Nor  does  this  difference  subsist  only  as  between 
sense  and  sense ;  for  in  the  same  sense,  and  even  in  that  sense 
which  has  very  commonly  been  held  exclusively  to  afford  a 

*  This  difference  in  the  power  of  discriminating  affections,  possessed  by 
diffcrent  parts  of  the  body,  seems  to  depend  partly  on  the  minuteness  and 
isolation  of  the  ultimate  nervous  fibrils,  partly  on  the  sensation  being  less 
or  more  connected  with  pleasure  and  pain.  In  this  respect  the  eve  greatly 
transcends  all  the  other  organs.  For  we  can  discriminate  in  the  retina  sen- 
sations, as  reciprocally  external,  more  minutely  than  we  can  in  touch — as 
over  the  greater  part  of  the  body  two  million  five  hundred  thousand  fold — 
as  at  the  most  sensitive  place  of  the  hand,  a  hundred  thousand  fold — as  at 
the  tip  of  the  tongue,  where  tactile  discrimination  is  at  its  maximum,  fifty 
thousand  fold.  I  am,  however,  inclined  to  think,  for  reasons  already  given, 
that  we  must  reduce  millions  to  myriads. — (See  p.  887,  note.) 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

knowledge  of  absolute  extension,  I  mean  Touch  proper,  the  min- 
imum, at  one  part  of  the  body,  is  some  fifty  times  greater  than 
it  is  at  another.  (See  p.  389  ab,  note.) 

28.  The  existence  of  an  extra-organic  world  is  apprehended, 
not  in  a  perception  of  the  Primary  qualities,  but  in  a  perception 
of  the  quasi-primary  phasis  of  the  Secundo-primary ;  that  is,  in 
the  consciousness  that  our  locomotive  energy  is  resisted,  and  not 
resisted  by  aught  in  our  organism  itself.     For  in  the  conscious- 
ness of  being  thus  resisted  is  involved,  as  a  correlative,  the  con- 
sciousness of  a  resisting  something  external  to  our  organism. 
Both  are,  therefore,  conjunctly  apprehended.      (See  p.  394  a, 
note.)     This  experience  presupposes,  indeed,  a  possession  of  the 
notions  of  space  and  motion  in  space. 

29.  But  on  the  doctrine  that  space,  as  a  necessary  condition, 
is  a  native  element  of  thought ;  and  since  the  notion  of  any  one 
of  its  dimensions,  as  correlative  to,  must  inevitably  imply  the 
others ;  it  is  evident  that  every  perception  of  sensations  out  of 
sensations  will  afford  the  occasion,  in  apprehending  any  one,  of 
conceiving  all  the  three  extensions ;  that  is,  of  conceiving  space. 
On  the  doctrine,  and  in  the  language  of  Reid,  our  original  cogni- 
tions of  space,  motion,  <fec.,  are  instinctive ;  a  view  which  is  con- 
firmed by  the  analogy  of  those  of  the  lower  animals,  which  havr 
the  power  of  locomotion  at  birth.     It  is  truly  an  idle  problem  to 
attempt  imagining  the  steps  by  which  we  may  be  supposed  to 
have  acquired  the  notion  of  extension;  when,  in  fact,  we  are 
unable  to  imagine  to  ourselves  the  possibility  of  that  notion  not 
being  always  in  our  possession. 

30.  We  have,  therefore,  a  twofold  cognition  of  space :  a)  an  a 
priori  or  -native  imagination  of  it,  in  general,  as  a  necessary  con- 
dition of  the  possibility  of  thought ;  and  b)  under  that,  an  o 
posteriori  or  adventitious  percept  of  it,  in  particular,  as  contin- 
gently apprehended  in  this  or  that  actual  complexus  of  sensations.* 

*  This  doctrine  agrees  with  that  of  Kant  and  Reid  in  the  former ;  it  dif- 
fers certainly  from  that  of  Kant,  and  probably  from  that  of  Reid,  in  the  lat- 
ter. But  see  chapter  i. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION.  425 

B.)  Editor's  doctrine  of  Perception,  in  contrast  to  that  of  Reid, 
Stewart,  Royer-Collard,  and  other  philosophers  of  the  Scottish 
School* 

31.  Perception  (proper)  is  the  Notion  or  Conception  of  an 
object,  instinctively  suggested,  excited,  inspired,  or,  as  it  were, 
conjured  up,  on  occasion  or  at  the  sign  of  a  Sensation  (proper).f 
Reid,  Inq.  Ill  b,  121  a,  122  a,  123  b,  128  b,  note,  130  b,  159  a,  183 
a,  188  a.  I.  P.  258  ab,  259  b,  260  b,.  318  ab,  327  a;  Stewart, 
El.  vol.  i.  pp.  92,  93 ;  Royer-Collard,  in  Jouffroy's  Reid,  vol.  iii. 
pp.  402,  403. 

*  I  here  contrast  my  own  doctrine  of  perception  with  that  of  the  philosophers 
in  question,  not  because  their  views  and  mine  are  those  at  farthest  variance 
on  the  point,  but,  on  the  contrary,  precisely  because  they  thereon  approxi- 
mate the  nearest.  I  have  already  shown  that  the  doctrine  touching  Percep- 
tion held  by  Eeid  (and  in  the  present  relation  lie  and  his  two  illustrious  fol- 
lowers are  in  almost  all  respects  at  one)  is  ambiguous.  For  while  some  of 
its  statements  seem  to  harmonize  exclusively  with  the  conditions  of  natural 
presentationism,  others,  again,  appear  only  compatible  with  those  of  an  ego- 
istical representationism.  .  Maintaining,  as  I  do,  the  former  doctrine,  it  is,  of 
course,  only  the  positions  conformable  to  the  latter,  which  it  is,  at  present, 
necessary  to  adduce. 

t  This  is  not  the  doctrine,  at  least  not  the  language  of  the  doctrine  of  real 
presentationism.  It  is  the  language,  at  best,  of  an  egoistical  representa- 
tionism; and,  as  a  doctrine,  it  coincides  essentially  with  the  theory  of 
mediate  perception  held  by  the  lower  Platonists,  the  Cartesians,  and  the 
Leibnitzians — as  properly  understood.  The  Platonizing  Cudworth,  in  differ- 
ent parts  of  his  works,  gives,  in  fact,  nearly  in  the  same  terms,  the  same 
account  of  the  process  of  Sensitive  Perception.  He  signalizes,  firstly,  the  ' 
bodily  affection,  determined  by  the  impression  of  an  external  something 
[precisely  as  Ecid] ;  secondly,  the  sympathetic  recognition  thereof  by  the 
soul  [Reid's  Sensation] ;  thirdly,  to  quote  his  expressions,  '  whereby  accord- 
ing to  nature's  instinct,  it  hath  several  Seemlngs  or  Appearances  begotten  in 
it  of  those  resisting  objects,  without  it  at  a  distance,  in  respect  of  color,  mag- 
nitude, figure,  and  local  motion.' — [Reid's  Conceptions  or  Notions  of  which 
Perception  is  made  up.]  (Imm.  Mor.  B.  v.  ch.  2,  §  3.  Compare  B.  iii.  ch. 
1,  §  5.)  See  also  above,  the  Neoplatonic  doctrine  as  stated,  p.  387  b,  note; 
the  Cartesian  Sylvain  Regis,  as  quoted,  p.  275  a;  and  the  Cartesian  Andala, 
as  quoted,  p.  377  b,  note ;  and  to  these  may  be  added  the  Aristotelian 
Oompton  Carlton  (who  did  not  reject  the  doctrine  of  a  representative  percep- 
tion of  the  Common  Sensiblcs),  as  quoted,  p.  318  a.  But  that  Reid  might 
possibly  employ  the  terms  notion  and  conception  in  a  vague  and  improper 
sense,  for  cognition  in  general,  see  p.  318,  b,  4. 


426  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

On  the  contrary,  I  hold,  in  general,  that  as  Perception,  in  either 
form,  is  an  immediate  or  presentative,  not  a  mediate  or  represent- 
ative cognition,  that  a  Perception  proper  is  not,  and  ought  npt  to 
be  called  a  Notion  or  Conception.  And,  I  hold  in  particular, 
that,  on  the  one  hand,  in  the  consciousness  of  sensations,  out  of 
each  other,  contrasted,  limited,  and  variously  arranged,  we  have  a 
Perception  proper,  of  the  primary  qualities,  in  an  externality  to 
the  mind,  though  not  to  the  nervous  organism,  as  an  immediate 
cognition,  and  not  merely  as  a  notion  or  concept  of  something 
extended,  figured,  &c. ;  and  on  the  other,  as  a  correlative  contain- 
ed in  the  consciousness  of  our  voluntary  motive,  energy  resisted, 
and  not  resisted  by  aught  within  the  limits  of  mind  and  its 
subservient  organs,  we  have  a  Perception  proper  of  the  secundo- 
primary  quality  of  resistance,  in  an  extra-organic  force,  as  an  imme- 
diate cognition,  and  not  merely  as  a  notion  or  concept,  of  a  resisting 
something  external  to  our  body, — though  certainly  in  either 
case,  there  may  be,  and  probably  is,  a  concomitant  act  of  imagi- 
nation, by  which  the  whole  complex  consciousness  on  the  occasion 
is  filled  up.  (See  21.)' 

32.  On  occasion  of  the  Sensation  (proper),  along  with  the  notion 
or  conception  which  constitutes  the  Perception  (proper),  of  the  ex- 
ternal object,  there  is  blindly  created  in  us,  or  instinctively  determin- 
ed, an  invincible  belief  in  its  existence.  (Reid,  Inq.  159  a,  122  ab, 
183  a,  I.  P.  258  a,  327  a,  alibi ;  Stewart  and  Royer-Collard,  11.  cc.) 

On  the  contrary,  I  hold,  that  we  only  believe  in  the  existence 
of  what  we  perceive,  as  extended,  figured,  resisting,  <fec.,  inasmuch 
as  we  believe  that  we  are  conscious  of  these  qualities  as  existing  ; 
consequently,  that  a  belief  in  the  existence  of  an  extended  world 
external  to  the  mind,  and  even  external  to  the  organism,  is  not  a 
faith  blindly  created  or  instinctively  determined,  in  supplement  of 
a  representative  or  mediate  cognition,  but  exists  in,  as  an  integral 
constituent  of,  Perception  proper,  as  an  act  of  intuitive  or  imme 
diate  knowledge. 

1  And  chapter  ii.  §  ii.—  W. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION.  427 

33.  The  object  of  Perception  (proper)  is  a  conclusion,  or  infer- 
ence, or  result  (instinctive,  indeed,  not  ratiocinative),  from  a  Sen- 
sation proper.     (Reid,  Inq.  125  a,  186  b,  I.  P.  310  ab,  319  a ; 
— Royer-Collard,  ].  c.) 

On  the  contrary,  I  hold,  that  the  object  of  Perception  proper 
is  given  immediately  in  and  along  with  the  object  of  Sensation 
proper. 

34.  Sensation  (proper)  precedes,  Perception  (proper)  follows. 
(Reid,  Inq.   186  b,   187  b.     I.  P.  320  b ;  Stewart  and  Royer- 
Collard,  11.  cc.) 

On  the  contraiy,  I  hold,  that  though  Sensation  proper  be  the 
condition  of,  and  therefore  anterior  to,  Perception  proper  in  the 
order  of  nature,  that,  in  the  order  of  time,  both  are  necessarily  co- 
existent,— the  latter  being  only  realized  in  and  through  the  pres- 
ent existence  of  the  former.  Thus  visual  extension  cannot  be 
perceived,  or  even  imagined,  except  under  the  sensation  of  color  ; 
while  color,  again,  cannot  be  apprehended  or  imagined,  without, 
respectively,  a  concomitant  apprehension  or  phantasm  of  exten- 
sion. 

35.  Sensation  (proper)  is  not  only  an  antecedent,  but  an  arbi- 
trary antecedent,  of  Perception  (proper.)     The  former  is  only  a 
sign  on  occasion  of  which  the  latter  follows  ;  they  have  no  neces- 
sary or  even  natural  connection  ;  and  it  is  only  by  the  will  of  God 
that  we  do  not  perceive  the  qualities  of  external  objects  indepen- 
dently of  any  sensitive  affection.     This  last,  indeed,  seems  to  be 
actually  the  case  in  the  perception  of  visible  extension  and  figure. 
(Reid,  Inq.  Ill  b,  121  a,  143  b,  122  a,  123  b,  187  b,  188  a.    I. 
P.  257  b,  260  b,  alibi;  Stewart  and  Royer-Collard,  11.  cc.) 

On  the  contrary,  I  hold  that  Sensation  proper  is  the  universal 
condition  of  Perception  proper.  We  are  never  aware  even  of  the 
existence  of  our  organism  except  as  it  is  somehow  affected ;  and 
are  only  conscious  of  extension,  figure,  and  the  other  objects  of 
Perception  proper,  as  realized  in  the  relations  of  the  affections  of 
our  sentient  organism,  as  a  body  extended,  figured,  &c.  As  to 
color  and  visible  extension,  neither  can  be  apprehended,  neither 


428  PHILOSOPHY   OF    PERCEPTION. 

can  be  even  imagined  apart  from  the  other.     (V.  320  a,  foot- 
note, et  alibi.) 

36.  In  a  Sensation  (proper)  of  the  secondary  qualities,  as  affec- 
tions in  us,  we  have  a  Perception  (proper)  of  them  as  properties 
in  objects  and  causes  of  the  affections  in  us.     (Reid,  I.  P.  310  ab, 
;md  Inq.  passim  ;  Royer-Collard,  1.  c.) 

On  the  contrary,  I  hold,  that  as  Perception  proper  is  an  imme- 
diate cognition  ;  and  as  the  secondary  qualities,  in  bodies,  are 
only  inferred,  and  therefore  only  mediately  known  to  exist  as  oc- 
cult causes  of  manifest  effects ;  that  these,  at  best  only  objects  of 
a  mediate  knowledge,  are  not  objects  of  Perception.  (See  20,  21, 
and  p.  378.) 

37.  In  like  manner,  in  the  case  of  various  other  bodily  affec- 
tions, as  the  toothache,  gout,  <fec.,  we  have  not  only  a  Sensation 
proper  of  the  painful   feeling,  but  a  conception  and  belief,  i.  e.  a 
Perception  (proper]  of  its  cause.     (Reid,  I.  P.  319  a,  alibi.) 

On  the  contrary,  and  for  the  same  reason,  I  hold,  that  there  is 
in  this  case  no  such  Perception. 

38.  Sensation  (proper)  is  an  affection  purely  of  the  mind,  and 
not  in  any  way  an  affection  of  the  body.    (Reid,  Inq.  105  a,  159 
ab,  187  a,  I.  P.  229  ab,  310.) 

On  the  contrary,  I  hold  with  Aristotle  (De  An.  i.  5,  De  Som. 
c.  1,  §  6),  indeed,  with  philosophers  in  general,  that  Sensation  is 
an  affection  neither  of  the  body  alone  nor  of  the  mind  alone,  but 
of  the  composite  of  which  each  is  a  constituent ;  and  that  the 
subject  of  Sensation  may  be  indifferently  said  to  be  our  organism 
(as  animated)  or  our  soul  (as  united  with  an  organism).  For  in- 
stance, hunger  or  color,  are,  as  apprehended,  neither  modes  of  mind 
apart  from  body,  nor  modes  of  body  apart  from  mind.  (See  1 8.) 

39.  Sensations  (proper)  as  merely  affections  of  the  rnind,  have 
wo  locality  in  the  body,  no  locality  at  all.     (Reid,  I.  P.  319  ab, 
320  ab.)     From  this  the  inference  is  necessary,  that,  though  con- 
scious of  the  relative  place  and  reciprocal  outness  of  sensations,  we 
do  not  in  this  consciousness  apprehend  any  real  externality  and 
extension. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF   PERCEPTION.  42-9 

On  the  contrary,  I  hold,  that  Sensation  proper,  being  the  con- 
sciousness of  an  affection,  not  of  the  mind  alone,  but  of  the  mind 
as  it  is  united  with  the  body,  that  in  the  consciousness  of  sensa- 
tions, relatively  localized  and  reciprocally  external,  we  have  a  veri- 
table apprehension,  and  consequently,  an  immediate  perception  of 
the  affected  organism,  as  extended,  divided,  figured,  &c.  This 
alone  is  the  doctrine  of  Natural  Realism,  of  Common  Sense. 
(See  18.) 

40.  In  the  case  of  Sensation  (proper)  and  the  Secondary  qual- 
ities, there  is  a  determinate  quality  in  certain  bodies,  exclusively 
competent  to  cause  a  determinate  sensation  in  us,  as  color,  odor, 
savor,  &c. ;  consequently,  that  from  the  fact  of  a  similar  internal 
effect,  we  are  warranted  to  infer  the  existence  of  a  similar  external 
concause.     (Reid,  Inq.  137-142.     I.  P.  315,  316,  alibi.) 

On  the  contrary,  I  hold,  that  a  similar  sensation  only  implies 
a  similar  idiopathic  affection  of  the  nervous  organism  ;  but  such 
affection  requires  only  the  excitation  of  an  appropriate  stimulus ; 
while  such  stimulus  may  be  supplied  by  manifold  agents  of  the 
most  opposite  nature,  both  from  within  the  body  and  from  with- 
out. 

41.  Perception  excludes  memory ;  Perception  (proper)  cannot 
therefore   be   apprehensive   of  motion.      (Royer-Collard,  supra 
352  ab.) 

On  the  contrary,  I  hold,  that  as  memory,  or  a  certain  contin- 
uous representation,  is  a  condition  of  consciousness,  it  is  a  condi- 
tion of  Perception  ;  and  that  motion,  therefore,  cannot,  on  this 
ground,  be  denied  as  an  object  apprehended  through  sense. 
(See  6.) 

42.  An  apprehension  of  relations  is  not  an  act  of  Perception 
(proper).     (Royer-Collard  [apparently],  ibid.) 

On  the  contrary,  I  hold,  in  general,  that  as  all  consciousness  is 
realized  only  in  the  apprehension  of  the  relations  of  plurality  and 
contrast ;  and  as  perception  is  a  consciousness ;  that  the  appre- 
hension of  relation  cannot,  simpliciter,  be  denied  to  perception  : 
and,  in  particular,  that  unless  we  annihilate  Perception  proper,  by 


430  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

denying  to  it  the  recognition  of  its  peculiar  objects,  Extension, 
Figure,  and  the  other  primary  qualities,  we  cannot  deny  to  it  the 
recognition  of  relations  ;  for,  to  say  nothing  of  the  others,  Exten- 
sion is  perceived  only  in  apprehending  sensations  out  of  sensa- 
tions— a  relation ;  and  Figure  is  only  perceived  in  apprehending 
one  perceived  extension  as  limited,  and  limited  in  a  certain  man- 
ner by  another — a  complexus  of  relations.  (See  9,  pp.  352  a, 
380  a.) 

43.  Distant  realities  are  objects  of  Perception  (proper).    Reid, 
Inq.  104  b,  145  a,  158  b,  159  ab,  160  a,   186  b;  I.  P.  299  a, 
302  a,  303  a,  304  a,  305  b;  Stewart,  El.  i.  79  sq.) 

On  the  contrary,  I  hold,  that  the  mind  perceives  nothing  exter- 
nal to  itself,  except  the  affections  of  the  organism  as  animated, 
the  reciprocal  relations  of  these  affections,  and  the  correlative  in- 
volved in  the  consciousness  of  its  locomotive  energy  being  resisted. 
(See  pp.  260,  270.) 

44.  Objects  not  in  contact  with  the  organs  of  sense  are  per- 
ceived by  a  medium.     (Reid,  Inq.  104  b,  186  ab,  187  b;  I.  P. 
247  ab.) 

On  the  contrary,  I  hold,  that  the  only  object  perceived  is  the 
organ  itself,  as  modified,  or  what  is  in  contact  with  the  organ,  as 
resisting.  The  doctrine  of  a  medium  is  an  error,  or  rather  a  con- 
fusion, inherited  from  Aristotle,  who  perverted,  in  this  respect, 
the  simpler  and  more  accurate  doctrine  of  Democritus. 

45.  Extension  and  Figure  are  first  perceived  through  the  sen- 
sations of    Touch.     (Reid,  Inq.   123-125,   188  a;    I.  P.  331; 
Stewart,  El.  i.  349,  357  ;  Ess.  564.) 

On  the  contrary,  I  hold,  that  (unless  by  Extension  be  under- 
stood only  extension  in  the  three  dimensions,  as  Reid  in  fact  seems 
to  do,  but  not  Stewart)  this  is  erroneous,  for  an  extension  is  ap- 
prehended in  the  apprehension  of  the  reciprocal  externality  of  all 
sensations.  Moreover,  to  allow  even  the  statement  as  thus  re- 
stricted to  pass,  it  would  be  necessary  to  suppose,  that  under  Touch 
it  is  meant  to  comprehend  the  consciousness  of  the  Locomotive 
energy  and  of  the  Muscular  feelings.  (See  390  b,  sq.) 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  431 

46.  Externality  is  exclusively  perceived  on  occasion  of  the  sen- 
sations of  Touch.    (Reid,  Inq.  123,  124,  188,  a  ;  I.  P.  332  and 
alibi ;  Roy er- Collar d,  Jouffroy's  Reid,  iii.  412.) 

On  the  contrary,  I  hold,  that  it  is,  primarily,  in  the  conscious- 
ness of  our  locomotive  energy  being  resisted,  and,  secondarily, 
through  the  sensations  of  muscular  feeling,  that  the  perception  of 
Externality  is  realized.  All  this,  however,  might  be  confusedly 
involved  in  the  Touch  of  the  philosophers  in  question.  (See  28.) 

47.  Real  (or  absolute)  magnitude  is  an  object  of  perception 
(proper)  through  Touch,  but  through  touch  only.     (Reid,  I.  P. 
303.) 

On  the  contrary,  I  hold,  that  the  magnitude  perceived  through 
touch  is  as  purely  relative  as  that  perceived  through  vision  or 
any  other  sense ;  for  the  same  magnitude  does  not  appear  the 
same  to  touch  at  one  part  of  the  body  and  to  touch  at  another. 
(303  b,  note  ;  863  ab,  note ;  and  n.  27.) 

48.  Color,  though  a  secondary  quality,  is  an  object  not  of  Sen- 
sation (proper)  but  of  Perception  (proper) ;  in  other  words,  we 
perceive  Color,  not   as   an   affection  of  our  own  minds,  but  as  a 
quality  of  external  things.     (Reid,  Inq.  137   ab,   138  a;  I.  P. 
319  b.) 

On  the  contrary,  I  hold,  that  color,  in  itself,  as  apprehended  or 
immediately  known  by  us,  is  a  mere  affection  of  the  sentient 
organism  ;  and  therefore  like  the  other  secondary  qualities,  an 
object  not  of  Perception,  but  of  Sensation,  proper.  The  only  dis- 
tinguishing peculiarity  in  this  case,  lies  in  the  three  following 
circumstances  : — a)  That  the  organic  affection  of  color,  though 
not  altogether  indifferent,  still,  being  accompanied  by  compara- 
tively little  pleasure,  comparatively  little  pain,  the  apprehension 
of  this  affection,  qua  affection,  i.  e.  its  Sensation  proper,  is,  con- 
sequently, always  at  a  minimum. — b)  That  the  passion  of  color 
first  rising  into -consciousness,  not  from  the  amount  of  the  intensive 
quantity  of  the  affection,  but  from  the  amount  of  the  extensive 
quantity  of  the  organism  affected,  is  necessarily  apprehended  un- 
der the  condition  of  extension. — c)  That  the  isolation,  tenuity, 


432  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PKRCKPTION. 

and  delicacy,  of  the  ultimate  filaments  of  the  optic  nerve,  afford 
us  sensations  minutely  and  precisely  distinguished,  sensations  real- 
ized in  consciousness  only  as  we  are  conscious  of  them  as  out  of 
each  other  in  space. — These  circumstances  show,  that  while  in 
vision  Perception  proper  is  at  its  maximum,  and  Sensation  pro- 
per at  its  minimum  (17),  the  sensation  of  color  cannot  be  real- 
ized apart  from  the  perception  of  extension  :  but  they  do  not 
warrant  the  assertions,  that  color  is  not,  like  the  other  secondary 
qualities,  apprehended  by  us  as  a  mere  sensorial  affection,  and, 
therefore,  an  object  not  of  Sensation  proper  but  of  Perception 
proper. 

§  II. — HISTORICAL  NOTICES  IN  REGARD  TO  THE  DISTINCTION  OF 
PERCEPTION  PROPER  AND  SENSATION  PROPER. 

This  distinction  is  universally  supposed  to  be  of  a  modern  date ; 
no  one  has  endeavored  to  carry  it  higher  than  Malebranche  ;  and, 
in  general,  the  few  indications  of  it  noticed  previous  to  Reid,  have 
been  commemorated  as  only  accidental  or  singular  anticipations.* 
This  is  altogether  erroneous ;  the  distinction  is  ancient ;  and 

*  The  only  attempt  of  which  I  am  aware,  at  any  historical  account  of  the 
distinction  in  hand,  is  by  Mr.  Stewart,  in  Note  F  of  his  Essays.  It  contains, 
however,  notices,  and  these  not  all  pertinent,  only  of  Hutchcson,  Crousaz, 
Baxter,  and  D'Alembert,  and  none  of  these  have  any  title  to  an  historical 
commemoration  on  the  occasion.  For  Hutchcson  (as  already  once  and  again 
mentioned)  only  repeats,  indeed,  only  thought  of  repeating,  Aristotle ;  while 
the  others,  at  best,  merely  re-echo  Malebranche  and  the  Cartesians. 

I  may  here  observe,  that  in  that  Note,  as  also  repeatedly  in  the  Disserta- 
tion, Mr.  Stewart  (who  has  been  frequently  followed)  is  wrong  in  stating,  uri- 
exclusively,  that  Keid's  writings  were  anterior  to  Kant's ;  founding  thereon 
a  presumption  against  the  originality  of  the  latter.  The  priority  of  Reid  is 
only  true  as  limited  to  the  '  Inquiry  ;'  but,  on  the  ground  of  this  alone  there 
could  be  proved,  between  the  philosophers,  but  little  community  of  thought, 
on  points  where  either  could  possibly  claim  any  right  of  property.  But 
though  Kant's  first  '  Critik'  and  '  Prolegomena'  preceded  Keid's  '  Kssays' 
by  several  years,  no  one  will  assuredly  suspect  any  connection  whatever  be- 
tween these  several  works.  In  general,  1  must  bo  allowed  to  say,  that  the 
tone  and  tenor  of  Mr.  Stewart's  remarks  on  the  philosopher  of  Koenigsberg 
are  remarkable  exceptions  to  the  usual  cautious,  candid,  and  dignified  charac- 
ter of  his  criticism. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  433 

adopting,  for  the  standard,  my  own  opinion  of  what  the  distinc- 
tion ought  to  be,  I  find  it  taken  more  simply  and  less  incorrectly 
by  Aristotle  than  by  any  modern  philosopher  whatever. 

Aristotle's  discrimination  of  the  Common  and  Proper  Sensibles 
or  Percepts  (which, has  been  already  explained,  312  b,  sq.)  embod- 
ies not  only  the  modern  distinction  of  the  Primary  and  Secondary 
Qualities  of  matter,  but  also  the  modern  distinction  of  the  two  Per- 
ceptions, Perception  proper  and  Sensation  proper.  The  generaliza- 
tion of  these  two  correlative  distinctions  into  one,  constitutes  indeed 
the  first  peculiar  merit  of  Aristotle's  analysis  and  nomenclature. 
But  a  second  is,  that  in  his  hands  at  least,  the  Common  Sensibles, 
the  immediate  objects  of  Perception  proper,  are  viewed  as  the  object- 
objects  of  an  intuitive,  and  not  perverted  into  the  subject-objects 
of  a  representative  cognition.  For  in  the  writings  of  Aristotle 
himself  I  can  find  no  ground  for  regarding  him  as  other  than  a 
presentationist  or  natural  realist.  In  this  respect  his  doctrine 
stands  distinguished  from  all  the  others  in  which  the  distinction 
in  question  has  been  recognized ;  for  the  Neo-Platonic,  the  Neo- 
Aristotelic,  the  Scholastic  (with  certain  exceptions),  and  the  Car- 
tesian, all  proceed  on  the  ideality  or  representative  character  of  the 
objects  of  which  we  are  conscious  in  Perception  proper.  Even 
Reid  himself,  as  we  have  seen,  and  the  Scottish  School  in  general, 
can  only  with  doubt  and  difficulty  be  held  as  qualified  excep- 
tions.1 

Nay,  the  canon  I  have  endeavored  to  establish  of  the  univer- 
sal coexistence  in  an  inverse  ratio  of  Perception  proper  and  Sen- 
sation proper  (and  in  general  of  Feeling  and  Cognition),  though 
not  enounced  in  its  abstract  universality  by  Aristotle,  may  still  be 
detected  as  supposed  and  specially  applied  by  him.  In  his  trea- 
tise On  the  Soul  (ii.  9,  1),  speaking  of  the  sense  of  Smell,  and  of 
the  difficulty  of  determining  the  nature  and  quality  of  its  objects 
— odors,  he  says :  '  The  cause  is,  that  we  do  not  possess  this  sense 
in  any  high  degree  of  accuracy,  but  are,  in  this  respect,  inferior 

1  See  §  I.  B  of  this  chapter,  and  §  II.  of  chapter  iii.—  W. 
19 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  PERCEPTION. 

to  many  of  the  brutes ;  for  man  smells  imperfectly,  and  has  no 
perception  of  things  odorous,  unaccompanied  by  either  pain  or 
pleasure ;  the  organ  of  this  sense  not  being  nicely  discriminative.' 
And  the  same  is  implied,  in  what  he  adds  touching  the  vision  of 
the  sclerophthalma.  Does  not  this  manifestly  suppose  the  prin- 
ciple— that  in  proportion  as  a  sense  rises  as  a  mean  of  informa- 
tion, it  sinks  as  a  vehicle  of  pleasure  and  pain  ? — Galen,  I  may 
notice,  has  some  remarkable  observations  to  the  same  effect.  In 
considering  '  the  causes  of  pleasure  and  pain  in  the  several  senses ;' 
and  after  stating,  in  general,  the  order  of  intensity  in  which  these 
are  susceptible  of  such  affections,  to  wit,  Touch  or  Feeling — Taste 
— Smell — Hearing — Vision  ;  he  goes  on  to  treat  of  them  in  de- 
tail. And  here  it  is  evident,  that  he  also  deems  the  capacity  of 
pain  and  pleasure  in  a  sense  to  be  inversely  as  its  power  of  cog- 
nitive discrimination.  For,  inter  alia,  he  says  of  Hearing  :  '  The 
pleasurable  is  more  conspicuous  in  this  sense  [than  in  that  of 
Vision],  because  it  is  of  a  coarser  nature  and  constitution  ;  but 
the  pleasurable  becomes  even  more  manifest  in  the  sensations  of 
Smell,  because  the  nature  and  constitution  of  this  sense  is  coarser 
still.'  (De  Symt.  causis  L.  i.  c.  6.) 

The  distinction  of  the  Common  and  Proper  Sensibles,  and  vir- 
tually, therefore,  the  distinction  in  question,  was  continued,  with 
some  minor  developments,  by  the  Greek  and  Latin  Aristotelians. 
(See  318  a,  385  ab.)  As  to  the  interesting  doctrine,  on  this 
point,  of  those  Schoolmen  who  rejected  intentional  species  in 
Perception,  I  may  refer,  instar  omnium,  to  Biel.  (Collect.  L.  ii. 
dist.  3.  qu.  2.) 

Sensation  proper  and  Perception  proper  were,  however,  even 
more  strongly  contradistinguished  in  the  system  of  the  lower 
Platonists.  They  discriminated,  on  the  one  hand,  in  the  body, 
the  organic  passion  and  its  recognition — that  is,  Sensation  proper ; 
and  on  the  other  in  the  impassive  soul,  the  elicitation  into  conscious- 
ness (through  some  inscrutable  instinct  or  inspiration)  of  a  gnos- 
tic reason,  or  subjective  form,  representative  of  the  external  object 
affecting  the  sense — that  is,  Perception  proper.  There  might  also 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  435 

be  shown,  in  like  manner,  an  analogy  between  the  distinction  in 
question,  and  that  by  the  Schoolmen  of  the  species  impressa  et 
expressa ;  but  on  this  I  shall  not  insist.  Nor  on  the  Neo-Pla- 
tonic  theory  of  Perception  which  has  rarely  been  touched  upon> 
and  when  touched  on  almost  always  misrepresented  (even  Mr. 
Harris,  for  instance,  has  wholly  misconceived  the  nature  of 
the  gnostic  reasons) ; — nor  on  this  can  I  now  enter,  though,  as 
recently  noticed,  it  bears  a  striking  analogy  to  one  phasis  of  the 
doctrine  of  Reid.  In  special  reference  to  the  present  distinction 
I  may,  however,  refer  the  reader  to  a  passage  of  Plotinus.  (Enn. 

in.  vi.  2.) 

In  the  Cartesian  philosophy,  the  distinction  was  virtually  taken 
by  Descartes,  but  first  discriminated  in  terms  by  his  followers. 
In  general,  Perception  proper,  and  the  Primary  qualities  as  per- 
ceived, they  denoted  by  Idea  ;  Sensation  proper,  and  the  Second- 
ary qualities  as  felt  by  Sensation  (sensatio,  sentiment).  See  De 
Raei  (Clavis,  &c.,  p.  299,  alibi,  ed.  1677) ;  De  la  Forge  (De 
1'Esprit,  ch.  10,  p.  109  sq.,  ch.  17,  p.  276,  ed.  Amst.  et  supra 
328  a)  ;  Geulinx  (Dicfe~~  Principia,  pp.  45,  48,  alibi,  et  supra 
,328  a) ;  Rohault  (Physique,  passim) ;  Malebranche  (Recherche, 
L.  iii.  P.  ii.  ch.  6  and  7,  with  Ecclairc.  on  last,  et  supra  330  b) ; 
Silvain  Regis  (Cours,  t.  i.  pp.  60,  61,  72,  145);  Bossuet  (Con- 
naisance  de  Dieu,  ch.  iii.  art.  8);  while  Huffier,  S"1 Gravesande, 
Crousaz,  Sinsert,  Keranflech,  Genovesi,  with  a  hundred  others, 
might  be  adduced  as  showing  that  the  same  distinction  had  been 
very  generally  recognized  before  Reid ;  who,  far  from  arrogating 
to  himself  the  credit  of  its  introduction,  remarks  that  it  had  been 
first  accurately  established  by  Malebranche. 

As  already  noticed  (330  b),  it  is  passing  strange  that  Locke, 
but  truly  marvellous  that  Leibnitz,  should  have  been  ignorant  of 
the  Cartesian  distinction  of  Sensation  and  Idea  (Sentiment,  Idee). 
Locke's  unacquaintance  is  shown  in  his  '  Essay,'  besides  other 
places,  in  B.  ii.  ch.  13,  §  25,  but,  above  all,  in  his  'Examination 
of  P.  Malebranche's  Opinion ;'  and  that  of  Leibnitz,  elsewhere, 
and  in  L.  ii.  ch.  8  of  his  '  Nouveaux  Essais,'  but  more  particularly 


436  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 

in  the  '  Examen  du  Sentiment  clu  P.  Malebranche,'  both  of  which 
works  he  wrote  in  opposition  to  the  relative  treatises  of  Locke. 
As  for  Locke,  he  seems  wholly  unaware  that  any  difference  sub- 
sisted in  the  Cartesian  school,  between  Idea  and  Sensation ; 
while  Leibnitz  actually  thinks  that  Malebranche  '  entend  par  sen- 
timent une  perception  d'imagination !'  In  his  own  philosophy, 
Leibnitz  virtually  supersedes  the  discrimination.  I  am,  therefore, 
doubly  surprised  at  the  observation  of  M.  Royer-Collard,  that 
'  Malebranche  is  the  first  among  modem  philosophers,  and,  with 
Leibnitz,  perhaps  the  only  one  before  Reid,  who  accurately  dis- 
tinguished perception  from  the  sensation  which  is  its  forerunner 
and  sign.'  (Jouffroy's  Reid,  iii.  329.) 

In  the  Kantian  school,  and  generally  in  the  recent  philosophy 
of  Germany,  the  distinction  is  adopted,  and  marked  out  by  the 
terms  Anschauung  or  Intuitio  for  the  one  apprehension,  and 
Empfindung  or  Sensatio  for  the  other.  In  France  and  Italy,  on 
the  other  hand,  where  the  distinction  has  been  no  less  universally 
recognized,  Reid's  expressions,  Perception  and  Sensation,  have 
become  the  prevalent;  but  their  ambiguity,  I  think,  ought  to 
have  been  avoided,  by  the  addition  of  some  such  epithet  as — 
proper. 

Since  generalizing  the  Law  of  the  coexistence,  but  the  coexist- 
ence in  an  inverse  ratio,  of  Sensation  and  Perception,  of  the  sub- 
jective and  objective,  and,  in  general,  of  feeling  and  cognition  ;  I 
have  noticed,  besides  those  adduced  above  from  Aristotle  and 
Galen,  other  partial  observations  tending  to  the  same  result,  by 
sundry  modern  philosophers.  Sulzer,  in  a  paper  published  in 
1759  (Vermischte  Schriften,  vol.  i.  p.  113),  makes  the  remark, 
that '  a  representation  manifests  itself  more  clearly  in  proportion 
as  it  has  less  the  power  of  exciting  in  us  emotion  ;'  and  confirms 
it  by  the  analogy  observed  in  the  gradation  of  the  agreeable  and 
disagreeable  sensations.  Kant  in  his  Anthropologie  (1798,  §  14), 
in  treating  of  the  determinate  or  organic  senses  (Seusus  fixi), 
says : — '  Three  of  these  are  rather  objective  than  subjective — i.  e. 
as  empirical  intuitions,  they  conduce  more  to  the  cognition  of  the 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION.  437 

external  object,  than  they  excite  the  consciousness  of  the  affected 
organ ;  but  two  are  rather  subjective  than  objective — i.  e.  the 
representation  they  mediate  is  more  that  of  enjoyment  [or  suffer- 
ing] than  of  the  cognition  of  the  external  object.  .  .  .  The 
senses  of  the  former  class  are  those — 1)  of  Touch  (tactus),  2)  of 
Sight  (visus),  3)  of  Hearing  (auditus) ;  of  the  latter,  those — a) 
of  Taste  (gustus),  b)  of  Smell  (olfactus).'  This  and  the  Galenic 
arrangement  will  appear  less  connective,  if  we  recollect,  that 
under  Touch  Galen  comprehends  Feeling  proper,  whereas  Feeling 
proper  is  by  Kant  relegated  to  his  vital  sense  or  sensus  vagus, 
the  coenaesthesis  or  common  sense  of  others.  See  also  Meiners, 
Untersuchungen,  i.  p.  64 ;  Wetzel,  Psychologic,  i.  §  225  ;  Fries, 
N.  Kritik,  i.  §  14-19 ;  Anthropologie,  i.  §§  27,  28,  &c.,  &c. 

M.  Ravaisson,  in  an  article  of  great  ability  and  learning  on  the 
4  Fragments  de  Philosophic'  which  M.  Peisse  did  me  the  honor 
to  translate,  when  speaking  of  the  reform  of  philosophy  in  France, 
originating  in  Maine  de  Hira^s  recoil  against  the  Sensualistic 
doctrine,  has  the  following  passage : — '  Maine  de  Biran  commence 
par  separer  profondement  de  la  passion  I'activite,  que  Condillac 
avait  confondue  avec  elle  sous  le  titre  commun  de  Sensation. 
La  sensation  proprement  dite  est  une  affection  tout  passive; 
1'etre  qui  y  serait  reduit  irait  se  perdre,  s' absorber  dans  toutes 
ses  modifications ;  il  deviendrait  successivement  chacune  d'elles, 
il  ne  se  trouverait  pas,  il  ne  se  distinguerait  pas,  et  jamais  ne  se 
connaitrait  lui-mfime.  Bien  loin  que  la  connaissance  soit  la  sen- 
sation seule,  la  sensation,  en  se  melant  a  elle,  la  trouble  et  1'ob- 
scurcit,  et  elle  eclipse  a  son  tour  la  sensation.  De  la,  la  loi  que 
M.  Hamilton  a  signalee  dans  son  remarquable  article  sur  la  theo- 
rie  de  la  perception  :  la  sensation  et  la  perception,  quoique  instpa- 
rables,  sont  en  raison  inverse  Vune  de  Tautre.  Cette  loi  fonda- 
mentale,  Maine  de  Biran  1'avait  decouverte  pres  de  trente  ans 
auparavant,  et  en  avait  suivi  toutes  les  applications  ;  il  en  avait 
surtout  approfondi  le  principe,  savoir,  que  la  sensation  resulte  de 
la  passion,  et  que  la  perception  resulte  de  1'action.'  (Revue  des 
Deux  Mondes,  Nov.  1840.)  It  is  perhaps  needless  for  me  to  say, 


438  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PERCEPTION. 

that  when  I  enounced  the  law  in  question  (in  1830),  I  had  never 
seen  the  printed  memoir  by  De  Biran,  which,  indeed,  from  the 
circumstances  of  its  publication,  was,  I  believe,  inaccessible 
through  the  ordinary  channels  of  the  trade,  and  to  be  found  in 
no  library  in  this  country ;  and  now  I  regret  to  find  that,  through 
procrastination,  I  must  send  this  chapter  to  press  before  having 
obtained  the  collective  edition  of  his  earlier  works,  which  has 
recently  appeared  in  Paris.  All  that  I  know  of  De  Biran  is 
comprised  in  the  volume  edited  in  1834  by  M.  Cousin,  from 
whose  kindness  I  received  it.  In  this,  the  '  Nouvelles  Conside- 
rations sur  les  Rapports  du  Physique  et  du  Moral  de  1'Homme,' 
the  treatise  in  which,  as  his  editor  informs  us,  the  full  and  final 
development  of  his  doctrine  is  contained,  was  for  the  first  time 
published.  But  neither  in  that,  nor  in  any  other  of  the  accom- 
panying pieces,  can  I  discover  any  passage  besides  the  following, 
that  may  be  viewed  as  anticipating  the  law  of  coexistence  and 
inversion  : — '  Souvent  une  impression  perdue  a  tel  degre  cesse  de 
l'6tre  a  un  degr6  plus  eleve  ou  lorsqu'elle  s'avive  au  point  d'ab- 
sorber  la  conscience  ou  le  moi  lui-meme  qui  la  devient.  Ainsi 
plus  la  sensation  serait  6minemment  animale,  moins  elle  aurait 
le  caractere  vrai  d'une  perception  humaine.' 


PART   THIRD. 


PHILOSOPHY 


OF  THE 


CONDITIONED, 


"Laudabilior  est  animus,  cui  nota  est  infirmitas  propria,  quam  qui,  eu 
non  respecta,  racenia  mundi,  vias  siderum,  fundamenta  terrarum  et  fastigia 
coelorum,  etiam  cogniturns,  scrutatur." — ST.  AUGUSTINE,  (De  Uhitate,  proem 
to  the  fourth  book.) 


CHAPTER  I.1 

EEFUTATION  OF  THE  VAEIOUS  DOCTRINES  OF  THE  UNCONDI- 
TIONED, ESPECIALLY  OF  COUSIN'S  DOCTEINE  OF  THE  INFI- 
NITO-ABSOLUTE.* 

THE  delivery  of  these  Lectures2  excited  an  unparalleled  sensa- 
tion in  Paris.  Condemned  to  silence  during  the  reign  of  Jesuit 
ascendency,  M.  Cousin,  after  eight  years  of  honorable  retirement, 


1  This  was  originally  published  in  the  Edinburgh  Review,  for  October, 
1829.  It  has  since  been  republished  in  the  Discussions,  pp.  1-37. —  W. 

s  Hamilton  is  reviewing  a  work  entitled,  '  Cours  de  Philosophic,  par  M. 
Victor  Cousin,  Professeur  de  Philosophie  a  la  Faculte"  des  Lettres  de  Paris. 
Introduction  d.  VHistoire  de  la  Philosophie,  8vo.  Paris,  1823.'  See  our  trans- 
lation of  '  Cousin's  History  of  Philosophy,'  vol.  i. —  W. 

*  [Translated  into  French,  by  M.  Peisse  ;  into  Italian,  by  S.  Lo  Gatto  : 
also  in  Cross's  Selections  from  the  Edinburgh  Review. 

This  article  did  not  originate  with  myself.  I  was  requested  to  write  it  by 
my  friend,  the  late  accomplished  Editor  of  the  Review,  Professor  Napier. 
Personally  I  felt  averse  from  the  task.  I  was  not  unaware,  that  a  discussion 
of  the  leading  doctrine  of  the  book  would  prove  unintelligible,  not  only 
to  '  the  general  reader,'  but,  with  few  exceptions,  to  our  British  metaphysi- 
cians at  large.  But,  moreover,  I  was  still  farther  disinclined  to  the  undertak- 
ing, because  it  would  behoove  me  to  come  forward  in  overt  opposition  to  a 
certain  theory,  which,  however  powerfully  advocated,  I  felt  altogether  una- 
ble to  admit ;  whilst  its  author,  M.  Cousin,  was  a  philosopher  for  whose 
genius  and  character  I  already  had  the  wannest  admiration, — an  admiration 
which  every  succeeding  year  has  only  augmented,  justified,  and  confirmed. 
Nor,  in  saying  this,  need  I  make  any  reservation.  For  I  admire,  even  where 
I  dissent ;  and  were  M.  Cousin's  speculations  on  the  Absolute  utterly  abol- 
ished, to  him  would  still  remain  the  honor,  of  doing  more  himself,  and  of 
contributing  more  to  what  has  been  done  by  others,  in  the  furtherance  of  an 
enlightened  philosophy,  than  any  other  living  individual  in  France — I  might 
say  in  Europe.  Mr.  Napier,  however,  was  resolute ;  it  was  the  first  number 
of  the  Review  under  his  direction ;  and  the  criticism  was  hastily  written. 
In  this  country  the  reasonings  were  of  course  not  understood,  and  naturally, 
for  a  season,  declared  incomprehensible.  Abroad,  in  France,  Germany, 
Italy,  and  latterly  in  America,  the  article  has  been  rated  higher  than  it  de- 
serves. The  illustrious  thinker,  against  one  of  whose  doctrines  its  argument 

19* 


442  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED. 

not  exempt  from  persecution,  had  again  ascended  the  chair  of 
Philosophy ;  and  the  splendor  with  which  he  recommenced  his 
academical  career,  more  than  justified  the  expectation  which  his 
recent  celebrity  as  a  writer,  and  the  memory  of  his  earlier  prelec- 
tions, had  inspired.  Two  thousand  auditors  listened,  all  with  ad- 
miration, many  with  enthusiasm,  to  the  eloquent  exposition  of 
doctrines  intelligible  only  to  the  few  ;  and  the  oral  discussion  of 
philosophy  awakened  in  Paris,  and  in  France,  an  interest  unex- 
ampled since  the  days  of  Abelard.  The  daily  journals  found  it 
necessary  to  gratify,  by  their  earlier  summaries,  the  impatient  cu- 
riosity of  the  public ;  and  the  lectures  themselves,  taken  in  short- 
hand, and  corrected  by  the  Professor,  propagated  weekly  the 
influence  of  his  instruction  to  the  remotest  provinces  of  the  king- 
dom. 

Nor  are  the  pretensions  of  this  doctrine  disproportioned  to  the 
attention  which  it  has  engaged.  It  professes  nothing  less  than  to 
be  the  complement  and  conciliation  of  all  philosophical  opinion  ; 
and  its  author  claims  the  glory  of  placing  the  key-stone  in  the 
arch  of  science,  by  the  discovery  of  elements  hitherto  unobserved 
among  the  facts  of  consciousness. 

Before  proceeding  to  consider  the  claims  of  M.  Cousin  to  ori- 
ginality, and  of  his  doctrine  to  truth,  it  is  necessary  to  say  a  few 
words  touching  the  state  and  relations  of  philosophy  in  France. 

After  the  philosophy  of  Descartes  and  Malebranche  had  sunk 


is  directed,  was  the  first  to  speak  of  it  in  terms  which,  though  I  feel  their 
generosity,  I  am  ashamed  to  quote.  I  may,  however,  state,  that  maintaining 
always  his  opinion,  M.  Cousin  (what  is  rare,  especially  in  metaphysical  dis- 
cussions) declared,  that  it  was  neither  unfairly  combated  nor  imperfectly 
understood. — In  connection  with  this  criticism,  the  reader  should  compare 
what  M.  Cousin  has  subsequently  stated  in  defence  and  illustration  of  his 
system,  in  his  Preface  to  the  new  edition  of  the  Introduction  a  PHistoire  de 
la  Philosophie,  and  Appendix  to  the  fifth  lecture  ((Euvres,  Serie  II.  Tome  i. 
pp.  vii.  ix.,  and  pp.  112-129) ; — in  his  Preface  to  the  second  edition,  and  his 
Advertisement  to  the  third  edition  of  the  Fragments  PhilosopMques  ((Euvres 
8.  III.  T.  iv.) — and  in  his  Prefatory  Notice  to  the  Pensies  de  Pascal  ((Euvres, 
8".  IV.  T.  i.) — On  the  other  hand,  M.  Peisse  has  ably  advocated  the  counter- 
view,  in  his  Preface  and  Appendix  to  the  Fragments  de  Philosophic,  &c.] 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED.  443 

into  oblivion,  and  from  the  time  that  Condillac,  exaggerating  the 
too  partial  principles  of  Locke,  had  analyzed  all  knowledge  into 
sensation,  Sensualism  (or,  more  correctly,  Sensuism),  as  a  psycho- 
logical theory  of  the  origin  of  our  cognitions,  became,  in  France, 
not  only  the  dominant,  but  almost  the  one  exclusive  opinion.  It 
was  believed  that  reality  and  truth  were  limited  to  experience, 
and  experience  was  limited  to  the  sphere  of  sense ;  while  the 
very  highest  faculties  of  mind  were  deemed  adequately  explained 
when  recalled  to  perceptions,  elaborated,  purified,  sublimated, 
and  transformed.  From  the  mechanical  relations  of  sense  with 
its  object,  it  was  attempted  to  solve  the  mysteries  of  will  and 
intelligence ;  the  philosophy  of  mind  was  soon  viewed  as,  cor- 
relative to  the  physiology  of  organization.  The  moral  nature 
of  man  was  at  last  formally  abolished,  in  its  identification  with 
his  physical :  mind  became  a  reflex  of  matter  ;  thought  a  secre- 
tion of  the  brain. 

A  doctrine  so  melancholy  in  its  consequences,  and  founded 
on  principles  thus  partial  and  exaggerated,  could  not  be  perma- 
nent :  a  reaction  was  inevitable.  The  recoil  which  began  about 
twenty  years  ago,  has  been  gradually  increasing ;  and  now  it  is 
perhaps  even  to  be  apprehended,  that  its  intensity  may  become 
excessive.  As  the  poison  was  of  foreign  growth,  so  also  has  been 
the  antidote.  The  doctrine  of  Condillac  was,  if  not  a  corruption, 
a  development  of  the  doctrine  of  Locke ;  and  in  returning  to  a 
better  philosophy,  the  French  are  still  obeying  an  impulse  com- 
municated from  without.  This  impulsion  may  be  traced  to  two 
different  sources, — to  the  philosophy  of  Scotland,  and  to  the 
philosophy  of  Germany. 

In  Scotland,  a  philosophy  had  sprung  up,  which,  though  pro- 
fessing, equally  with  the  doctrine  of  Condillac,  to  build  only  on 
experience,  did  not,  like  that  doctrine,  limit  experience  to  the 
relations  of  sense  and  its  objects.  Without  vindicating  to  man 
more  than  a  relative  knowledge  of  existence,  and  restricting  the 
science  of  mind  to  an  observation  of  the  fact  of  consciousness,  it, 
however,  analyzed  that  fact  into  a  greater  number  of  more  im- 


444  PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE     CONDITIONED. 

portent  elements  than  had  been  recognized  in  the  school  of  Con- 
dillac.  It  showed  that  phenomena  were  revealed  in  thought 
which  could  not  be  resolved  into  any  modifications  of  sense, — 
external  or  internal.  It  proved  that  intelligence  supposed  prin- 
ciples, which,  as  the  conditions  of  its  activity,  cannot  be  the 
results  of  its  operation ;  that  the  mind  contained  knowledges, 
which,  as  primitive,  universal,  necessary,  are  not  to  be  explained 
as  generalizations  from  the  contingent  and  individual,  about 
which  alone  all  experience  is  conversant.  The  phenomena  of 
mind  were  thus  distinguished  from  the  phenomena  of  matter ; 
and  if  the  impossibility  of  materialism  were  not  demonstrated, 
there  was,  at  least,  demonstrated  the  impossibility  of  its  proof. 

This  philosophy,  and  still  more  the  spirit  of  this  philosophy 
was  calculated  to  exert  a  salutary  influence  on  the  French.  And 
such  an  influence  it  did  exert.  For  a  time,  indeed,  the  truth 
operated  in  silence,  and  Reid  and  Stewart  had  already  modified 
the  philosophy  of  France,  before  the  French  were  content  to 
acknowledge  themselves  their  disciples.  In  the  works  of  Dege- 
rando  and  Laromiguiere,  may  be  traced  the  influence  of  Scottish 
speculation  ;  but  it  is  to  Royer-Collard,  and,  more  recently,  to 
Jouffroy,  that  our  countrymen  are  indebted  for  a  full  acknowl- 
edgment of  their  merits,  and  for  the  high  and  increasing  estima- 
tion in  which  their  doctrines  are  now  held  in  France.  M.  Royer- 
Collard,  whose  authority  has,  in  every  relation,  been  exerted  only 
for  the  benefit  of  his  country,  and  who,  once  great  as  a  professor, 
is  now  not  less  illustrious  as  a  statesman,  in  his  lectures,  advo- 
cated with  distinguished  ability  the  principles  of  the  Scottish 
school ;  modestly  content  to  follow,  while  no  one  was  more 
entitled  to  lead.  M.  Jouffroy,  by  his  recent  translation  of  the 
works  of  Dr.  Reid,  and  by  the  excellent  preface  to  his  version  of 
Mr.  Dugald  Stewart's  '  Outlines  of  Moral  Philosophy,'  has  like- 
wise powerfully  co-operated  to  the  establishment,  in  France,  of  a 
philosophy  equally  opposed  to  the  exclusive  Sensualism  of  Con- 
dillac,  and  to  the  exclusive  Rationalism  of  the  new  German 
school. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED.  445 

Germany  may  be  regarded,  latterly  at  least,  as  the  metaphysi- 
cal antipodes  of  France.  The  comprehensive  and  original  genius 
of  Leibnitz,  itself  the  ideal  abstract  of  the  Teutonic  character,  had 
reacted  powerfully  on  the  minds  of  his  countrymen  ;  and  Ra- 
tionalism (more  properly  Intellectualism*},  has,  from  his  time, 
always  remained  the  favorite  philosophy  of  the  Germans.  On 
the  principle  of  this  doctrine,  it  is  in  Reason  alone  that  truth  and 
reality  are  to  be  found.  Experience  affords  only  the  occasions 
on  which  intelligence  reveals  to  us  the  necessary  and  universal 
notions  of  which  it  is  the  complement ;  and  these  notions  con- 
stitute at  once  the  foundation  of  all  reasoning,  and  the  guaran- 
tee of  our  whole  knowledge  of  reality.  Kant,  indeed,  pro- 
nounced the  philosophy  of  Rationalism  a  mere  fabric  of  delusion. 
He  declared  that  a  science  of  existence  was  beyond  the  compass 
of  our  faculties  ;  that  pure  reason,  as  purely  subjective,!  and  con- 

*  [On  the  modern  commutation  of  Intellect  or  Intelligence  (Nous,  Mens,  In- 
teUectvs,  Verstand),  and  Reason  (A.6yos,  Ratio,  Vernunft),  see  Dissertations  on 
Eeid,  pp.  668,  669,  693.  (This  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  confusion  of  Rea- 
son and  Reasoning. )  Protesting,  therefore,  against  the  abuse,  I  historically 
employ  the  terms  as  they  were  employed  by  the  philosophers  here  commem- 
orated. This  unfortunate  reversal  has  been  propagated  to  the  French  philos- 
ophy, and  also  adopted  in  England  by  Coleridge  and  his  followers. — I  may 
here  notice  that  I  use  the  term  Understanding,  not  for  the  noetic  faculty, 
intellect  proper,  or  place  of  principles,  but  for  the  dianoetic  or  discursive  fac- 
ulty, in  its  widest  signification,  for  the  faculty  of  relations  or  comparison ; 
and  thus  in  the  meaning  in  which  Verstand  is  now  employed  by  the  Ger- 
mans. In  this  sense  I  have  been  able  to  be  uniformly  consistent.] 

t  In  the  philosophy  of  mind,  subjective  denotes  what  is  to  be  referred  to 
the  thinking  subject,  the  Ego;  objective  what  belongs  to  the  object  of 
thought,  the  Non-Ego. — It  may  ba  safe,  perhaps,  to  say  a  few  words  in 
vindication  of  our  employment  of  these  terms.  By  the  Greeks  the  word 
kroKttitcvov  was  equivocally  employed  to  express  either  the  object  of  knowledge 
(the  materia  circa  quam),  or  the  subject  of  existence  (the  materia  in  qua). 
The  exact  distinction  of  subject  and  object  was  first  made  by  the  schoolmen ; 
and  to  the  schoolmen  the  vulgar  languages  are  principally  indebted  for  what 
precision  and  analytic  subtilty  they  possess.  These  correlative  terms  cor- 
respond to  the  first  and  most  important  distinction  in  philosophy  ;  they  em- 
body the  original  antithesis  in  consciousness  of  self  and  not-self, — a  distinc- 
tion which,  in  fact,  involves  the  whole  science  of  mind ;  for  psychology  is 
nothing  more  than  a  determination  of  the  subjective  and  the  objective,  in 
themselves,  and  in  their  reciprocal  relations.  Thus  significant  of  the  prima- 
ry and  most  extensive  analysis  in  philosophy,  these  terms,  in  their  substan- 


446  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED. 

scious  of  nothing  but  itself,  was  therefore  unable  to  evince  the 
reality  of  aught  beyond  the  phenomena  of  its  personal  modifica- 
tions. But  scarcely  had  the  critical  philosopher  accomplished 
the  recognition  of  this  important  principle,  the  result  of  which 
was,  to  circumscribe  the  field  of  speculation  by  narrow  bounds  ; 
than  from  the  very  disciples  of  his  school  there  arose  philoso- 
phers, who,  despising  the  contracted  limits  and  humble  results 
of  a  philosophy  of  observation,  re-established,  as  the  predomi- 
nant opinion,  a  bolder  and  more  uncompromising  Rationalism 
than  any  that  had  ever  previously  obtained  for  their  countrymen 
the  character  of  philosophic  visionaries— 

'  Gens  ratione  ferox,  et  mentem  pasta  chimseris.'* 
('  Minds  fierce  for  reason,  and  on  fancies  fed.') 

live  and  adjective  forms,  passed  from  the  schools  into  the  scientific  language 
of  Telesius,  Campanella,  Berigardus,  Gassendi,  Descartes,  Spinosa,  Leib- 
nitz, Wolf,  &c.  Deprived  of  these  terms,  the  Critical  philosophy,  indeed 
the  whole  philosophy  of  Germany,  would  be  a  blank.  In  this  country, 
though  familiarly  employed  in  scientific  language,  even  subsequently  to  the 
time  of  Locke,  the  adjective  forms  seem  at  length  to  have  dropt  out  of  the 
English  tongue.  That  these  words  waxed  obsolete  was  perhaps  caused  by 
the  ambiguity  which  had  gradually  crept  into  the  signification  of  the  sub- 
stantives. Object,  besides  its  proper,  signification,  came  to  be  abusively 
applied  to  denote  motive,  end,  final  cause  (a  meaning  not  recognized  by  John- 
son). This  innovation  was  probably  borrowed  from  the  French,  in  whose 
language  the  word  had  been  similarly  corrupted  after  the  commencement  of 
the  last  century  (Diet,  de  Trevoux,  voce  olget).  Subject  in  English,  as  sujet 
in  French,  had  been  also  perverted  into  a  synonym  for  object,  taken  in  its 
proper  meaning,  and  had  thus  returned  to  the  original  ambiguity  of  the  cor- 
responding term  in  Greek.  It  is  probable  that  the  logical  application  of  the 
word  (subject  of  attribution  or  predication)  facilitated  or  occasioned  this  con- 
fusion. In  using  the  terms,  therefor!,  we  think  that  an  explanation,  but 
no  apology,  is  required.  The  distinction  is  of  paramount  importance,  and  of 
infinite  application,  not  only  hi  philosophy  proper,  but  in  grammar,  rheto- 
ric, criticism,  ethics,  politics,  jurisprudence,  theology.  It  is  adequately 
expressed  by  no  other  terms ;  and  if  these  did  not  already  enjoy  a  prescrip- 
tive right,  as  denizens  of  the  language,  it  cannot  be  denied,  that,  as  strictly 
analogical,  they  would  be  well  entitled  to  sue  out  their  naturalization. — [Not 
that  these  terms  were  formerly  always  employed  in  the  same  signification 
and  contrast  which  they  now  obtain.  For  a  history  of  these  variations,  see 
Part  II.  chapter  ii.  p.  243  sq. — Since  this  article  was  written,  the  words  have 
in  this  country  re-entered  on  their  ancient  rights ;  they  are  now  in  common 
use.] 
*  [This  line,  which  was  quoted  from  memory,  has,  I  find,  in  the  origiixal, 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE  CONDITIONED.  447 

Founded  by  Fichte,  but  evolved  by  Schelling,  this  doctrine  re- 
gards experience  as  unworthy  of  the  name  of  science  ;  because,  as 
only  of  the  phenomenal,  the  transitory,  the  dependent,  it  is  only 
of  that  which,  having  no  reality  in  itself,  cannot  be  established 
as  a  valid  basis  of  certainty  and  knowledge.  Philosophy  must, 
therefore,  either  be  abandoned,  or  we  must  be  able  to  seize  the 
One,  the  Absolute,  the  Unconditioned,  immediately  and  in  itself. 
And  this  they  profess  to  do  by  a  kind  of  intellectual  vision.* 
In  this  act,  reason,  soaring  above  the  world  of  sense,  but  beyond 
the  sphere  of  personal  consciousness,  boldly  places  itself  at  the 
very  centre  of  absolute  being,  with  which  it  claims  to  be,  in  fact, 
identified  ;  and  thence  surveying  existence  in  itself,  and  in  its  re- 
lations, unveils  to  us  the  nature  of  the  Deity,  and  explains,  from 
first  to  last,  the  derivation  of  all  created  things. 

M.  Cousin  is  the  apostle  of  Rationalism  in  France,  and  we  are 
willing  to  admit  that  the  doctrine  could  not  have  obtained  a  more 
eloquent  or  devoted  advocate.  For  philosophy  he  has  suffered ; 


'  furens;'  therefore  translated — 'Minds  mad  with  reasoning — and  fancy-fed.' 
The  author  certainly  had  in  his  eye  the  '  ratione  insanias '  of  Terence.  It  is 
from  a  satire  by  Abraham  Eemi,  who  in  the  former  half  of  the  seventeenth 
century,  was  professor  Eoyal  of  Eloquence  in  the  University  of  Paris ;  and 
it  referred  to  the  disputants  of  the  Irish  College  in  that  illustrious  school. 
The  '  Hibernian  Logicians'  were,  indeed,  long  famed  over  the  continent  of 
Europe,  for  their  acuteness,  pugnacity,  and  barbarism ;  as  is  recorded  by 
Patin,  Bayle,  Le  Sage,  and  many  others.  The  learned  Menage  was  so  de- 
lighted with  the  verse,  as  to  declare  that  he  would  give  his  best  benefice 
(and  he  enjoyed  some  fat  ones)  to  have  written  it.  It  applies,  not  only 
with  real,  but  with  verbal  accuracy,  to  the  German  Rationalists ;  who  in 
Philosophy  (as  Aristotle  has  it),  '  in  making  reason  omnipotent,  show  their 
own  impotence  of  reason,'  and  in  Theology  (as  Charles  II.  said  of  Isaac 
Vossius), — '  believe  every  tiling  but  the  Bible.'] 

*  ['  InteUectuelle  Anschauung."1 — This  is  doubly  wrong. — 1°,  In  grammatical 
rigor,  the  word  in  German  ought  to  have  been  '  intellectual.'  2°,  In  phi- 
losophical consistency  the  intuition  ought  to  have  been  called  by  its  authors 
(Fichte  and  Schelling),  intellectual.  For,  though  this  be,  in  fact,  absolutely 
more  correct,  yet  relatively  it  is  a  blunder ;  for  the  intuition,  as  intended  by 
them,  is  of  their  higher  faculty,  the  Reason  (Vernunft),  and  not  of  their 
lower,  the  Understanding  or  Intellect  (Verstand).  In  modern  German 
Philosophy,  Verstand  is  always  translated  by  Intettecfaa  ;  and  this  again  cor- 
responds to  NoBj.] 


448  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE  CONDITIONED. 

to  her  ministry  he  has  consecrated  himself — devoted  without 
reserve  his  life  and  labors.  Neither  has  he  approached  the 
sanctuary  with  unwashed  hands.  The  editor  of  Proclus  and 
Descartes,  the  translator  and  interpreter  of  Plato,  and  the  prom- 
ised expositor  of  Kant,  will  not  be  accused  of  partiality  in  the 
choice  of  his  pursuits ;  while  his  two  works,  under  the  title  of 
Philosophical  Fragments,  bear  ample  evidence  to  the  learning, 
elegance,  and  distinguished  ability  of  their  author.  Taking  him 
all  in  all,  in  France  M.  Cousin  stands  alone  :  nor  can  we  contem- 
plate his  character  and  accomplishments,  without  the  sincerest 
admiration,  even  while  we  dissent  from  the  most  prominent  prin- 
ciple of  his  philosophy.  The  development  of  his  system,  in  all  its 
points,  betrays  the  influence  of  German  speculation  on  his  opin- 
ions. His  theory  is  not,  however,  a  scheme  of  exclusive  Ra- 
tionalism ;  on  the  contrary,  the  peculiarity  of  his  doctrine  con- 
sists 1n  the  attempt  to  combine  the  philosophy  of  experience,  and 
the  philosophy  of  pure  reason,  into  one.  The  following  is  a  con- 
cise statement  of  the  fundamental  positions  of  his  system. 

Reason,  or  intelligence,  has  three  integrant  elements,  affording 
three  regulative  principles,  which  at  once  constitute  its  nature, 
and  govern  its  manifestations.  These  three  ideas  severally  sup- 
pose each  other,  and,  as  inseparable,  are  equally  essential  and 
equally  primitive.  They  are  recognized  by  Aristotle  and  by 
Kant,  in  their  several  attempts  to  analyze  intelligence  into  its 
principles  ;  but  though  the  categories  of  both  philosophers  com 
prise  all  the  elements  of  thought,  in  neither  list  are  these  elements 
naturally  co-arranged,  or  reduced  to  an  ultimate  simplicity. 

The  first  of  these  ideas,  elements,  or  laws,  though  funda- 
mentally one,  our  author  variously  expresses,  by  the  terms  unity, 
identity,  substance,  absolute  cause,  the  infinite,  pure  thought,  &c. ; 
(we  would  briefly  call  it  the  unconditioned.)  The  second,  he 
denominates  plurality,  difference,  phenomenon,  relative  cause, 
the  finite,  determined  thought,  <fec. ;  (we  would  style  it  the  con- 
ditioned.) These  two  elements  are  relative  and  correlative.  The 
first,  though  absolute,  is  not  conceived  as  existing  absolutely  in 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE    CONDITIONED.  449 

itself ;  it  is  conceived  as  an  absolute  cause,  as  a  cause  which  can- 
not but  pass  into  operation ;  in  other  words,  "the  first  element 
must  manifest  itself  in  the  second.  The  two  ideas  are  thus  con- 
nected together  as  cause  and  effect ;  each  is  only  realized  through 
the  other ;  and  this  their  connection,  or  correlation,  is  the  third 
integrant  element  of  intelligence. 

Reason,  or  intelligence,  in  which  these  ideas  appear,  and  which, 
in  fact,  they  make  up,  is  not  individual,  is  not  ours,  is  not  even 
human  ;  it  is  absolute,  it  is  divine.  What  is  personal  to  us,  is 
our  free  and  voluntary  activity ;  what  is  not  free  and  not  volun- 
tary, is  adventitious  to  man,  and  does  not  constitute  an  integrant 
part  of  his  individuality.  Intelligence  is  conversant  with  truth  ; 
truth,  as  necessary  and  universal,  is  not  the  creature  of  my  voli- 
tion ;  and  reason,  which,  as  the  subject  of  truth,  is  also  universal 
and  necessary,  is  consequently  impersonal.  We  see,  therefore,  by 
a  light  which  is  not  ours,  and  reason  is  a  revelation  of  God  in  man. 
The  ideas  of  which  we  are  conscious,  belong  not  to  us,  but  to  ab- 
solute intelligence.  They  constitute,  in  truth,  the  very  mode  and . 
manner  of  its  existence.  For  consciousness  is  only  possible  under 
plurality  and  difference,  and  intelligence  is  only  possible  through 
consciousness. 

The  divine  nature  is  essentially  comprehensible.  For  the  three 
ideas  constitute  the  nature  of  the  Deity  ;  and  the  very  nature  of 
ideas  is  to  be  conceived.  God,  in  fact,  exists  to  us,  only  in  so  far 
as  he  is  known  ;  and  the  degree  of  our  knowledge  must  always 
determine  the  measure  of  our  faith.  The  relation  of  God  to  the 
universe  is  therefore  manifest,  and  the  creation  easily  understood. 
To  create,  is  not  to  make  something  out  of  nothing,  for  this  is 
contradictory,  but  to  originate  from  self.  We  create  so  often 
as  we  exert  our  free  causality,  and  something  is  created  by  us, 
when  something  begins  to  be  by  virtue  of  the  free  causality  which 
belongs  to  us.  To  create,  is,  therefore,  to  cause,  not  with  nothing1, 
but  with  the  very  essence  of  our  being — with  our  force,  our  will, 
our  personality.  The  divine  creation  is  of  the  same  character. 
God,  as  he  is  a  cause,  is  able  to  create ;  as  he  is  an  absolute  cause, 


450  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE  CONDITIONED. 

he  cannot  but  create.  In  creating  the  universe,  he  does  not  draw 
it  from  nothing  ;•  he  draws  it  from  himself.  The  creation  of  the 
universe  is  thus  necessary ;  it  is  a  manifestation  of  the  Deity,  but 
not  the  Deity  absolutely  in  himself;  it  is  God  passing  into  activ- 
ity, but  not  exhausted  in  the  act. 

The  universe  created,  the  principles  which  determined  the  cre- 
ation are  found  still  to  govern  the  worlds  of  matter  and  mind. 

Two  ideas  and  their  connection  explain  the  intelligence  of 
God ;  two  laws  in  their  counterpoise  and  correlation  explain  the 
material  universe.  The  law  of  Expansion  is  the  movement  of 
unity  to  variety ;  the  law  of  Attraction  is  the  return  of  variety  to 
unity. 

In  the  world  of  mind  the  same  analogy  is  apparent.  The 
study  of  consciousness  is  psychology.  Man  is  the  microcosm  of 
existence ;  consciousness,  within  a  narrow  focus,  concentrates  a 
knowledge  of  the  universe  and  of  God ;  psychology  is  thus  the 
abstract  of  all  science,  human  and  divine.  As  in  the  external 
world,  all  phenomena  may  be  reduced  to  the  two  great  laws  of 
Action  and  Reaction ;  so,  in  the  internal,  all  the  facts  of  con- 
sciousness may  be  reduced  to  one  fundamental  fact,  comprising, 
in  like  manner,  two  principles  and  their  correlation ;  and  these 
principles  are  again  the  One  or  the  Infinite,  the  Many  or  the 
Finite,  and  the  Connection  of  the  infinite  and  finite* 

In  every  act  of  consciousness  we  distinguish  a  Self  or  Ego,  and 
something  different  from  self,  a  Non-ego  ;  each  limited  and  mod- 
ified by  the  other.  These,  together,  constitute  the  finite  element. 
But  at  the  same  instant,  when  we  are  conscious  of  these  exist- 
ences, plural,  relative,  and  contingent,  we  are  conscious,  likewise, 
of  a  superior  unity  in  which  they  are  contained,  and  by  which 
they  are  explained ; — a  unity  absolute  as  they  are  conditioned, 
substantive  as  they  are  phenomenal,  and  an  infinite  cause  as  they 
are  finite  causes.  This  unity  is  GOD.  The  fact  of  consciousness 
is  thus  a  complex  phenomenon,  comprehending  three  several 
terms :  1°,  The  idea  of  the  Ego  and  Non-ego  as  Finite;  2°,  The 
idea  of  something  else  as  Infinite ;  and,  3°,  The  idea  of  the  Rela- 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE  CONDITIONED.  451 

tion  of  the  finite  element  to  the  infinite.  These  elements  are 
revealed  in  themselves  and  in  their  mutual  connection,  in  every 
act  of  primitive  or  Spontaneous  consciousness.  They  can  also  be 
reviewed  by  Reflection  in  a  voluntary  act;  but  here  reflection 
distinguishes,  it  does  not  create.  The  three  ideas,  the  three  cate- 
gories of  intelligence,  are  given  in  the  original  act  of  instinctive 
apperception,  obscurely,  indeed,  and  without  contrast.  Reflection 
analyzes  and  discriminates  the  elements  of  this  primary  synthesis ; 
and  as  will  is  the  condition  of  reflection,  and  will  at  the  same 
time  is  personal,  the  categories,  as  obtained  through  reflection, 
have  consequently  the  appearance  of  being  also  personal  and 
subjective.  It  was  this  personality  of  reflection  that  misled  Kant : 
caused  him  to  overlook  or  misinterpret  the  fact  of  spontaneous 
consciousness ;  to  individualize  intelligence ;  and  to  collect  under 
this  personal  reason  all  that  is  conceived  by  us  as  necessary  and 
universal.  But  as,  in  the  spontaneous  intuition  of  reason,  there 
is  nothing  voluntary,  and  consequently  nothing  personal ;  and  as 
the  truths  which  intelligence  here  discovers,  come  not  from  our- 
selves ;  we  have  a  right,  up  to  a  certain  point,  to  impose  these 
truths  on  others  as  .revelations  from  on  high ;  while,  on  the  con- 
trary, reflection  being  wholly  personal,  it  would  be  absurd  to 
impose  on  others  what  is  the  fruit  of  our  individual  operations. 
Spontaneity  is  the  principle  of  religion ;  reflection  of  philosophy. 
Men  agree  in  spontaneity ;  they  differ  in  reflection.  The  former 
is  necessarily  veracious ;  the  latter  is  naturally  delusive. 

The  condition  of  Reflection  is  separation :  it  illustrates  by  dis- 
tinguishing ;  it  considers  the  different  elements  apart,  and  while 
it  contemplates  one,  it  necessarily  throws  the  others  out  of  view. 
Hence,  not  only  the  possibility,  but  the  necessity  of  error.  The 
primitive  unity,  supposing  no  distinction,  admits  of  no  error; 
reflection  in  discriminating  the  elements  of  thought,  and  in  con- 
sidering one  to  the  exclusion  of  others,  occasions  error,  and  a 
variety  in  error.  He  who  exclusively  contemplates  the  element 
of  the  Infinite,  despises  him  who  is  occupied  with  the  idea  of  the 
Finite ;  and  vice  versa.  It  is  the  wayward  development  of  the 


452  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE   CONDITIONED. 

various  elements  of  intelligence,  which  determines  the  imperfec- 
tions and  varieties  of  individual  character.  Men  under  this  par- 
tial and  exclusive  development,  are  but  fragments  of  that  human- 
ity which  can  only  be  fully  realized  in  the  harmonious  evolution 
of  all  its  principles.  What  Reflection  is  to  the  individual,  History 
is  to  the  human  race.  The  difference  of  an  epoch  consists  exclu- 
sively in  the  partial  development  of  some  one  element  of  intelli- 
gence in  a  prominent  portion  of  mankind ;  and  as  there  are  only 
three  such  elements,  so  there  are  only  three  grand  epochs  in  the 
history  of  man. 

A  knowledge  of  the  elements  of  reason,  of  their  relations  and 
of  their  laws,  constitutes  not  merely  Philosophy,  but  is  the  con- 
dition of  a  History  of  Philosophy.  The  history  of  human  rea- 
son, or  the  history  of  philosophy,  must  be  rational  and  philo- 
sophic. It  must  be  philosophy  itself,  with  all  its  elements,  in  all 
their  relations,  and  under  all  their  laws,  represented  in  striking 
characters  by  the  hands  of  time  and  of  history,  in  the  manifested 
progress  of  the  human  mind.  The  discovery  and  enumeration  of 
all  the  elements  of  intelligence  enable  us  to  survey  the  progress 
of  speculation  from  the  loftiest  vantage  ground ;  it  reveals  to  us 
the  laws  by  which  the  development  of  reflection  or  philosophy  is 
determined;  and  it  supplies  us  with  a  canon  by  which  the 
approximation  of  the  different  systems  to  the  truth  may  be  finally 
ascertained.  And  what  are  the  results  ?  Sensualism,  Idealism, 
Skepticism,  Mysticism,  are  all  partial  and  exclusive  views  of  the 
elements  of  intelligence.  But  each  is  false  only  as  it  is  incom- 
plete. They  are  all  true  in  what  they  affirm,  all  erroneous  in 
what  they  deny.  Though  hitherto  opposed,  they  are,  conse- 
quently, not  incapable  of  coalition ;  and,  in  fact,  can  only  obtain 
their  consummation  in  a  powerful  Eclecticism — a  system  which 
shall  comprehend  them  all.  This  Eclecticism  is  realized  in  the 
doctrine  previously  developed ;  and  the  possibility  of  such  a 
catholic  philosophy  was  first  afforded  by  the  discovery  of  M.  Cousin, 
made  so  long  ago  as  the  year  181*7, — '  that  consciousness  contained 
many  more  phenomena  than  had  previously  been  suspected.' 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED.  453 

The  present  course  is  at  once  an  exposition  of  these  principles, 
as  a  true  theory  of  philosophy,  and  an  illustration  of  the  mode 
in  which  this  theory  is  to  be  applied,  as  a  rule  of  criticism  in  the 
history  of  philosophical  opinion.  As  the  justice  of  the  applica- 
tion must  be  always  subordinate  to  the  truth  of  the  principle, 
we  shall  confine  ourselves  exclusively  to  a  consideration  of  M. 
Cousin's  system,  viewed  absolutely  in  itself.  This,  indeed,  we 
are  afraid  will  prove  comparatively  irksome  ;  and,  therefore,  soli- 
cit indulgence,  not  only  for  the  unpopular  nature  of  the  discus- 
sion, but  for  the  employment  of  language  which,  from  the  total 
neglect  of  these  speculations  in  Britain,  will  necessarily  appear 
abstruse — not  merely  to  the  general  reader. 

Now,  it  is  manifest  that  the  whole  doctrine  of  M.  Cousin  is 
involved  in  the  proposition, — that  the  Unconditioned,  the  Abso- 
lute, the  Infinite,  is  immediately  known  in  consciousness,  and  this 
by  difference,  plurality,  and  relation.  The  unconditioned,  as  an 
original  element  of  knowledge,  is  the  generative  principle  of  his 
system,  but  common  to  him  with  others ;  whereas  the  mode  in 
which  the  possibility  of  this  knowledge  is  explained,  affords  its 
discriminating  peculiarity.  The  other  positions  of  his  theory,  as 
deduced  from  this  assumption,  may  indeed  be  disputed,  even  if 
the  antecedent  be  allowed  ;  but  this  assumption  disproved,  every 
consequent  in  his  theory  is  therewith  annihilated.  The  recogni- 
tion of  the  absolute  as  a  constitutive  principle  of  intelligence,  our 
author  regards  as  at  once  the  condition  and  the  end  of  philoso- 
phy ;  and  it  is  on  the  discovery  of  this  principle  in  the  fact  of 
consciousness,  that  he  vindicates  to  himself  the  glory  of  being 
the  founder  of  the  new  eclectic,  or  the  one  catholic,  philosophy. 
The  determination  of  this  cardinal  point  will  thus  briefly  satisfy 
us  touching  the  claim  and  character  of  the  system.  To  explain 
the  nature  of  the  problem  itself,  and  the  sufficiency  of  the  solu- 
tion propounded  by  M.  Cousin,  it  is  necessary  to  premise  a  state- 
ment of  the  opinions  which  may  be  entertained  regarding  the 
Unconditioned,  as  an  immediate  object  of  knowledge  and  of 
thought. 


454  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED. 

These  opinions  may  be  reduced  to  four. — 1°,  The  Uncondi- 
tioned is  incognizable  and  inconceivable ;  its  notion  being  only 
negative  of  the  conditioned,  which  last  can  alone  be  positively 
known  or  conceived. — 2°,  It  is  not  an  object  of  knowledge ;  but 
its  notion,  as  a  regulative  principle  of  the  mind  itself,  is  more 
than  a  mere  negation  of  the  conditioned. — 3°,  It  is  cognizable, 
but  not  conceivable ;  it  can  be  known  by  a  sinking  back  into 
identity  with  the  absolute,  but  is  incomprehensible  by  conscious- 
ness and  reflection,  which  are  only  of  the  relative  and  the  dif- 
ferent.— 4°,  It  is  cognizable  and  conceivable  by  consciousness  and 
reflection,  under  relation,  difference,  and  plurality. 

The  first  of  these  opinions  we  regard  as  true ;  the  second  is 
held  by  Kant ;  the  third  by  Schelling ;  and  the  last  by  our 

author. 

• 

1.  In  our  opinion  the  mind  can  conceive,  and  consequently 
can  know,  only  the  limited,  and  the  conditionally  limited.  The 
unconditionally  unlimited,  or  the  Infinite,  the  unconditionally 
limited,  or  the  Absolute,  cannot  positively  be  construed  to  the 
mind  ;  they  can  be  conceived,  only  by  a  thinking  away  from,  or 
abstraction  of,  those  very  conditions  under  which  thought  itself 
is  realized ;  consequently  the  notion  of  the  Unconditioned  is  only 
negative, — negative  of  the  conceivable  itself.  For  example,  on 
the  one  hand  we  can  positively  conceive,  neither  an  absolute 
whole,  that  is,  a  whole  so  great,  that  we  cannot  also  conceive  it 
as  a  relative  part  of  a  still  greater  whole ;  nor  an  absolute  part, 
that  is,  a  part  so  small,  that  we  cannot  also  conceive  it  as  a  rela- 
tive whole,  divisible  into  smaller  parts.  On  the  other  hand,  we 
cannot  positively  represent,  or  realize,  or  construe  to  the  mind  (as 
here  understanding  and  imagination  coincide),*  an  infinite  whole, 

*  [The  Understanding,  thought  proper,  notion,  concept,  &c.,  may  coincide 
or  not  with  Imagination,  representation  proper,  image,  &c.  The  two  facul- 
ties do  not  coincide  in  a  general  notion ;  for  we  cannot  represent  Man  or 
Horse  in  an  actual  imago  without  individualizing  the  universal ;  and  thus 
contradiction  emerges.  But  in  the  individual,  say,  Socrates  or  Bucephalus, 
they  do  coincide ;  for  I  sec  no  valid  ground  why  we  should  not  think,  in  the 
strict  sense  of  the  word,  or  conceive  the  individuals  which  we  represent.  In 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED.  455 

for  this  could  only  be  done  by  the  infinite  synthesis  in  thought 
of  finite  wholes,  which  would  itself  require  an  infinite  time  for 
its  accomplishment ;  nor,  for  the  same  reason,  can  we  follow  out 
iu  thought  an  infinite  divisibility  of  parts.  The  result  is  the 
same,  whether  we  apply  the  process  to  limitation  in  space,  in  time, 
or  in  degree.1  The  unconditional  negation,  and  the  uncondition- 
al affirmation  of  limitation  ;  in  other  words,  the  infinite  and  the 
absolute,  properly  so  called*  are  thus  equally  inconceivable  to  us. 

like  manner  there  is  no  mutual  contradiction  between  the  image  nnd  the 
concept  of  the  Infinite  or  Absolute,  if  these  be  otherwise  possible  ;  for  there 
is  not  necessarily  involved  the  incompatibility  of  the  one  act  of  cognition 
with  the  other.] 

*  It  is  right  to  observe,  that  though  we  are  of  opinion  that  the  terms, 
Infinite  and  Absolute,  and  Unconditioned,  ought  not  to  be  confounded,  and 
accurately  distinguish  them  in  the  statement  of  our  own  view;  yet,  in 
speaking  of  the  doctrines  of  those  by  whom  they  are  indifferently  employed, 
we  have  not  thought  it  necessary,  or  rather,  we  have  found  it  impossible,  to 
adhere  to  the  distinction.  The  Unconditioned  in  our  use  of  language  de- 
notes the  genus  of  which  the  Infinite  and  Absolute  are  the  species. 

[The  term  Absolute  is  of  a  twofold  (if  not  threefold)  ambiguity,  correspond- 
ing to  the  double  (or  treble)  signification  of  the  word  in  Latin. 

1.  Absolutam  means  what  is  freed  or  loosed  ;  in  which  sense  the  Absolute 
will  be  what  is  aloof  from  relation,  comparison,  limitation,  condition,  depen- 
dence, Ac.,  and  thus  is  tantamount  to  rd  oTnJAurov  of  the  lower  Greeks.    In 
this  meaning  the  Absolute  is  not  opposed  to  the  Infinite. 

2.  Absulutum  means  finished,  perfected,  completed  ;  in  which  sense  the  Ab- 
solute will  be  what  is  out  of  relation,  &c.,  as  finished,  perfect,  complete, 
total,  and  thus  corresponds  to  rd  S\ov  and  rb  r/Atiov  of  Aristotle.     In  this 
acceptation, — and  it  is  that  in  which  for  myself  I  exc-liisively  use  it, — the  Ab- 
solute is  diametrically  opposed  to,  is  contradictory  of,  the  Infinite. 

Besides  these  two  meanings,  there  is  to  be  noticed  the  use  of  the  word, 
for  the  most  part  in  its  adverbial  form  ; — absolutely  (absolute)  in  the  sense  of 
simply,  simpliciter  (<JjrA<Ds),  that  is,  considered  in  and  for  itself — considered 
not  iii  relation.  This  holds  a  similar  analogy  to  the  two  former  meanings 
of  Absolute,  which  the  Indefinite  (T&  adpiarov)  does  to  the  Infinite  (rd 
airitpov).  It  is  subjective  as  they  arc  objective  ;  it  is  in  our  thought  as  they 
are  in  their  own  existence.  This  application  is  to  be  discounted,  as  here 
irrelevant.] 

1  The  distinction  between  the  absolute  and  the  infinite  is  one  of  the  most 
important  points  in  Hamilton's  philosophy.  Inasmuch  as  it  is  somewhat 
difficult  to  apprehend  this  distinction,  we  will  illustrate  it,  with  reference  to 
the  three  species  of  quantity  that  constitute  the  relation  of  Existence.  In 
regard  to  time ;—  the  distinction  may  be  made  in  three  ways  : — 1°,  we  cannot 
conceive  it  as  having  an  absolute  commencement,  or  nn  infinite  non-com- 


456  PHILOSOPHY    OF  THE    CONDITIONED. 

As  the  conditionally  limited  (which  we  may  briefly  call  the 
conditioned)  is  thus  the  only  possible  object  of  knowledge  and  of 
positive  thought — thought  necessarily  supposes  conditions.  To 
think  is  to  condition  ;  and  conditional  limitation  is  the  funda- 
mental law  of  the  possibility  of  thought  For,  as  the  greyhound 
cannot  outstrip  his  shadow,  nor  (by  a  more  appropriate  simile) 
the  eagle  out-soar  the  atmosphere  in  which  he  floats,  and  by 
which  alone  he  may  be  supported ;  so  the  mind  cannot  transcend 
that  sphere  of  limitation,  within  and  through  which  exclusively 
the  possibility  of  thought  is  realized.  Thought  is  only  of  the 
conditioned ;  because,  as  we  have  said,  to  think  is  simply  to 
condition.  The  absolute  is  conceived  merely  by  a  negation  of 
conceivability  ;  and  all  that  we  know,  is  only  known  as 

'  won  from  the  void  and  formless  infinite.1 


How,  indeed,  it  could  ever  be  doubted  that  thought  is  only  of  the 
conditioned,  may  well  be  deemed  a  matter  of  the  profoundest 
admiration.  Thought  cannot  transcend  consciousness  ;  conscious- 
ness is  only  possible  under  the  antithesis  of  a  subject  and  object 
of  thought,  known  only  in  correlation,  and  mutually  limiting 
each  other ;  while,  independently  of  this,  all  that  we  know  either 
of  subject  or  object,  either  of  mind  or  matter,  is  only  a  knowl- 
edge in  each  of  the  particular,  of  the  plural,  of  the  different,  of 
the  modified,  of  the  phenomenal.  We  admit  that  the  conse- 
quence of  this  doctrine  is, — that  philosophy,  if  viewed  as  more 
than  a  science  of  the  conditioned,  is  impossible.  Departing  from 


mencement;  2°,  we  cannot  conceive  it  as  having  an  absolute  termination,  or 
an  infinite  non-termination ;  3°,  we  cannot  conceive  it  as  an  absolute  mini- 
mum, or  as  one  of  the  parts  of  an  infinite  division.  In  regard  to  space  ; — the 
distinction  may  be  made  in  two  ways : — 1°,  we  cannot  conceive  it  as  a  whole, 
absolutely  bounded,  or  infinitely  unbounded ;  2°,  we  cannot  conceive  it  as  a 
part,  which  is  absolutely  indivisible,  or  is  the  product  of  an  infinite  division. 
In  regard  to  degree; — the  distinction  may  also  be  made  in  two  ways  : — 1°,  we 
cannot  conceive  it  as  absolutely  greatest,  or,  in  increase,  as  infinitely  unlimit- 
ed ;  2°,  we  cannot  conceive  it  as  an  absolute  least,  or,  in  diminution,  as  infi- 
nitely without  limit. — The  mind  takes  cognizance  of  no  other  quantities,  and 
it  is  impossible  to  carry  the  distinction  any  further. —  W. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED.  457 

the  particular,  we  admit  that  we  can  never,  in  our  highest  gener- 
alizations, rise  above  the  finite  ;  that  our  knowledge,  whether  of 
mind  or  matter,  can  be  nothing  more  than  a  knowledge  of  the 
relative  manifestations  of  an  existence,  which  in  itself  it  is  our 
highest  wisdom  to  recognize  as  beyond  the  reach  of  philosophy, 
— in  the  language  of  St.  Austin, — '  cognoscendo  ignorari,  et  igno- 
rando  cognpsci? 

The  conditioned  is  the  mean  between  two  extremes, — two  in- 
conditionates,  exclusive  of  each  other,  neither  of  which  can  be 
conceived  as  possible,  but  of  which,  on  the  principles  of  contra- 
diction and  excluded  middle,  one  must  be  admitted  as  necessary. 
On  this  opinion,  therefore,  reason  is  shown  to  be  weak,  but  not 
deceitful.  The  mind  is  not  represented  as  conceiving  two  propo- 
sitions subversive  of  each  other,  as  equally  possible  ;  but  only,  as 
unable  to  understand  as  possible,  either  of  two  extremes ;  one 
of  which,  however,  on  the  ground  of  their  mutual  repugnance,  it 
is  compelled  to  recognize  as  true.  We  are  thus  taught  the  salu- 
tary lesson,  that  the  capacity  of  thought  is  not  to  be  constituted 
into  the  measure  of  existence  ;  and  are  warned  from  recognizing 
the  domain  of  our  knowledge  as  necessarily  coextensive  with  the 
horizon  of  our  faith.  And  by  a  wonderful  revelation,  we  are 
thus,  in  the  very  consciousness  of  our  inability  to  conceive  aught 
above  the  relative  and  finite,  inspired  with  a  belief  in  the  exist- 
ence of  something  unconditioned  beyond  the  sphere  of  all  com- 
prehensible reality.* 

2.  The  second  opinion,  that  of  KANT,  is  fundamentally  the 
same  as  the  preceding.  Metaphysic,  strictly  so  denominated,  the 

*  [True,  therefore,  are  the  declarations  of  a  pious  philosophy : — '  A  God 
understood  would  be  no  God  at  all ;' — '  To  think  that  God  is,  as  we  can 
think  him  to  be,  is  blasphemy.' — The  Divinity,  in  a  certain  sense,  is  re- 
vealed ;  in  a  certain  sense  is  concealed  :  He  is  at  once  known  and  unknown. 
But  the  last  and  highest  consecration  of  all  true  religion,  must  be  an  altar — 
1  Ayviaarrif  Gcia — '  To  the  unknown  and  unknowable  God.1  In  this  consumma- 
tion, nature  and  revelation,  paganism  and  Christianity,  are  at  one ;  and  from 
either  source  the  testimonies  are  so  numerous  that  I  must  refrain  from  quo- 
ting any. — Am  I  wrong  in  thinking  that  M.  Cousin  would  not  repudiate 
this  doctrine  ?] 

20 


458  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED. 

philosophy  of  Existence,  is  virtually  the  doctrine  of  the  uncondi- 
tioned. From  Xenophanes  to  Leibnitz,  the  infinite,  the  absolute, 
the  unconditioned,  formed  the  highest  principle  of  speculation ; 
but  from  the  dawn  of  philosophy  in  the  school  of  Elea  until  the 
rise  of  the  Kantian  philosophy,  no  serious  attempt  was  made  to 
investigate  the  nature  and  origin  of  this  notion  (or  notions)  as  a 
psychological  phenomenon.  Before  Kant,  philosophy  was  rather 
a  deduction  from  principles,  than  an  inquiry  concerning  princi- 
ples themselves.  At  the  head  of  every  system  a  cognition  figured 
which  the  philosopher  assumed  in  conformity  to  his  views  ;  but 
it  was  rarely  considered  necessary,  and  more  rarely  attempted,  to 
ascertain  the  genesis,  and  determine  the  domain,  of  this  notion 
or  judgment,  previous  to  application.  In  his  first  Critique,  Kant 
undertakes  a  regular  survey  of  consciousness.  He  professes  to 
analyze  the  conditions  of  human  knowledge, — to  mete  out  its 
limits, — to  indicate  its  point  of  departure, — and  to  determine  its 
possibility.  That  Kant  accomplished  much,  it  would  be  preju- 
dice to  deny  ;  nor  is  his  service  to  philosophy  the  less,  that  his 
success  has  been  more  decided  in  the  subversion  of  error  than  in 
the  establishment  of  truth.  The  result  of  his  examination  was 
the  abolition  of  the  metaphysical  sciences, — of  rational  psycholo- 
gy, ontology,  speculative  theology,  <fec.,  as  founded  on  mere  peti- 
tianes  principiorum.  Existence  is  revealed  to  us  only  under  spe- 
cific modifications,  and  these  are  known  only  under  the  condi- 
tions of  our  faculties  of  knowledge.  '  Things  in  themselves,'  Mat- 
ter, Mind,  God, — all,  in  short,  that  is  not  finite,  relative,  and  phe- 
nomenal, as  bearing  no  analogy  to  our  faculties,  is  beyond  the 
verge  of  our  knowledge.  Philosophy  was  thus  restricted  to  the 
observation  and  analysis  of  the  phenomena  of  consciousness ;  and 
what  is  not  explicitly  or  implicitly  given  in  a  fact  of  conscious- 
ness, is  condemned,  as  transcending  the  sphere  of  a  legitimate 
speculation.  A  knowledge  of  the  unconditioned  is  declared  im- 
possible ;  either  immediately,  as  a  notion,  or  mediately  as  an  in- 
ference. A  demonstration  of  the  absolute  from  the  relative  is 
logically  absurd ;  as  in  such  a  syllogism  we  must  collect  in  the 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE   CONDITIONED.  459 

conclusion  what  is  not  distributed  in  the  premises  :  And  an  im- 
mediate knowledge  of  the  unconditioned  is  equally  impossible. — 
But  here  we  think  his  reasoning  complicated,  and  his  reduction 
incomplete.  We  must  explain  ourselves. 

While  we  regard  as  conclusive,  Kant's  analysis  of  Time  and 
Space  into  conditions  of  thought,  we  cannot  help  viewing  his  de- 
duction of  the  '  Categories  of  Understanding,'  and  the  '  Ideas  of 
Speculative  Reason,'  as  the  work  of  a  great  but  perverse  inge- 
nuity. The  categories  of  understanding  are  merely  subordinate 
forms  of  the  conditioned.  Why  not,  therefore,  generalize  the 
Condition — Existence  conditioned,  as  the  supreme  category,  or 
categories,  of  thought? — and  if  it  were  necessary  to  analyze  this 
form  into  its  subaltern  applications,  why  not  develop  these  im- 
mediately out  of  the  generic  principle,  instead  of  preposterously, 
and  by  a  forced  and  partial  analogy,  deducing  the  laws  of  the 
understanding  from  a  questionable  division  of  logical  proposi- 
tions ?  Why  distinguish  Reason  (  Vernunft)  from  Understand- 
ing ( Verstand),  simply  on  the  ground  that  the  former  is  conver- 
sant about,  or  rather  tends  towards,  the  unconditioned  ;  when  it 
is  sufficiently  apparent,  that  the  unconditioned  is  conceived  only 
as  the  negation  of  the  conditioned,  and  also  that  the  conception 
of  contradictories  is  one  ?  In  the  Kantian  philosophy  both  facul- 
ties perform  the  same  function,  both  seek  the  one  in  the  many  ; 
— the  Idea  (Idee)  is  only  the  Concept  (Begriff)  sublimated  into 
the  inconceivable ;  Reason  only  the  Understanding  which  has 
'  overleaped  itself.'  Kant  has  clearly  shown,  that  the  idea  of  the 
unconditioned  can  have  no  objective  reality, — that  it  conveys  no 
knowledge, — and  that  it  involves  the  most  insoluble  contradic- 
tions. But  he  ought  to  have  shown  that  the  unconditioned  had 
no  objective  application,  because  it  had,  in  fact,  no  subjective  af- 
firmation,— that  it  afforded  no  real  knowledge,  because  it  con- 
tained nothing  even  conceivable, — and  that  it  is  self-contradicto- 
ry, because  it  is  not  a  notion,  either  simple  or  positive,  but  only 
a  fasciculus  of  negations — negations  of  the  conditioned  in  its  op- 
posite extremes,  and  bound  together  merely  by  the  aid  of  Ian- 


460  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE  CONDITIONED. 

guage  and  their  common  character  of  incomprehensibility.  And 
while  he  appropriated  Reason  as  a  specific  faculty  to  take  cogni- 
zance of  these  negations,  hypostatized  as  positive,  under  the  Platon- 
ic name  of  Ideas  ;  so  also,  as  a  pendant  to  his  deduction  of  the  cat- 
egories of  Understanding  from  a  logical  division  of  propositions, 
he  deduced  the  classification  and  number  of  these  ideas  of  Reason 
from  a  logical  division  of  syllogisms. — Kant  thus  stands  interme- 
diate between  those  who  view  the  notion  of  the  absolute  as  the 
instinctive  affirmation  of  an  encentric  intuition,  and  those  who 
regard  it  as  the  factitious  negative  of  an  eccentric  generaliza- 
tion. 

Were  we  to  adopt  from  the  Critical  Philosophy  the  idea  of 
analyzing  thought  into  its  fundamental  conditions,  and  were  we 
to  carry  the  reduction  of  Kant  to  what  we  think  its  ultimate  sim- 
plicity, we  would  discriminate  thought  into  positive  and  negative, 
according  as  it  is  conversant  about  the  conditioned  or  uncondi- 
tioned. This,  however,  would  constitute  a  logical,  not  a  psycho- 
logical distinction  ;  as  positive  and  negative  in  thought  are  known 
at  once,  and  by  the  same  intellectual  act.  The  twelve  Categories 
of  the  Understanding  would  be  thus  included  under  the  former ; 
the  three  Ideas  of  Reason  under  the  latter  ;  and  to  this  intent  the 
contrast  between  understanding  and  reason  would  disappear. 
Finally,  rejecting  the  arbitrary  limitation  of  time  and  space  to  the 
sphere  of  sense,  we  would  express  under  the  formula  of — The 
CONDITIONED  in  TIME  and  SPACE — a  definition  of  the  conceiv- 
able, and  an  enumeration  of  the  three  categories  of  thought.1 

The  imperfection  and  partiality  of  Kant's  analysis  are  betrayed 
in  its  consequences.  His  doctrine  leads  to  absolute  skepticism. 
Speculative  reason,  on  Kant's  own  admission,  is  an  organ  of 
mere  delusion.  The  idea  of  the  unconditioned,  about  which  it  is 
conversant,  is  shown  to  involve  insoluble  contradictions,  and  yet 
to  be  the  legitimate  product  of  intelligence.  Hume  has  well  ob- 


1  See  the  next  chapter,  §  I.,  for  a  more  matured  view  of  these  categories  or 
conditions  of  thought. —  W. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE  CONDITIONED.  461 

served,  '  that  it  matters  not  whether  we  possess  a  false  reason,  or 
no  reason  at  all.'  If  '  the  light  that  leads  astray,  be  light  from 
heaven,'  what  are  we  to  believe  ?  If  our  intellectual  nature  be 
perfidious  in  one  revelation,  it  must  be  presumed  deceitful  in  all ; 
nor  is  it  possible  for  Kant  to  establish  the  existence  of  God,  Free- 
will, and  Immortality,  on  the  presumed  veracity  of  reason,  in  a 
practical  relation,  after  having  himself  demonstrated  its  mendacity 
in  a  speculative. 

Kant  had  annihilated  the  older  metaphysic,  but  the  germ  of  a 
more  visionary  doctrine  of  the  absolute,  than  any  of  those  refuted, 
was  contained  in  the  bosom  of  his  own  philosophy.  He  had  slain 
the  body,  but  had  not  exorcised  the  spectre  of  the  absolute ;  and 
this  spectre  has  continued  to  haunt  the  schools  of  Germany  even 
to  the  present  day.  The  philosophers  were  not  content  to  aban- 
don their  metaphysic  ;  to  limit  philosophy  to  an  observation  of 
phenomena,  and  to  the  generalization  of  these  phenomena  into 
laws.  The  theories  of  Bouterweck  (in  his  earlier  works),  of  Bar- 
dili,  of  Reinhold,  of  Fichte,  of  Schelling,  of  Hegel,  and  of  sundry 
others,  are  just  so  many  endeavors,  of  greater  or  of  less  ability, 
to  fix  the  absolute  as  a  positive  in  knowledge ;  but  the  absolute, 
like  the  water  in  the  sieves  of  the  Danaides,  has  always  hitherto 
run  through  as  a  negative  into  the  abyss  of  nothing. 

3.  Of  these  theories,  that  of  SCHELLING  is  the  only  one  in  re- 
gard to  which  it  is  now  necessary  to  say  any  thing.  His  opinion 
constitutes  the  third  of  those  enumerated  touching  the  knowledge 
of  the  absolute  ;  and  the  following  is  a  brief  statement  of  its  prin- 
cipal positions : 

While  the  lower  sciences  are  of  the  relative  and  conditioned, 
Philosophy,  as  the  science  of  sciences,  must  be  of  the  absolute — 
the  unconditioned.  Philosophy,  therefore,  supposes  a  science  of 
the  absolute.  Is  the  absolute  beyond  our  knowledge  ? — then  is 
philosophy  itself  impossible. 

But  how,  it  is  objected,  can  the  absolute  be  known  ?  The  ab- 
solute, as  unconditioned,  identical,  and  one,  cannot  be  cognized 
under  conditions,  by  difference  and  plurality.  It  cannot,  there- 


462  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE  CONDITIONED. 

fore,  be  known,  if  the  subject  of  knowledge  be  distinguished 
from  the  object  of  knowledge ;  in  a  knowledge  of  the  absolute, 
existence  and  knowledge  must  be  identical ;  the  absolute  can  only 
be  known,  if  adequately  known,  and  it  can  only  be  adequately 
known,  by  the  absolute  itself.  But  is  this  possible  ?  We  are 
wholly  ignorant  of  existence  in  itself  : — the  mind  knows  nothing, 
except  in  parts,  by  quality,  and  difference,  and  relation  ;  con- 
sciousness supposes  the  subject  contradistinguished  from  the  ob- 
ject of  thought ;  the  abstraction  of  this  contrast  is  a  negation  of 
consciousness ;  and  the  negation  of  consciousness  is  the  annihi- 
lation of  thought  itself.  The  alternative  is  therefore  unavoidable  : 
— either  finding  the  absolute,  we  lose  ourselves  ;  or  retaining  self 
and  individual  consciousness,  we  do  not  reach  the  absolute. 

All  this  Schelling  frankly  admits.  He  admits  that  a  knowledge 
of  the  absolute  is  impossible,  in  personality  and  consciousness: 
he  admits  that,  as  the  understanding  knows,  and  can  know,  only 
by  consciousness,  and  consciousness  only  by  difference,  we,  as  con- 
scious and  understanding,  can  apprehend,  can  conceive  only  the 
conditioned ;  and  he  admits  that,  only  if  man  be  himself  the 
infinite,  can  the  infinite  be  known  by  him  : 

1  Nee  aentire  Deum,  nisi  qtii  pars  ipse  Deornm  est;'* 
('  None  can  feel  God,  who  shares  not  in  the  Godhead.') 

*  [This  line  is  from  Manilius.    But  as  a  statement  of  Schelling's  doctrine 
it  is  inadequate ;  for  on  his  doctrine  the  Deity  can  be  known  only  if  fully 
known,  and  a  full  knowledge  of  deity  is  possible  only  to  the  absolute  deity — 
that  is,  not  to  a  sharer  in  the  Godhead.    Manilius  has  like  wiso'anothcr  (poet- 
ically) laudable  line,  of  a  similar,  though  less  exceptionable,  purport: 
'  Exemplumquo  Dei  quisque  est  in  imagine  parva;" 
('  Each  is  himself  a  miniature  of  God.') 

For  we  should  not  recoil  to  the  opposite  extreme ;  and,  though  man  be  not 
identical  with  the  Deity,  still  is  he  'created  in  the  image  of  God.'  It  is,  in- 
deed, only  through  an  analogy  of  the  human  with  the  Divine  nature,  that  we 
are  percipient  and  recipient  of  Divinity.  As  St.  Prosper  has  it : — '  Nemo 
possidet  Deum,  nisi  qui  possidetur  a  Deo.' — So  Seneca: — 'In  unoqnoque 
virorum  bonorum  habitat  Deus.' — So  Plotinus : — '  Virtue  tending  to  consum- 
mation, and  irradicatcd  in  the  soul  by  moral  wisdom,  reveals  a  God ;  but  a 
God  destitute  of  true  virtue  is  an  empty  name.' — So  Jacobi ; — '  From  the 
enjoyment  of  virtue  springs  the  idea  of  a  virtuous ;  from  the  enjoyment  of 
freedom,  the  idea  of  a  free  ;  from  the  enjoyment  of  life,  the  idea  of  a  living; 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE  CONDITIONED.  463 

But  Schelling  contends  that  there  is  a  capacity  of  knowledge 
above  consciousness,  and  higher  than  the  understanding,  and  that 
this  knowledge  is  competent  to  human  reason,  as  identical  with 
the  Absolute  itself.  In  this  act  of  knowledge,  which,  after  Fichte, 
he  calls  the  Intellectual  Intuition,  there  exists  no  distinction  of 
subject  and  object, — no  contrast  of  knowledge  and  existence ;  all 
difference  is  lost  in  absolute  indifference, — all  plurality  in  abso- 
lute unity.  The  Intuition  itself, — Reason, — and  the  Absolute  are 
identified.  The  absolute  exists  only  as  known  by  reason,  and 
reason  knows  only  as  being  itself  the  absolute. 

This  act  (act !)  is  necessarily  ineffable : 

'  The  vision  and  the  faculty  divine,' 

to  be  known,  must  be  experienced.  It  cannot  be  conceived  by 
the  understanding,  because  beyond  its  sphere ;  it  cannot  be  de- 
scribed, because  its  essence  is-identity,  and  all  description  supposes 
discrimination.  To  those  who  are  unable  to  rise  beyond  a  philos- 
ophy of  reflection,  Schelling  candidly  allows  that  the  doctrine  of 
the  absolute  can  appear  only  a  series  of  contradictions ;  and  he 
has  at  least  the  negative  merit  of  having  clearly  exposed  the  im- 
possibility of  a  philosophy  of  the  unconditioned,  as  founded  on  a 
knowledge  by  difference,  if  he  utterly  fails  in  positively  proving 
the  possibility  of  such  a  philosophy,  #s  founded  on  a  knowledge 
in  identity,  through  an  absorption  into,  and  vision  of,  the  absolute. 

from  the  enjoyment  of  the  divine,  the  idea  of  a  godlike — and  of  a  God.' — 
So  Goethe: 

4  Waer  nicht  das  Auge  sonnenhaft, 

Wie  koennten  wir  das  Licht  erblicken  ? 

Lebt'  nicht  in  uns  des  Gottes  eigne  Kraft, 

Wie  koennte  uns  das  Goettliches  entzuecken?' 

So  Kant  and  many  others.  (Thus  morality  and  religion,  necessity  and 
atheis7n,  rationally  go  together.) — The  Platonists  and  Fathers  have  indeed 
finely  said,  that '  God  is  the  life  of  the  soul,  as  the  soul  is  the  life  of  the 
body.' 

'  Vita  Animse  Deus  est ;  hsec  Corporis.    Hue  fugiente, 

Solvitur  hoc ;  peril  hsec,  clestituente  Deo.' 

These  verses  are  preserved  to  us  from  an  ancient  poet  by  John  of  Salisbury, 
and  they  denote  the  comparison  of  which  Buchanan  has  made  so  admirable 
a  use  in  his  Calvini  Epicedium.] 


464  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE  CONDITIONED. 

Out  of  Laputa  or  the  Empire  it  would  be  idle  to  enter  into  an 
articulate  refutation  of  a  theory,  which  founds  philosophy  on  the 
annihilation  of  consciousness,  and  on  the  identification  of  the  un- 
conscious philosopher  with  God.  The  intuition  of  the  absolute 
is  manifestly  the  work  of  an  arbitrary  abstraction,  and  of  a  self- 
delusive  imagination.  To  reach  the  point  of  indifference, — by 
abstraction  we  annihilate  the  object,  and  by  abstraction  we  anni- 
hilate the  subject,  of  consciousness.  But  what  remains  ? — Noth- 
ing. '  Nil  conscimus  nobis.'  We  then  hypostatize  the  zero ;  we 
baptize  it  with  the  name  of  Absolute  ;  and  conceit  ourselves  that 
we  contemplate  absolute  exigence,  when  we  only  speculate  abso- 
lute privation.*  This  truth  has  been  indeed  virtually  confessed 
by  the  two  most  distinguished  followers  of  Schelling.  Hegel  at 
last  abandons  the  intuition,  and  regards  '•pure  or  undetermined 
existence1  as  convertible  with  'pure  nothing ;'  whilst  Oken,  if  he 
adhere  to  the  intuition,  intrepidly  identifies  the  Deity  or  Absolute 
with  zero.  God,  he  makes  the  Nothing,  the  Nothing,  he  makes 
God; 

'  And  Naught 
Is  every  thing,  and  every  thing  is  Naught.'t 

*  [The  Infinite  and  Absolute  are  only  the  names  of  two  counter  imbecili- 
ties of  the  human  mind,  transmuted  into  properties  of  the  nature  of  tilings, — 
of  two  subjective  negations,  converted  into  objective  affirmations.  We  tire 
ourselves,  either  in  adding  to,  or  in  taking  from.  Some^  more  reasonably, 
call  the  thing  uufinishable — infinite  ;  others,  less  rationally,  call  it  finished — 
absolute.  But  in  both  cases,  the  metastasis  is  in  itself  irrational.  Not,  how- 
ever, in  the  highest  degree ;  for  the  subjective  contradictories  were  not  at  first 
objectified  by  the  same  philosophers ;  and  it  is  the  crowning  irrationality  of 
the  Infinite-absolutists,  that  they  have  not  merely  accepted  as  objective  what 
is  only  subjective,  but  quietly  assumed  as  the  same,  what  are  not  only  differ- 
ent but  conflictive,  not  only  conflictive,  but  repugnant.  Seneca  (Ep.  118)  has 
given  the  true  genealogy  of  the  original  fictions ;  but  at  his  time  the  consum- 
inative  union  of  the  two  had  not  been  attempted.  '  Ubi  animus  aliquid  diu 
protulit,  et  magnitudinein  ejus  sequendo  lassatus  est,  infinitum,  coepit  vocari. 
Eodem  modo,  aliquid  difficulter  secari  cogitavimus,  novissime,  crescente 
difficultate,  insecdbtte  inventum  est.'] 

t  [From  the  Rejected  Addresses.  *Their  ingenious  authors  have  embodied 
a  jest  in  the  very  words  by  which  Oken,  in  sober  seriousness,  propounds  the 
first  and  greatest  of  philosophical  truths.  Jacobi  (or  Neeb  ?)  might  well  say, 
that,  in  reading  this  last  consummation  of  German  speculation,  he  did  not 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  CONDITIONED.  465 

Nor  does  the  negative  chimera  prove  less  fruitful  than  the  posi- 
tive ;  for  Schelling  has  found  it  as  difficult  to  evolve  the  one  into 
the  many,  as  his  disciples  to  deduce  the  universe  and  its  contents 
from  the  first  self-affirmation  of  the  '  primordial  Nothing.' 

'  Hiri  homines !  NiMl  esse  aliquid  statuantve  negentve ; 
Quodque  negant  statuunt,  quod  statuuntque  negant.' 

To  Schelling,  indeed,  it  has  been  impossible,  without  gratuitous 
and  even  contradictory  assumptions,  to  explain  the  deduction  of 
the  finite  from  the  infinite.  By  no  salto  mortale  has  he  been  able 
to  clear  the  magic  circle  in  which  he  had  inclosed  himself.  Un- 
able to  connect  the  unconditioned  and  the  conditioned  by  any 
natural  correlation,  he  has  variously  attempted  to  account  for  the 
phenomenon  of  the  universe,  either  by  imposing  a  necessity  of 
self-manifestation  on  the  absolute,  i.  e.  by  conditioning  the  uncon- 
ditioned ;  or  by  postulating  a  fall  of  the  finite  from  the  infinite, 
i.  e.  by  begging  the  very  fact  which  his  hypothesis  professed  its 
exclusive  ability  to  explain.  The  veil  of  Isis  is  thus  still  unwith- 
drawn  ;*  and  the  question  proposed  by  Orpheus  at  the  dawn  of 
speculation  will  probably  remain  unanswered  at  its  setting : 

'  FI5f  £1  noi  tv  TI  T&  itdvr'  eirrai  /cat  ^wptj  txaffrov ;' 
('  How  can  I  think  each,  separate,  and  all,  one?') 

In  like  manner,  annihilating  consciousness  in  order  to  recon- 

kn'ow  whether  he  were  standing  on  his  head  or  his  feet.  The  book  in  which 
Oken  so  ingeniously  deduces  the  All  from  the  Nothing,  has,  I  see,  been  lately 
translated  into  English,  and  published  by  the  Eay  Society  (I  think).  The 
statement  of  the  paradox  is,  indeed,  somewhat  softened  in  the  second  edi- 
tion, from  which,  I  presume,  the  version  is  made.  Not  that  Oken  and  Hegel 
are  original  even  in  the  absurdity.  For  as  Varro  right  truly  said :— '  Niliil 
tarn  absurde  dici  potest,  quod  non  dicatur  ab  aliquo  philosophorum  ;'  so  the 
Intuition  of  God  =•  the  Absolute,  =—  the  Nothing,  we  find  asserted  by  the 
lower  Platonists,  by  the  Buddhists,  and  by  Jacob  Boehme.] 

*  [Isis  appears  as  the  jEgypto-Grecian  symbol  of  the  Unconditioned. 
(TIojj — 'I(rta — Qtiaia:  "lorctov, — yvSiais  rov  Svrof.  Plut.  I.  CtO.)  In  the  temple 
of  Athene-Isis,  at  Sais,  on  the  fane  there  stood  this  sublime  inscription : 

I  AM  ALL  THAT  WAS,  AND  IS,  AND  SHALL  BE  ; 
NOB  MY  VEIL,  HAS  IT  BEEN  WITHDRAWN  BY  MORTAL. 

('  'Ey<5  tlpi  ttav  TO  yeyovbs,  *at  Sv,  Kal  iffdftivov,  Kat  rbv  tfidv  vliihor  obSeli  ira 
Ovqri);  dir«dXvi//e.')] 

20* 


466 


PHILOSOPHY    OF  THE   CONDITIONED. 


struct  it,  Schelling  has  never  yet  been  able  to  connect  the  faculties 
conversant  about  the  conditioned,  with  the  faculty  of  absolute 
knowledge.  One  simple  objection  strikes  us  as  decisive,  although 
we  do  not  remember  to  have  seen  it  alleged.  '  We  awaken,'  says 
Schelling, l  from  the  Intellectual  Intuition  as  from  a  state  of  death  ; 
we  awaken  by  Reflection,  that  is,  through  a  compulsory  return  to 
ourselves.'*  We  cannot,  at  the  same  moment,  be  in  the  intel- 
lectual intuition  and  in  common  consciousness ;  we  must  there- 
fore be  able  to  connect  them  by  an  act  of  memory — of  recollection. 
But  how  can  there  be  a  remembrance  of  the  absolute  and  its  intu- 
ition ?  as  out  of  time,  and  space,  and  relation,  and  difference,  it 
is  admitted  that  the  absolute  cannot  be  construed  to  the  under- 
standing. But  as  remembrance  is  only  possible  under  the  con- 
ditions of  the  understanding,  it  is  consequently  impossible  to  re- 
member any  thing  anterior  to  the  moment  when  we  awaken  into 
consciousness ;  and  the  clairvoyaiice  of  the  absolute,  even  granting 
its  reality,  is  thus,  after  the  crisis,  as  if  it  had  never  been.  We 
defy  all  solution  of  this  objection. 

4.  What  has  now  been  stated  may  in  some  degree  enable  the 
reader  to  apprehend  the  relations  in  which  our  author  stands, 
both  to  those  who  deny  and  to  those  who  admit  a  knowledge  of 
the  absolute.  If  we  compare  the  philosophy  of  COUSIN  with  the 
philosophy  of  Schelling,  we  at  once  perceive  that  the  former  is  a 
disciple,  though  by  no  means  a  servile  disciple,  of  the  latter. 
The  scholar,  though  enamored  with  his  master's  system  as  a 
whole,  is  sufficiently  aware  of  the  two  insuperable  difficulties  of 
that  theory.  He  saw  that  if  he  pitched  the  absolute  so  high,  it 
was  impossible  to  deduce  from  it  the  relative ;  and  he  felt,  prob- 
ably, that  the  Intellectual  Intuition — a  stumbling-block  to  him- 
self— would  be  arrant  foolishness  in  the  eyes  of  his  countrymen. 
Cousin  and  Schelling  agree,  that  as  philosophy  is  the  science  of 
the  unconditioned,  the  unconditioned  must  be  within  the  com- 
pass of  science.  They  agree  that  the  unconditioned  is  known, 

*  In  Fichte's  u.  Nicthhammcr's  Phil.  Journ.,  vol.  iii.  p.  214. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   CONDITIONED.  467 

and  immediately  known ;  and  they  agree  that  intelligence,  as 
competent  to  the  unconditioned,  is  impersonal,  infinite,  divine. 
But  while  they  coincide  in  the  fact  of  the  absolute,  as  known, 
they  are  diametrically  opposed  as  to  the  mode  in  which  they 
attempt  to  realize  this  knowledge ;  each  regarding,  as  the  climax 
of  contradiction,  the  manner  in  which  the  other  endeavors  to 
bring  human  reason  and  the  absolute  into  proportion.  Accord- 
ing to  Schelling,  Cousin's  absolute  is  only  a  relative ;  according 
to  Cousin,  Schelling's  knowledge  of  the  absolute  is  a  negation  of 
thought  itself.  Cousin  declares  the  condition  of  all  knowledge 
to  be  plurality  and  difference ;  and  Schelling,  that  the  condition, 
under  which  alone  a  knowledge  of  the  absolute  becomes  possible, 
is  indifference  and  unity.  The  one  thus  denies  a  notion  of  the 
absolute  to  consciousness ;  whilst  the  other  affirms  that  conscious- 
ness is  implied  in  every  act  of  intelligence.  Truly,  we  must  view 
each  as  triumphant  over  the  other ;  and  the  result  of  this  mutual 
neutralization  is — that  the  absolute,  of  which  both  assert  a 
knowledge,  is  for  us  incognizable.* 

*  ['  Quod  genus  hoc  pugnse,  qua  victor  victus  uterque !' 

is  still  further  exhibited  in  the  mutual  refutation  of  the  two  great  apostles 
of  the  Absolute,  in  Germany — Schelling  and  Hegel.  They  were  early 
friends — contemporaries  at  the  same  university — occupiers  of  the  same 
bursal  room  (college  chums) :  Hegel,  somewhat  the  elder  man,  was  some- 
what the  younger  philosopher ;  and  they  were  joint  editors  of  the  journal  in 
which  their  then  common  doctrine  was  at  first  promulgated.  So  far  all  was 
in  unison ;  but  now  they  separated,  locally  and  in  opinion.  Both,  indeed, 
stuck  to  the  Absolute,  but  each  regarded  the  way  in  which  the  other  pro- 
fessed to  reach  it  as  absurd.  Hegel  derided  the  Intellectual  Intuition  of 
Schelling,  as  a  poetical  play  of  fancy ;  Schelling  derided  the  Dialectic  of 
Hegel  as  a  logical  play  with  words.  Both,  I  conceive,  were  right;  but 
neither  fully  right.  If  Schelling's  Intellectual  Intuition  were  poetical,  it  was 
a  poetry  transcending,  in  fact  abolishing,  human  imagination.  If  Hegel's 
Dialectic  were  logical,  it  was  a  logic  outraging  that  science  and  the  condi- 
tions of  thought  itself.  Hegel's  whole  philosophy  is  indeed  founded  on  two 
errors ; — on  a  mistake  in  logic,  and  on  a  violation  of  logic.  In  his  dream  of 
disproving  the  law  of  Excluded  Middle  (between  two  Contradictories),  he 
inconceivably  mistakes  Contraries  for  Contradictories  ;  and  in  positing  pure 
or  absolute  existence  as  a  mental  datum,  immediate,  intuitive,  and  above 
proof  (though,  in  truth,  this  be  palpably  a  mere  relative  gained  by  a  process 
of  abstraction),  he  not  only  mistakes  the  fact,  but  violates  the  logical  law 


468  PHILOSOPHY    OF  THE   CONDITIONED. 

In  these  circumstances,  we  might  expect  our  author  to  have 
stated  the  difficulties  to  which  his  theory  was  exposed  on  the  one 
side  and  on  the  other ;  and  to  have  endeavored  to  obviate  the 
objections,  both  of  his  brother  absolutists,  and  of  those  who  alto- 
gether deny  a  philosophy  of  the  unconditioned.  This  he  has  not 
done.  The  possibility  of  reducing  the  notion  of  the  absolute  to 
a  negative  conception  is  never  once  contemplated ;  and  if  one  or 
two  allusions  (not  always,  perhaps,  correct)  are  made  to  his  doc- 
trine, the  name  of  Schelling  does  not  occur,  as  we  recollect,  in  the 
whole  compass  of  these  lectures.  Difficulties,  by  which  either  the 
doctrine  of  the  absolute  in  general,  or  his  own  particular  modifi- 
cation of  that  doctrine,  may  be  assailed,  are  either  avoided  or 
solved  only  by  still  greater.  Assertion  is  substituted  for  proof; 
facts  of  consciousness  are  alleged,  which  consciousness  never 
knew  ;  and  paradoxes,  that  baffle  argument,  are  promulgated  as 
intuitive  truths,  above  the  necessity  of  confirmation.  With  every 
feeling  of  respect  for  M.  Cousin  as  a  man  of  learning  and  genius, 
we  must  regard  the  grounds  on  which  he  endeavors  to  establish 
his  doctrine  as  assumptive,  inconsequent,  and  erroneous.  In  vin- 
dicating the  truth  of  this  statement,  we  shall  attempt  to  show : — 
in  the  first  place,  that  M.  Cousin  is  at  fault  in  all  the  authorities 
he  quotes  in  favor  of  the  opinion,  that  the  absolute,  infinite, 
unconditioned,  is  a  primitive  notion,  cognizable  by  our  intellect ; 
in  the  second,  that  his  argument  to  prove  the  correality  of  his 
three  ideas  proves  directly  the  reverse ;  in  the  third,  that  the 
conditions  under  which  alone  he  allows  intelligence  to  be  possi- 
ble, necessarily  exclude  the  possibility  of  a  knowledge,  not  to  say 
a  conception,  of  the  absolute  ;  and  in  the  fourth,  that  the  abso- 
lute, as  defined  by  him,  is  only  a  relative  and  a  conditioned. 

which  prohibits  us  to  assume  the  principle  which  it  behooves  us  to  prove. 
On  these  two  fundamental  errors  rests  Hegel's  dialectic ;  and  Hegel's  dialec- 
tic is  the  ladder  by  which  he  attempts  to  scale  the  Absolute. — The  peculiar 
doctrine  of  these  two  illustrious  thinkers  is  thus  to  me  only  another  mani- 
festation of  an  occurrence  of  the  commonest  in  human  speculation ;  it  is 
only  a  sophism  of  relative  self-love,  victorious  over  the  absolute  love  of 
truth : — '  Quod  volant  sapiunt,  et  nolunt  sapcre  quse  vera  sunt.'] 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED.  469 

In  the  first  place,  then,  M.  Cousin  supposes  that  Aristotle  and 
Kant,  in  their  several  categories,  equally  proposed  an  analysis  of 
the  constituent  elements  of  intelligence;  and  he  also  supposes 
that  each,  like  himself,  recognized  among  these  elements  the 
notion  of  tlie  infinite,  absolute,  unconditioned.  In  both  these 
suppositions  we  think  him  wrong. 

It  is  a  serious  error  in  a  historian  of  philosophy  to  imagine 
that,  in  his  scheme  of  categories,  Aristotle  proposed,  like  Kant, 
'  an  analysis  of  the  elements  of  human  reason.'  It  is  just,  how- 
ever, to  mention  that  in  this  mistake  M.  Cousin  has  been  pre- 
ceded by  Kant  himself.  But  the  ends  proposed  by  the  two  phi- 
losophers were  different,  even  opposed.  In  their  several  tables  : 
— Aristotle  attempted  a  synthesis  of  things  in  their  multiplicity — 
a  classification  of  objects  real,  but  in  relation  to  thought ; — Kant, 
an  analysis  of  mind  in  its  unity — a  dissection  of  thought,  pure, 
but  in  relation  to  its  objects.  The  predicaments  of  Aristotle  are 
thus  objective,  of  things  as  understood  ;  those  of  Kant  subjective, 
of  the  mind  as  understanding.  The  former  are  results  a  poste- 
riori— the  creations  of  abstraction  and  generalization  ;  the  latter, 
anticipations  a  priori — the  conditions  of  those  acts  themselves. 
It  is  true,  that  as  the  one  scheme  exhibits  the  unity  of  thought 
diverging  into  plurality,  in  appliance  to  its  objects,  and  the  other 
exhibits  the  multiplicity  of  these  objects  converging  towards  unity 
by  a  collective  determination  of  the  mind  ;  while,  at  the  same 
time,  language  usually  confounds  the  subjective  and  objective 
under  a  common  term ; — it  is  certainly  true,  that  some  elements 
in  the  one  table  coincide  in  name  with  some  elements  in  the 
other.  This  coincidence  is,  however,  only  equivocal.  In  reality, 
the  whole  Kantian  categories  must  be  excluded  from  the  Aristo- 
telic  list  as  entia  rationis,  as  notiones  secundce — in  short,  as  deter- 
minations of  thought,  and  not  genera  of  real  things  ;  while  the 
several  elements  would  be  specially  excluded,  as  partial,  privative, 
transcendent,  <kc.  But  if  it  would  be  unjust  to  criticise  the  cate- 
gories of  Kant  in  whole,  or  in  part,  by  the  Aristotelic  canon, 
what  must  we  think  of  Kant,  who,  after  magnifying  the  idea  of 


470  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED. 

investigating  the  forms  of  pure  intellect  as  worthy  of  the  mighty 
genius  of  the  Stagirite,  proceeds,  on  this  false  hypothesis,  to  blame 
the  execution,  as  a  kind  of  patchwork,  as  incomplete,  as  confound- 
ing derivative  with  simple  notions ;  nay,  even,  on  the  narrow 
principles  of  his  own  Critique,  as  mixing  the  forms  of  pure  sense 
with  the  forms  of  pure  understanding  ?*  If  M.  Cousin  also  were 
correct  in  his  supposition  that  Aristotle  and  his  followers  had 
viewed  his  categories  as  an  analysis  of  the  fundamental  forms  of 
thought,  he  would  find  his  own  reduction  of  the  elements  of  rea- 
son to  a  double  principle  anticipated  in  the  scholastic  division  of 
existence  into  ens  per  se  and  ens  per  accidens. 

Nor  is  our  author  correct  in  thinking  that  the  categories  of 
Aristotle  and  Kant  are  complete,  inasmuch  as  they  are  coexten- 
sive with  his  own.  As  to  the  former,  if  the  Infinite  were  not 
excluded,  on  what  would  rest  the  scholastic  distinction  of  ens  cat- 
egoricum  and  ens  transcendens  ?  The  logicians  require  that  pre- 
dicamental  matter  shall  be  of  a  limited  and  finite  nature  ;f  God, 
as  infinite,  is  thus  excluded :  and  while  it  is  evident  from  the 
whole  context  of  his  book  of  categories,  that  Aristotle  there  only 
contemplated  a  distribution  of  the  finite,  so,  in  other  of  his  works, 
he  more  than  once  emphatically  denies  the  infinite  as  an  object 
not  only  of  knowledge,  but  of  thought ; — TO  awsipov  ayvwcvov  77 
a.<K£ipov — TO  ewrsipov  ours  vorjrov,  OUTS  ditfdrjTov.J  But  if  Aristotle 
thus  regards  the  Infinite  as  beyond  the  compass  of  thought,  Kant 
views  it  as,  at  least,  beyond  the  sphere  of  knowledge.  If  M. 


*  See  the  Critik  d.  r.  V.  and  the  Prolegomena. 

t  [M.  Peisse,  in  a  note  here,  quotes  the  common  logical  law  of  categorical 
entities,  well  and  briefly  expressed  in  the  following  verse : 

'Entia  per  scse^finita,  realia,  tota.' 

He  likewise  justly  notices,  that  nothing  is  included  in  the  Aristotelic  cate- 
gories but  what  is  susceptible  of  definition,  consequently  of  analysis.] 

J  Phys.  L.  iii.  c.  1JO,  text.  66,  c.  7,  text.  40.  See  also  Mctaph.  L  ii.  c.  2, 
text.  11.  Analyt.  Post.  L.  i.  c.  20,  text.  39— et  alibi.— [Aristotle's  definition 
of  the  Infinite  (of  the  avttpov  in  contrast  to  the  a6ptarov) — '  that  of  which  there 
is  always  something  beyond,''  may  be  said  to  be  a  definition  only  of  the  Indefi- 
nite. This  I  shall  not  gainsay.  But  it  was  the  only  Infinite  which  he  con- 
templated ;  as  it  is  the  only  Infinite  of  which  we  can  form  a  notion.] 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   CONDITIONED.  4:71 

Cousin  indeed  employed  the  term  category  in  relation  to  the 
Kantian  philosophy  in  the  Kantian  acceptation,  he  would  be  as 
erroneous  in  regard  to  Kant  as  he  is  in  regard  to  Aristotle ;  but 
we  presume  that  he  wishes,  under  that  term,  to  include  not  only 
the  '  Categories  of  Understanding,'  but  the  '  Ideas  of  Reason.'* 
But  Kant  limits  knowledge  to  experience,  and  experience  to  the 
categories  of  the  understanding,  which,  in  reality,  are  only  so 
many  forms  of  the  conditioned ;  and  allows  to  the  notion  of  the 
unconditioned  (corresponding  to  the  ideas  of  reason)  no  objective 
reality,  regarding  it  merely  as  a  regulative  principle  in  the 
arrangement  of  our  thoughts.  As  M.  Cousin,  however,  holds 
that  the  unconditioned  is  not  only  subjectively  conceived,  but 
objectively  known  ;  he  is  thus  totally  wrong  in  regard  to  the  one 
philosopher,  and  wrong  in  part  in  relation  to  the  other. 

In  the  second  place,  our  author  maintains  that  the  idea  of  the 
infinite,  or  absolute,  and  the  idea  of  the  finite,  or  relative,  are 
equally  real,  because  the  notion  of  the  one  necessarily  suggests 
the  notion  of  the  other. 

Correlatives  certainly  suggest  each  other,  but  correlatives  may, 
or  may  not,  be  equally  real  and  positive.  In  thought  contradic- 
tories necessarily  imply  each  other,  for  the  knowledge  of  contra- 
dictories is  one.  But  the  reality  of  one  contradictory,  so  far  from 
guaranteeing  the  reality  of  the  other,  is  nothing  else  than  its  ne- 
gation. Thus  every  positive  notion  (the  concept  of  a  thing  by 
what  it  is)  suggests  a  negative  notion  (the  concept  of  a  thing  by 
what  it  is  not) ;  and  the  highest  positive  notion,  the  notion  of  the 
conceivable,  is  not  without  its  corresponding  negative  in  the  no- 
tion of  the  inconceivable.  But  though  these  mutually  suggest 


*  ['  The  Categories  of  Kant  are  simple  forms  or  frames  (schemata)  of  the 
Understanding  ( Verstand),  under  which,  an  object  to  be  known,  must  be 
necessarily  thought.  Kant's  Jd-eas,  a  word  which  he  expressly  borrowed 
from  Plato,  are  concepts  of  the  Reason  (  Vernunft) ;  whose  objects  transcend- 
ing the  sphere  of  all  experience  actual  or  possible,  consequently  do  not  fall 
under  the  categories,  in  other  words,  are  positively  unknowable.  These 
ideas  are  God,  Matter,  Soul,  objects  which,  considered  out  of  relation,  or  in 
their  transcendent  reality,  are  so  many  phases  of  the  Absolute.'1 — M.  Peisse.] 


472  PHILOSOPHY    OF   THE   COXDFTIONED. 

«>ach  other,  the  positive  alone  is  real ;  the  negative  is  only  an 
abstraction  of  the  other,  and  in  the  highest  generality,  even  an 
abstraction  of  thought  itself.  It  therefore  behooved  M.  Cousin, 
instead  of  assuming  the  objective  correality  of  his  two  elements  on 
the  fact  of  their  subjective  correlation,  to  have  suspected,  on  this 
very  ground,  that  the  reality  of  the  one  was  inconsistent  with  the 
reality  of  the  other.  In  truth,  upon  examination,  it  will  be  found 
that  his  two  primitive  ideas  are  nothing  more  than  contradictory 
relatives.  These,  consequently,  of  their  very  nature,  imply  each 
other  in  thought ;  but  they  imply  each  other  only  as  affirmation 
and  negation  of  the  same. 

We  have  already  shown,  that  though  the  Conditioned  (condi- 
tionally limited)  be  one,  what  is  opposed  to  it  as  the  Uncondition- 
ed, is  plural :  that  the  unconditional  negation  of  limitation  gives 
one  unconditioned,  the  Infinite ;  as  the  unconditional  affirmation 
of  limitation  affords  another,  the  Absolute.  This,  while  it  coin- 
cides with  the  opinion,  that  the  Unconditioned  in  either  phasis  is 
inconceivable,  is  repugnant  to  the  doctrine,  that  the  uncondition- 
ed (absoluto-infinite)  can  be  positively  construed  to  the  mind. 
For  those  who,  with  M.  Cousin,  regard  the  notion  of  the  uncondi- 
tioned as  a  positive  and  real  knowledge  of  existence  in  its  all-com- 
prehensive unity,  and  who  consequently  employ  the  terms  Abso- 
lute, Infinite,  Unconditioned,  as  only  various  expressions  for  the 
same  identity,  are  imperatively  bound  to  prove  that  their  idea  of 
the  One  corresponds — either  with  that  Unconditioned  we  have  dis- 
tinguished as  the  Absolute — or  with  tliat  Unconditioned  ice  have 
distinguished  as  the  Infinite — or  that  it  includes  both, — or  that 
it  excludes  both.  This  they  have  not  done,  and,  we  suspect,  have 
never  attempted  to  do. 

Our  author  maintains,  that  the  unconditioned  is  known  under 
the  laws  of  consciousness ;  and  does  not,  like  Schelling,  pretend 
to  an  intuition  of  existence  beyond  the  bounds  of  space  and  time. 
Indeed,  he  himself  expressly  predicates  the  absolute  and  infinite 
of  these  forms. 

Time  is  only  the  image  or  the  concept  of  a  certain  correlation 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE    CONDITIONED.  473 

of  existences — of  existence  therefore,  pro  tanto,  as  conditioned.  It 
is  thus  itself  only  a  form  of  the  conditioned.  But  let  that  pass. — 
Is,  then,  the  Absolute  conceivable  of  time  ?  Can  we  conceive  time 
as  unconditionally  limited  ?  We  can  easily  represent  to  ourselves 
time  under  any  relative  limitation  of  commencement  and  termina- 
tion ;  but  we  are  conscious  to  ourselves  of  nothing  more  clearly, 
than  that  it  would  be  equally  possible  to  think  without  thought, 
as  to  construe  to  the  mind  an  absolute  commencement,  or  an  ab- 
solute termination,  of  time ;  that  is,  a  beginning  and  an  end, 
beyond  which,  time  is  conceived  as  non-existent.  Goad  imagina- 
tion to  the  utmost,  it  still  sinks  paralyzed  within  the  bounds  of 
time ;  and  time  survives  as  the  condition  of  the  thought  itself  in 
which  we  annihilate  the  universe : 

'  Sur  les  mondes  detruits  le  Temps  dprt  immobile.' 

But  if  the  Absolute  be  inconceivable  of  this  form,  is  the  Infinite 
more  comprehensible  ?  Can  we  imagine  time  as  unconditionally 
unlimited  ? — We  cannot  conceive  the  Infinite  regress  of  time  ;  for 
such  a  notion  could  only  be  realized  by  the  infinite  addition  in 
thought  of  finite  times,  and  such  an  addition  would,  itself,  require 
nn  eternity  for  its  accomplishment.  If  we  dream  of  affecting  this, 
we  only  deceive  ourselves  by  substituting  the  indefinite  for  the  in- 
finite, than  which  no  two  notions  can  be  more  opposed.  The  ne- 
gation of  the  commencement  of  time  involves  likewise  the  affir- 
mation, that  an  infinite  time  has  at  every  moment  already  run ; 
that  is,  it  implies  the  contradiction,  that  an  infinite  has  been  com- 
pleted.— For  the  same  reasons  we  are  unable  to  conceive  an  infi- 
nite progress  of  time ;  while  the  infinite  regress  and  the  infinite 
progress,  taken  together,  involve  the  triple  contradiction  of  an  in- 
finite concluded,  of  an  infinite  commencing,  and  of  two  infinites, 
not  exclusive  of  each  other. 

Sp&ce,  like  time,  is  only  the  intuition  or  the  concept  of  a  cer- 
tain correlation  of  existence — of  existence,  therefore,  pro  tanto, 
as  conditioned.  It  is  thus  itself  only  a  form  of  the  conditioned. 
But  apart  from  this,  thought  is  equally  powerless  in  realizing  a 


4T4  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE  CONDITIONED. 

notion  either  of  the  absolute  totality,  or  of  the  infinite  immensity, 
of  space. — And  while  time  and  space,  as  wholes,  can  thus  neither 
be  conceived  as  absolutely  limited,  nor  as  infinitely  unlimited  ;  s*. 
their  parts  can  be  represented  to  the  mind  neither  as  absolutely 
individual,  nor  as  divisible  to  infinity.  The  universe  cannot  be 
imagined  as  a  whole,  which  may  not  also  be  imagined  as  a  part ; 
nor  an  atom  be  imagined  as  a  part,  which  may  not  also  be  im- 
agined as  a  whole. 

The  same  analysis,  with  a  similar  result,  can  be  applied  to 
cause  and  effect,  and  to  substance  and  phenomenon.  These,  how- 
ever, may  both  be  reduced  to  the  law  itself  of  the  conditioned.1 

The  Conditioned  is,  therefore,  that  only  which  can  be  positive- 
ly conceived  ;  the  Absolute  and  Infinite  are  conceived  only  as  ne- 
gations of  the  conditioned  in  its  opposite  poles. 

Now,  as  we  observed,  M.  Cousin,  and  those  who  confound  the 
absolute  and  infinite,  and  regard  the  unconditioned  as  a  positive 
and  indivisible  notion,  must  show  that  this  notion  coincides 
either,  1°,  with  the  notion  of  the  Absolute,  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
infinite  ;  or  2°,  with  the  notion  of  the  Infinite,  to  the  exclusion  ot 
the  absolute  ;  or  3°,  that  it  includes  both  as  true,  carrying  their, 
up  to  indifference  ;  or  4°,  that  it  excludes  both  as  false.  The  last 
two  alternatives  are  impossible,  as  either  would  be  subversive  ot 
the  highest  principle  of  intelligence,  which  asserts,  that  of  two 
contradictories,  both  cannot,  but  one  must,  be  true.  It  only, 
therefore,  remains  to  identify  the  unity  of  the  Unconditioned  with 
the  Infinite,  or  with  the  Absolute — with  either,  to  the  exclusion 
of  the  other.  But  while  every  one  must  be  intimately  conscious 
of  the  impossibility  of  this,  the  very  fact  that  our  author  and 
other  philosophers  a  priori  have  constantly  found  it  necessary  to 
confound  these  contradictions,  sufficiently  proves  that  neither 
term  has  a  right  to  represent  the  unity  of  the  unconditioned,  to 
the  prejudice  of  the  other. 

The  Unconditioned  is,  therefore,  not  a  positive  concept ;  nor 

1  Bee  the  next  chapter,  §  I.  for  the  applications  of  that  doctrine.—  W. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED.  475 

has  it  even  a  real  or  intrinsic  unity  ;  for  it  only  combines  the  Ab- 
solute and  the  Infinite,  in  themselves  contradictory  of  each  other, 
into  a  unity  relative  to  us  by  the  negative  bond  of  their  incon- 
ceivability. It  is  on  this  mistake,  of  the  relative  for  the  irre- 
spective, of  the  negative  for  the  positive,  that  M.  Cousin's  theory 
is  founded  :  And  it  is  not  difficult  to  understand  how  the  mistake 
originated. 

This  reduction  of  M.  Cousin's  two  ideas  of  the  Infinite  and  Fi- 
nite to  one  positive  conception  and  its  negative,  implicitly  anni- 
hilates also  the  third  idea,  devised  by  him  as  a  connection  be- 
tween his  two  substantive  ideas ;  and  which  he  marvellously  iden- 
tifies with  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect. 

Yet  before  leaving  this  part  of  our  subject,  we  may  observe, 
that  the  very  simplicity  of  our  analysis  is  a  strong  presumption 
in  favor  of  its  truth.  A  plurality  of  causes  is  not  to  be  postula- 
ted, where  one  is  sufficient  to  account  for  the  phenomena  (Entia 
non  sunt  multiplicanda  prceter  necessitatetn)  ;  and  M.  Cousin,  in 
supposing  three  positive  ideas,  where  only  one  is  necessary,  brings 
the  rule  of  parsimony  against  his  hypothesis,  even  before  its  un- 
soundness  may  be  definitely  brought  to  light. 

In  the  third  place,  the  restrictions  to  which  our  author  subjects 
intelligence,  divine  and  human,  implicitly  deny  a  knowledge — 
even  a  concept — of  the  absolute,  both  to  God  and  man.  '  The 
condition  of  intelligence,'  says  M.  Cousin,  lis  difference  ;  and  an 
act  of  knowledge  is  only  possible  where  there  exists  a  plurality 
of  terms.  Unity  does  not  suffice  for  conception ;  variety  is  ne- 
cessary ;  nay  more,  not  only  is  variety  necessary,  there  must  like- 
wise subsist  an  intimate  relation  between  the  principles  of  unity 
and  variety;  without  which,  the  variety  not  being  perceived  by 
the  unity,  the  one  is  as  if  it  could  not  perceive,  and  the  other  as 
if  it  could  not  be  perceived.  Look  back  for  a  moment  into  your- 
selves, and  you  will  find,  that  what  constitutes  intelligence  in  our 
feeble  consciousness,  is,  that  there  are  there  several  terms,  of 
which  the  one  perceives  the  other,  of  which  the  other  is  perceived 
by  the  first :  in  this  consists  self-knowledge, — in  this  consists  self- 


476  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED. 

comprehension, — in  this  consists  intelligence :  intelligence  with- 
out consciousness  is  the  abstract  possibility  of  intelligence,  not  in- 
telligence in  the  act ;  and  consciousness  implies  diversity  and  dif- 
ference. Transfer  all  this  from  human  to  absolute  intelligence ; — 
that  is  to  say,  refer  the  ideas  to  the  only  intelligence  to  which 
they  can  belong.  You  have  thus,  if  I  may  so  express  myself,  the 
life  of  absolute  intelligence ;  you  have  this  intelligence  with  the 
complete  development  of  the  elements  which  are  necessary  for  it 
to  be  a  true  intelligence  ;  you  have  all  the  momenta  whose  rela- 
tion and  motion  constitute  the  reality  of  knowledge.' — In  all  this, 
so  far  as  human  intelligence  is  concerned,  we  cordially  agree  ;  for 
a  more  complete  admission  could  not  be  imagined,  not  only  that 
a  knowledge,  and  even  a  notion,  of  the  absolute  is  impossible  for 
man,  but  that  we  are  unable  to  conceive  the  possibility  of  such  a 
knowledge,  even  in  the  Deity,  without  contradicting  our  human 
conceptions  of  the  possibility  of  intelligence  itself.  Our  author, 
however,  recognizes  no  contradiction  ;  and,  without  argument  or 
explanation,  accords  a  knowledge  of  that  which  can  only  be 
known  under  the  negation  of  all  difference  and  plurality,  to  that 
which  can  only  know  under  the  affirmation  of  both. 

If  a  knowledge  of  the  absolute  were  possible  under  these  con- 
ditions, it  may  excite  our  wonder  that  other  philosophers  should 
have  viewed  this  supposition  as  utterly  impossible ;  and  that 
Schelling,  whose  acuteness  was  never  questioned,  should  have 
exposed  himself  gratuitously  to  the  reproach  of  mysticism,  by  his 
postulating  for  a  few,  and  through  a  faculty  above  the  reach  of 
consciousness,  a  knowledge  already  given  to  all  in  the  fact  of  con- 
sciousness itself.  Monstrous  as  is  the  postulate  of  the  Intellectual 
Intuition,  we  freely  confess  that  it  is  only  through  such  a  faculty 
that  we  can  imagine  the  possibility  of  a  science  of  the  absolute ; 
and  have  no  hesitation  in  acknowledging,  that  if  Schilling's 
hypothesis  appear  to  us  incogitable,  that  of  Cousin  is  seen  to  be 
self-contradictory. 

Our  author  admits,  and  must  admit,  that  the  Absolute,  as  ab- 
solutely universal,  is  absolutely  one  ;  absolute  unity  is  convertible 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   THE   CONDITIONED.  477 

with  the  absolute  negation  of  plurality  and  difference ;  the  abso- 
lute, and  the  knowledge  of  the  absolute,  are  therefore  identical. 
But  knowledge,  or  intelligence,  it  is  asserted  by  M.  Cousin,  sup- 
poses a  plurality  of  terms — the  plurality  of  subject  and  object. 
Intelligence,  whose  essence  is  plurality,  cannot  therefore  be  iden- 
tified with  the  absolute,  whose  essence  is  unity ;  and  if  known, 
the  absolute,  as  known,  must  be  different  from  the  absolute  as 
existing ;  that  is,  there  must  be  two  absolutes — an  absolute  in 
knowledge,  and  an  absolute  in  existence,  which  is  contradictory. 

But  waiving  this  contradiction,  and  allowing  the  non-identity 
of  knowledge  and  existence,  the  absolute  as  known  must  be 
known  under  the  conditions  of  the  absolute  as  existing,  that  is, 
as  absolute  unity.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  asserted,  that  the 
condition  of  intelligence,  as  knowing,  is  plurality  and  difference ; 
consequently  the  condition  of  the  absolute,  as  existing,  and  under 
which  it  must  be  known,  and  the  condition  of  intelligence,  as  ca- 
pable of  knowing,  are  incompatible.  For,  if  we  suppose  the  ab- 
solute cognizable :  it  must  be  identified  either, — 1°,  with  the 
subject  knowing ;  or,  2°,  with  the  object  known ;  or,  3°,  with  the 
indifference  of  both.  The  first  hypothesis,  and  the  second,  are 
contradictory  of  the  absolute.  For  in  these  the  absolute  is  sup- 
posed to  be  known,  either  as  contradistinguished  from  the  know- 
ing subject,  or  as  contradistinguished  from  the  object  known  ;  in 
other  words,  the  absolute  is  asserted  to  be  known  as  absolute 
unity,  i.  e.  as  the  negation  of  all  plurality,  while  the  very  act  by 
which  it  is  known,  affirms  plurality  as  the  condition  of  its  own 
possibility.  The  third  hypothesis,  on  the  other  hand,  is  contra- 
dictory of  the  plurality  of  intelligence  ;  for  if  the  subject  and  the 
object  of  consciousness  be  known  as  one,  a  plurality  of  terms  is 
not  the  necessary  condition  of  intelligence.  The  alternative  is 
therefore  necessary : — Either  the  absolute  cannot  be  known  or 
conceived  at  all ;  or  our  author  is  wrong  in  subjecting  thought  to 
the  conditions  of  plurality  and  difference.  It  was  the  iron  neces- 
sity of  the  alternative  that  constrained  Schelling  to  resort  to  the 
hypothesis  of  a  knowledge  in  identity  through  the  intellectual 


478  PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   CONDITIONED. 

intuition  ;  and  it  could  only  be  from  an  oversight  of  the  main 
difficulties  of  the  problem  that  M.  Cousin,  in  abandoning  the  in- 
tellectual intuition,  did  not  abandon  the  absolute  itself.  For  how 
that,  whose  essence  is  all-comprehensive  unity,  can  be  known  by 
the  negation  of  that  unity  under  the  condition  of  plurality ; — how 
that,  which  exists  only  as  the  identity  of  all  difference,  can  be 
known  under  the  negation  of  that  identity,  in  the  antithesis  of 
subject  and  object,  of  knowledge  and  existence  : — these  are  con- 
tradictions which  M.  Cousin  has  not  attempted  to  solve, — contra- 
dictions which  he  does  not  seem  to  have  contemplated. 

In  the  fourth  place. — The  objection  of  the  inconceivable  nature 
of  Schelling's  intellectual  intuition,  and  of  a  knowledge  of  the 
absolute  in  identity,  apparently  determined  our  author  to  adopt 
the  opposite,  but  suicidal  alternative,  of  a  knowledge  of  the 
absolute  in  consciousness,  and  by  difference. — The  equally  insu- 
perable objection, — that  from  the  absolute  defined  as  absolute, 
Schelling  had  not  been  able,  without  inconsequence,  to  deduce 
the  conditioned,  seems,  in  like  manner,  to  have  influenced  M. 
Cousin  to  define  the  absolute  by  a  relative ;  not  observant,  it 
would  appear,  that  though  he  thus  facilitated  the  derivation  of 
the  conditioned,  he  annihilated  in  reality  the  absolute  itself. — By 
the  former  proceeding,  our  author  virtually  denies  the  possibility 
of  the  absolute  in  thought ;  by  the  latter,  the  possibility  of  the 
absolute  in  existence. 

The  absolute  is  defined  by  our  author,  '  an  absolute  cause, — a 
cause  which  cannot  but  pass  into  act.'' — Now,  it  is  sufficiently 
manifest  that  a  thing  existing  absolutely  (i.e.  not  under  relation), 
and  a  thing  existing  absolutely  as  a  cause,  are  contradictory. 
The  former  is  the  absolute  negation  of  all  relation,  the  latter  is 
the  absolute  affirmation  of  a-  particular  relation.  A  cause  is  a 
relative,  and  what  exists  absolutely  as  a  cause,  exists  absolutely 
under  relation.  Schelling  has  justly  observed,  that  '  he  would 
deviate  wide  as  the  poles  from  the  idea  of  the  absolute,  who 
would  think  of  defining  its  nature  by  the.  notion  of  activity.''  * 

*  Bruno,  p.  171. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   CONDITIONED.  479 

But  he  who  would  define  the  absolute  by  the  notion  of  a  cause, 
would  deviate  still  more  widely  from  its  nature ;  inasmuch  as 
the  notion  of  a  cause  involves  not  only  the  notion  of  a  determi- 
nation to  activity,  but  of  a  determination  to  a  particular,  nay  a 
dependent  kind  of  activity, — an  activity  not  immanent,  but 
transeunt.  What  exists  merely  as  a  cause,  exists  merely  for  the 
sake  of  something  else, — is  not  final  in  itself,  but  simply  a  mean 
towards  an  end ;  and  in  the  accomplishment  of  that  end,  it  con- 
summates its  own  perfection.  Abstractly  considered,  the  effect 
is  therefore  superior  to  the  cause.  A  cause,  as  cause,  may  indeed 
be  better  than  one  or  two  or  any  given  number  of  its  effects. 
But  the  total  complement  of  the  effects  of  what  exists  only  as  a 
cause,  is  better  than  that  which,  ex  hypothesi,  exists  merely  for 
the  sake  of  their  production.  Further,  not  only  is  an  absolute 
cause  dependent  on  the  effect  for  its  perfection, — it  is  dependent 
on  it  even  for  its  reality.  For  to  what  extent  a  thing  exists 
necessarily  as  a  cause,  to  that  extent  it  is  not  all-sufficient  to 
itself ;  since  to  that  extent  it  is  dependent  on  the  effect,  as  on 
the  condition  through  which  alone  it  realizes  its  existence ;  and 
what  exists  absolutely  as  a  cause,  exists,  therefore,  in  absolute 
dependence  on  the  effect  for  the  reality  of  its  existence.  An 
absolute  cause,  in  truth,  only  exists  in  its  effects :  it  never 
is,  it  always  becomes ;  for  it  is  an  existence  in  potentia,  and 
not  an  existence  in  actu,  except  through  and  in  its  effects. 
The  absolute  is  thus,  at  best,  a  being  merely  inchoative  and 
imperfect. 

The  definition  of  the  absolute  by  absolute  cause,  is,  therefore, 
tantamount  to  a  negation  of  itself;  for  it  defines  by  relation 
and  conditions  that  which  is  conceived  only  as  exclusive  of  both. 
The  same  is  true  of  the  definition  of  the  absolute  by  substance. 
But  of  this  we  do  not  speak. 

The  vice  of  M.  Cousin's  definition  of  the  absolute  by  absolute 
cause,  is  manifested  likewise  in  its  applications.  He  maintains 
that  his  theory  can  alone  explain  the  nature  and  relations  of  the 
Deity ;  and  on  its  absolute  incompetency  to  fulfil  the  conditions 


480  PHILOSOPHY   OF    THE   CONDITIONED. 

of  a  rational  theism,  we  are  willing  to  rest  our  demonstration  of 
its  radical  unsoundness. 

'  God,'  says  our  author,  '  creates ;  he  creates  in  virtue  of  his 
creative  power,  and  he  draws  the  universe,  not  from  nonentity, 
but  from  himself,  who  is  absolute  existence.  His  distinguishing 
characteristic  being  an  absolute  creative  force,  which  cannot  but 
pass  into  activity,  it  follows,  not  that  the  creation  is  possible,  but 
that  it  is  necessary? 

We  must  be  very  brief. — The  subjection  of  the  Deity  to  a 
necessity — a  necessity  of  self-manifestation  identical  with  the 
creation  of  the  universe,  is  contradictory  of  the  fundamental  pos- 
tulates of  a  divine  nature.  On  this  theory,  God  is  not  distinct 
from  the  world ;  the  creature  is  a  modification  of  the  creator. 
Now,  without  objecting  that  the  simple  subordination  of  the 
Deity  to  necessity,  is  in  itself  tantamount  to  his  dethronement, 
let  us  see  to  what  consequences  this  necessity,  on  the  hypothesis 
of  M.  Cousin,  inevitably  leads.  On  this  hypothesis,  one  of  two 
alternatives  must  be  admitted.  God,  as  necessarily  determined 
to  pass  from  absolute  essence  to  relative  manifestation,  is  deter- 
mined to  pass  either  from  the  better  to  the  worse,  or  from  the 
worse  to  the  better.  A  third  possibility,  that  both  states  are  equal, 
as  contradictory  in  itself,  and  as  contradicted  by  our  author,  it  is 
not  necessary  to  consider. 

The  first  supposition  must  be  rejected.  The  necessity  in  this 
case  determines  God  to  pass  from  the  better  to  the  worse ;  that 
is,  operates  to  his  partial  annihilation.  The  power  which  com- 
pels this  must  be  external  and  hostile,  for  nothing  operates  wil- 
lingly to  its  own  deterioration ;  and,  as  superior  to  the  pretended 
God,  is  either  itself  the  real  deity,  if  an  intelligent  and  free 
cause,  or  a  negation  of  all  deity,  if  a  blind  force  or  fate. 

The  second  is  equally  inadmissible : — that  God,  passing  into 
the  universe,  passes  from  a  state  of  comparative  imperfection, 
into  a  state  of  comparative  perfection.  The  divine  nature  is 
identical  with  the  most  -perfect  nature,  and  is  also  identical  with 
the  first  cause.  If  the  first  cause  be  not  identical  with  the  most 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED.  481 

perfect  nature,  there  is  no  God,  for  the  two  essential  conditions 
of  his  existence  are  not  in  combination.  Now,  on  the  present 
supposition,  the  most  perfect  nature  is  the  derived  ;  nay  the  uni- 
verse, the  creation,  the  yivo'fisvov,  is,  in  relation  to  its  cause,  the 
real,  the  actual,  the  ovrws  ov.  It  would  also  be  the  divine,  but 
that  divinity  supposes  also  the  notion  of  cause,  while  the  uni- 
verse, ex  hypethesi,  is  only  an  effect. 

It  is  no  answer  to  these  difficulties  for  M.  Cousin  to  say,  that 
the  Deity,  though  a  cause  which  cannot  choose  but  create,  is  not 
however  exhausted  in  the  act ;  and  though  passing  with  all  the 
elements  of  his  being  into  the  universe,  that  he  remains  entire  in 
his  essence,  and  with  all  the  superiority  of  the  cause  over  the 
effect.  The  dilemma  is  unavoidable : — Either  the  Deity  is  in- 
dependent of  the  universe  for  his  being  or  perfection  ;  on  which 
alternative  our  author  must  abandon  his  theory  of  God,  and  the 
necessity  of  creation  :  Or  the  Deity  is  dependent  on  his  manifes- 
tation in  the  universe  for  his  being  or  perfection  ;  on  which  alter- 
native, his  doctrine  is  assailed  by  the  difficulties  previously 
stated. 

The  length  to  which  the  preceding  observations  have  extended, 
prevents  us  from  adverting  to  sundry  other  opinions  of  our 
author,  which  we  conceive  to  be  equally  unfounded. — For  exam- 
ple (to  say  nothing  of  his  proof  of  the  impersonality  of  intelligence, 
because,  forsooth,  truth  is  not  subject  to  our  will),  what  can  be 
conceived  more  self-contradictory  than  his  theory  of  moral  liber- 
ty ?  Divorcing  liberty  from  intelligence,  but  connecting  it  with 
personality,  he  defines  it  to  be  a  cause  which  is  determined  to  act 
by  its  proper  energy  alone.  But  (to  say  nothing  of  remoter 
difficulties)  how  liberty  can  be  conceived,  supposing  always  a 
plurality  of  modes  of  activity,  without  a  knowledge  of  that  plu- 
rality ;  how  a  faculty  can  resolve  to  act  by  preference  in  a  par- 
ticular manner,  and  not  determine  itself  by  final  causes ; — how 
intelligence  can  influence  a  blind  power,  without  operating  as  an 
efficient  cause  ; — or  how.  in  fine,  morality  can  be  founded  on  a 
liberty  which,  at  best,  only  escapes  necessity  by  taking  refuge 

21 


482  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED. 

with  chance : — these  are  problems  which  M.  Cousin,  in  none 
of  his  works,  has  stated,  and  which  we  are  confident  he  is  unable 
to  solve. 

After  the  tenor  of  our  previous  observations,  it  is  needless  to 
say  that  we  regard  M.  Cousin's  attempt  to  establish  a  general 
peace  among  philosophers,  by  the  promulgation  of  his  Eclectic 
theory,  as  a  failure.  But  though  no  converts  to  his  Uncondi- 
tioned, and  viewing  with  regret  what  we  must  regard  as  the  mis- 
application of  his  distinguished  talents,  we  cannot  disown  a  strong 
feeling  of  interest  and  admiration  for  those  qualities,  even  in  their 
excess,  which  have  betrayed  him,  with  so  many  other  aspiring 
philosophers,  into  a  pursuit  which  could  only  end  in  disappoint- 
ment : — we  mean  his  love  of  truth,  and  his  reliance  on  the  pow- 
ers of  man.  Not  to  despair  of  philosophy  is  '  a  last  infirmity  of 
noble  minds.'  The  stronger  the  intellect,  the  stronger  the  confi- 
dence in  its  force ;  the  more  ardent  the  appetite  for  knowledge, 
the  less  are  we  prepared  to  canvass  the  uncertainty  of  the  frui- 
tion. '  The  wish  is  parent  to  the  thought.'  Loth  to  admit 
that  our  science  is  at  best  the  reflection  of  a  reality  we  cannot 
know,  we  strive  to  penetrate  to  existence  in  itself;  and  what  we 
have  labored  intensely  to  attain,  we  at  last  fondly  believe  we 
have  accomplished.  But,  like  Ixion,  we  embrace  a  cloud  for  a 
divinity.  Conscious  only  of,  conscious  only  in  and  through,  lim- 
itation, we  think  to  comprehend  the  infinite  ;  and  dream  even  of 
establishing  the  science — the  nescience  of  man,  on  an  identity 
with  the»  omniscience  of  God.  It  is  this  powerful  tendency  of 
the  most  vigorous  minds  to  transcend  the  sphere  of  our  faculties, 
which  makes  a  '  learned  ignorance'  the  most  difficult  acquire- 
ment, perhaps,  indeed,  the  consummation  of  knowledge.  In 
the  words  of  a  forgotten,  but  acute  philosopher, — ' Mayna, 
immo  maxima  pars  sapicntice  est, — qucedam  cequo  animo  nescire 


1  See  the  next  chapter,  §  2,  for  testimonies  in  regard  to  the  limitation  of 
our  knowledge. —  W. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   CONDITIONED. 


483 


Hie  mundus  est  infinites. 

Infinitas  et  totus  est, 

(Nam  mente  numquam  absolveris  ;) 

Infinitas  et  illius 

Pars  quselibet,  partisque  pars. 

Quod  tangis  est  infinitas  ; 

Quod  cernis  est  infinitas  ; 

Quod  non  vides  corpusculum, 

Sed  mente  sola  concipis, 

Corpusculi  et  corpusculum, 

Huj  usque  pars  corpusculi, 

Partisque  pars,  hujusque  pars, 

In  hacque  parte  quicquid  est, 

Infinitatem  coutiuet. 


INJTNITAS! 

Secare  mens  at  pergito, 
Numquam  secare  desine  ; 
In  sectione  qualibet 
Infinitates  dissecas. 
Quiesce  mens  heic  denique, 
Arctosque  nosce  limites 
Queis  contineris  undique  ; 
Quiesce  mens,  et  limites 
In  orbe  cessa  quserere. 
Quod  quaeris  in  te  repperis: 
In  mente  sunt,  in  mente  sunt, 
Hi,  quos  requiris,  termini  ; 
A  rebus  absunt  limites, 
In  hisce  tantum  infinitas, 
INITNITAS  !    INHNITAS  ! 

Proh,  quantus  heic  acervus  est  ! 

Et  quam  nihil  quod  nostra  mens 

Ex  hoc  acervo  intelligit  ! 

At  ilia  Mens  vah,  qualis  est, 

Conspecta  cui  stant  omnia  ! 

In  singulis  quse  perspicit 

Qusecunque  sunt  in  singulis 

Et  singulorum  singulis  !'] 


CHAPTER    II. 

LIMITATION  OF  THOUGHT  AND  KNOWLEDGE. 

§  I. — A  DOCTRINE  OF  THE    RELATIVE  :   THE   CATEGORIES   OF 
THOUGHT. 

THINKING  (employing  that  terra  as  comprehending  all  our  cog- 
nitive energies')  is  of  two  kinds.  It  is  either  A)  Negative  or  B) 
Positive. 

A.)  Thinking  is  NEGATIVE  (in  propriety,  a  negation  of  thought), 
when  Existence  is  not  attributed  to  an  object.  It  is  of  two  kinds ; 
inasmuch  as  the  one  or  the  other  of  the  conditions  of  positive 
thinking  is  violated.  In  either  case,  the  result  is  Nothing. 

I.)  If  the  condition  of  Non-contradiction  be  not  fulfilled,  there 
emerges  The  really  Impossible,  what  has  been  called  in  the  schools, 
Nihil  purum. 

II.)  If  the  condition  of  Relativity  be  not  purified,  there  results 
The  Impossible  to  thought  ;  that  is,  what  may  exist,  but  what  we 
are  unable  to  conceive  existing.  This  impossible,  the  schools  have 
not  contemplated  ;  we  are,  therefore,  compelled,  for  the  sake  of 
symmetry  and  precision,  to  give  it  a  scholastic  appellation  in  the 
Nihil  cogitabile. 

B.)  Thinking  is  POSITIVE  (and  this  in  propriety  is  the  only 
real  thought),  when  Existence  is  predicated  of  an  object.  By  ex- 
istence is  not,  however,  here  meant  real  or  objective  existence,  but 


1  '  Thought  and  thinking  are  used  in  a  more,  and  in  a  less,  restricted  signi- 
fication. In  the  former  meaning  they  are  limited  to  the  discursive  energies 
alone ;  in  the  latter,  they  are  co-extensive  with  consciousness.  In  the  Car- 
tesian language,  the  term  thought  included  all  of  which  we  are  conscious.' — 
Keid,  pp.  222,  270.—  W. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED.  485 

only  existence  subjective  or  ideal.  Thus,  imagining  a  Centaur  or 
a  Hippogryph,  we  do  not  suppose  that  the  phantasm  has  any 
being  beyond  our  imagination ;  but  still  we  attribute  to  it  an  ac- 
tual existence  in  thought.  Nay,  we  attribute  to  it  a  possible  ex- 
istence in  creation ;  for  we  can  represent  nothing,  which  we  do 
not  think,  as  within  the  limits  of  Almighty  power  to  realize. — 
Positive  thinking  can  be  brought  to  bear  only  under  two  condi- 
tions ;  the  condition  of  I)  Non-contradiction,  and  the  condition 
of  II)  Relativity.  If  both  are  fulfilled,  we  think  Something. 

I.  NON-CONTRADICTION.  This  condition  is  insuperable.  We 
think  it,  not  only  as  a  law  of  thought,  but  as  a  law  of  things  ; 
and  while  we  suppose  its  violation  to  determine  an  absolute  im- 
possibility, we  suppose  its  fulfilment  to  afford  only  the  Not-im- 
possible. Thought  is,  under  this  condition,  merely  explicative  or 
analytic  ;  and  the  condition  itself  is  brought  to  bear  under  three 
phases,  constituting  three  laws :  i.) — the  law  of  Identity  ;  ii.) — 
the  law  of  Contradiction  ;  iii.) — the  law  of  Excluded  Middle. 
The  science  of  these  laws  is  Logic  ;  and  as  the  laws  are  only  ex- 
plicative, Logic  is  only  formal.  (The  principle  of  Sufficient  Rea- 
son* should  be  excluded  from  Logic.  For,  inasmuch  as  this  prin- 
ciple is  not  material  (material = non-formal),  it  is  only  a  deriva- 
tion of  the  three  formal  laws  ;  and  inasmuch  as  it  is  material,  it 
coincides  with  the  principle  of  Causality,  and  is  extra-logical.) 

Though  necessary  to  state  the  condition  of  Non-contradiction, 
there  is  no  dispute  about  its  effect,  no  danger  of  its  violation. 
When  I,  therefore,  speak  of  the  Conditioned,  I  use  the  term  in 


1  Sufficient  Reason=Sum  of  Causes. — '  The  principle  of  the  Sufficient  Rea- 
son (p.  rationis  sufficientis). — called,  likewise,  by  Leibnitz,  that  of  the  Deter- 
mining Reason  (p.  rationis  determinantis) — of  Convenience  (p.  convenientwi) — 
of  Perfection  (p.  perfectionis) — and  of  the  Order  of  Existences  (p.  existentia- 
rum) — is  one  of  the  most  extensive,  not  to  say  ambiguous,  character.  For  it 
is  employed  to  denote,  conjunctly  and  severally,  the  two  metaphysical  or  real 
principles — 1°,  Why  a  thing  is  (principium  or  ratio  essendi) ;  2°,  Why  a 
thing  becomes  or  is  produced  (p.  or  r.Jiendi) ;  and,  3°,  the  logical  or  ideal 
principle,  Why  a  thing  is  known  or  conceived  (p.  or  r.  cognoscendi).''  Reid, 
p.  464.—  W. 


486  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED. 

special  reference  to  Relativity.  By  existence  conditioned,  is  meant, 
emphatically,  existence  relative,  existence  thought  under  relation. 
Relation  may  thus  be  understood  to  contain  all  the  categories  and 
forms  of  positive  thought. 

II.)  RELATIVITY.  This  condition  (by  which,  be  it  observed,  is 
meant  the  relatively  or  conditionally '  relative,  and,  therefore,  not 
even  the  relative,  absolutely  or  infinitely) — this  condition  is  not 
insuperable.  We  should  not  think  it  as  a  law  of  things,  but 
merely  as  a  law  of  thought ;  for  we  find  that  there  are  contradic- 
tory opposites,  one  of  which,  by  the  rule  of  Excluded  Middle, 
must  be  true,  but  neither  of  which  can  by  us  be  positively  thought, 
as  possible. — Thinking,  under  this  condition,  is  ampliative  or  syn- 
thetic. Its  science,  Metaphysic  (using  that  term  in  a  comprehen- 
sive meaning)  is  therefore  material,  in  the  sense  of  non-formal. 
The  condition  of  Relativity,  in  so  far  as  it  is  necessary,  is  brought 
to  bear  under  three  principal  relations ;  the  first  of  which  springs 
from  the  subject  of  knowledge — the  mind  thinking  (the  relation 
of  Knowledge) ;  the  second  and  third  from  the  object  of  knowl- 
edge— the  thing  thought  about  (the  relations  of  Existence). 

(Besides  these  necessary  and  original  relations,  of  which  alone 
it  is  requisite  to  speak  in  an  alphabet  of  human  thought,  there 
are  many  relations,  contingent  and  derivative,  which  we  frequently 
employ  in  the  actual  applications  of  our  cognitive  energies.  Such 
for  example  (without  arrangement),  as — True  and  False,  Good 
and  Bad,  Perfect  and  Imperfect,  Easy  and  Difficult,  Desire  and 
Aversion,  Simple  and  Complex,  Uniform  and  Various,  Singular 
and  Universal,  Whole  and  Part,  Similar  and  Dissimilar,  Congru- 

1  We  can  know,  we  can  conceive,  only  what  is  relative.  Our  knowledge 
of  qualities  or  phenomena  is  necessarily  relative ;  for  these  exist  only  as  they 
exist  in  relation  to  our  faculties.  The  knowledge  or  even  the  conception,  of  a 
substance  in  itself,  and  apart  from  any  qualities  in  relation  to,  and  therefore 
cognizable  or  conceivable  by,  our  minds,  involves  a  contradiction.  Of  such 
we  can  form  ordyanegative  notion ;  that  is,  we  can  merely  conceive  it  as  incon- 
ceivable. But  to  call  this  negative  notion  a  relative  notion,  is  wrong ;  1°,  be- 
cause all  our  (positive)  notions  are  relative ;  and  2°,  because  this  is  itself  a 
negative  notion— i.  e.  no  notion  at  all— simply  because  there  is  no  relation. 
Reid,  p.  828.—  W. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED.  487 

ent  and  Incongruent,  Equal  and  Unequal,  Orderly  and  Disorderly, 
Beautiful  and  Deformed,  Material  and  Immaterial,  Natural  and 
Artificial,  Organized  and  Inorganized,  Young  and  Old,  Male  and 
Female,  Parent  and  Child,  &c.,  <fec.  These  admit  of  classification 
from  different  points  of  view ;  but  to  attempt  their  arrangement 
at  all,  far  less  on  any  exclusive  principle,  would  here  be  manifestly 
out  of  place.) 

i.)  The  relations  of  Knowledge  are  those  which  arise  from  the 
reciprocal  dependence  of  the  subject  and  of  the  object  of  thought, 
SELF  AND  NOT-SELF  {Ego  and  Non-ego, — Subjective  and  Object- 
ive). Whatever  comes  into  consciousness,  is  thought  by  us,  either 
as  belonging  to  the  mental  self,  exclusively  (subjective-subjective), 
or  as  belonging  to  the  not-self,  exclusively  (objectivo-objective), 
or  as  belonging  partly  to  both  (subjective-objective).  It  is  diffi- 
cult, however,  to  find  words  to  express  precisely  all  the  complex 
correlations  of  knowledge.  For  in  cognizing  a  mere  affection  of 
self,  we  objectify  it ;  it  forms  a  subject-object  or  subjective  object, 
or  subjective-subjective  object :  and  how  shall  we  name  and  dis- 
criminate a  mode  of  mind,  representative  of  and  relative  to  a 
mode  of  matter  ?  This  difficulty  is,  however,  strictly  psycholo- 
gical. In  so  far  as  we  are  at  present  concerned,  it  is  manifest  that 
all  these  cognitions  exist  for  us,  only  as  terms  of  a  correlation. 

The  relations  of  Existence,  arising  from  the  object  of  knowledge, 
are  twofold ;  inasmuch  as  the  relation  is  either  Intrinsic  or  Ex- 
trinsic. 

ii.)  As  the  relation  of  Existence  is  Intrinsic,  it  is  that  of  SUB- 
STANCE AND  QUALITY  (form,  accident,  property,  mode,  affection, 
phenomenon,  appearance,  attribute,  predicate,  &c.)  It  may  be 
called  qualitative. 

Substance  and  Quality  are,  manifestly,  only  thought  as  mutual 
relatives.  We  cannot  think  a  quality  existing  absolutely,  in  or 
of  itself.  We  are  constrained  to  think  it,  as  inhering  in  some 
basis,  substratum,  hypostasis,  or  substance ;  but  this  substance 
cannot  be  conceived  by  us,  except  negatively,  that  is,  as  the  un- 


488  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED. 

apparent — the  inconceivable  correlative  of  certain  appearing  qual- 
ities. If  we  attempt  to  think  it  positively,  we  can  think  it  only 
by  transforming  it  into  a  quality  or  bundle  of  qualities,  which, 
again,  we  are  compelled  to  refer  to  an  unknown  substance,  now 
supposed  for  their  incogitable  basis.  Every  thing,  in  fact,  may 
be  conceived  as  the  quality,  or  as  the  substance  of  something  else. 
But  absolute  substance  and  absolute  quality,  these  are  both  in- 
conceivable, as  more  than  negations  of  the  conceivable.  It  is 
hardly  requisite  to  observe,  that  the  term  substance  is  vulgarly 
applied,  in  the  abusive  signification,  to  a  congeries  of  qualities, 
denoting  those  especially  which  are  more  permanent,  in  contrast 
to  those  which  are  more  transitory.  (See  the  treatise  De  Mundo, 
attributed  to  Aristotle,  c.  iv.) 

What  has  now  been  said,  applies  equally  to  Mind  and  Matter. 

As  the  relation  of  Existence  is  Extrinsic,  it  is  threefold  ;  and 
as  constituted  by  three  species  of  quantity,  it  maybe  called  quan- 
titative. It  is  realized  in  or  by:  1°.  Protensive  quantity,  Pro- 
tension  or  Time ;  2°.  Extensive  quantity,  Extension  or  Space ; 
3°.  Intensive  quantity,  Intension  or  Degree.  These  quantities 
may  be  all  considered  either  as  Continuous  or  as  Discrete  ;  and 
they  constitute  the  three  last  great  relations  which  we  have  here 
to  signalize. 

iii.)  TIME,  Protension  or  protensive  quantity,  called  likewise 
Duration,  is  a  necessary  condition  of  thought.  It  may  be  consid- 
ered both  in  itself  and  in  the  things  which  it  contains. 

Considered  in  itself. — Time  is  positively  inconceivable,  if  we 
attempt  to  construe  it  in  thought ; — either,  on  the  one  hand,  as 
absolutely  commencing  or  absolutely  terminating,  or  on  the  other, 
as  infinite  or  eternal,  whether  ab  ante  or  a  post ;  and  it  is  no 
less  inconceivable,  if  we  attempt  to  fix  an  absolute  minimum  or 
to  follow  out  an  infinite  division.  It  is  positively  conceivable  : 
if  conceived  as  an  indefinite  past,  present,  or  future ;  and  as  an 
indeterminate  mean  between  the  two  unthinkable  extremes  of 
an  absolute  least  and  an  infinite  divisibility.  For  thus  it  is 
relative. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   THE   CONDITIONED.  489 

In  regard  to  Time  Past  and  Time  Future  there  is  compara- 
tively no  difficulty,  because  these  are  positively  thought  as  pro- 
tensive  quantities.  But  Time  Present,  when  we  attempt  to 
realize  it,  seems  to  escape  us  altogether — to  vanish  into  nonen- 
tity. The  present  cannot  be  conceived  as  of  any  length,  of  any 
quantity,  of  any  pretension,  in  short,  as  any  thing  positive.  It 
is  only  conceivable  as  a  negation,  as  the  point  or  line  (and  these 
are  only  negations)  in  which  the  past  ends  and  the  future  begins, 
in  which  they  limit  each  other. 

'  Le  moment  ou  je  parle,  est  d6jil  loin  de  moi.' 

In  fact,  we  are  unable  to  conceive  how  we  do  exist ;  and,  specu- 
latively,  we  must  admit,  in  its  most  literal  acceptation — '  Victuri 
semper,  vivimus  nunquam.'  The  Eleatic  Zeno's  demonstration 
of  the  impossibility  of  Motion,  is  not  more  insoluble  than  could 
be  framed  a  proof,  that  the  Present  has  no  reality ;  for  however 
certain  we  may  be  of  both,  we  can  positively  think  neither.  So 
true  is  it  as  said  by  St.  Augustin :  '  What  is  Time, — if  not  asked. 
t  know  ;.  but  attempting  to  explain,  I  know  not.' 

Things  in  Time  are  either  co-inclusive  or  co-exclusive.  Things 
co-inclusive — if  of  the  same  time  are,  pro  tanto,  identical,  appa- 
rently and  in  thought ;  if  of  different  times  (as  causes  and  effect, 
causoK  et  causatum),  they  appear  as  different,  but  are  thought  as 
identical.  Things  co-exclusive  are  mutually,  either  prior  and  pos- 
terior, or  contemporaneous. 

The  impossibility  we  experience  of  thinking  negatively  or  as 
non-existent,  non-existent,  consequently  in  time  (either  past  or 
future),  aught,  which  we  have  conceived  positively  or  as  existent, 
— this  impossibility  affords  the  principle  of  Causality,  &c.  (Spe- 
cially developed  in  the  sequel.) 

Time  applies  to  both  Substance  and  Quality ;  and  includes  the 
other  quantities,  Space  and  Degree. 

iv.) — SPACE,  Extension  or  extensive  quantity  is,  in  like  man- 
ner, a  necessary  condition  of  thought ;  and  may  also  be  consid- 
ered, both  in  itself,  and  in  the  things  which  it  contains. 

21* 


490  PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   CONDITIONED. 

Considered  in  itself. — Space  is  positively  inconceivable  : — as  a 
whole,  either  infinitely  unbounded,  or  absolutely  bounded ;  as  a 
part,  either  infinitely  divisible,  or  absolutely  indivisible.  Space 
is  positively  conceivable : — as  a  mean  between  these  extremes  ; 
in  other  words,  we  can  think  it  either  as  an  indefinite  whole,  or 
as  an  indefinite  part.  For  thus  it  is  relative. 

The  things  contained  in  Space  may  be  considered,  either  in 
relation  to  this  form,  or  in  relation  to  each  other. — In  relation  to 
Space :  the  extension  occupied  by  a  thing  is  called  its  place  ;  and 
a  thing  changing  its  place,  gives  the  relation  of  motion  in  space, 
space  itself  being  always  conceived  as  immovable, 

'stabilisque  manens  dat  cuncta  mover!.' 

— Considered  in  relation  to  each  other.  Things,  spacially,  are 
either  inclusive,  thus  originating  the  relation  of  containing  and 
contained  ;  or  co-exclusive,  thus  determining  the  relation  of  posi- 
tion or  situation — of  here  and  there. 

Space  applies,  proximately,  to  things  considered  as  Substance  ; 
for  the  qualities  of  substances,  though  they  are  in,  may  not  oc- 
cupy, space.  In  fact,  it  is  by  a  merely  modern  abuse  of  the  term, 
that  the  affections  of  Extension  have  been  styled  Qualities.  It 
is  extremely  difficult  for  the  human  mind  to  admit  the  possibility 
of  unextended  substance.  Extension,  being  a  condition  of  posi- 
tive thinking,  clings  to  all  our  conceptions ;  and  it  is  one  merit 
of  the  philosophy  of  the  Conditioned,  that  it  proves  space  to  be 
only  a  law  of  thought,  and  not  a  law  of  things.  The  difficulty 
of  thinking,  or  rather  of  admitting  as  possible,  the  immateriality 
of  the  soul,  is  shown  by  the  tardy  and  timorous  manner  in  which 
the  inextension  of  the  thinking  subject  was  recognized  in  the 
Christian  Church.  Some  of  the  early  Councils  and  most  of  the 
Fathers  maintained  the  extended,  while  denying  the  corporeal, 
nature  of  the  spiritual  principle ;  and,  though  I  cannot  allow, 
that  Descartes  was  the  first  by  whom  the  immateriality  of  mind 
vra&  fully  acknowledged,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  an  assertion 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   CONDITIONED.  491 

of  the  inextension  and  illocality  of  the  soul,  was  long  and  very 
generally  eschewed,  as  tantamount  to  the  assertion  that  it  was  a 
mere  nothing. 

On  space  are  dependent  what  are  called  the  Primary  Qualities 
of  body,  strictly  so  denominated,  and  Space  combined  with  De- 
gree affords,  of  body,  the  Secundo-primary  Qualities.1 

Our  inability  to  conceive  an  absolute  elimination  from  space  of 
aught,  which  we  have  conceived  to  occupy  space,  gives  the  law 
of  what  I  have  called  Ultimate  Incompressibility,  <fec.2 

v.)  DEGREE,  Intension  or  intensive  quantity,  is  not,  like  Time 
and  Space,  an  absolute  condition  of  thought.  Existences  are  not 
necessarily  thought  under  it ;  it  does  not  apply  to  Substance,  but 
to  Quality,  and  that  in  the  more  limited  acceptation  of  the  word. 
For  it  does  not  apply  to  what  have  (abusively)  been  called  by 
modern  philosophers  the  Primary  Qualities  of  body  ;  these  being 
merely  evolutions  of  Extension,  which,  again,  is  not  thought  un- 
der Degree.3  Degree  may,  therefore,  be  thought  as  null,  or  as 
existing  only  potentially.  But  thinking  it  to  be,  we  must  think 
it  as  a  quantity ;  and,  as  a  quantity,  it  is  positively  both  incon- 
ceivable and  conceivable. — It  is  positively  inconceivable :  abso- 
lutely, either  as  least  or  as  greatest ;  infinitely,  as  without  limit, 
either  in  increase  or  in  diminution. — On  the  contrary,  it  is  posi- 
tively conceivable  ;  as  indefinitely  high  or  higher,  as  indefinitely 
low  or  lower. — The  things  thought  under  it ;  if  of  the  same  in- 
tension are  correlatively  uniform,  if  of  a  different  degree,  are  cor- 
relatively  higher  or  lower. 

Degree  affords  the  relations  of  Actuality  and  Potentiality, — of 
Action  and  Passion, — of  Power  active,  and  Power  passive,  &c.,  &c. 

Degree  is,  likewise,  developed  into  what,  in  propriety,  are 
called  the  Secondary  Qualities  of  body;  and  combined  with 
Space,  into  the  Secundo-primary.1 

1  On  this  distinction,  see  Part  Second,  chapter  iii.  pp.  852,  870. —  W. 
»  Ib.  p.  856.—  W.        «  Ib.  p.  854.—  W.       *  Ib.  p.  870,  p.  858,  sq.—  W. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE  CONDITIONED. 

So  much  for  the  Conditions  of  Thinking,  in  detail. 

If  the  general  doctrine  of  the  Conditioned  be  correct,  it  yields 
as  a  corollary,  that  Judgment,  that  Comparison  is  implied  in 
every  act  of  apprehension ;  and  the  fact,  that  consciousness  can- 
not be  realized  without  an  energy  of  judgment,  is,  again,  a  proof 
of  the  correctness  of  the  theory,  asserting  the  Relativity  of 
Thought. 

The  philosophy  of  the  Conditioned  even  from  the  preceding 
outline,  ia,  it  will  be  seen,  the  express  converse  of  the  philosophy 
of  the  Absolute, — at  least,  as  this  system  has  been  latterly  evolved 
in  Germany.  For  this  asserts  to  man  a  knowledge  of  the  Uncon- 
ditioned,— of  the  Absolute  and  Infinite  ;  while  that  denies  to  him 
a  knowledge  of  either,  and  maintains,  all  which  we  immediately 
know,  or  can  know,  to  be  only  the  Conditioned,  the  Relative,  the 
Phenomenal,  the  Finite.  The  one,  supposing  knowledge  to 
be  only  of  existence  in  itself,  and  existence  in  itself  to  be  appre- 
hended, and  even  understood,  proclaims — '  Understand  that  you 
may  believe'  ('  Intellige  ut  credos') ;  the  other,  supposing  that 
existence,  in  itself,  is  unknown,  that  apprehension  is  only  of  phe- 
nomena, and  that  these  are  received  only  upon  trust,  as  incompre- 
hensibly revealed  facts,  proclaims,  with  the  prophet, — '  Believe 
that  ye  may  understand'  ('  Crede  ut  intelligas.'  Is.  vii.  9,  sec. 
Ixx.) — But  extremes  meet.  In  one  respect,  both  coincide ;  for 
both  agree,  that  the  knowledge  of  Nothing  is  the  principle  or  re- 
sult of  all  true  philosophy  : 

'  Scire  NihU,— stadium,  quo  nos  Isetamur  utrique.' 

But  the  one  doctrine,  openly  maintaining  that  the  Nothing 
must  yield  every  thing,  is  a  philosophic  omniscience ;  whereas  the 
other,  holding  that  Nothing  can  yield  nothing,  is  a  philosophic 
nescience.  In  other  words :  the  doctrine  of  the  Unconditioned 
is  a  philosophy  confessing  relative  ignorance,  but  professing  ab- 
solute knowledge  ;  while  the  doctrine  of  the  Conditioned  is  a  phi- 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE  CONDITIONED.  493 

losophy  professing  relative  knowledge,  but  confessing  absolute  ig- 
norance. Thus,  touching  the  absolute :  the  watchword  of  the 
one  is, — '  Noscendo  cognoscitur,  ignorando  ignoratur  ;'  the  watch- 
word of  the  other  is, — '  Noscendo  ignoratur,  ignorando  cognosci- 
tur.' 

But  which  is  true  ?— To  answer  this,  we  need  only  to  examine 
our  own  consciousness  ;  there  shall  we  recognize  the  limited  '  ex- 
tent of  our  tether.' 

'  Tecum  habita,  et  noris  quam  sittibi  curta  supellex.' 

But  this  one  requisite  is  fulfilled  (alas !  )  by  few ;  and  the  same 
philosophic  poet  has  to  lament : 

1  Ut  nemo  in  sese  tentat  descenders, — nemo ; 
Sed  precedent!  spectator  mantica  tergo  !' 

To  manifest  the  utility  of  introducing  the  principle  of  the  Con- 
ditioned into  our  metaphysical  speculations,  I  shall  (always  in 
outline)  give  one  only,  but  a  signal  illustration  of  its  importance. 
— Of  all  questions  in  the  history  of  philosophy,  that  concerning 
the  origin  of  our  judgment  of  Cause  and  Effect  is,  perhaps,  the 
most  celebrated ;  but  strange  to  say,  there  is  not,  so  far  as  I  am 
aware,  to  be  found  a  comprehensive  view  of  the  various  theories, 
proposed  in  explanation,  not  to  say,  among  these,  any  satisfactory 
explanation  of  the  phenomenon  itself. 

The  phenomenon  is  this  : — When  aware  of  a  new  appearance, 
we  are  unable  to  conceive  that  therein  has  originated  any  new 
existence,  and  are,  therefore,  constrained  to  think,  that  what  now 
appears  to  us  under  a  new  form,  had  previously  an  existence 
under  others.  These  others  (for  they  are  always  plural)  are 
called  its  cause ;  and  a  cause  (or  more  properly  causes)  we  cannot 
but  suppose  ;  for  a  cause  is  simply  every  thing  without  which  the 
effect  would  not  result,  and  all  such  concurring,  the  effect  cannot 
but  result.  We  are  utterly  unable  to  construe  it  in  thought  as 
possible,  that  the  complement  of  existence  has  been  either  increased 
or  diminished.  We  cannot  conceive,  either,  on  the  one  hand, 
nothing  becoming  something,  or,  on  the  other,  soniothinj;  becoming 


494  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE    CONDITIONED. 

nothing.  When  God  is  said  to  create  the  universe  out  of  nothing, 
we  think  this,  by  supposing,  that  he  evolves  the  universe  out  of 
himself;  and  in  like  manner,  we  conceive  annihilation,  only  by 
conceiving  the  creator  to  withdraw  his  creation  from  actuality  into 

power. 

'  Nil  posse  creari 
De  Nihilo,  neque  quod  genitu  'st  ad  Nil  revocari ;' 

.'  Gigni 

De  Nihilo  Nihil,  in  Nihilum  Nil  posse  reverti :'— 

— these  lines  of  Lucretius  and  Persius  enounce  a  physical  axiom 
of  antiquity  ;  which,  when  interpreted  by  the  doctrine  of  the  Con- 
ditioned, is  itself  at  once  recalled  to  harmony  with  revealed  truth, 
and  expressing,  in  its  purest  form,  the  conditions  of  human  thought, 
expresses  also,  implicitly,  the  whole  intellectual  phenomenon  of 
causality. 

The  mind  is  thus  compelled  to  recognize  an  absolute  identity 
of  existence  in  the  effect  and  in  the  complement  of  its  causes, — 
between  the  causatum  and  the  causa.  We  think  the  causes  to 
contain  all  that  is  contained  in  the  effect ;  the  effect  to  contain 
nothing  but  what  is  contained  in  the  causes.  Each  is  the  sum  of 
the  other.  '  Omnia  mutantur,  nihil  intent,'  is  what  we  think, 
what  we  must  think ;  nor  can  the  change  itself  be  thought  without 
a  cause.  Our  judgment  of  causality  simply  is  : — We  necessarily 
deny  in  thought,  that  the  object  which  we  apprehend  as  begin- 
ning to  be,  really  so  begins ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  affirm,  as  we 
must,  the  identity  of  its  present  sum  of  being,  with  the  sum  of  its 
past  existence. — And  here,  it  is  not  requisite  for  us  to  know,  under 
what  form,  under  what  combination  this  quantum  previously  ex- 
isted ;  in  other  words,  it  is  unnecessary  for  us  to  recognize  the 
particular  causes  of  this  particular  effect.  A  discovery  of  the 
determinate  antecedents  into  which  a  determinate  consequent 
may  be  refunded,  is  merely  contingent, — merely  the  result  of 
experience ;  but  the  judgment,  that  every  event  should  have  its 
causes,  is  necessary,  and  imposed  on  us,  as  a  condition  of  our 
human  intelligence  itself.  This  necessity  of  so  thinking,  is  the 
only  phenomenon  to  be  explained. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE   CONDITIONED.  495 

Now,  throwing  out  of  account  the  philosophers,  who,  like  Dr. 
Thomas  Brown,*  quietly  eviscerate1  the  problem  of  its  sole  diffi- 
culty, and  enumerating  only  the  theories  which  do  not  accommo- 
date the  phenomenon  to  be  explained  to  their  attempts  at  expla- 
nation,— these  are,  in  all,  seven. 

1°, — And,  in  the  first  place,  they  fall  into  two  supreme  classes. 
The  one  (A)  comprehends  those  theories  which  consider  the  causal 
judgment  as  adventitious,  empirical,  or  a  posteriori,  that  is,  as 
derived  from  experience ;  the  other  (B)  comprehends  those  which 
view  it  as  native,  pure,  or  a  priori,  that  is,  as  a  condition  of  intel- 
ligence itself. — The  two  primary  genera,  are,  however,  severally 
subdivided  into  various  species. 

2°, — The  former  class  (A)  falls  into  two  subordinates ;  inas- 
much as  the  judgment  is  viewed  as  founded  either  on  an  original 
(a)  or  on  a  derivative  (b)  cognition. 

3°, — Each  of  these  is  finally  distributed  into  two ;  according  as 
the  judgment  is  supposed  to  have  an  objective  or  a  subjective  ori- 
gin. In  the  former  case  (a)  it  is  objective,  perhaps  objectivo- 
objective,  (1)  when  held  to  consist  in  an  immediate  apprehension 
of  the  efficiency  of  causes  in  the  external  and  internal  worlds  ; 
and  subjective,  or  rather  subjectivo-objective,  (2)  when  viewed  as 
given  through  a  self-consciousness  alone  of  the  efficiency  of  our 
own  volitions. — In  the  latter  case  (b)  it  is  regarded,  if  objective 
(3),  as  a  product  of  induction  and  generalization  ;  if  subjective 
(4),  as  a  result  of  association  and  custom. 

4°, — In  like  manner,  the  latter  supreme  class  (B)  is  divided 
into  two,  according  as  the  opinions  under  it,  view  in  the  causal 
judgment,  a  law  of  thought : — either  ultimate,  primary  (c)  ;  or 
secondary,  derived  (d). 

*  The  fundamental  vice  of  Dr.  Brown's  theory  has  been,  with  great  acute- 
ness,  exposed  by  his  successor,  Professor  Wilson.  (See  Blackwood's  Maga- 
zine, July  1836,  vol.  xl.  p.  122,  sq.) 

1  '  In  this  theory,  the  phenomenon  to  be  saved  is  silently  or  in  effect  evac- 
uated of  its  principal  quality — the  quality  of  Necessity  ;  for  the  real  problem 
is  to  explain  how  it  is  that  we  cannot  but  think  that  all  which  begins  to  be  has 
not  an  absolute  but  only  a  relative  commencement.  These  pliilosophers  do 
not  anatomize  but  truncate? — Reid,  p.  604. —  W. 


496  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE  CONDITIONED. 

5°, — It  is  a  corollary  of  the  former  doctrine  (c),  (which  is  not 
subdivided),  that  the  judgment  is  a  positive  act,  an  affirmative 
deliverance  of  intelligence  (5). — The  latter  doctrine  (d),  on  the 
other  hand,  considers  the  judgment  as  of  a  negative  character ; 
and  is  subdivided  into  two.  For  some  maintain  that  the  princi- 
ple of  causality  may  be  resolved  into  the  principle  of  Contradic- 
tion, or,  more  properly,  non-contradiction  (6);  whilst,  though 
not  previously  attempted,  it  may  be  argued  that  the  judgment 
of  causality  is  a  derivation  from  the  Condition  of  Relativity  in 
Time  (7). 

First  and  Second  theories. — Of  these  seven  opinions,  the  first 
has  always  been  held  in  combination  with  the  second ;  whereas, 
the  second  has  been  frequently  held  by  those  who  abandon  the 
first  Considering  them  together,  that  is,  as  the  opinion,  that  we 
immediately  apprehend  the  efficiency  of  causes  external  or  inter- 
nal ; — this  is  obnoxious  to  two  fatal  objections. 

The  first  is, — that  we  have  no  such  apprehension,  no  such  ex- 
perience. It  is  now,  indeed,  universally  admitted,  that  we  have 
no  perception  of  the  causal  nexus  in  the  material  world.  Hume 
it  was,  who  decided  the  opinion  of  philosophers  upon  this  point. 
But  though  he  advances  his  refutation  of  the  vulgar  doctrine  as 
original,  he  was,  in  fact,  herein  only  the  last  of  a  long  series  of 
metaphysicians,  some  of  whom  had  even  maintained  their  thesis 
not  less  lucidly  than  the  Scottish  skeptic.  I  cannot  indeed  be- 
lieve, that  Hume  could  have  been  ignorant  of  the  anticipation. — 
But  whilst  surrendering  the  first,  there  are  many  philosophers  who 
still  adhere  to  the  second  opinion ;  a  theory  which  has  been  best 
stated  and  most  strenuously  supported  by  the  late  M.  Maine  de  Bi- 
ran,  one  of  the  acutest  metaphysicians  of  France.  I  will  to  move 
my  arm,  and  I  move  it.  When  we  analyze  this  phenomenon,  says 
De  Biran,  the  following  are  the  results : — 1°,  the  consciousness  of 
an  act  of  will ;  2°,  the  consciousness  of  a  motion  produced ;  3°, 
the  consciousness  of  a  relation  of  the  motion  to  the  volition.  And 
what  is  this  relation  ?  Not  one  of  simple  succession.  The  will 
is  not  for  us  an  act  without  efficiency  ;  it  is  a  productive  energy ; 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED.  497 

so  that,  in  a  volition,  there  is  given  to  us  the  notion  of  cause ;  and 
this  notion  we  subsequently  project  out  from  our  internal  activities 
into  the  changes  of  the  external  world. — But  the  empirical  fact, 
here  asserted,  is  incorrect.  For  between  the  overt  fact  of  corpo- 
real movement,  which  we  perceive,  and  the  internal  act  of  the 
will  to  move,  of  which  we  are  self-conscious,  there  intervenes  a 
series  of  intermediate  agencies,  of  which  we  are  wholly  unaware ; 
consequently,  we  can  have  no  consciousness,  as  this  hypothesis 
maintains,  of  any  causal  connection  between  the  extreme  links  of 
this  chain,  that  is,  between  the  volition  to  move  and  the  arm 
moving.1 

But  independently  of  this,  the  second  objection  is  fatal  to  the 
theory  which  would  found  the  judgment  of  causality  on  any  em- 
pirical apprehension  whether  of  the  phenomena  of  mind  or  of  the 
phenomena  of  matter.  Admitting  the  causal  efficiency  to  be  cog- 
nizable, and  perception  with  self-consciousness  to  be  competent 
for  its  apprehension,  still  as  these  faculties  can  inform  us  only  of 
individual  causations,  the  quality  of  necessity  and  consequent 
universality  by  which  this  judgment  is  characterized  remains 
wholly  unexplained.  (See  Cousin  on  Locke.)  So  much  for  the 
two  theories  at  the  head  of  our  enumeration. 

As  the  first  and  second  opinions  have  been  usually  associated, 
so  also  have  been  the  third  and  fourth. 

Third  theory. — In  regard  to  the  third  opinion  it  is  manifest, 
that  the  observation  of  certain  phenomena  succeeding  certain 
other  phenomena,  and  the  generalization,  consequent  thereon, 
that  these  are  reciprocally  causes  and  effect, — it  is  manifest  that 
this  could  never  of  itself  have  engendered,  not  only  the  strong, 
but  the  irresistible,  conviction,  that  every  event  must  have  its 
causes.  Each  of  these  observations  is  contingent,  and  any  num- 
ber of  observed  contingencies  will  never  impose  upon  us  the  con- 
sciousness of  necessity,  that  is,  the  consciousness  of  an  inability  to 
think  the  opposite.  This  theory  is  thus  logically  absurd.  For  it 

1  See  p.       ,  above. —  W, 


498  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE '  CONDITIONED. 

would  infer  as  a  conclusion,  the  universal  necessity  of  the  causal 
judgment,  from  a  certain  number  of  actual  consecutions  ;  that  is, 
it  would  collect  that  all  must  be,  because  some  are.  Logically 
absurd,  it  is  also  psychologically  false.  For  we  find  no  difficulty 
in  conceiving  the  converse  of  one  or  of  all  observed  consecutions ; 
and  yet,  the  causal  judgment  which,  ex  hypothesi,  is  only  the  re- 
sult of  these  observations,  we  cannot  possibly  think,  as  possibly 
unreal.  We  have  always  seen  a  stone  returning  to  the  ground 
when  thrown  into  the  air ;  but  we  find  no  difficulty  in  represent- 
ing to  ourselves  some  or  all  stones  rising  from  the  earth ;  nay,  we 
can  easily  suppose  even  gravitation  itself  to  be  reversed.  Only, 
we  are  unable  to  conceive  the  possibility  of  this  or  of  any  other 
event, — without  a  cause. 

Fourth  opinion. — Nor  does  the  fourth  theory  afford  a  better 
solution.  The  necessity  of  so  thinking,  cannot  be  derived  from 
a  custom  of  so  thinking.  The  force  of  custom,  influential  as  it 
may  be,  is  still  always  limited  to  the  customary  ;  and  the  custom- 
ary never  reaches,  never  even  approaches,  to  the  necessary.  As- 
sociation may  explain  a  strong  and  special,  but  it  can  never  ex- 
plain a  universal  and  absolutely  irresistible  belief. — On  this  theory, 
also,  when  association  is  recent,  the  causal  judgment  should  be 
weak,  and  rise  only  gradually  into  full  force,  as  custom  becomes 
inveterate.  But  we  do  not  find  that  this  judgment  is  feebler  in 
the  young,  stronger  in  the  old.  In  neither  case,  is  there  less  and 
more ;  in  both  cases  the  necessity  is  complete. — Mr.  Hume  pat- 
ronized the  opinion,  that  the  causal  judgment  is  an  offspring  of 
experience  engendered  upon  custom.  But  those  have  a  sorry  in- 
sight into  the  philosophy  of  that  great  thinker  who  suppose,  like 
Brown,  that  this  was  a  dogmatic  theory  of  his  own,  or  one  con- 
sidered satisfactory  by  himself.  On  the  contrary,  in  his  hands  it 
was  a  reduction  of  the  prevalent  dogmatism  to  palpable  absurd- 
ity, by  showing  out  the  inconsistency  of  its  results.  To  the 
Lockian  sensualism,  Hume  proposed  the  problem, — to  account 
for  the  phenomenon  of  necessity  in  our  thought  of  the  causal 
nexus.  That  philosophy  afforded  no  other  principle  than  the 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   CONDITIONED.  499 

custom  of  experience,  through  which  even  the  attempt  at  a  solu- 
tion could  be  made ;  and  the  principle  of  custom  Hume  shows 
could  never  account  for  the  product  of  any  real  necessity.  The 
alternative  was  plain.  Either  the  doctrine  of  sensualism  is  false ; 
or  our  nature  is  a  delusion.  Shallow  thinkers  admitted  the  latter 
alternative,  and  were  lost ;  profound  thinkers,  on  the  contrary, 
were  determined  to  build  philosophy  on  a  deeper  foundation  than 
that  of  the  superficial  edifice  of  Locke ;  and  thus  it  is,  that  Hume 
has,  immediately  or  mediately,  been  the  cause  or  the  occasion  of 
whatever  is  of  principal  value  in  the  subsequent  speculations  of 
Scotland,  Germany,  and  France. 

Fifth  theory. — In  regard  to  the  second  supreme  genus  (B), 
the  first  of  the  three  opinions  which  it  contains  (the  fifth  in  gen- 
eral) maintains  that  the  causal  judgment  is  a  primary  datum,  a 
positive  revelation  of  intelligence.  To  this  are  to  be  referred  the 
relative  theories  of  Leibnitz,  Reid,  Kant,  Stewart,  Cousin,  and 
the  majority  of  recent  philosophers.  To  this  class  Brown  like- 
wise belongs ;  inasmuch  as  he  idly  refers  what  remains  in  his 
.  hands  of  the  evacuated  phenomenon  to  an  original  belief. 

Without  descending  to  details,  it  is  manifest  in  general,  that 
against  the  assumption  of  a  special  principle,  which  this  doctrine 
makes,  there  exists  a  primary  presumption  of  philosophy.  This 
is  the  law  of  parsimony ;  which  prohibits,  without  a  proven  ne- 
cessity, the  multiplication  of  entities,  powers,  principles,  or 
causes ;  above  all,  the  postulation  of  an  unknown  force  where  a 
known  impotence  can  account  for  the  phenomenon.  We  are, 
therefore,  entitled  to  apply  '  Occam's  razor'  to  this  theory  of 
causality,  unless  it  be  proved  impossible  to  explain  the  causal 
judgment  at  a  cheaper  rate,  by  deriving  it  from  a  common,  and 
that  a  negative,  principle.  On  a  doctrine  like  the  present  is 
thrown  the  burden  of  vindicating  its  necessity,  by  showing  that 
unless  a  special  and  positive  principle  be  assumed,  there  exists 
no  competent  mode  to  save  the  phenomenon.  The  opinion  can 
therefore  only  be  admitted  provisorily ;  and  it  falls,  of  course,  if 
what  it  would  explain  can  be  explained  on  less  onerous  conditions. 


500  PHILOSOPHY    OK   THK   CONDITIONKD. 

Leaving,  therefore,  this  theory,  which  certainly  does  account 
for  the  phenomenon,  to  fall  or  stand,  according  as  either  of  the 
two  remaining  opinions  be,  or  be  not,  found  sufficient,  I  go  on  to 
this  consideration. 

Sixth  opinion. — Of  these,  the  former,  that  is,  the  sixth  theory, 
has  been  long  exploded.  It  attempts  to  establish  the  causal  judg- 
ment upon  the  principle  of  Contradiction.  Leibnitz  was  too 
acute  a  metaphysician  to  attempt  the  resolution  of  the  principle 
of  Sufficient  Reason  or  Causality,  which  is  ampliative  or  syn- 
thetic, into  the  principle  of  Contradiction,  which  is  merely  ex- 
plicative or  analytic.  But  his  followers  were  not  so  wise.  Wolf, 
Baumgarten,  and  many  other  Leibnitians,  paraded  demonstrations 
of  the  law  of  Sufficient  Reason  on  the  ground  of  the  law  of  Con- 
tradiction; but  the  reasoning  always  proceeds  on  a  covert  as- 
sumption of  the  very  point  in  question.  The  same  argument  is, 
however,  at  an  earlier  date,  to  be  found  in  Locke,  while  modifi- 
cations of  it  are  also  given  by  Hobbes  and  Samuel  Clarke.  Hume, 
who  was  only  aware  of  the  demonstration,  as  proposed  by  the 
English  metaphysicians,  honors  it  with  a  refutation  which  has 
obtained  even  the  full  approval  of  Reid  ;  whilst  by  foreign  phi- 
losophers, the  inconsequence  of  the  reduction,  at  the  hands  of  the 
Wolfian  metaphysicians,  has  frequently  been  exposed.  I  may 
therefore  pass  it  in  silence. 

Seventh  opinion. — The  field  is  thus  open  for  the  last  theory, 
which  would  analyze  the  judgment  of  causality  into  a  form  of 
the  mental  law  of  the  Conditioned.  This  theory,  which  has  not 
hitherto  been  proposed,  comes  recommended  by  its  cheapness  and 
simplicity.  It  postulates  no  new,  no  express,  no  positive  princi- 
ple. It  merely  supposes  that  the  mind  is  limited ;  the  law  of 
limitation, — the  law  of  the  Conditioned  constituting,  in  one  of  its 
applications,  the  law  of  Causality.  The  mind  is  astricted  to 
think  in  certain  forms  ;  and,  under  these,  thought  is  possible  only 
in  the  conditioned  interval  between  two  unconditioned  contradic- 
tory extremes  or  poles,  each  of  which  is  altogether  inconceivable, 
but  of  which,  on  the  principle  of  Excluded  Middle,  the  one  or  the 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED.  501 

other  is  necessarily  true.  In  reference  to  the  present  question,  it 
need  only  be  recapitulated,  that  we  must  think  under  the  condi- 
tion of  Existence, — Existence  Relative, — and  Existence  Relative 
in  Time,  But  what  does  existence  relative  in  time  imply  ?  It 
implies,  1°,  that  we  are  unable  to  realize  in  thought :  on  the  one 
pole  of  the  irrelative,  either  an  absolute  commencement,  or  an 
absolute  termination  of  time;  as  on  the  other,  either  an  infinite 
non-commencement,  or  an  infinite  non-termination  of  time.  It 
implies,  2°,  that  we  can  think,  neither,  on  the  one  pole,  an  abso- 
lute minimum,  nor,  on  the  other,  an  infinite  divisibility  of  time. 
Yet  these  constitute  two  pairs  of  contradictory  propositions ; 
which,  if  our  intelligence  be  not  all  a  lie,  cannot  both  be  true, 
whilst,  at  the  same  time,  either  the  one  or  the  other  necessarily 
must.  But,  as  not  relatives,  they  are  not  cogitables. 

Now  the  phenomenon  of  causality  seems  nothing  more  than  a 
corollary  of  the  law  of  the  conditioned,  in  its  application  to  a 
thing  thought  under  the  form  or  mental  category  of  existence 
relative  in  time.  We  cannot  know,  we  cannot  think  a  thing,  ex- 
cept under  the  attribute  of  existence  ;  we  cannot  know  or  think 
a  thing  to  exist,  except  as  in  time  ;  and  we  cannot  know  or  think 
a  thing  to  exist  in  time,  and  think  it  absolutely  to  commence. 
Now  this  at  once  imposes  on  us  the  judgment  of  causality.  And 
thus : — An  object  is  given  us,  either  by  our  presentative,  or  by 
our  representative,  faculty.  As  given,  we  cannot  but  think  it  ex- 
istent, and  existent  in  time.  But  to  say,  that  we  cannot  but  think 
it  to  exist,  is  to  say,  that  we  are  unable  to  think  it  non-existent, 
— to  think  it  away, — to  annihilate  it  in  thought.  And  this  we 
cannot  do.  We  may  turn  away  from  it ;  we  may  engross  our 
attention  with  other  objects ;  we  may,  consequently,  exclude  it 
from  our  thought.  That  we  need  not  think  a  thing  is  certain  ; 
but  thinking  it,  it  is  equally  certain  that  we  cannot  think  it  not 
to  exist.  So  much  will  be  at  once  admitted  of  the  present ;  but 
it  may  probably  be  denied  of  the  past  and  future.  Yet  if  we 
make  the  experiment,  we  shall  find  the  mental  annihilation  of  an 
object,  equally  impossible  under  time  past,  and  present,  and  fu- 


502  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED. 

ture.  To  obviate,  however,  misapprehension,  a  very  simple 
observation  may  be  proper.  In  saying  that  it  is  impossible  to 
annihilate  an  object  in  thought,  in  other  words,  to  conceive  as 
non-existent,  what  had  been  conceived  as  existent, — it  is  of  course 
not  meant,  that  it  is  impossible  to  imagine  the  object  wholly 
changed  in  form.  We  can  represent  to  ourselves  the  elements  of 
which  it  is  composed,  divided,  dissipated,  modified  in  any  way  ; 
we  can  imagine  any  thing  of  it,  short  of  annihilation.  But  the 
complement,  the  quantum,  of  existence,  thought  as  constituent  of 
an  object, — that  we  cannot  represent  to  ourselves,  either  as  in- 
creased, without  abstraction  from  other  entities,  or  as  diminished, 
without  annexation  to  them.  In  short,  we  are  unable  to  construe 
it  in  thought,  that  there  can  be  an  atom  absolutely  added  to,  or 
absolutely  taken  away  from,  existence  in  general.  Let  us  make 
the  experiment.  Let  us  form  to  ourselves  a  concept  of  the  uni- 
verse. Now,  we  are  unable  to  think,  that  the  quantity  of  exist- 
ence, of  which  the  universe  is  the  conceived  sum,  can  either  be 
amplified  or  diminished.  We  are  able  to  conceive,  indeed,  the 
creation  of  a  world ;  this  indeed  as  easily  as  the  creation  of  an 
atom.  But  what  is  our  thought  of  creation  ?  It  is  not  a  thought 
of  the  mere  springing  of  nothing  into  something.  On  the  con- 
trary, creation  is  conceived,  and  is  by  us  conceivable,  only  as  the 
evolution  of  existence  from  possibility  into  actuality,  by  the  fiat 
of  the  deity.  Let  us  place  ourselves  in  imagination  at  its  very 
crisis.  Now,  can  we  construe  it  to  thought,  that  the  moment  after 
the  universe  flashed  into  material  reality,  into  manifested  being, 
that  there  was  a  larger  complement  of  existence  in  the  universe 
and  its  author  together,  than,  the  moment  before,  there  subsisted 
in  the  deity  alone  ?  This  we  are  unable  to  imagine.  And  what 
is  true  of  our  concept  of  creation,  holds  of  our  concept  of  anni- 
hilation. We  can  think  no  real  annihilation, — no  absolute  sink- 
ing of  something  into  nothing.  But,  as  creation  is  cogitable  by 
us,  only  as  a  putting  forth  of  divine  power,  so  is  annihilation  by 
us  only  conceivable,  as  a  withdrawal  of  that  same  power.  All 
that  is  now  actually  existent  in  the  universe,  this  we  think  and 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   THE   CONDITIONED.  503 

must  think,  as  having,  prior  to  creation,  virtually  existed  in  the 
creator ;  and  in  imagining  the  universe  to  be  annihilated,  we  can 
only  conceive  this,  as  the  retractation  by  the  deity  of  an  oVert 
energy  into  latent  power. — In  short,  it  is  impossible  for  the  human 
mind  to  think  what  it  thinks  existent,  lapsing  into  non-existence, 
either  in  time  past  or  in  time  future. 

Our  inability  to  think  what  we  have  once  conceived  existent 
in  time,  as  in  time  becoming  non-existent,  corresponds  with  our 
inability  to  think,  what  we  have  conceived  existent  in  space,  as  in 
space  becoming  non-existent.  We  cannot  realize  it  to  thought, 
that  a  thing  should  be  extruded,  either  from  the  one  quantity  or 
from  the  other.  Hence,  under  extension,  the  law  of  ultimate 
incompressibility  ;  under  protension,  the  law  of  cause  and  effect. 

I  have  hitherto  spoken  only  of  one  inconceivable  pole  of  the 
conditioned,  in  its  application  to  existence  in  time,  of  the  absolute 
extreme,  as  absolute  commencement  and  absolute  termination. 
The  counter  or  infinite  extreme,  as  infinite  regress  or  non-com- 
mencement and  infinite  progress  or  non-termination,  is  equally 
unthinkable.  With  this  latter  we  have,  however,  at  present 
nothing  to  do.  Indeed,  as  not  obtrusive,  the  Infinite  figures  far 
less  in  the  theatre  of  mind,  and  exerts  a  far  inferior  influence  in 
the  modification  of  thought,  Jhan  the  Absolute.  It  is,  in  fact, 
both  distant  and  delitescent ;  and  in  place  of  meeting  us  at  every 
turn,  it  requires  some  exertion  on  our  part  to  seek  it  out.  It  is 
the  former  and  more  obtrusive  extreme — it  is  the  Absolute  alone 
which  constitutes  and  explains  the  mental  manifestation  of  the 
causal  judgment.  An  object  is  presented  to  our  observation 
which  has  phenominally  begun  to  be.  But  we  cannot  construe 
it  to  thought,  that  the  object,  that  is,  this  determinate  complement 
of  existence,  had  really  no  being  at  any  past  moment ;  because,  in 
that  case,  once  thinking  it  as  existent,  we  should  again  think  it 
as  non-existent,  which  is  for  us  impossible.  What  then  can  we 
— must  we  do  ?  That  the  phenomenon  presented  to  us,  did,  as 
a  phenomenon,  begin  to  be — this  we  know  by  experience ;  but 
that  the  elements  of  its  existence  only  began,  when  the  phenome- 


504:  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED. 

non  which  they  constitute  came  into  manifested  being — this  we 
are  wholly  unable  to  think.  In  these  circumstances  how  do  we 
proceed  ?  There  is  for  us  only  one  possible  way.  We  are  com- 
pelled to  believe  that  the  object  (that  is,  the  certain  quale  and 
quantum  of  being),  whose  phenomenal  rise  into  existence  we  have 
witnessed,  did  really  exist  prior  to  this  rise,  under  other  forms. 
But  to  say,  that  a  thing  previously  existed  under  different  forms, 
is  only  to  say,  in  other  words,  that  a  thing  had  causes.  (It 
would  be  here  out  of  place  to  refute  the  error  of  philosophers,  in 
supposing  that  any  thing  can  have  a  single  cause ;' — meaning 
always  by  a  cause  that  without  which  the  effect  would  not  have 
been.  I  speak  of  course  only  of  second  causes,  for  of  the  divine 
causation  we  can  form  no  conception.) 

I  must,  however,  now  cursorily  observe,  that  nothing  can  be 
more  erroneous  in  itself,  or  in  its  consequences  more  fertile  in 
delusion  than  the  common  doctrine,  that  the  causal  judgment  is 
elicited,  only  when  we  apprehend  objects  in  consecution,  and  uni- 
form consecution.  No  doubt,  the  observation  of  such  succession 
prompts  and  enables  us  to  assign  particular  causes  to  particular 
effects.  But  this  assignation  ought  to  be  carefully  distinguished 
from  the  judgment  of  causality  absolutely.  This  consists,  not  in 
the  empirical  and  contingent  attribution  of  this  phenomenon,  as 
cause,  to  that  phenomenon,  as  effect ;  but  in  the  universal  neces- 
sity of  which  we  are  conscious,  to  think  causes  for  every  event, 
whether  that  event  stand  isolated  by  itself,  and  be  by  us  referrible 
to  no  other,  or  whether  it  be  one  in  a  series  of  successive  phe- 
nomena, which,  as  it  were,  spontaneously  arrange  themselves 


1  '  There  is  no  reason  why  whatever  is  conceived  as  necessarily  going  to  the 
constitution  of  the  phenomenon  called  the  effect — in  other  words,  why  all 
rvnd  each  of  its  coefficients — may  not  be  properly  called  causes,  or  rather  con- 
cause*;  for  there  must  always  be  more  causes  than  one  to  an  effect.  This 
would  be  more  correct  than  to  give  exclusively  the  name  of  Cause  to  any 
partial  constituent  or  coefficient,  even  though  proximate  and  principal.  In 
this  view,  the  doctrine  of  Aristotle  and  other  ancients,  is  more  rational  thau 
that  of  our  modern  philosophers.' — Reid,  p.  607. —  W. 


PHILOSOPHY   OP   THE   CONDITIONED.  505 

under  the  relation  of  effect  and  cause.  On  this,  not  sunken, 
rock,  Dr.  Brown  and  others  have  been  shipwrecked. 

The  preceding  doctrine  of  causality  seems  to  me  the  one  pref- 
erable, for  the  following,  among  other  reasons. 

In  the  first  place,  to  explain  the  phenomena  of  the  casual 
judgment,  it  postulates  no  new,  no  extraordinary,  no  express 
principle.  It  does  not  even  proceed  on  the  assumption  of  a  posi- 
tive power  ;  for  while  it  shows,  that  the  phenomenon  in  question 
is  only  one  of  a  class,  it  assigns,  as  their  common  cause,  only  a 
negative  impotence.  In  this  respect,  it  stands  advantageously 
contrasted  with  the  only  other  theory  which  saves  the  phenome- 
non, but  which  saves  it,  only  on  the  hypothesis  of  a  special  prin- 
ciple, expressly  devised  to  account  for  this  phenomenon  alone. 
But  nature  never  works  by  more,  and  more  complex  instruments 
than  are  necessary — ^Sev  fSptrrZis  :  and  to  excogitate  a  particu- 
lar force  to  perform  what  can  be  better  explained  on  the  ground 
of  a  general  imbecility,  is  contrary  to  every  rule  of  philoso- 
phizing. 

But,  in  the  second  place,  if  there  be  postulated  an  express  and 
positive  affirmation  of  intelligence,  to  account  for  the  mental 
deliverance, — that  existence  cannot  absolutely  commence ;  we 
must  equally  postulate  a  counter  affirmation  of  intelligence,  posi- 
tive and  express,  to  explain  the  counter  mental  deliverance, — 
that  existence  cannot  infinitely  not  commence.  The  one  neces- 
sity of  mind  is  equally  strong  as  the  other ;  and  if  the  one  be  a 
positive  datum,  an  express  testimony  of  intelligence,  so  likewise 
must  be  the  other.  But  they  are  contradictories ;  and,  as  con- 
tradictories they  cannot  both  be  true.  On  this  theory,  therefore, 
the  root  of  our  nature  is  a  lie.  By  the  doctrine,  on  the  contrary, 
which  I  propose,  these  contradictory  phenomena  are  carried  up 
into  the  common  principle  of  a  limitation  of  our  faculties.  In- 
telligence is  shown  to  be  feeble,  but  not  false ;  our  nature  is, 
thus,  not  a  lie,  nor  the  author  of  our  nature  a  deceiver. 

In  the  third  place,  this  simpler  and  easier  doctrine,  avoids  a 
most  serious  inconvenience  which  attaches  to  the  more  difficult 

22 


506  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THK   CONDITIONED 

and  complex.  It  is  this.  To  suppose  a  positive  and  special  prin- 
ciple of  causality,  is  to  suppose  that  there  is  expressly  revealed 
to  us,  through  intelligence,  an  affirmation  of  the  fact,  that  there 
exists  no  free  causation ;  that  is,  that  there  is  no  cause  which  is 
not  itself  merely  an  effect,  existence  being  only  a  series  of  deter- 
mined antecedents  and  determined  consequents.  But  this  is  an 
assertion  of  Fatalism.  Such,  however,  many  of  the  partisans  of 
that  doctrine  will  not  admit.  An  affirmation  of  absolute  neces- 
sity is,  they  are  aware,  virtually  the  negation  of  a  moral  universe, 
consequently  of  the  moral  governor  of  a  moral  universe.  But 
this  is  Atheism.  Fatalism  and  Atheism  are,  indeed,  convertible 
terms.1  The  only  valid  arguments  for  the  existence  of  a  God, 
and  for  the  immortality  of  the  human  soul,  rest  on  the  ground  of 
man's  moral  nature  ;  consequently,  if  that  moral  nature  be  anni- 
hilated, which  in  any  scheme  of  thorough-going  necessity  it  is, 
every  conclusion,  established  on  such  a  nature,  is  annihilated  like- 
wise. Aware  of  this,  some  of  those  who  make  the  judgment  of 
causality  a  positive  dictate  of  intelligence,  find  themselves  com- 
pelled, in  order  to  escape  from  the  consequences  of  their  doctrine, 
to  deny  that  this  dictate,  though  universal  in  its  deliverance, 
should  be  allowed  to  hold  universally  true ;  and  accordingly,  they 
would  exempt  from  it  the  facts  of  volition.  Will,  they  hold  to 
be  a  free  cause,  a  cause  which  is  not  an  effect ;  in  other  words, 
they  attribute  to  it  the  power  of  absolute  origination.  But  here 
their  own  principle  of  causality  is  too  strong  for  them.  They 
say,  that  it  is  unconditionally  promulgated,  as  an  express  and 
positive  law  of  intelligence,  that  every  origination  is  an  apparent 
only,  not  a  real,  commencement.  Now  to  exempt  certain  phe- 
nomena from  this  universal  law,  on  the  ground  of  our  moral  con- 
sciousness, cannot  validly  be  done. — For,  in  the  first  place,  this 

1  '  It  can  easily  be  proved  to  those  who  are  able  and  not  afraid  to  reason, 
that  the  doctrine  of  Necessity  is  subversive  of  religion,  natural  and  reveal- 
ed ;  and,  Fatalism  involving  Atheism,  the  Necessitarian  who  intrepidly  fol- 
lows out  his  scheme  to  ita  consequences,  however  monstrous,  will  consist- 
ently reject  every  argument  which  proceeds  upon  the  supposition  of  a  Deity 
and  divine  attributes.' — Reid,  p.  617. —  W. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED.  507 

would  be  an  admission,  that  the  mind  is  a  complement  of  con- 
tradictory revelations.  If  mendacity  be  admitted  of  some  of  our 
mental  dictates,  we  cannot  vindicate  veracity  to  any.  If  one  be 
delusive,  so  may  all.  '  Falsus  in  uno,  falsus  in  omnibus.'  Ab- 
solute skepticism  is  here  the  legitimate  conclusion. — But,  in  the 
second  place,  waving  this  conclusion,  what  right  have  we,  on  this 
doctrine,  to  subordinate  the  positive  affirmation  of  causality  to 
our  consciousness  of  moral  liberty, — what  right  have  we,  for  the 
interest  of  the  latter,  to  derogate  from  the  former  ?  We  have 
none.  If  both  be  equally  positive,  we  are  not  entitled  to  sacri- 
fice the  alternative,  which  our  wishes  prompt  us  to  abandon. 

But  the  doctrine  which  I  propose  is  not  obnoxious  to  these 
objections.  It  does  not  maintain,  that  the  judgment  of  causality 
is  dependent  on  a  power  of  the  mind,  imposing,  as  necessary  in 
thought,  what  is  necessary  in  the  universe  of  existence.  On  the 
contrary,  it  resolves  this  judgment  into  a  mere  mental  impotence, 
— an  impotence  to  conceive  either  of  two  contradictories.  And 
as  the  one  or  the  other  of  contradictories  must  be  true,  whilst 
both  cannot ;  it  proves  that  there  is  no  ground  for  inferring  a 
certain  fact  to  be  impossible,  merely  from  our  inability  to  conceive 
it  possible.  At  the  same  time/  if  the  causal  judgment  be  not  an 
express  affirmation  of  mind,  but  only  an  incapacity  of  thinking 
the  opposite ;  it  follows  that  such  a  negative  judgment  cannot 
counterbalance  the  express  affirmative,  the  unconditional  testi- 
mony, of  consciousness, — that  we  are,  though  we  know  not  how, 
the  true  and  responsible  authors  of  our  actions,  not  merely  the 
worthless  links  in  an  adamantine  series  of  effects  and  causes.  It 
appears  to  me,  that  it  is  only  on  such  a  doctrine,  that  we  can 
philosophically  vindicate  the  liberty  of  the  human  will, — that  we 
can  rationally  assert  to  man — '  fatis  avolsa  voluntas.'  How  the 
will  can  possibly  be  free,  must  remain  to  us,  under  the  present 
limitation  of  our  faculties,  wholly  incomprehensible.'  We  are 

1  '  To  conceive  a  free  act,  is  to  conceive  an  act  which,  being  a  came,  is  not 
itself  an  effect ;  in  other  words,  to  conceive  an  absolute  commencement.  But 
is  such  by  us  conceivable  ?' — Reid,  p.  602. —  PT. 


508  PHILOSOPHY   OK  THE   CONDITIONED. 

unable  to  conceive  an  absolute  commencement ;  we  cannot, 
therefore,  conceive  a  free  volition.  A  determination  by  motives, 
cannot,  to  on*  understanding,  escape  from  necessitation.1  Nay, 


1  '  A  motive,  abstractly  eoittulwvt!,  L»  »v»!!yil  -in  *.*l  or^nal  cause.  It  was 
well  denominated  in  the  Greek  philosophy,  rd  Ivtua  o{ — that  for  the  sake  of 
which.  A  motive,  however,  in  its  concrete  reality,  is  nothing  apart  from  the 
mind  ;  only  a  mental  tendency.' 

'  If  Motives  "  influence  to  action,"  they  must  co-operate  in  producing  a 
certain  effect  upon  the  agent ;  and  the  determination  to  act,  and  to  act  in  a 
certain  manner — is  that  effect.  They  are  thus,  on  Reid's  own  view,  in  this 
relation,  causes,  and  efficient  causes.  It  is  of  no  consequence  in  the  argu- 
ment whether  motives  be  said  to  determine  a  man  to  act  or  to  influence  (that 
is  to  determine)  him  to  determine  himself  to  act.  It  does  not,  therefore, 
seem  consistent  to  say  that  motives  are  not  causes,  and  that  they  do  not  act.'' 

'  I  shall  now,'  says  Leibnitz,  in  his  controversy  with  Clark,  '  come  to  an 
objection  raised  here,  against  my  comparing  the  weights  of  a  balance  with 
the  motives  of  the  Will.  It  is  objected,  that  a  balance  is  merely  passive, 
and  moved  by  the  weights ;  whereas  agents  intelligent  and  endowed  with 
will,  are  active.  To  this  I  answer,  that  the  principle  of  the  want  of  a  suffi- 
cient reason,  is  common  both  to  agents  and  patients.  They  want  a  sufficient 
reason  of  their  action,  as  well  as  of  their  passion.  A  balance  does  not  only 
not  act  when  it  is  equally  pulled  on  both  sides,  but  the  equal  weights  like- 
wise do  not  act  when  they  are  in  an  equilibrium,  so  that  one  of  them  cannot 
go  down  without  the  other  rising  up  as  much. 

'  It  must  also  be  considered  that,  properly  speaking,  motives  do  not  act 
upon  the  mind  as  weights  do  upon  a  balance  ;  but  it  is  rather  the  mind  that 
acts  by  virtue  of  the  motives,  which  are  its  dispositions  to  act.  And,  there- 
fore, co  pretend,  as  the  author  does  here,  that  the  mind  prefers  sometimes 
weak  motives  to  strong  ones,  and  even  that  it  prefers  that  which  is  indiffer- 
ent before  motives — this,  I  say,  is  to  divide  the  mind  from  the  motives,  as  if 
they  were  without  the  mind,  as  the  weight  is  distinct  from  the  balance,  and 
as  if  the  mind  had,  besides  motives,  other  dispositions  to  act,  by  virtue  of 
which  it  could  reject  or  accept  the  motives.  Whereas,  in  truth,  the  motives 
comprehend  all  the  dispositions  which  the  mind  can  have  to  act  voluntarily  ; 
for  they  include  not  only  the  reasons,  but  also  the  inclinations  arising  from 
passions  or  other  preceding  impressions.  Wherefore,  if  the  mind  should 
prefer  a  weak  inclination  to  a  strong  one,  it  would  act  against  itself,  and  oth- 
erwise than  it  is  disposed  to  act.  Which  shows  that  the  author's  notions, 
contrary  to  mine,  are  superficial,  and  appear  to  have  no  solidity  in  them, 
when  they  are  well  considered. 

'  To  assert,  also,  that  the  mind  may  have  good  reasons  to  act,  when  it  has 
no  motives,  and  when  things  are  absolutely  indifferent,  as  the  author  ex- 
plains himself  here— this,  I  say,  is  a  manifest  contradiction  ;  for,  if  the  mind 
has  good  reasons  for  taking  the  part  it  takes,  then  the  things  are  not  indif- 
ferent to  the  mind.' — Collection  of  Papers,  <fcc.,  Leibnitz's  Fifth  Paper, 
§§  14-16. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED.  509 

were  we  even  to  admit  as  true,  what  we  cannot  think  as  possible, 
still  the  doctrine  of  a  motiveless  volition  would  be  only  casual- 
ism  ;  and  the  free  acts  of  an  indifferent,  are,  morally  and  ration- 
ally, as  worthless  as  the  pre-ordered  passions  of  a  determined 
will.  How,  therefore,  I  repeat,  moral  liberty  is  possible  in  man 
or  God,  we  are  utterly  unable  speculatively  to  understand.1  But 


'  The  death  of  Leibnitz  terminated  his  controversy  with  Clarke  ;  but  a  de- 
fence of  the  fifth  and  last  paper  of  Leibnitz  against  the  answer  of  Clarke,  by 
Thummig,  was  published,  who,  in  relation  to  the  point  in  question,  says — 
"  The  simile  of  the  balance  is  very  unjustly  interpreted.  No  resemblance 

is  intended  between  scales  and  motives It  is  of  no  consequence 

whether,  in  their  reciprocal  relations,  the  scales  are  passive,  while  the  mind 
is  active,  since,  in  this  respect,  there  is  no  comparison  attempted.  But,  in 
so  far  as  the  principle  of  Sufficient  Eeason  is  concerned,  that  principle  ap- 
plies equally  to  actions  and  passions,  as  has  been  noticed  by  Baron  Leibnitz. 

It  is  to  philosophize  very  crudely  concerning  mind,  and  to 

image  every  thing  in  a  corporeal  manner,  to  conceive  that  actuating  reasons 
are  something  external,  which  make  an  impression  on  the  mind,  and  to  dis- 
tinguish motives  from  the  active  principle  (principio  actionis)  it3elf."  (In 
Koehler's  German  Translation  of  tliese  Papers.) 

'  On  the  supposition  that  the  sum  of  influences  (motives,  dispositions,  ten- 
dencies) to  volition  A,  is  equal  to  12,  and  the  sum  of  influences  to  counter 
volition  B,  equal  to  8 — can  we  conceive  that  the  determination  of  volition  A 
should  not  be  necessary  ? — We  can  only  conceive  the  volition  B  to  be  deter- 
mined by  supposing  that  the  man  creates  (calls  from  non-existence  into  ex- 
istence) a  certain  supplement  of  influences.  But  this  creation  as  actual,  or, 
in  itself,  is  inconceivable,  and  even  to  conceive  the  possibility  of  this  incon- 
ceivable act,  we  must  suppose  some  cause  by  which  the  man  is  determined 
to  exert  it.  We  thus,  in  thought,  never  escape  determination  and  necessity. 
It  will  be  observed,  that  I  do  not  consider  this  inability  to  the  notion,  any 
disproof  of  the  fact  of  Free  Will.'— Eeid,  pp.  607,  610-11.—  W. 

1  Is  the  person  an  original  undetermined  cause  of  the  determination  of  his 
will  ?  If  he  be  not,  then  is  he  not  a  free  agent,  and  the  scheme  of  Necessity 
is  admitted.  If  he  be,  in  the  first  place,  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  the  pos- 
sibility of  this ;  and,  in  the  second,  if  the  fact,  though  inconceivable,  be  al- 
lowed, it  is  impossible  to  see  how  a  cause,  undetermined  by  any  motive,  can  be 
a  rational,  moral,  and  accountable,  cause.  There  is  no  conceivable  medium 
between  Fatalism  and  Casualism  ;  and  the  contradictory  schemes  of  Liberty 
and  Necessity  themselves  are  inconceivable.  For,  as  we  cannot  compass  in 
thought  an  undetermined  cause — an  absolute  commencement — the  fundamental 
hypothesis  of  the  one ;  so  we  can  as  little  think  an  infinite  series  of  determined 
causes — of  relative  commencements — the  fundamental  hypothesis  of  the  other. 
The  champions  of  the  opposite  doctrines,  are  thus  at  once  resistless  in  as- 
sault, and  impotent  in  defence.  Each  is  hewn  down,  and  appears  to  die 


510  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE  CONDITIONED. 

practically,  the  fact,  that  we  are  free,  is  given  to  us  in  the  con- 
sciousness of  an  uncompromising  law  of  duty,  in  the  conscious- 
ness of  our  moral  accountability  ;  and  this  fact  of  liberty  cannot 
be  redargued  on  the  ground  that  it  is  incomprehensible,  for  the 
philosophy  of  the  conditioned  proves,  against  the  necessitarian, 
that  things  there  are,  which  may,  nay  must  be  true,  of  which 
the  understanding  is  wholly  unable  to  construe  to  itself  the  pos- 
sibility.1 

But  this  philosophy  is  not  only  competent  to  defend  the  fact  of 
our  moral  liberty,  possible  though  inconceivable,  against  the  as- 
under the  home-thrusts  of  his  adversary ;  but  each  again  recovers  life  from 
the  very  death  of  his  antagonist,  and,  to  borrow  a  simile,  both  are  like  the 
heroes  in  Valhalla,  ready  in  a  moment  to  amuse  themselves  anew  in  the 
same  bloodless  and  interminable  conflict.  The  doctrine  of  Moral  Liberty 
cannot  be  made  conceivable,  for  we  can  only  conceive  the  determined  and 
the  relative.  As  already  elated,  all  that  can  be  done,  is  to  show — 1°,  That  for 
ihefact  of  Liberty,  we  have,  immediately  or  mediately,  the  evidence  of  con- 
sciousness ;  and,  2°,  That  there  are,  among  the  phenomena  of  mind,  many 
facts  which  we  must  admit  as  actual,  but  of  whose  possibility  we  are  wholly 
unable  to  form  any  notion.  I  may  merely  observe,  that  the  fact  of  Motion 
can  be  shown  to  be  impossible,  on  grounds  not  less  strong  than  those  on 
which  it  is  attempted  to  disprove  the  fact  of  Liberty ;  to  say  nothing  of 
many  contradictories,  neither  of  which  can  be  thought,  but  one  of  which 
must,  on  the  laws  of  Contradiction  and  Excluded  Middle,  necessarily  J«.' — 
Reid,  p.  602.—  W. 

1  We  must  be  -unable  to  conceive  the  possibility  of  the  fact  of  Liberty.  But, 
though  inconceivable,  this  fact  is  not  therefore  false.  For  there  are  many 
contradictories  (and,  of  contradictories,  one  must,  and  one  only  can,  be  true) 
of  which,  we  are  equally  unable  to  conceive  the  possibility  of  either.  The 
philosophy,  therefore,  which  I  profess,  annihilates  the  theoretical  problem- 
How  is  the  scheme  of  Liberty,  or  the  scheme  of  Necessity,  to  be  rendered 
comprehensible  ? — by  showing  that  both  schemes  are  equally  inconceivable ; 
but  it  establishes  Liberty  practically  as  a  fact,  by  showing  that  it  is  either 
itself  an  immediate  datum,  or  is  involved  in  an  immediate  datum  of  con- 
sciousness. 

Hommel,  certainly  one  of  the  ablest  and  most  decided  fatalists,  says,  '  I 
have  a  feeling  of  Liberty  even  at  the  very  moment  when  I  am  writing  against 
Liberty,  upon  grounds  which  I  regard  as  incontrovertible.  Zeno  was  a  fatal- 
ist only  in  theory ;  in  practice,  he  did  not  act  in  conformity  to  that  convic- 
tion.' 

Among  others,  Reid's  friend,  Lord  Kames,  in  the  first  edition  of  his  '  Es- 
says on  the  Principles  of  Morality  and  Natural  Religion,'  admitted  this  natu- 
ral conviction  of  freedom  from  necessity,  maintaining  it  to  be  illusive.  On 
this  melancholy  doctrine, — 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE   CONDITIONED.  511 

sault  of  the  fatalist ;  it  retorts  against  himself  the  very  objection 
of  incomprehensibility  by  which  the  fatalist  had  thought  to  tri- 
umph over  the  libertarian.  It  shows,  that  the  scheme  of  free- 
dom is  not  more  inconceivable  than  the  scheme  of  necessity.  For 
whilst  fatalism  is  a  recoil  from  the  more  obtrusive  inconceivability 
of  an  absolute  commencement,  on  the  fact  of  which  commence- 


'  Man  fondly  dreams  that  he  is  free  in  act : 
Naught  is  he  but  the  powerless,  worthless  plaything 
Of  the  blind  force  that  in  his  Will  itself 
Works  out  for  him  a  dread  necessity.' 

All  necessitarians  do  not,  however,  admit  the  reality  of  this  deceitful  expe- 
rience, or  fallacious  feeling  of  liberty.  '  Dr.  Hartley,'  say3  Mr.  Stewart,  '  was 
I  believe,  one  of  the  first,  if  not  the  first,  who  denied  that  our  consciousness 
is  in  favor  of  free  agency ;'  and  in  this  assertion,  he  observes,  '  Hartley  was 
followed  by  Priestley  and  Belsham.'  Speaking  of  the  latter,  '  We  are  told,' 
he  says,  '  by  Mr.  Belsham,  that  the  popular  opinion  that,  in  many  cases,  it 
was  in  the  power  of  the  agent  to  have  chosen  differently,  the  previous  cir- 
cumstances remaining  exactly  the  same,  arises. either  from  a  mistake  of  the 
question,  or  from  aforaetfulness  of  the  motives  by  which  our  choice  was  deter- 
mined.'— (Philosophy  of  the  Active  Powers,  ii.  p.  510.) 

To  deny,  or  rather  to  explain  away,  the  obnoxious  phenomenon  of  a  sense 
of  liberty,  had,  however,  been  attempted  by  many  Necessitarians  before 
Hartley,  and  with  far  greater  ingenuity  than  either  he  or  his  two  followers 
displayed.  Thus  Leibnitz,  after  rejecting  the  Liberty  of  Indifference,  says, 
'Quamobrem  ratio  ilia,  quam  Cartesius  adduxit,  ad  probandum  actionum  nos- 
trarum  liberarum  indepcndentiam,  ex  jactuto  quodam  mvido  sensu  interne, 
vim  nullam  habet.  Non  possumus  proprk  expe-r-iri  independentiam  nostram, 
nee  caitsas  a  quibus  electio  nostra  pendet  semper  percipimus,  utpote  ssepe  sen- 
sum  omnem  fugientes.  [He  here  refers  to  his  doctrine  of  latent  mental 
modifications.]  Et  perinde  est  ac  si  acus  magnetica  versus  polum  converti 
leetaretur  ;  putaret  enim,  se  illuc  converti  independenter  a  quacunque  alia  causa, 
cum  non  perciperet  motus  insensibiles  material,  magneticce.'1  But,  previously  to 
Leibnitz,  a  similar  solution  and  illustration,  I  find,  had  been  proposed  by 
Bayle — his  illustration  is  a  conscious  weather-cock ,  but  both  philosophers 
are,  in  argument  and  example,  only  followers  of  Spinoza.  Spinoza,  after 
supposing  that  a  certain  quantity  of  motion  had  been  communicated  to  a 
stone,  proceeds — '  Porro  concipe  jam  si  placet,  lapidem  dum  moveri  pergit 
cogitare  et  scire,  se  quantum  potest  conari  ut  moveri  pergat.  Hie  lapis  sane, 
quando  quidem  sui  tantum  modo  conatus  est  conscius  et  minime  indifferens, 
se  liberrimum  esse  et  nulla  alia  cle  causa  in  motu  perseverare  credet  quam 
quia  vult. — Atque  h<zc  humana  ilia  libertas  est  quam  omnes  habere  jactant,  et 
qu<K  in  hoc  solo  consi-stit — quod  homines  sui  appetibu«  sunt  con-scii,  et  causarum  a> 
quibus  determinants  ignari."1  Chrysippus's  Top  or  Cylinder  is  the  source. 
Reid,  pp.  599,  616,  617.—  W. 


512  PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE  CONDITIONED. 

ment  the  doctrine  of  liberty  proceeds ;  the  fatalist  is  shown  to 
overlook  the  equal,  but  less  obtrusive,  inconceivability  of  an  in- 
finite non-commencement,  on  the  assertion  of  which  non-com- 
mencement his  own  doctrine  of  necessity  must  ultimately  rest. 
As  equally  unthinkable,  the  two  counter,  the  two  one-sided, 
schemes  are  thus  theoretically  balanced.  But  practically,  our 
consciousness  of  the  moral  law,  which,  without  a  moral  liberty  in 
man,  would  be  a  mendacious  imperative,  gives  a  decisive  pre- 
ponderance to  the  doctrine  of  freedom  over  the  doctrine  of 
fate.  We  are  free  in  act,  if  we  are  accountable  for  our  actions. 
Such  ((pwvavrct  tfuvsrorrfiv)  are  the  hints  of  an  undeveloped  phi- 
losophy, which,  I  am  confident,  is  founded  upon  truth.  To  this 
confidence  I  have  come,  not  merely  through  the  convictions  of 
my  own  consciousness,  but  by  finding  in  this  system  a  centre  and 
conciliation  for  the  most  opposite  of  philosophical  opinions.  Above 
all,  however,  I  am  confirmed  in  my  belief,  by  the  harmony  be- 
tween the  doctrines  of  this  philosophy,  and  those  of  revealed  truth. 
'  Credo  equidem,  nee  vana  fides.'  The  philosophy  of  the  Condi- 
tioned is  indeed  pre-eminently  a  discipline  of  humility  ;  a  '  learn- 
ed ignorance,'  directly  opposed  to  the  false  '  knowledge  which  puf- 
feth  up.'  I  may  indeed  say  with  St.  Chrysostom  : — '  The  founda- 
tion of  our  philosophy  is  humility.' — (Homil.  de  Perf.  Evang.) 
For  it  is  professedly  a  scientific  demonstration  of  the  impossibility 
of  that '  wisdom  in  high  matters '  which  the  Apostle  prohibits  us 
even  to  attempt ;  and  it  proposes,  from  the  limitation  of  the  hu- 
man powers,  from  our  impotence  to  comprehend  what,  however, 
we  must  admit,  to  show  articulately  why  the  '  secret  things  of 
God'  cannot  but  be  to  man  '  past  finding  out.'  Humility  thus 
becomes  the  cardinal  virtue,  not  only  of  revelation  but  of  reason. 
This  scheme  proves,  moreover,  that  no  difficulty  emerges  in  the- 
ology which  had  not  previously  emerged  in  philosophy ;  that,  in 
fact,  if  the  divine  do  not  transcend  what  it  has  pleased  the  Deity 
to  reveal,  and  wilfully  identify  the  doctrine  of  God's  word  with 
some  airogant  extreme  of  human  speculation,  philosophy  will  be 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   CONDITIONED.  513 

found  the  most  useful  auxiliary  of  theology.  For  a  world  of  false, 
and  pestilent,  and  presumptuous  reasoning,  by  which  philosophy 
and  theology  are  now  equally  discredited,  would  be  at  once  abol- 
ished, in  the  recognition  of  this  rule  of  prudent  nescience ;  nor 
could  it  longer  be  too  justly  said  of  the  code  of  consciousness,  as 
by  reformed  divines  it  has  been  acknowledged  of  the  Bible : 

'  This  is  the  book,  where  each  his  dogma  seeks ; 
And  this  the  book,  where  each  his  dogma  finds.' 

Specially ;  in  its  doctrine  of  causality  this  philosophy  brings  us 
back  from  the  aberrations  of  modern  theology,  to  the  truth  and 
simplicity  of  the  more  ancient  church.  It  is  here  shown  to  be  as 
irrational  as  irreligious,  on  the  ground  of  human  understanding, 
to  deny,  either,  on  the  one  hand,  the  foreknowledge,  predestina- 
tion, and  free  grace  of  God,  or,  on  the  other,  the  free  will  of  man ; 
that  we  should  believe  both,  and  both  in  unison,  though  unable 
to  comprehend  either  even  apart.  This  philosophy  proclaims  with 
St.  Augustin,  and  Augustin  in  his  maturest  writings  : — '  If  there  be 
not  free  grace  in  God,  how  can  He  save  the  world ;  and  if  there 
be  not  free  will  in  man,  how  can  the  world  by  God  be  judged !' 
(Ad  Valentinum,  Epist.  214.)  Or,  as  the  same  doctrine  is  per- 
haps expressed  even  better  by  St.  Bernard :  'Abolish  free  will, 
and  there  is  nothing  to  be  saved ;  abolish  free  grace,  and  there  is 
nothing  wherewithal  to  save.'  (De  Gratia  et  Libero  Arbitrio.  c. 
i.)  St.  Austin  repeatedly  declares,  the  conciliation  of  the  fore- 
knowledge, predestination,  and  free  grace  of  God  with  the  free 
will  of  man,  to  be  '  a  most  difficult  question,  intelligible  only  to  a 
few.'  Had  he  denounced  it  as  a  fruitless  question,  and  (to  un- 
derstanding) soluble  by  none,  the  world  might  hare  been  spared 
a  large  library  of  acrimonious  and  resultless  disputation.  This 
conciliation  is  of  the  things  to  be  believed,  not  understood.  The 
futile  attempts  to  harmonize  these  antilogies,  by  human  reasoning 
to  human  understanding,  have  originated  connective  systems  of 
theology,  divided  the  Church,  and,  as  far  as  possible,  dishonored 

22* 


514  PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE    CONDITIONED. 

religion.  It  must  however  be  admitted,  that  confessions  of  the 
total  inability  of  man  to  conceive  the  union,  of  what  he  should 
believe  united,  are  to  be  found  ;  and  they  are  found,  not,  per- 
haps less  frequently,  and  certainly  in  more  explicit  terms  among 
Catholic  than  among  Protestant  theologians. 

Of  the  former,  I  shall  adduce  only  one  testimony,  by  a  prince 
of  the  Church ;  and  it  is  the  conclusion  of  what,  though  wholly 
overlooked,  appears  to  me  as  the  ablest  and  truest  criticism  of  the 
many  fruitless,  if  not  futile,  attempts  at  conciliating  *  the  ways  of 
God'  to  the  understanding  of  man,  in  the  great  articles  of  divine 
foreknowledge  and  predestination  (which  are  both  embarrassed  by 
the  self-same  difficulties),  and  human  free-will.  It  is  the  testimo- 
ny of  Cardinal  Cajetan,  and  from  his  commentary  on  the  Sum- 
ma  Theologise  of  Aquinas.  The  criticism  itself  I  may  take  another 
opportunity  of  illustrating. 

•Thus  elevating  our  mental  eye  to  a  loftier  range  [we  may  suppose  that], 
God,  from  an  excellence  supernally  transcending  human  thought,  so  foresees 
events  and  things,  that  from  his  providence  something  higher  follows  than 
evitability  or  inevitability,  and  that  his  passive  prevision  of  the  event  docs 
not  determine  the  alternative  of  either  combination.  And  can  we  do  so,  the 
intellect  is  quieted ;  not  by  the  evidence  of  the  truth  known,  but  by  the  in- 
accessible height  of  the  truth  concealed.  And  this  to  my  poor  intellect 
seems  satisfactory  enough,  both  for  the  reason  above  stated,  and  because,  as 
Saint  Gregory  expresses  it,  "  The  man  has  a  low  opinion  of  God,  who  believes 
of  Him  only  so  much  as  can  be  measured  by  human  understanding."  Not 
that  we  should  deny  aught,  that  we  have  by  knowledge  or  by  fuith  of  the 
immutability,  actuality,  certainty,  universality,  and  similar  attributes  of  God ; 
but  I  suspect  (hat  there  is  something  here  lying  hid,  either  as  regards  the  rela- 
tion between  the  Deity  and  event  foreseen,  or  as  regards  the  connection  be- 
tween the  event  itself  and  its  prevision.  Thus,  reflecting  that  the  intelli- 
gence of  man  [in  such  matters]  is  as  the  eye  of  the  owl  [in  the  blaze  of  day 
(he  refers  to  Aristotle)],  I  find  its  repose  in  ignorance  alone.  For  it  is  more 
consistent,  both  with  Catholic  faith  and  with  philosophy,  to  confess  our 
blindness,  than  to  assert,  as  things  evident,  what  afford  no  tranquillity  to  the 
intellect;  for  evidence  is  tranquillizing.  Not  that  I  would,  therefore,  accuse 
all  the  doctors" of  presumption;  because,  stammering,  as  they  could,  they 
have  all  intended  to  insinuate,  with  God's  immutability,  the  supreme  and 
eternal  efficiency  of  His  intellect,  and  will,  and  power, — through  the  infalli- 
ble relation  between  the  Divine  election  and  whatever  comes  to  pass.  Noth- 
ing of  all  this  is  opposed  to  the  foresaid  suspicion — that  something  too  deep 
for  ««  lies  hid  herein.  And  assuredly,  if  it  were  thus  promulgated,  no  Chris- 
tian would  err  in  the  matter  of  Predestination,  as  no  one  errs  in  the  doctrine 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE    CONDITIONED.  515 

of  the  Trinity  ;*  because  of  the  Trinity  the  truth  is  declared  orally  and  in 
writing, — that  this  is  a  mystery  concealed  from  human  intellect,  and  to  which 
faith  alone  is  competent.  Indeed,  the  best  and  most  wholesome  counsel  in 
this  matter  is : — To  begin  with  those  things  which  we  certainly  know,  and 
have  experience  of  in  ourselves ;  to  wit,  that  all  proceeding  from  our  free- 
will may  or  may  not  be  performed  by  us,  and  therefore  are  we  amenable  to 
punishment  or  reward ;  but  how,  this  being  saved,  there  shall  be  saved  the 
providence,  predestination,  &c.,  of  God, — to  believe  what  holy  mother 
Church  believes.  For  it  is  written,  "Altiora  te  ne  qusesieris"  ("Be  not 
wise  in  things  above  thee") ;  there  being  many  things  revealed  to  man  above 
thy  human  comprehension.  And  this  is  one  of  those.'  (Pars.  I.  q.  xxii., 
art.  4.) 

Averments  to  a  similar  effect,  might  be  adduced  from  the  writ- 
ings of  Calvin ;  and,  certainly,  nothing  can  be  conceived  more 
contrary  to  the  doctrine  of  that  great  divine,  than  what  has  lat- 
terly been  promulgated  as  Calvinism  (and,  in  so  far  as  I  know, 
without  reclamation),  in  our  Calvinistic  Church  of  Scotland.  For 
it  has  been  here  promulgated,  as  the  dogma  of  this  Church,  by 
pious  and  distinguished  theologians,  that  man  has  no  will,  agency, 
moral  personality  of  his  own,  God  being  the  only  real  agent  in 
every  apparent  act  of  his  creatures ; — in  short  (though  quite  the 
opposite  was  intended),  that  the  theological  scheme  of  the  abso- 
lute decrees  implies  fatalism,  pantheism,  the  negation  of  a  moral 
governor,  and  of  a  moral  world.  For  the  premises,  arbitrarily 
assumed,  are  atheistic ;  the  conclusion,  illogically  drawn,  is  Chris- 
tian. Against  such  a  view  of  Calvin's  doctrine,  I  for  one  must 
humbly  though  solemnly  protest,  as  not  only  false  in  philosophy, 
but  heterodox  and  ignorant  in  theology. 


*  This  was  written  before  1507 ;  consequently  long  before  Servetus  and 
Campanus  had  introduced  their  Unitarian  heresies. 


516 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   CONDITIONED. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED.  517 


§  II. — PHILOSOPHICAL  TESTIMONIES  TO  THE  LIMITATION  OF  OUR 
KNOWLEDGE,  FROM  THE  LIMITATION  OF  OUR  FACULTIES. 

THESE,  which  might  be  indefinitely  multiplied,  I  shall  arrange 
under  three  heads.  I  omit  the  Skeptics,  adducing  only  speci- 
mens from  the  others. 

I.   Testimonies  to  the  general  fact  that  the  highest  knowledge  is  a 
consciousness  of  ignorance. 

There  are  two  sorts  of  ignorance :  we  philosophize  to  escape 
ignorance,  and  the  consummation  of  our  philosophy  is  ignorance  ; 
we  start  from  the  one,  we  repose  in  the  other;  they  are  the 
goals  from  which,  and  to  which,  we  tend ;  and  the  pursuit  of 
knowledge  is  but  a  course  between  two  ignorances,  as  human 
life  is  itself  only  a  travelling  from  grave  to  grave. 

'  'T/j  |3foj ; — 'Eic  Tvpfioio  Oop&v,  i-rrl  rvufiov  bSc6<aS 

The  highest  reach  of  human  science  is  the  scientific  recognition 
of  human  ignorance  ;  '  Qui  nescit  ignorare,  ignorat  scire.'  This 
'  learned  ignorance'  is  the  rational  conviction  by  the  human 
mind  of  its  inability  to  transcend  certain  limits  ;  it  is  the  knowl- 
edge of  ourselves, — the  science  of  man.  This  is  accomplished 
by  a  demonstration  of  the  disproportion  between  what  is  to  be 
known,  and  our  faculties  of  knowing, — the  disproportion,  to  wit, 
between  the  infinite  and  the  finite.  In  fact,  the  recognition  of 
human  ignorance,  is  not  only  the  one  highest,  but  the  one  true, 
knowledge ;  and  its  first  fruit,  as  has  been  said,  is  humility. 
Simple  nescience  is  not  proud ;  consummated  science  is  positively 
humble.  For  this  knowledge  it  is  not,  which  '  puffeth  up  ;'  but 
its  opposite,  the  conceit  of  false  knowledge, — the  conceit  in  truth, 
as  the  Apostle  notices,  of  an  ignorance  of  the  very  nature  of 
knowledge : 

'  Nam  nesciens  quid  scire  sit, 
Te  scire  cuncta  jactitas.' 


518  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED. 

But  as  our  knowledge  stands  to  Ignorance,  so  stands  it  also 
to  Doubt.  Doubt  is  the  beginning  and  the  end  of  our  efforts 
to  know  ;  for  as  it  is  true, — '  Alte  dubitat  qui  altius  credit,'  so  it 
is  likewise  true, — '  Quo  magis  quaerimus  magis  dubitamus.' 

The  grand  result  of  human  wisdom,  is  thus  only  a  consciousness 
that  what  we  know  is  as  nothing  to  what  we  know  not  ('  Quan- 
tum est  quod  nescimus  !') — an  articulate  confession,  in  fact,  by 
our  natural  reason  of  the  truth  declared  in  revelation, — that 
'  now  we  see  through  a  glass,  darkly.' 

1. — DEMOCBITUS  (as  reported  by  Aristotle,  Cicero,  Sextus  Empiricus, 
<fec.) : — '  We  know  nothing  in  its  cause  [or  on  a  conjectural  reading — in 
truth] ;  for  truth  lies  hid  from  us  in  depth  and  distance.' 

2. — SOCRATES  (as  we  learn  from  Plato,  Xenophon,  Cicero,  <tc.)  was  d«- 
clared  by  the  Delphic  oracle  the  wisest  of  the  Greeks ;  and  why  ?  B* 
cause  he  taught, — that  all  human  knowledge  is  but  a  qualified  ignorance 

3. — ABISTOTLE  (Metaphysica,  L.  ii.,  c.  1). — '  A  theory  of  Truth,  is 
partly  easy,  partly  difficult.  This  is  shown  by  the  fact — that  no  one 
has  been  wholly  successful,  no  one  wholly  unsuccessful,  in  its  acqui- 
sition ;  but  while  each  has  had  some  report  to  make  concerning  nature, 
though  the  contributions,  severally  considered,  are  of  little  or  no  avail, 
the  whole  together  make  up  a  considerable  amount.  And  if  so  it  be,  we 
may  apply  the  proverb — "  Who  can  miss  the  gate  ?"  In  this  respect  a 
theory  of  Truth  is  easy. — But  our  inability  to  compass  some  Whole  and 
Part  [or,  to  c.  both  W.  and  P.],  may  evince  the  difficulty  of  the  inquiry  ; 
(Td  i'  8Xov  ri  (or  r')  l^civ  *«i  pfpos  nn  fdvaaOai,  Sti\ol  rd  \a\fnbv  airi/f.) — 
As  difficulty,  however,  arises  in  two  ways  ;  [in  this  case]  its  cause  may 
lie,  not  in  things  [as  the  objects  known],  but  in  us  [as  the  subjects 
knowing].  For  as  the  eye  of  the  bat  holds  to  the  light  of  day,  so  the 
intellect  [vovs,  which  is,  as  it  were  (Eth.  Nic.  i.  7),  the  eye]  of  our  soul, 
holds  to  what  in  nature  are  of  all  most  manifest.'  * 


*  In  now  translating  this  passage  for  a  more  general  purpose,  I  am  strong- 
ly impressed  with  the  opinion,  that  Aristotle  had  in  view  the  special  doc- 
trine of  the  Conditioned.  For  it  is  not  easy  to  see  what  he  could  mean  by 
saying,  that '  we  are  unable  to  have  [compass,  realize  the  notions  of]  Whole 
and  Part,'  or  of '  some  Whole  and  Part ;'  except  to  say,  that  we  are  unable 
to  conceive  (of  space,  or  time,  or  degree)  a  whole,  however  large,  which  is 
not  conceivable  as  the  part  of  a  still  greater  whole,  or  a  part,  however  small, 
which  we  may  not  always  conceive  as  a  whole,  divisible  into  parts.  But  this 
would  be  implicitly  the  enouncement  of  a  full  doctrine  of  the  Conditioned. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   THE   CONDITIONED.  519 

4. — PLINY.  (Historia  Naturalis,  L.  ii.  c.  32.) — '  Omnia  incerta  ratione,  et 
in  naturae  maj  estate  abdita.' 

5. — TEETULLIAN.  (Adversus  Haereticos,  N.  iv.) — '  Cedat  curiositas  fidei,  ce- 
dat  gloria  saluti.  Certe,  aut  non  obstrepant,  aut  quiescant  adversus  regulam 
— Nihil  scire  omnia  scire  est.' — (De  Anima,  c.  1 .) — '  Quis  revelabit  quod 
Deus  texit  ?  Unde  scitandum  ?  Quare  ignorare  tutissimum  est.  Prses- 
tat  enim  per  Deum  nescire  quia  non  revelaverit,  quam  per  hominera  scire 
quia  ipse  praesumpserit.' 

6. — ARNOBIUS.  (Contra  Gentes,  L.  ii.) — '  Quae  nequeunt  sciri,  nescire 
noa  confiteamur ;  neque  ea  vestigare  curemus,  quaa  non  posse  compre- 
hend! liquidissimum  est.' 

7. — ST.  ACGUSTIN.  (Sermo  xxvii.  Benedictine  Edition,  vol.  v.) — '  Quaeris 
tu  rationem,  ego  expavesco  altitudinem.  ("  0  altitudo  divitiarura  sapientiae 
et  scientiae  Dei !")  Tu  ratiocinare,  ego  mirer ;  tu  disputa,  ego  credam  ; 
altitudinem  video,  ad  profundum  non  pervenio.  ....  Ille  dicit, 
"  Inscrutabilia  sunt  judicia  ejus :"  et  tu  scrutari  venisti  ?  Ille  dicit, — "  In- 
iuvestigabiles  sunt  vise  ejus  :"  et  tu  investigare  venisti  ?  Si  inscrutabilia 
scrutari  venisti,  et  ininvestigabilia  investigare  venisti ;  crede,  jam  peristi.' 
— (Sermo  xciii.) — '  Quid  inter  nos  agebatur  ?  Tu  dicebas,  Intelligam,  ut 
credam ;  ego  dicebam,  Ut  intelligas,  crede.  Nata  est  controversia,  venia- 
mus  ad  judicem,  judicet  Propheta,  immo  vero  Deus  judicet  per  Prophetam; 
Ambo  taceamus.  Quid  ambo  dixerimus,  auditum  est.  Intelligam,  inquis, 
ut  credam ;  Crede,  inquam,  ut  intelligas.  Respondeat  Propheta  :  "  Nisi 
credideritis,  non  intelligetis."  '  [Isaiah  vii.  9,  according  to  the  Seventy.] — 
(Sermo  cxvii.) — '  De  Deo  loquimur,  quid  mirum,  si  non  comprehendis  ?  Si 
enim  comprehendis,  non  est  Deus.  Sit  pia  confessio  ignorantice  magis  quam 
temeraria  professio  sciential.  Adtingere  aliquantum  mente  Deum,  magna 
beatitude  est ;  comprehendere  autem,  omnino  impossible.'* — (Sermo  clxv.) 
— '  Ideo  multi  de  isto  profundo  quaerentes  reddere  rationem,  in  fabulas 
vanitatis  abierunt.'  [Compare  Sermo  cxxvi.  c.  i.] — (Sermo  cccii.) — '  Con- 
Be  this  however  as  it  may,  Aristotle's  commentators  have  been  wholly  una- 
ble to  reach,  even  by  a  probable  conjecture,  his  meaning  in  the  text.  Alex- 
ander gives  six  or  seven  possible  interpretations,  but  all  nothing  to  the 
point ;  whilst  the  other  expositors  whom  I  have  had  patience  to  look  into 
(as  Averroes,  Javellus,  Fonseca,  Suarez,  Sonerus),  either  avoid  the  sentence 
altogether,  or  show  that  they,  and  the  authorities  whom  they  quote,  had  no 
glimpse  of  a  satisfactory  interpretation.  I  have  been  unable  to  find  (on  a 
hurried  search)  in  the  able  and  truly  learned  '  Essay  on  the  Metaphysics  of 
Aristotle,'  by  M.  Eavaisson,  a  consideration  of  the  passage. 

*  A  century  before  Augustin,  St.  Cyprian  had  said : — '  We  can  only  justly 
conceive  God  in  recognizing  Him  to  be  inconceivable.'  I  cannot,  however, 
at  the  moment,  refer  to  the  passage  except  from  memory. 


520  PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   CONDITIONED. 

fessio  ignorantise,  gradus  est  scientiae.' — (Epistola  cxc.  vol.  ii.) — '  Qua 
nullo  sensu  carnis  explorari  possunt,  et  a  nostra  experientia  longe  rcmota 
aunt,  atque  in  abditisshni*  naturae  finibus  latent,  non  erubesceudum  est 
in  'mini  confiteri  se  nescire  quod  nescit,  ne  durn  se  scire  mentitur,  nunquam 
scire  mereatur.' — (Epistola  cxcvil) — '  Magis  eligo  cautam  ignorantiam  con- 
fiteri, quam  falsam  scientiam  profited.' 

8. — ST.  dm YSOSTOM.     (  .) — '  Nothing  is 

wiser  than  ignorance  in  those  matters,  where  they  who  proclaim  that  they 
know  nothing,  proclaim  their  paramount  wisdom ;  whilst  those  who  busy 
themselves  therein,  are  the  most  senseless  of  mankind.' 

9. — THEODOKET.  (Therapeutica,  <fcc.,  Curative  of  Greek  Affections,  Ser- 
mon 1.) — '  The  beginning  of  science  is  the  science  of  nescience  ;'  or — '  The 
principle  of  knowledge  is  the  knowledge  of  ignorance.' 

10. — ST.  PETER  CHRYSOLOGUE.  (Sermo  li.) — '  Nolle  omnia  scire,  summa 
scientiae  est.' 

11. — 'THE  ARABIAN  SAGE.'  (I  translate  this  and  the  two  following  from 
Drusius  and  Gale) : — '  A  man  is  wise  while  in  pursuit  of  wisdom  ;  a  fool, 
when  he  thinks  it  to  be  mastered.' 

.  12. — A  RABBI  : — '  The  wiser  a  man,  the  more  ignorant  does  he  feel ;  as 
the  Preacher  has  it  [L  18] — "  To  add  science  is  to  add  sorrow."  ' 

13. — A  RABBI  : — '  Who  knows  nothing,  and  thinks  that  he  knows  some- 
thing, his  ignorance  is  twofold.'* 

14. — PETRARCH.  (De  Contemptu  Mundi,  Dial,  ii.) — '  Excute  pectus  tuum 
acriter ;  invenies  cuncta  quae  nosti,  si  ad  ignorata  referantur,  earn  propor- 
tionem  obtinere,  quam,  collatus  oceano,  rivulus  aestivia  siccandus  ardoribus : 
quamquam  vel  multa  nosse,  quid  revelat  ?' 

16. — CARDINAL  DE  CUSA.  (Opera  ed.  1565  ;  De  Docta  Iguorantia,  L.  L 
c.  3,  p.  3.) — '  Quidditas  ergo  rerum,  quae  est  entium  veritas,  in  sua.  puritate 
inattingibilis  est ;  et  per  omnes  Philosophos  investigata,  sed  per  neminem, 

*  Literally: 

'  Te,  tenebris  jactum,  ligat  ignorantia  duplex ; 

Scis  nihil,  et  nescis  to  modo  scire  nihil.' 

Or,  with  reference  to  our  German  evolvers  of  the  Nothing  into  the  Every- 
thing ;  and  avoiding  the  positio  debilis : 

'  Te,  sophia  insanum,  terit  insipientia  triplex; 
Nil  sapis,  et  nil  non  to  sapuisse  doces  !' 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   THE    CONDITIONED.  521 

nti  est,  reperta ;  et  quanto  in  hac  ignorantia  profundius  docti  fuerimus, 
tanto  magis  ad  ipsam  accedemus  veritatem.' — (Ib.  c.  17,  p.  13). — '  Sublata 
igitur  ab  omnibus  entibus  participatione,  remanet  ipsa  simplicissima  enti- 
tas,  quae  est  essentia  omnium  entium,  et  non  conspicimus  ipsara  talem  en- 
titatem,  nisi  in  doctissima  ignorantia,  quoniam  cum  omnia  participantia 
entitatem  ab  animo  removeo,  nihil  remanere  videtur.  Et  propterea  mag- 
nus  Dionysius  [Areopagita]  dicit,  intellectum  Dei,  magis  accedere  ad 
nihil,  quam  ad  aliquid.  Sacra  autem  ignorantia  me  instruit,  hoc  quod 
intellectui  nihil  videtur,  esse  maximum  incomprehensibile.' — (Apologia 
Doctae  Ignorantise,  p.  67.) — '  Augustinus  ait : — "  Deum  potius  ignorantia 
quam  scieutia  attingi."  Ignorantia  enim  abjicit,  intelligentia  colligit ;  doc- 
ta  vero  ignorantia  omnes  modos  quibus  accedi  ad  veritatem  potest,  unit. 
Ita  eleganter  dixit  Algazel  in  sua  Metaphysica,  de  Deo :  "  Quod  quisque 
scit  per  probationem  necessariam,  impossibilitatem  suam  apprehendendi 
eum.  Ipse  sui  est  cognitor,  et  apprehensor  ;  quoniam  apprehendit,  scire 
ipsuin  a  nullo  posse  comprehend!.  Quisquis  autem  non  potest  apprehen- 
dere,  et  nescit  necessario  esse  impossibile  eum  apprehendere,  per  proba- 
tionem prsedictam,  est  ignorans  Deum :  et  tales  sunt  omnes  homines,  ex- 
ceptis  dignis,  et  prophetis  et  sapientibus,  qui  sunt  profundi  in  sapientia." 
Hsec  ille.' — See  also:  De  Beryllo,  c.  36,  p.  281  ;  De  Venatione  Sapientiae. 
c.  12,  p.  306  ;  De  Deo  Abscondito,  p.  338  ;  &c.,  &c.* 


*  So  far,  Cusa's  doctrine  coincides  with  what  I  consider  to  be  the  true  pre- 
cept of  a  '  Learned  Ignorance.'  But  he  goes  farther :  and  we  find  his  profes- 
sion of  negative  ignorance  converted  into  an  assumption  of  positive  knowledge; 
his  Nothing,  presto,  becoming  every  thing ;  and  contradictions,  instead  of 
standing  an  insuperable  harrier  to  all  intellectual  cognition,  employed  in  lay- 
ing its  foundation.  In  fact,  I  make  no  doubt  that  his  speculations  have  ori- 
ginated the  whole  modern  philosophy  of  the  Absolute.  For  Giordano  Bruno, 
as  I  can  show,  was  well  acquainted  with  Cusa's  writings  ;  from  these  he  bor- 
rowed his  own  celebrated  theory,  repeating  even  the  language  in  which  its 
doctrines  were  originally  expressed.  To  Cusa,  we  can,  indeed,  articulately 
trace,  word  and  thing,  the  recent  philosophy  of  the  Absolute.  The  term 
XisoZ«fe(Absolutum),  in  its  precise  and  peculiar  signification,  he  every  where 
employs.  The  Intellectual  Intuition,  (Intuitio  Intellectualis)  he  describes  and 
names ;  nay,  we  find  in  him,  even  the  process  of  Hegel's  Dialectic.  His 
works  are,  indeed,  instead  of  the  neglect  to  which  they  have  been  doomed, 
well  deserving  of  attentive  study  in  many  relations.  In  Astronomy,  before 
Copernicus,  he  had  promulgated  the  true  theory  of  the  heavenly  revolutions, 
with  the  corollary  of  a  plurality  of  worlds ;  and  in  the  science  of  Politics,  he 
was  the  first  perhaps  to  enounce  the  principles  on  which  a  representative 
constitution  should  be  based.  The  Germans  have,  however,  done  no  justice 
to  their  countryman.  For  Cusa's  speculations  have  been  most  perfunctorily 
noticed  by  German  historians  of  philosophy;  and  it  is  through  Bruno  that 
he  seems  to  have  exerted  an  influence  on  the  Absolutist  theories  of  the 
Empire. 


522  PHILOSOPHY    OF   THE   CONDITIONED. 

16. — ./ENEAS  SYLVIOS.  (Piccolomini,  Pope  Pius  II.  lihet.  L.  ii.)— 'Oui 
plura  nosse  datum  est,  euni  majora  dubia  sequuntur.' 

17. — PALINGENIUS.    (Zodiacus  Vitse,  Virgo  v.  181,  sq.) — 
'  Tune  mea  Dux  tandem  pulcro  sic  incipit  ore  :— 
Simla  coelicolum*  risusque  jocusque  Deorum  est 
Tune  homo,  quum  temere  ingenio  confidit,  et  audet 
Abdita  naturae  scrutari,  arcanaque  Divum, 
Cum  re  Tera  ejus  crassa  imbecillaque  sit  mens. 
Si  posita  ante  pedes  nescit,  quo  jure  videbit 
Quie  Deus  et  natura  sinu  occuluere  profundo  ? 
Omnia  se  tamen  arbitratur  noscere  ad  unguem 
Garrulus,  infelix,  caecus,  temerarius,  amens ; 
Usque  adeo  sibi  palpatur,  seseque  licetur.' 

18. — 'Multa  tegit  saero  involucro  natura,  neque  ullia 
Fas  est  scire  quidem  mortalibus  omnia ;  multa 
Admirare  modo,  nee  non  venerare :  neque  ilia 
Inquires  qme  sunt  arcanis  proxima ;  namque 
In  manibus  quo;  sunt,  linr.  nos  vix  scire  putandum. 
Est  procul  a.  nobis  adeo  praesentia  veri  !'f 

('  Full  many  a  secret  in  her  sacred  veil 
Hath  Nature  folded.     She  vouchsafes  to  knowledge 
Not  every  mystery,  reserving  much, 
For  human  veneration,  not  research. 
Let  us  not,  therefore,  seek  what  God  conceals ; 

*  The  comparison  of  man  as  an  ape  to  God,  is  from  Plato,  who,  while  he 
repeatedly  exhibits  human  beings  as  the  jest  of  the  immortals,  somewhere 
says — '  The  wisest  man,  if  compared  with  God,  will  appear  an  ape.'  Pope, 
who  was  well  read  in  the  modern  Latin  poets,  especially  of  Italy,  and  even 
published  from  them  a  selection,  in  two  volumes,  abounds  in  manifest  imi- 
tations of  their  thoughts,  wholly  unknown  to  his  commentators.  In  his 
line — 

'  And  show'd  a  Newton  as  we  show  an  ape' 

— he  had  probably  this  passage  of  Palingenius  in  his  eye,  and  not  Plato. 
Warburton  and  his  other  scholiasts  are  aware  of  no  suggestion. 

t  I  know  not  the  author  of  these  verses.  I  find  them  first  quoted  by  Fer- 
nelius,  in  his  book  '  De  Abditis  Rerum  Causis'  (L.  ii.  c.  18),  which  appeared 
before  the  year  1551.  They  may  be  his  own.  They  are  afterwards  given  by 
Sennertus,  in  his  Hypomnemata,  but  without  an  attribution  of  authorship 
By  him,  indeed,  they  are  undoubtedly  taken  from  Fernelius.  Finally,  they 
are  adduced  by  the  learned  Morhof  in  his  Polyhistor,  who  very  unlearnodly 
however,  assigns  them  to  Lucretius.  They  are  not  by  Palingenius.  nor  Pale- 
anus,  nor  Hospitalius,  all  of  whose  versification  they  resemble ;  for  the  last, 
indeed,  they  are  almost  too  early. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   THE   CONDITIONED. 

For  even  the  things  which  lie  within  our  hands — 
These,  knowing,  we  know  not.    So  far  from  us, 
In  doubtful  dimness,  gleams  the  star  of  truth !') 

19. — JULIUS  C^ESAE  SCALIGEE.  (De  Subtilitate,  Ex.  cclxxiv.)  '  Sapientia 
est  vera,  nolle  nimis  sapere.'  (Ib.  ex.  cccvii,  sect.  29.;  and  compare  Ex. 
cccxliv.  sect.  4.)  '  Humanae  sapientiae  pars  est,  quaedam  aaquo  animo 
nescire  velle.'*  (Ib.  Ex.  lii.)  '  Ubique  clamare  soleo,  nos  nihil  scire.' 

20. — JOSEPH  JUSTUS  SCALIGER.     (Poemata :  Iambi  GnomicL  xxi.) 
'  Ne  curiosus  quaere  causas  omnium. 
Qusecunque  libris  vis  Prophetarmn  indidit 
Afflata  ccelo,  plena  veraci  Deo, 
Nee  operta  sacri  supparo  silentii 
Irrumpere  aude,  sed  pudenter  praeteri. 
Nescire  velle,  quce  magister  maximus 
Docere  non  vult,  erudita  inscitia  est.'^ 

21. — GBOTIUS.    (Poemata ;  Epigrammata,  L.  i.) 

ERUDITA  IGNORANTIA. 
'  Qui  curiosus  postulat  Totum  suae 
Patere  menti,  ferre  qui  non  sufficit 
Mediocritatis  conscientiam  suae, 
Judex  iniquus,  aestimator  est  malus 
Suique  naturaeque.     Nam  rerum  parens, 
Libanda  tantum  quae  venit  mortalibus, 
Nos  scire  pauca,  multa  mirari  jubet. 
Hie  primus  error  auctor  est  pejoribus. 
Nam  qui  fateri  nil  potest  incognitum, 
Falso  necesse  est  placet  ignorantiam ; 
Umbrasque  inanes  captet  inter  nubilia, 
Imaginosaa  adulter  Ixion  Deae. 
Magis  quiescet  animus,  errabit  minus, 
Contentus  eruditione  parabili, 
Nee  quaeret  illam,  siqua  quaerentem  fugit. 
Nescire  qucedam,  magna pars  Sapientia:  est'\ 

*  I  meant,  in  another  place,  to  quote  this  passage  of  Scaliger,  but  find  that 
my  recollection  confused  this  and  the  preceding  passage,  with,  perhaps,  the 
similar  testimony  of  Chrysologus  (No.  10).  Chrysologus,  indeed,  anticipates 
Scaliger  in  the  most  felicitous  part  of  the  expression. 

t  It  is  manifest  that  Joseph,  in  these  verses,  had  in  his  eye  the  saving  of 
his  father.  But  I  have  no  doubt,  that  they  were  written  on  occasion  of  the 
controversy  raised  by  Gomarus  against  Arminius. 

J  In  this  excellent  epigram,  Grotius  undoubtedly  contemplated  the  corre- 
sponding verses  of  his  illustrious  friend,  the  Dictator  of  the  Kepublic  of 


524  I'urr.osopHY  OF  THE  CONDITIONED. 

22. — PASCAL.  (Pensees,  Partie  I.  Art.  vi.  sect.  26.) — '  Si  llionune  com- 
mengoit  par  s'ltudicr  lui-meme,  il  verroit  combien  il  est  incapable  de  pas- 
aer  outre.  Comment  pourroit-il  tie  faire  qu'une  partie  connut  le  tout  '.'* 
.  .  .  .  '  Qui  ne  croiroit,  a  nous  voir  composer  toutes  chases  d'esprit  et  d« 
corps,  que  ce  melange-la  nous  seroit  bien  comprehensible  ?  C'est  ne"an- 
moins  la  chose  que  Ton  comprend  le  moins.  L'homme  est  a  lui-meme  le 
plus  prodigieux  objet  de  la  nature  ;  car  il  ne  peut  concevoir  ce  que  c'est 
que  corps,  et  encore  raoins  ce  quec'est  qu'esprit,  et  moins  qu'aucune  chose 
comment  un  corps  peut  6tre  uni  avec  un  esprit.  C'est  la  le  comble  do 
sea  difficult^,  et  cependant  c'est  son  propre  fitre  :  Modus,  quo  corporibux 
adhceret  spiritus,  comprchcndi  ab  horninibus  nonpotest ;  et  hoc  tamenhomn 


II.   Testimonies  to  the  more  special  fact,  that  all  our  knowledge, 
whether  of  Mind  or  of  Matter,  is  only  phenomenal. 

Our  whole  knowledge  of  mind  and  of  matter  is  relative, — con- 
ditioned,— relatively  conditioned.  Of  things  absolutely  or  in 
themselves,  be  they  external,  be  they  internal,  we  know  nothing, 
or  know  them  only  as  incognizable ;  and  Ave  become  aware  of 
their  incomprehensible  existence,  only  as  this  is  indirectly  and 
accidentally  revealed  to  us,  through  certain  qualities  related  to 
our  faculties  of  knowledge,  and  which  qualities,  again,  we  cannot 
think  as  unconditioned,  irrelative,  existent  in  and  of  themselves. 
All  that  we  know  is  therefore  phenomenal, — phenomenal  of  the 


Letters  ;  but,  at  the  same  time,  he,  an  Arminian,  certainly  had  in  view  the 
polemic  of  the  Remonstrants  and  anti-Remonstrants,  touching  the  Divine 
Decrees.  Nor,  apparently,  was  he  ignorant  of  testimonies  Nos.  17,  18. 

*  This  testimony  of  Pascal  corresponds  to  what  Aristotle  says :  '  There  is 
no  proportion  of  the  Infinite  to  the  Finite.'  (De  Ccelo,  L.  i.  cc.  7,  8.) 

t  Pascal  apparently  quotes  these  words  from  memory,  and,  I  have  no 
doubt,  quotes  them  from  Montaigne,  who  thus  (L.  ii.  ch.  12.)  adduces  them 
as  from  St.  Augustin  :  '  Modus,  quo  corporibus  adherent  spiritns,  omnino 
minis  est,  nee  comprehendi  abhomine  potest ;  et  hoc  ipse  homo  est.' — Mon- 
taigne's commentator,  Pierre  Coste,  says  that  these  words  are  from  Augustin, 
De  Spiritu  ct  Anima.  That  curious  farrago,  which  is  certainly  not  Augustin's, 
does  not  however  contain  either  the  sentence  or  the  sentiment ;  and  Coste 
himself,  who  elsewhere  gives  articulate  references  to  the  quotations  of  his 
author,  here  alleges  only  the  treatise  in  general. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   THE   CONDITIONED.  525 

unknown.*  The  philosopher  speculating  the  worlds  of  matter 
and  of  mind,  is  thus,  in  a  certain  sort,  only  an  ignorant  admirer. 
In  his  contemplation  of  the  universe,  the  philosopher,  indeed, 
resembles  ^Eneas  contemplating  the  adumbrations  on  his  shield  ; 
as  it  may  equally  be  said  of  the  sage  and  of  the  hero, — 

'  Miratur  ;  Rerumque  ignarus,  Imagine  ga/udet."1 

Nor  is  this  denied  ;  for  it  has  been  commonly  confessed,  £hat  as 
substances,  we  know  not  what  is  Matter  and  are  ignorant  of  what 
is  Mind.  With  the  exception,  in  fact,  of  a  few  late  Absolutist 
theorizers  in  Germany,  this  is,  perhaps,  the  truth  of  all  others 
most  harmoniously  re-echoed  by  every  philosopher  of  every 
school ;  and,  as  has  so  frequently  been  done,  to  attribute  any 
merit,  or  any  singularity  to  its  recognition  by  any  individual 
thinker,  more  especially  in  modern  times,  betrays  only  the  igno- 
rance of  the  encomiasts. 

1. — PROTAGORAS  (as  reported  by  Plato,  Aristotle,  Sextus  Empiricus, 
Laertius,  <fcc.). — 'Man  is  [for  himself]  the  measure  of  all  things.'  (Se« 
Bacon,  No.  14.) 

2. — ARISTOTLE.  (Metaphysica,  L.  vii.,  c.  10.) — '  Matter  is  incognizable 
absolutely  or  in  itself.' — (De  Anima,  L.  iii.,  c.  5.) — 'The  intellect  knows 
itself,  only  in  knowing  its  objects.' — The  same  doctrine  is  maintained  at 
length  in  the  Metaphysics,  b.  xii.  cc.  7  and  9,  and  elsewhere. 

3. — ST.  AUGUSTIN.  (De  Trinitate,  L.  ix.,  cc.  1,  2.)  The  result  is — '  Ab 
utroque  notitia  paritur;  a  cognoscente  et  cognito.' — (Ib.  L.  x.,  cc,  3-12.) 
Here  he  shows  that  we  know  Mind  only  from  the  phenomena  of  which  we 
are  conscious ;  and  that  all  the  theories,  in  regard  to  the  substance  of  what 
thinks,  are  groundless  conjectures. — (Confessionum,  L.  xii.  c.  5.) — Of  our 
attempts  to  cognize  the  basis  of  material  qualities  he  says ;  '  Dura  sibi 


*  Hypostasis  in  Greek  (of  oMa  I  do  not  now  speak,  nor  of  hypostasis  in 
its  ecclesiastical  signification),  and  the  corresponding  term  in  Latin,  Substan- 
tia  (per  se  subsistens,  or  substam,  i.  e.  accidentibus,  whichever  it  may  mean), 
expresses  a  relation — a  relation  to  its  phenomena.  A  basis  for  phenomena, 
is,  in  fact,  only  supposed,  by  a  necessity  of  our  thought ;  even  as  a  relative 
it  is  not  positively  known.  On  this  real  and  verbal  relativity,  see  St.  Angus- 
tin  (De  Trinitate,  1.  vii.,  cc.  4.  5,  6). — Of  the  ambiguous  term  Sufyect 
(faoicelptvov)  I  have  avoided  speaking. 


526  PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE     CONDITIONED. 

haec  (licit  humana  cogitatio,  conetur  earn,  vel  nosse  ignorando,  vcl  ignorare 
noecendo.' 

4. — BOETHIUS.  (De  Consolatione  Philosophise,  L.  v.,  pr.  4.) — '  Omne  quod 
cognoscitur,  non  secundum  sui  vim,  sed  secundum  cognoscentium  potius 
comprehenditur  facultatem.'— {Pr.  6.) — '  Omne  quod  scitur,  non  ex  sua,  sed 
ex  comprehendentium,  imtura  cognoscitur.' 

5. — AVERROES.  (In  Aristotelem  De  Anhna,  L.  ill  Text  8.) — '  Intellectus 
intelligit  seipsum  modo  accidentall' 

6. — ALBERTUS  MAGNUS.  (Contra  Averroem  de  Unitate  Intellectus,  c.  7.) 
— '  Intellectus  non  intelligit  seipsum,  nisi  per  accidens  fiat  intelligible ;  ut 
materia  cognoscitur  per  aliquid,  cujus  ipsa  est  fundament  am.  Et  si  ali- 
qui  dicant  intellectum  intelligi  per  hoc,  quia  per  essentiam  est  praesens 
sibi  ipsi,  hoc  tamen  secundum  philosophiam  non  potcst  dici.'  (See  also 
Aquinas  (Summa  Theologize,  P.  i.  Qu.  89,  Art.  2;  De  Veritate,  Qu.  10, 
Art.  8)  and  Ferrariensis  (Contra  Gentes,  L.  iii.  c.  46.) 

7. — GERSON.  (De  Concordia  Metaphysicse.) — '  Ens  quodlibet  dici  potest 
habere  duplex  Esse ;  sumendo  Esse  valde  transcendentaliter.  Uno  modo, 
sumitur  Ens,  pro  natura  rei  in  seipsa ;  alio  modo,  prout  habet  esse,  objec- 
tale  seu  reprsesentativum,  in  ordine  ad  intellectum  creatum  vel  increatum. 
— Haec  autem  distinctio  non  conficta  est  vel  nova ;  sed  a  doctoribus,  tarn 
metaphysicis  quam  logicis  subtilibus,  introducta.  Ens  consideratum  seu 
relictum  prout  quid  absolutum,  seu  res  quaedam  in  seipsa,  plurimum 

differt  ab  esse,  quod  habet  objectaliter  apud  intellectum. 

Ens  reale  non  potest  constituere  scientiaua  aliquam,  si  non  consideretur  in 
suo  esse  objectali,  relate  ad  ipsum  ens  reale,  sicut  ad  primarium  et  princi- 
pale  objectum.' 

8. — LEO  HEBR^EUS.  (De  Amore,  Dial  i.) — '  Cognita  res  a  cognoscente, 
pro  viribus  ipsius  cognoscentis,  baud  pro  rei  cognitse  dignitate  recipi  solet.' 

9. — MELANCHTHON.  (Erotemata  Dialectices,  L.  i.  Pr.  Substantia.) — '  Mens 
humana,  per  accidentia,  agnoscit  substantiam.  Non  enim  cernimus  oculis 
substantias,  tectas  accidentibus,  sed  mente  eas  agnoscimus.  Cum  videmus 
aquam  manere  eandem,  sive  sit  frigida,  sive  sit  calida,  ratiocinamur : — aliud 
quiddam  esse  formas  illas  discedentes,  et  aliud  quod  eas  sustinet." 

10. — JULIUS  CAESAR  SCALIGER.  (De  Subtilitate,  Ex  cccviL  §  12.) — 
'  Nego  tibi  ullam  esse  formam  nobis  notam  plene,  et  plane :  nostramque 
scientiam  esse  umbram  in  sole  [contendo].  Formarum  enim  cognitio  est 
rudis,  confusa,  nee  nisi  per  Ttifiardatn.  Neque  verum  est, — formae  substan 
tialis  speciem  recipi  in  intellectum.  Non  enim  in  sensu  unquam  fuit.' — 
(Ib.  Ex.  cccvii.  §  21.) — '  Substantias  non  sua  specie  cognosci  a  nobis,  sed 
per  earum  accidentia.  Quis  enim  me  doceat,  quid  sit  substantia,  nisi  illis 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE  CONDITIONED.  527 

miseris  verbis, — res  subsistens? Quid  ipsa  ilia  substantia 

sit,  plane  ignoras ;  sod,  sicut  Vulpes  elusa  a  Ciconia,  lambimus  vitreutn 
vas,  pultem  baud  attingimus.' 

11. — FRANCIS  PICCOLOMINI.  (De  Mente  Humana.  L.  i.  c.  8.) — 'Mens  in- 
telligit  se,  non  per  se  primo,  sed  cum  castera  intellexerit ;  ut  dicitur  in  L. 
iii.  de  Anima,  t.  8,  et  in  L.  xii.  Metaphysics,  t.  38.' 

12. — GIORDANO  BRUNO.  (De  Imaginum,  Signorum  et  Idearum  Compo- 
sitione ;  Dcdicatio.) — '  Quemadmodum,  non  nosmetipsos  in  profundo  et 
individuo  quodam  consistentes,  sed  nostri  quffidani  externa  de  superficie 
(colorem,  scilicet,  atque  figtiram),  accidentia,  ut  oculi  ipsius  similitudinem 
in  speculo,  videre  posumus :  ita  etiam,  neque  intellectus  noster  se  ipsam  in 
se  ipso,  et  res  ipsas  omnes  in  seipsis,  sed  in  exteriore  quadam  specie,  simu- 
lacro,  imagine,  figura,  signo.  Hoc  quod  ab  Aristotele  relatum,  ab  antiquis 
prius  fuit  expressum  ;  at  a  neotericorum  paucis  capitur.  Intelligere  nos- 
trum (id  est,  operationes  nostri  intellectus),  aut  est  pbautasia,  aut  non  sine 
phantasia.  Rursum.  Non  intelligimus,  nisi  pbantasmata  speculamur.  Hoc 
est,  quod  non  in  simplicitate  quadam,  statu  et  unitate,  sed  in  compositione, 
collatione,  terminorum,  pluralitate,  mediante  discursu  atque  reflexione, 
comprebendimus.'* 

13. — CAMPANELLA.     (Metaphysica.  L.  i.  c.  1,  dub.  3,  p.  12.) — 'Ergo,  non 
.  videntur  res  prout  sunt,  neque  videntur  extare  nisi  respectus.' 

14. — BACON.  (Instauratio  Magna ;  Distr.  Op.) — '  Informatio  sensus  sem- 
per est  ex  analogia  hominis,  non  ex  analogia  universi ;  atque  magr.o 
prorsus  errore  asseritur,  sensum  esse  mensuram  rerum.'  (See  Protago- 
ras, n.  1.) 

15. — SPINOZA.  (Ethices,  Pars  II.  Prop,  xix.) — 'Mens  humana  ipsum  hu- 
manum  corpus  non  cognoscit,  nee  ipsum  existere  scit,  nisi  per  ideas  affec- 
tionum  quibus  corpus  afficitur.' — (Prop,  xxiii.) — 'Mens  se  ipsam  non  cog- 
noscit, nisi  quatenus  corporis  affectionum  ideas  percipit.'  Et  alibi. — (See 
Bruno,  n.  12.) 

16. — SIR  ISAAC  NEWTON.  (Principia,  Schol.  lilt.) — '  Quid  sit  rei  alicujus 
substantia;  minime  cognoscimus.  Videmus  tantum  corporum  figuras  et 
colores,  audimus  tantum  sonos,  tangiinus  tantum  superficies  externas, 
olfacimus  odores  solos,  et  gustamus  sapores :  intimas  substantias  nullo 
sensu,  nulla  actione  reflexa,  cognoscimus.' 

*  Had  Bruno  adhered  to  this  doctrine,  he  would  have  missed  martyrdom 
as  an  atheist ;  but  figuring  to  posterity,  neither  as  a  great  fool  (if  we  believe 
Adelung),  nor  as  a  great  philosopher  (if  we  believe  Schelling).  Compare 
the  parallel  testimony  of  Spinoza  (15),  a  fellow  Pantheist,  but  on  different 
grounds. 


528  PHILOSOPHY  OF   THE   CONDITIONED. 

17. — KANT.  (Critik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  Vorr.)  '  In  perception  every 
thing  is  known  iu  conformity  to  the  constitution  of  our  faculty.'  And  a 
hundred  testimony  to  the  same  truth  might  be  adduced  from  the  phi- 
losopher of  Koenigsberg,  of  whose  doctrine  it  is,  in  fact,  the  foundation. 

III. — The  recognition  of  Occult  Causes. 

This  is  the  admission  that  there  are  phenomena  which,  though 
unable  to  refer  to  any  known  cause  or  class,  it  would  imply  an 
irrational  ignorance  to  deny.  This  general  proposition  no  one,  I 
presume,  will  be  found  to  gainsay ;  for,  in  fact,  the  causes  of  all 
phenomena  are,  at  last,  occult.  There  has,  however,  obtained  a 
not  unnatural  presumption  against  such  causes ;  and  this  pre- 
sumption, though  often  salutary,  has  sometimes  operated  most 
disadvantageous^  to  science,  from  a  blind  and  indiscriminate 
application ;  in  two  ways.  In  the  first  place,  it  has  induced  men 
lightly  to  admit  asserted  phenomena,  false  in  themselves,  if  only 
confidently  assigned  to  acknowledged  causes.  In  the  second 
place,  it  has  induced  them  obstinately  to  disbelieve  phenomena, 
in  themselves  certain  and  even  manifest,  if  these  could  not  at 
once  be  referred  to  already  recognized  causes,  and  did  not  easily 
fall  in  with  the  systems  prevalent  at  the  time.  An  example  of 
the  former  is  seen  in  the  facile  credence  popularly  accorded,  in 
this  country,  to  the  asserted  facts  of  Craniology ;  though  even 
the  fact  of  that  hypothesis,  first  and  fundamental — the  fact,  most 
probable  in  itself,  and  which  can  most  easily  be  proved  or  dis- 
proved by  the  widest  and  most  accurate  induction,  is  diametri- 
cally opposite  to  the  truth  of  nature ;  I  mean  the  asserted  cor- 
respondence between  the  development  and  hypothetical  function 
of  the  cerebellum,  as  manifested  in  all  animals,  under  the  various 
differences  of  age,  of  sex,  of  season,  of  integrity  and  mutilation. 
This  (among  other  of  the  pertinaciously  asserted  facts)  I  know,  by 
a  tenfold  superfluous  evidence,  to  be  even  ludicrously  false.  An 
example  of  the  latter,  is  seen  in  the  difficult  credence  accorded  in 
this  country  to  the  phenomena  of  Animal  Magnetism ;  pheno- 
mena in  themselves  the  most  unambiguous,  which,  for  nearly 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  CONDITIONED.  5291 

half  a  century,  have  been  recognized  generally  and  by  the  highest 
scientific  authorities  in  Germany ;  while,  for  nearly  a  quarter  of  a 
century,  they  have  been  verified  and  formally  confirmed  by  the 
Academy  of  Medicine  in  France.  In  either  case,  criticism  was 
required,  and  awanting. 

So  true  is  the  saying  of  Cullen : — '  There  are  more  false  facts 
current  in  the  world  than  false  theories.'  So  true  is  the  saying 
of  Hamlet : — '  There  are  more  things  in  heaven  and  earth,  Hora- 
tio, than  are  dreamt  of  in  your  philosophy.'  But  averse  from 
experiment  and  gregariously  credulous — 

'  L'homme  est  de  glace  aux  verites ; 
II  est  de  feu  pour  les  mensonges.' 

1. — JULIUS  C^ESAE  SCALIGEK.*  In  his  commentary  on  Theophrastus 
touching  the  Causes  of  Plants,  he  repeatedly  asserts,  as  the  Aristotelic 
doctrine,  the  admission  of  Occult  Causes.  Thus  (L.  ii.  c.  5) — '  Hoc  dixit 
(Theophrastus),  nequis  ab  eo  nunc  exigat  occultas  illarum,  quas  subticet, 
causas.  Quasi  dicat, — Sapienti  multa  licet  ignorare.'  In  like  manner 
(L.  iv.  c.  13). — 'Hunc  quoque  locum  simul  cum  aliis  adducere  potes 
adversus  eos  qui  negant  Peripateticis  ab  occulta  proprietate  quicquam 
fieri.  Apud  hunc  philosophum  saepe  monuimus  inveniri.  Est  autem 
asylum  humanse  imbecillitatis,  ac  simile  perfugium  illi  Periclis, — tls  ra 
Kovra.'  This  we  may  translate — '  Secret  service  money.'  The  same  he 
had  also  previously  declared  in  his  book  De  Subtilitate;  where,  for 
example  (Ex.  ccxviii.,  §  8),  he  says : — '  Ad  manifestas  omnia  deducere, 
qualitates  summa  impudentia  est ;'  for  there  are  many  of  these, '  quae 
oinnino  latent  animos  temperatos,  illudunt  curiosis ;'  and  he  derides  those, 
'  qui  irrident  salutare  asylum  illud,  occultae  proprietatis.' 

2. — ALSTEDIUS.  (PHYSICA  (1630),  Pars.  I.  c.  xiii.,  reg.  4.) — '  Quod  Augus- 
tinus  ait,  "  Multa  cognoscendo  ignorari,  et  ignoratulo,  cognosci,"  hie  impri- 

*  I  have  quoted  the  elder  Scaliger  under  all  the  three  heads  of  this  article, 
for  a  truth  in  his  language  is  always  acutely  and  strikingly  enounced.  The 
writings  of  no  philosopher,  indeed,  since  those  of  Aristotle,  are  better  worthy 
of  intelligent  study ;  and  few  services  to  philosophy  would  be  greater  than  a 
eystematic  collection  and  selection  of  the  enduring  and  general  views  of  this 
illustrious  thiriker.  For,  to  apply  to  him  his  own  expressions,  these  '  zopyra,' 
these  'semina  seternitatis,'  lie  smothered  and  unfruitful  in  a  mass  of  matters 
of  merely  personal  and  transitory  interest.  I  had  hoped  to  have  attempted 
this  in  the  appendix  to  a  work  '  De  vita,  genere  et  genio  Scaligerorum ;'  but 
this  I  hope  no  longer. 

23 


530  PHILOSOPHY    OF   THE   CONDITION  KO. 

mis  habet  locum,  ubi  agitur  do  Occultis  Qualitatibus,  quaruni  inventiga- 
tio  dicitur  Magi  a  Naturalis,  id  est,  praastantissima  naturae  indagatio  in 
qua  verbum  modestise,  Nescio,  subinde  usurpandum  est.  Vi-rbum  mo- 
destise dico,  non  autem  stultiti;t.' 

8. — VOLTAIRE.  (Dictiouuaire  Philosophique,  voce  Occultes.) — 'Qualitf- 
( >ccultes. — On  s'est  moque  fort  longtemps  des  qualites  occultes ;  on  doit 
se  moquer  de  ceux  qui  n'y  croient  pas.  R6p^tons  cent  fois,  que  tout 
principe,  tout  premier  ressort  de  quelque  oeuvre  que  ce  puisse  Atre  du 
^rand  Demiourgos,  est  occulte  et  cacb^  pour  jamais  aux  mortela.'  And 
so  forth. — (Physique  Particuliere,  ch.  xxxiii.) — '  II  y  a  done  certainement 
des  lois  eternelles,  iuconnues,  suivant  lesquelles  tout  s'opere,  sans  qu'on 
puisse  les  expliquer  par  la  matiere  et  par  le  mouvement.  .  .  .  II  y  a 
dans  toutes  les  Academies  une  chaire  vacante  pour  les  ve'rite's  inconnuea 
comme  Athenes  avait  un  autel  pour  les  dieux  ignores.'* 


*  Besides  the  few  testimonies  adduced,  I  would  refer,  in  general,  for  sonu- 
excellent  observations  on  the  point,  to  Fernelius  '  De  Abditis  Rerum  Caufis  ' 
and  to  the  '  Hypomnemata'  of  Scnnertus. 


FINIS. 


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